

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 01721298 6





Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

THE
DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES
OF
LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.



From a photograph by Freeman & Co Sydney NSW

Charles Lopham

HE-B
L. 8298d
6.

THE
DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES
OF
LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS,
P.C., G.C.B.
1837—1862.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.
WITH PORTRAIT.

3-T 93
2

CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED:
LONDON, PARIS & MELBOURNE.

1892.

[ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.]

DA

46

L6A3

11



CONTENTS.



CHAPTER I.

	PAGE
Early Life—Winter at Brighton, 1835-36—The Court and Society—William IV. and his family—Death of my Sister—Winter at Paris—Louis Philippe—Court and Society—Count and Countess Flahaut—Madame Graham—Dinner to Marquis and Marchioness of Londonderry—The Orleans Princes—Visit of Louis Philippe to Versailles to show my Father the Palace—Return to England in 1837—Death of William IV.—My Appointment as Attaché to the Legation at Berlin	1

CHAPTER II.

Character of William IV.—Departure for Berlin—Death of Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz—Frederick William III.—His Character—The Devotion of His People—His Will—Great Change in Germany since 1837—The Result of Three Wars—Commencement of Political Agitation in Favour of Constitutional Government—Prophecy of Lord William Russell—Expediency of Removing Universities from large Towns	13
---	----

CHAPTER III.

Berlin in 1837—The Court—Society—Diplomatic Corps—Lord and Lady William Russell—Prussian Ministers—The Zollverein—Foreign Relations then guided by Prince Metternich—Eventual Effect of this Policy—Non-recognition of the Queens of Spain and Portugal—The Carlist Coterie: its Influence on the Crown Prince	25
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

Prophecy by Mme. Le Norman at Paris in 1815 of the Death of Frederick William III. in 1840—Legend of the "White Lady"—Extension of Berlin—Causes of Abstention of Prussian Aristocracy from visiting Berlin—Satisfactory Administration of Finances—War Fund largely	
--	--

increased by Will of Frederick William III.—King's secluded Life; his Marriage with Countess Harrach, Princess Liegnitz; his last Reception of Diplomatic Corps; the last Act of his Reign—Arrival of the Emperor Nicholas—Death of Frederick William III.—Importance attached by Count Bresson, the French Minister, to the Change of Reign; his frequent Attempts to bring about a close Alliance between France and Russia; the probable Motives of it—Project of Prince Polignac in 1829 for Re-partition of Europe frustrated by the Revolution of 1830	36
--	----

CHAPTER V.

Eastern Affairs—Quadruple Treaty to arrest the March of Mehemet Ali—Indignation of French Government—M. Thiers's Attempt to gain Allies—War imminent—Change of Ministry in France—Secret Courier to order Bülow not to sign the Treaty, but he arrived too late—Mission of Zea Bermudez to obtain Recognition of the Queen of Spain counteracted by Austria—Conversation with Prince Metternich on the Creation of the Germanic Confederation; its Nature and Defects—Prince Metternich's Recommendation of Count Rechberg as Successor to Count Beust—Prince Metternich's Relation of his Saving the Life of Prince Louis (afterwards Emperor Napoleon III.)—Prince Metternich's Admiration of Queen Hortense—Character of Prince Metternich; his Policy—Funeral of Frederick William III.—The Mausoleum at Charlottenburg—Funeral of Prince Sigismund at Potsdam	49
--	----

CHAPTER VI.

Political Position of Prussia on the Death of Frederick William III.—Character of Frederick William IV.—Mrs. Fry and Richard Allen—Peaceful Disposition of Frederick William IV.—Queen Elizabeth's Visit to St. Petersburg—Recall of Baron Bülow—Appointment of Chevalier Bunsen—Bülow appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs—Recall of Lord William Russell—Appointment of Lord Burghersh—Visit of the King of Prussia to London—Return Visit of Her Majesty the Queen to Stolzenfels	61
--	----

CHAPTER VII.

My Appointment—Stuttgart—Observation of Lord Brougham on visiting the Royal Stables of the King of Würtemberg—Prince Jerome Bonaparte—Society—Prince Gortschacoff—The Grand Duchy of Baden—Visit to Baden-Baden—My Marriage—The Grand Duchess Stephanie—"Caspar Hauser"; the Mystery concerning Him—Visit with the Grand Duchess Stephanie to the Lichtenthal Convent—Lines on the Grave of a Nun—Our Visit to the Grand Duchess at Mannheim; her	
---	--

CONTENTS.

vii

PAGE

Family—The Grand Duchess Sophie of Baden—Marriage of the Prince of Leiningen to the Princess Marie, Daughter of the Grand Duke—Destruction by Fire of Carlsruhe Theatre—The Revolution of 1849—My Encounter with the Soldiers of the Free Corps—Battle of Gernsbach—The Advance of the Prussian and German Army under the Prince of Prussia	96
---	----

CHAPTER VIII.

Influence of Two Political Events in 1846-47 (namely, the Incorporation of Cracow and the Spanish Marriages) on the Public Mind—Forebodings of Revolution—Vacillating Policy of Frederick William IV.—Sudden Outburst of Revolution at Berlin—Withdrawal of Troops from Berlin—Their Retirement to Potsdam—Flight of the Prince of Prussia—"Berliner Witz"—King and Queen remove to Potsdam	110
---	-----

CHAPTER IX.

My Appointment by Lord Palmerston to the Special Mission of Sir Stratford Canning—Brussels—Hanover—King Ernest; his Court: Anecdotes with respect to it—Injudicious Policy of King George—Indemnity voted to him sequestrated—Injudicious Course taken by the Present Duke of Cumberland; Arrangements may still be Possible if he will follow the Advice tendered to Him	116
---	-----

CHAPTER X.

Departure from Hanover—Halt at Brunswick—Arrival at Berlin—Visit to Lord and Lady Westmoriand—Sensitiveness of Lords Westmorland and Ponsonby on Sir Stratford's Mission—Sir Stratford's Audiences of the King and of the Princess of Prussia—Departure for Dresden—Arrival at Vienna—State of Vienna—Nightly <i>Charivaris</i> —Students at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs clamouring for Count Fiquelmont's Resignation	125
---	-----

CHAPTER XI.

State of the Austrian Empire—Hungary—Bohemia—Departure from Vienna—Arrival at Munich—Lola Montez—Riots at Munich—Abdication of King Louis—Accession of Maximilian I.—Arrival at Trieste—Dinner at the Governor's—Intelligence of Revolution at Venice and <u>Departure of the combined Italian Fleet for Trieste</u> —Communication with the Fleet—Military Preparations by General Giulay—Departure for Corfu—Hospitality of Lord and Lady Seaton	133
--	-----

CHAPTER XII.

	PAGE
Visit to Vostitza—Visit to Corinth—Embarkation at Kalamaki for the Piræus—Arrival there at Midnight—Incident in regard to General Church—Dinner at Sir Edmund Lyons'—Differences between Sir Stratford Canning and Sir Edmund Lyons—Departure from Athens—Passage to Dardanelles—Gallipoli—Sea of Marmora	146

CHAPTER XIII.

Arrival at Constantinople—Therapia—Bujukdere—Mysterious Flocks of Birds—Cholera—Official Visit to Rifaat Pasha—Sir Stratford's Audience of the Sultan—Palace of Tcheragan—The Sultan Abdul Medjed—The Mosque of Santa Sophia—The Sweet Waters of Asia—Changes Produced by the Crimean War—Turkish Statesmen	159
---	-----

CHAPTER XIV.

Return to Baden—Dinner to the Prince of Prussia—Appointed Secretary of Legation at Stuttgart, 1852—Transferred to Berlin in 1853—Rivalry between the Latin and Greek Churches the Cause of the Crimean War—Countess Kisseleff—Presented at Berlin as Chargé-d'Affaires—Meeting of Conference at Vienna for Adjustment of Differences between Russia and Turkey—The Vienna Note: Negotiations respecting It—Baron Manteuffel—The Czar's Invitation to Frederick William IV. to Warsaw, and Correspondence between the two Sovereigns—The Czar's Visit to Berlin—Firmness of Baron Manteuffel.	169
--	-----

CHAPTER XV.

Occupation by Russia of the Principalities—Emperor Nicholas misled by Brünnow, Kisseleff, and Princess Lieven—Vienna Conference—Terms of Vienna Note—Acceptance by Russia and Rejection by Turkey without Modifications—Lord Clarendon's Reasons for not urging the Porte to accept original Vienna Note—Austro-Russian Proposal rejected by Manteuffel—Austrian Summons to Russia to Evacuate the Principalities, supported by Prussia—Russians retire behind the Pruth, August, 1854.	184
---	-----

CHAPTER XVI.

Rivalry of Austria and Prussia at Germanic Diet—Herr von Bismarck; his Character; his Statement to Mr. Disraeli; his Conversation with Russian Chargé-d'Affaires at Frankfort; Russian, Prussian, and French	
--	--

CONTENTS.

ix

PAGE

Alliance, his Ideal—Fraternity of Russian and Prussian Courts—	
Deathbed of Emperor Nicholas—Mutual Services of Russia and Prussia	
—Repudiation by Russia of Article in Treaty of Paris	202

CHAPTER XVII.

War declared by England and France on the 27th of March, 1854—Evacua- tion of the Principalities by Russia—Siege of Silistria raised—French Expedition into Dobrudscha—Council of War at Varna—Expedition to Crimea—General Todleben—Naval Campaign in Baltic—Bombardment of Bomarsund—Impracticability of attacking Cronstadt—Blockade of Russian Baltic Ports	216
--	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

Suffering of the Allied Armies during the Severe Winter of 1854-55—Death of Lord Raglan—Battle of Inkerman—The Bombardment of Fort Constantine—Ships <i>versus</i> Forts—Russian Attack on Balaclava repulsed	225
---	-----

CHAPTER XIX.

General Pelissier's Despatch announcing the Fall of Sevastopol—Emperor of Russia's Order of the Day to his Army—Peace Currents—Failure of Secret Endeavours of Russia to gain the Emperor Napoleon for Peace independently of England—Prussian Action for Peace at St. Petersburg unsuccessful—Austrian Ultimatum ; its Acceptance by Russia—Protocol signed at Vienna stipulating Meeting of a European Congress at Paris within Three Weeks—Abstraction of Secret Despatches at Berlin— Prince Gortschacoff's Opinion of Treaty between Sweden and Western Powers	242
---	-----

CHAPTER XX.

Visit to Paris of Baron Beust and Herr von der Pfordten—The Bamberg Coalition—The State of Germany in 1855, contrasted with the Forma- tion of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1803	255
---	-----

CHAPTER XXI.

The Congress of Paris—Admission of Prussia—Peace signed on March 30th —Secret Treaty between England, France, and Austria—Satisfaction of the Emperor Napoleon at Conclusion of Peace : Reasons for it—Russia and France—Betrothal of the Princess Royal to Prince Frederick William of Prussia—Birth of Prince Imperial—Results of the Crimean War—Future Abstention of England from Continental Wars	263
---	-----

CHAPTER XXII.

	PAGE
The Neufchâtel Question; Conversation thereon with the Prince of Prussia in 1856 at Coblenz—Mission of M. de Bismarck Schönhausen to Paris—Visit of Prince Napoleon to Berlin—Audience of His Imperial Highness—Ball at French Legation—Conversation with His Imperial Highness; his Reception at Berlin	274

CHAPTER XXIII.

Conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the Union of the Danubian Principalities; Difference of Opinion thereon between England and France satisfactorily arranged by a Visit of the Emperor Napoleon to Osborne—My Reports to Lord Clarendon of the Visit of the Emperor Alexander to Berlin—Intended Meeting of the Emperor of Russia and Napoleon—Russian Aims for a French Alliance—The Origin and Character of the Schleswig-Holstein Question—The Danish War and its Results—Marriage of the Princess Royal; State Entry into Berlin—the Queen's Visit to Babelsberg—Baron Stockmar—Bismarck's Opinion of England	292
---	-----

CHAPTER XXIV.

Appointment to Vienna—First Interview with Count Buol—Audience of the Emperor—Dinner at the Imperial Court—Vienna Court and Aristocracy—Buol's Conversation on the Conference; only Three Questions to be Treated—Distrust of the Emperor Napoleon and his Policy in regard to Italy—Montenegro—Sanguinary Conflict with Turkey—Origin of Montenegro—Exceptional Position of Russia in regard to Montenegro—Difference with Turkey subsequently arranged by European Commission—French Fleet in the Adriatic viewed suspiciously by Austria—Offer made by Sultan Mahmoud in 1829 to give up Wallachia and Moldavia in lieu of War Indemnity; Declined by Count Orloff—Intrigues to Remove Buol—Prince Alexander of Hesse fails to bring about Reconciliation between the Emperors of Austria and Russia	317
---	-----

CHAPTER XXV.

Effect of Orsini's Attempt on the Emperor Napoleon; his Decision to join Sardinia against Austria—Secret Meeting of Napoleon and Cavour at Plombières in 1858—The Italian Question—The Mazzinists—The Moderate Party—Garibaldi—The Paris Conferences—Differences between Austria and France, menacing the Failure of the Conferences; after many Difficulties they were happily adjusted—The Conferences closed on the 19th of August—The Hungarian Question—The Birth of the Crown Prince Rudolf	350
---	-----

CONTENTS.

xi

CHAPTER XXVI.

	PAGE
Peaceful Close of 1858—Effect of Words Addressed by the Emperor Napoleon to Baron Hübner on the 1st of January, 1859; Considered to be Premonitory of War—Conversation with Count Buol on Italian Affairs—Lord Malmesbury's Despatch on the Estrangement between Austria and France; My Report of its Communication to Count Buol, and his Observations—Earl Cowley's Confidential Mission to Vienna—Lord A. Loftus's Private Letter to Count Buol	372
APPENDIX	401



THE
DIPLOMATIC REMINISCENCES
OF
LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

CHAPTER I.

Early Life—Winter at Brighton, 1835-36—The Court and Society—William IV. and his Family—Death of my Sister—Winter at Paris—Louis Philippe—Court and Society—Count and Countess Flahaut—Madame Graham—Dinner to the Marquis and Marchioness of Londonderry—The Orleans Princes—Visit of Louis Philippe to Versailles to show my Father the Palace—Return to England in 1837—Death of William IV.—My Appointment as Attaché to the Legation at Berlin.

IN recording the reminiscences of a long life, of which nearly fifty years have been passed in Her Majesty's service, I do not intend to include those of my early youth, which in themselves are unimportant and have no special interest for the public. To the age of nineteen I lived under the paternal roof, and under the fostering care of devoted parents. Those happy years passed as swiftly as the fleecy clouds of a summer day, but they have left memories which will never be obliterated, and the joys of which, in the serenity of old age, are reflected as in a mirror.

I was fond of reading and of literature, especially of the classics and of history. For the cultivation of these literary tastes I feel that I am indebted to that

distinguished and esteemed prelate, then the Rev. Thomas Legh Claughton, afterwards Bishop of St. Albans. To me he appeared the model of all that was pure and good—a noble example to copy. He was endowed with great classical taste and learning, and with a mind richly stored and highly cultivated. It was from him that I received the first impulse of ambition, and it was he who sowed in me the first seeds of a love of classics and of literature, and I have always felt deeply indebted to him as having been the promoter of my success in life.

I passed the winter of 1835-36 with my parents at Brighton, and this was my first introduction to society. My mother was then Lady of the Bedchamber to Queen Adelaide, and as William IV. usually passed the winter at the Pavilion at Brighton she was thus enabled to perform her Court duties.

In the preceding reign the Sovereign had lived in seclusion, and rarely saw anyone but those in his immediate *entourage*. William IV., on the contrary, liked society, and was the first Sovereign in England who gave large dinners. During the winter I am now referring to, the King was surrounded by the members of his family who bore the name of Fitz-Clarence; on his eldest son he had conferred the title of Earl of Munster, and given to his younger sons and daughters the rank of marquis's younger children. The King married late in life, and only when it became apparent that (both his elder brothers having no children) the succession to the Throne was open to him. For many

years he lived with Mrs. Jordan, an actress of great beauty, and by her he had a numerous family—four sons: Lord Munster; Lord Frederick Fitz-Clarence, in the army; Lord Augustus, a clergyman; and Lord Adolphus, in the navy. The daughters were the Countess of Errol, Lady Augusta Kennedy Erskine (afterwards Lady Augusta Hallyburton), Lady de L'Isle, and Viscountess Falkland — all handsome and fascinating.

The King, often termed the Sailor-King, was very devoted to the navy, and there was rarely a dinner without the presence of some distinguished admiral, and among the favoured ones Sir Isaac Coffin and Sir Robert Otway were the most prominent.

To my great consternation I was invited, with my parents, on two occasions to dine at the Pavilion, and at the age of eighteen it is permitted even for an Irishman to feel shy and nervous. On the first occasion I was summoned after dinner to approach the King, when His Majesty, with that genial kindness which was his nature, and which completely put me at ease, asked me what profession I was destined for. I replied that I hoped to serve His Majesty in the Diplomatic Service; to which the King replied good-naturedly, "And so you shall, my boy, and I will look after you." These royal words, so kindly spoken, were most encouraging, and they inspired me with hope and gratitude.

It is a curious coincidence that my first appointment in diplomacy by Lord Palmerston was dated on the

20th of June, the day of the King's death, and in the name of her present gracious Majesty.

Brighton in those days was very different to the Brighton of to-day. It was not then, as it has since become by railway communication, a suburb of London. The society was much smaller, but more select, and the residence of the Court in winter induced many of the nobility and first families to make it their residence.

The Pavilion, which is a building unique of its kind, is now a place of public amusement:—a downfall, it is true, but under the altered circumstances and the total want of privacy Brighton could not, after the introduction of the railway, have continued to be a royal residence.

But I retain very pleasurable recollections of the Brighton of those days, and being in the bloom of youth, when everything is viewed in a sunny light, I enjoyed the dinners, balls, and parties, which were constant during the winter.

After the London season of 1836 I accompanied my parents to Tunbridge Wells, which the doctor had advised for my sister's health. She had been suffering from a pulmonary complaint for many months, and it was hoped that the fine air of Tunbridge Wells might revive her; but, alas! such was not the case. After a lingering illness she succumbed to this treacherous malady and breathed her last at Boyne House on the 3rd of October, 1836.

My sister was buried in the Holy Trinity

churchyard of Tunbridge Wells, and, by my parents' wish, I inscribed the following lines on her tombstone:—

So fair, so young, so sincere,
So dearly loved, so early lost, may claim a tear.
Yet mourn not if the life resumed by Heaven
Was spent to every end for which 't was given.
The part assigned if she essayed to fill,
If she obeyed her heavenly Father's will,
If humble trust in her Redeemer's love
Matured her early for the courts above,
Could she too soon escape a world of sin,
Or could eternal bliss too soon begin?
Then cease her death too fondly to deplore;
What could the longest life have added more?*

Immediately after this severe loss my father went abroad for change of scene, and passed the winter at Paris. He had personally known Louis Philippe when an exile in England, and had then shown attentions to him. The King received him very graciously and cordially, frequently mentioning the kind attentions he had received in England.

The society of Paris was at that time very agreeable. There were many English of note who entertained, and the Court gave many dinners and balls. England was nobly represented by Lord and Lady Granville, the charm of whose manner, if ever equalled, was never surpassed, and their hospitalities were unbounded. They were much esteemed at Paris by the French, as well as by all who then formed the cosmopolitan

* These lines are, I believe, by Mrs. Hemans.

society of that gay capital. Lord Granville was an able diplomatist, and served his Sovereign and his country with great distinction. He was of that polished school which is rapidly passing away, and was a *grand seigneur* in the fullest sense of the term. Among the celebrities then forming the society of Paris, Count and Countess Flahaut held a prominent place. They had a beautiful house on the Champs Elysées, and gave frequent parties. He was a distinguished general, and was in 1848 French Ambassador at Vienna. Almost the only remaining link of that family which held so high a position in France is the Dowager Lady Lansdowne, who, at the time I refer to, was the ornament and graceful beauty of the Flahaut salon.

There was also the salon of Madame Graham, a very remarkable woman, of shrewd talent and wit, who had made a wonderful career, and was generally appreciated in society. It was in her salon that Count Pozzo di Borgo, the then Russian Ambassador, used daily to seek repose from his arduous diplomatic duties. Among the beauties of that day were the Marquise de Caraman, and her sister the Duchesse de Vallembrose; the Comtesse Le Hon, the wife of the Belgian Minister; Madame Charles Pozzo di Borgo; and a host of others whose names have passed from my recollection. Among the English society were Lord Pembroke; General Sir Alexander Duff, grandfather to the present Duke of Fife, and his son James; Sir William and Lady Gordon-Cumming; Sir Fleetwood and Lady Pellew; the

Duchesse de Montebello ; the Misses Berrys ; Lady Helena Robinson ; and many others.

The life of Paris at that time was very enjoyable. There were constant dinners and balls, and society was more exclusive, and not so overcharged with numbers as at present. Life was easier, and the turmoil and cares of life were less.

We were frequently invited to dine at the Tuileries, and the royal boxes at the various theatres were constantly sent to my father by order of the King. The Court was brilliant and handsomely kept up, and the large dinners in the Salle de Diane were very imposing. The Queen was gracious and affable to all classes. It was evident that her mind was constantly anxious for the King's safety, for she bore in her countenance the marks of inward care and suffering. The King's sister, Madame Adelaide (who was said to be secretly married to General Athalin, one of the King's aides-de-camp), then resided in the Tuileries. She was a lady of remarkable talent ; and it was said that it was principally owing to her that the crown of France was conferred on her brother, then Duc d'Orléans. There never was a happier or more united family. The Duc d'Orléans, remarkable for his handsome and military bearing, was very popular, and his captivating manners and courtesy endeared him to the nation. The Duc de Nemours, the Duc de Montpensier, and the Duc d'Aumale served with distinction in the ranks of the army, and rendered important services in Algeria ; while the Prince de Joinville devoted himself to the interests of the navy. The

Due d'Orléans was a man of considerable talent, with good judgment and a clear perception of character; and it has been often observed that, had he lived, he would have firmly established his dynasty. His sudden tragic death, and that of Madame Adelaïde, deprived the King of his best and wisest counsellors. "*Mais l'homme propose et Dieu dispose,*" and it has been truly said that, "*Le hasard joue le plus grand rôle dans les destinées des nations.*"

I was present at a dinner given by the King to the late Marquis and Marchioness of Londonderry on their arrival from St. Petersburg *en route* to London. It was in May, 1837; and after the 1st of May, by the etiquette of the Court, all the guests appear *en frac*, and the ladies in demi-toilette. Lord and Lady Londonderry, not being aware of this Court regulation, appeared in full-dress—the Marquis in his handsome Hussar uniform covered with decorations, the Marchioness a blaze of diamonds. General Arthur Upton was amongst the guests, and I had the honour to conduct to dinner the Dowager Lady Rendlesham. Nothing could exceed the attentions both of the King and Queen to Lord and Lady Londonderry, to which the Marquis was duly entitled by his distinguished services. There were not more than twenty guests, and I was struck by seeing a boiled goose being placed before the King, which he carved most dexterously.

In the early part of 1837 I was present at the last ball given by Prince Talleyrand at his house in the Rue St. Florentin, overlooking the Tuileries gardens.

His niece, the Duchesse de Dino, afterwards Duchesse de Sagan, received the company. She was a lady of considerable talent, and in every sense *grande dame*, and had gained a high position during Prince Talleyrand's residence in London as French Ambassador on the accession of Louis Philippe. It was at the same time that Princess Lieven, wife of the Russian Ambassador in London, shared with the Duchesse de Dino the honours of the fashionable and diplomatic world; and it is difficult to say which of the two unravelled most skilfully its mysteries and intrigues.

At the termination of his whist party the Prince was wheeled in his chair into the ball-room to witness the cotillon, and I had the honour of being presented to him by the Duchesse. He said he hoped that I had amused myself, adding, "*D'ailleurs vous êtes à l'âge où l'on s'amuse facilement.*"

It was singular to see this venerable old man, with his silvery locks falling on his shoulders, with still a keen and piercing eye, and rapidly descending to the tomb, surrounded by those entering on the joyous stage of life, buoyant with the bloom and brightness of youth. A singular contrast, and the more so if it were possible to conjecture what could have been his thoughts on such a festive occasion, on reviewing the various stages of his eventful life, and the various tragic scenes which he had witnessed. His countenance expressed that perfect calmness and repose which he had shown on all occasions, even during the most difficult and anxious periods through which he had passed. He died the

following year (1838), and I have been told by an eyewitness that on his deathbed he evinced the same calmness and serenity of mind.

He left all his papers to the Duchesse de Dino, with strict injunctions that they should not be published till forty years after his death. The Duchesse confided them to Monsieur de Bacourt, who had been his Counsellor of Embassy in London. At M. de Bacourt's death I believe they were left to his lawyer for publication at the period named; but they have not yet appeared in print, although they are now in the hands of the Duc de Broglie, who has undertaken to publish them.

I was intimate with M. de Bacourt, who with his friend Count Pahlen passed the winter of 1850-51 at Baden-Baden, where I then resided. They constantly passed the evening with us, and M. de Bacourt used to relate to us interesting anecdotes of the Prince's life from the papers which he was then preparing for publication.

In 1837 I attended a Court Ball at the Tuileries, to which all the officers of the National Guard were invited. The crush was enormous, and the heat tropical. Sir Richard Acton and I lost our carriages and servants, and with the latter our coats. The cold was intense, and we had to walk some distance before we could find a vehicle. The result was that, coming out of the intense heat, we both caught a violent cold, from the effect of which Sir Richard* died, and I was at death's door;

* Sir Richard Acton had married a daughter of the Duc d'Alberg (who was afterwards the wife of the late Earl Granville), and was the father of the present Lord Acton.

but, being younger, I was mercifully enabled to pull through.

At that time the King was much pre-occupied with restoring the Palace at Versailles, on which he lavished considerable sums. No one was allowed to see it while undergoing repairs, unless by the King's express permission.

My father having expressed a great wish to see the palace, as probably he might never re-visit France, the King promised to show it to him himself. On leaving Paris, my father went to Versailles, previous to returning to England. He daily expected to be summoned by the King, who frequently visited the palace to inspect the progress of the works. Fearing that it had escaped the King's recollection, he sent me to Paris with a letter to the Vicomte de Chabot, an old friend of my father's, and Grand Chambellan of the Court. (He married a sister of the Duke of Leinster, and his son was afterwards Chargé d'Affaires at an eventful period in London.) I was charged to ascertain from the Vicomte de Chabot if it were possible to remind the King of his promise. On my arrival I learnt from the Vicomte de Chabot that on that very day the King had gone to Versailles with the intention of showing the palace to my father, the result of which was that I lost a most interesting opportunity of seeing Versailles; and on my return I found that the King had specially included me in the invitation. The Ecole de St. Cyr was also present, and served as spectators to fill the beautiful theatre, which was lighted

up for the occasion. My father told me that the King was very amusing in showing the beauties of the palace; and in passing through the picture gallery specially devoted to distinguished admirals pointed out several who, he said, "had never been to sea in their lives." (This reminds me that in Russia admirals have filled the posts of Ministers of Finance and of Public Works—a circumstance not likely to happen in England, although a civilian is put at the head of the Admiralty.)

We returned to England early in June, 1837, and on the 20th of that month William IV. expired after a short illness at Windsor Castle. A few days afterwards I received from Lord Palmerston my appointment as Attaché to the Legation at Berlin, in Her Majesty's name, and dated on the day of her accession to the Throne, so that I had nearly completed my fifty years in Her Majesty's service on the very day that the Jubilee of her glorious reign was so loyally and enthusiastically celebrated in every part of her Empire.

CHAPTER II.

Character of William IV.—Departure for Berlin—Death of Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz—Frederick William III.—His Character—The Devotion of His People—His Will—Great Change in Germany since 1837—The Result of Three Wars—Commencement of Political Agitation in Favour of Constitutional Government—Prophecy of Lord William Russell—Expediency of Removing Universities from large Towns.

WILLIAM IV. was greatly beloved and respected. He had never taken much part in politics, and ascending the Throne at his advanced time of life, and at a moment of much political agitation on the question of Reform, his position was one of considerable difficulty and anxiety. But he followed a strictly constitutional course. The voice of the nation through its representatives in the House of Commons strongly supported the Reform Bill, which was carried by a large majority. It was thrown out by the House of Lords. An appeal to the nation resulted in favour of the Bill. The necessity of its acceptance by the House of Lords was urgent. His Majesty then appealed to many of his personal friends who were opposed to the Bill (and amongst them my father), requesting them to abstain from further opposition and to allow the Bill, by their abstention, to pass, in order to avoid a creation of peers to insure its acceptance by the Lords. Thus a satisfactory result was obtained, and the popular

feeling was conciliated without any recourse to an extra-constitutional measure.

I may here mention also a noble and patriotic act of William IV. The revenues he received from Hanover during the seven years of his reign were carefully administered, and the savings, after defraying the expenses of the Viceroyalty, were annually laid by. They formed a considerable sum at the time of the King's death, and by his Will it was left to the State of Hanover, although he had a numerous family, not over largely provided for, considering their position, to whom he might legally have bequeathed it.

I left London to join the Legation at Berlin *viâ* Hamburg early in September, 1837. In those days there were no railways, and the route *viâ* Hamburg, which was the nearest seaport to Berlin, was the most convenient and the shortest. The late King of Würtemberg, attended by Baron Taubenheim and other Court personages, was on board, intending to stay at Berlin for the manœuvres of the Prussian army, but on reaching Hamburg he learnt that the cholera had broken out in the Prussian capital with some severity. His Majesty therefore abandoned his visit, and proceeded direct to Stuttgart. The King had the gracious courtesy to inform me of the news he had received, in case that I might wish to defer proceeding to Berlin; but, in duty bound, I continued my route.

On my arrival at Berlin I learnt the death of Duke Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, brother of

Queen Louise, and the intimate friend of Frederick William III. This was a severe loss to the King, and it greatly depressed him. The funeral of Duke Charles took place with great state. It was the first Prussian military pageant I had seen, and I was much impressed with it. The habits of Frederick William III. were monotonous: "*Les jours se suivaient et se ressemblaient.*" It seems that the troublous times he had passed through—the misfortunes which had overwhelmed his country during many years, and the death of Queen Louise—had impregnated him with a melancholy and a desire for solitude which had become a second nature. There were two privileged persons who were admitted to his intimacy—namely, Prince Wittgenstein, the Grand Chambellan, and Baron Wilhelm von Humboldt. The former dined daily with the King, and was the organ through whom all matters of a private nature reached His Majesty. General Muffling, who had been Governor of Paris during the allied occupation, and who was in 1837 Governor of Berlin, also enjoyed the favour of the King. It was at this time that certain evidence given by the Duke of Wellington before a Committee on Military Affairs, in which His Grace had used some disparaging expressions in regard to the discipline of the Prussian army when occupying Paris in 1815, was deeply resented by General Muffling, and there was consequently a coldness in his relations with the British Legation; but, nevertheless, he had the courtesy to ask me to dinner, and as he was known

for his excellent *cuisine*, it was an honour that I did not decline.

The King was a just, merciful, and benevolent Sovereign. He was often humorous in doing a kind act. I remember an instance of this. A lacquey who had been discovered after the annual *déjeuner dansant* to have partaken of certain red wine by the stains on his white livery had been summarily dismissed; he placed himself in the King's way, and fell on his knees, asking forgiveness. The King granted him his pardon, adding, "*Dummer Kerl, warum hast du nicht Weiss getrunken?*" *

But although the King lived a secluded life, he attended to the affairs of State with strict conscientiousness and devotion to the interests of his people. He was thus endeared to his subjects, and, whatever his failings, they were condoned by his subjects, who were loyally resolved not to trouble his declining years.

He was averse to any political changes or reforms in the internal administration of his country, from the purest motives and from a fixed conviction that "*le mieux est l'ennemi du bien.*" He could not divest himself of the doctrine of the divine right of kings and of the value of absolute government, which were the ruling principles of most of the sovereigns of that day. He had been brought up in those principles—had fought against the revolutionary doctrines of the Napoleonic age—and it was therefore not surprising that in his

* "Stupid fellow, why did you not drink *white* wine?"

maturer age he still clung to them with persistency. He felt that it was the military power which had liberated Prussia and Europe from the yoke of Napoleon, and he looked to the maintenance of it as the only means of saving his country from internal disorders and from the encroachment of a rising democracy.

Promises of free institutions had been freely given to the nation when it rose *en masse* for its liberation from the galling yoke of France, when the women brought their jewels, and gold and silver ornaments, and even their hair, to lay them on the altar of freedom. But at the successful close of the great patriotic struggle these promises remained unfulfilled, and continued so from 1815 to the King's death in 1840. But there were, perhaps, other causes, other political agencies, which acted against the fulfilment of these promises. Although the Holy Alliance had received a check by the failure of the Congress of Verona, its principles had not died out, nor even had it undergone any modification. Those principles were as strongly maintained by Austria and Russia as on the day when the Holy Alliance was signed, and the indissoluble union of the three Northern Powers was the basis on which the foreign and internal policy of Frederick William III. rested. It would not in that day have entered into the brain of any Prussian statesman to take a lead in proposing a constitutional system of government. The time had not arrived for Prussia to take the leading-strings in her hand; and

even had she done so, it must have led to a breach with Austria and Russia, the consequences of which might have been disastrous, and would probably have retarded instead of furthering the advance of freedom.

In writing on this subject, and in confirmation of what I have stated, I may cite the Will of Frederick William III.—a most remarkable document, in which he impresses on his successor the high importance of a firm and lasting union between Russia, Austria, and Prussia as the necessary means of safeguarding their common interests and those of Europe. In other words, it was the spirit, if not the phraseology, of the Holy Alliance.

The following is a copy in translation of the Will of Frederick William III. as published in the *Official Prussian Gazette*, June, 1840 :—

MY LAST WILL.

My time in trouble ; my hope in God.
Every work depends upon Thy blessings, O
Lord. Grant it even to me now for this end.

When this my last Will shall be made known to my beloved children, to my beloved Augusta, and to my other dear relations, I shall be no longer amongst them, but shall be numbered among the dead. May they, when they see the well-known inscription “Think of the departed one,”* then also think of me with affection.

* This inscription was placed by Frederick William III. on the Mausoleum at Charlottenburg which he built on the death of Queen Louise, with the beautiful recumbent statue of her by Professor Rauch.

May God be a merciful and gracious Judge to me, and receive my spirit, which I commend to His hands. Yea, O Lord, into Thy hands I commend my spirit. In another world Thou wilt re-unite us all again. Mayest Thou find us worthy of Thy mercy, for Christ's sake, Thy dear Son, our Saviour.

By God's decree I have had severe and difficult trials to encounter, in personal affairs (more especially when He snatched away from me what was dearest and most beloved to me, now seventeen years ago) as well as in the events which my dear country has experienced so severely. But God—eternal praise be to Him!—has permitted me to live to see also glorious, happy, and prosperous events. Among the first I reckon, particularly, the glorious termination of the struggle of 1813, 1814, 1815, to which the country owes its redemption. But amongst the latter—viz., the happy and the prosperous—I most especially esteem the affectionate love and attachment and welfare of my beloved children, as well as the special unexpected providence of God in having conferred upon me, even in my fiftieth year, a companion whom I consider myself bound openly to acknowledge as a pattern of faithful and tender attachment. My last sincere cordial thanks to all who have served the State and myself with judgment and fidelity.

My last sincere cordial thanks to all who have been devoted to me in their affection, fidelity, and in their personal attachment. I forgive all my enemies: those also who, by malicious speeches or writings, or by designed calumnious representations, have endeavoured (yet seldom with success, thank God!) to destroy the confidence of my people—my greatest treasure.

(Signed) FREDERICK WILLIAM.

Berlin, December 1, 1827.

On you, my dear Fritz, will devolve the burthen of the affairs of Government, with the whole weight of their responsibility. You are more prepared than many other heredi-

tary princes by the position in which I have placed you for their discharge. It remains for you now to fulfil my just hopes and the expectations of the country—at least, to strive to do so. Your principles and sentiments are a guarantee to me that you will be a father to your subjects.

Guard yourself, nevertheless, from the desire of innovation so generally disseminated around you; guard yourself from impracticable theories, which are now in such general agitation; but at the same time guard yourself from a too exaggerated desire for old usages, which is as pernicious as the former; for beneficial improvements can be attained, provided that you know how to avoid these two rocks.

The army is now in a state seldom so flourishing. It has fulfilled my expectations in war as well as in peace since its reorganisation. May it continually bear in view its important duties; may also the country never forget what it is indebted to it.

Do not neglect to promote unity among the European Powers; above all, may Prussia, Russia, and Austria never separate from each other. Their union together may be regarded as the keystone of the great European Alliance.

My dearly beloved children all give me reason to expect that it will be their continual endeavour to distinguish themselves by a useful, active, morally pure, and pious course of life—for this alone draws down blessings—and the thought will afford me consolation still in my last hour. May God protect and preserve my dear country.

May God protect and preserve our family now and for ever.

May He bless thee, my dear son, and thy government, and grant thee strength and understanding, and give thee conscientious, faithful counsellors and servants, and obedient subjects. Amen.

(Signed) FREDERICK WILLIAM.

Berlin, December 1, 1827.

This remarkable document breathes a truly Christian spirit and resignation. It evinces deeply-rooted feelings of affection for his children, for the partner of his declining years, and for his country; and it expresses a fervent forgiveness to all his enemies, and to those who had endeavoured, "by malicious speeches or writings, or by designed calumnious representations, to destroy the confidence of my people—my greatest treasure."

To his eldest son and successor the King addresses special warnings and advice against impracticable theories, as also against an exaggerated desire for old usages. He passes encomiums on the army, and then expresses the hope that Prussia, Russia, and Austria may "never separate from each other, for their union may be regarded as the keystone of the great European Alliance."

It is reported that the Emperor William shortly before his death, and in conversation with his grandson, then Prince William, gave expression to a similar sentiment, stating the importance he attached to a good understanding between Prussia and Russia, and expressing a hope that this good understanding would be sedulously maintained by his future successors. It would appear that this advice was not neglected by his grandson, the Emperor William, for the first visit he paid after his accession to the Throne was to his cousin, the Emperor Alexander, which was productive of the best results. But great changes have taken place since the days of Frederick William III. and

the Emperor Nicholas. Prussia and Germany have been relieved of that "incubus" of Russian influence which weighed so heavily on the German people, and which was a constant discouragement to the realisation of their hopes of freedom and liberty.

What would Frederick William III. and the Prussian statesmen of that day say were they now to rise from their graves?

Austria deprived of her Italian possessions, excluded from Germany, and the German Confederation dissolved; Prussia representing the Empire of United Germany; Alsace and Lorraine wrested from France and annexed to the German Empire; Schleswig-Holstein incorporated with Prussia; and all these mighty changes the result of three wars of short duration compared with those of previous centuries, although productive of momentous results.

Soon after the close of the War of Liberation a latent movement commenced in Southern Germany in favour of Liberal institutions, and this movement first manifested itself amongst the students of the universities—youths of heated imagination, impelled by an ardent patriotism. Secret societies were formed, agitation was fomented for political ends, and poets added fuel to the flame by composing stirring and patriotic songs in the national cause.

The effect of this agitation was great, and the assassination of the Russian councillor Kotzebue, at Mannheim, by the student Georges Sand, in 1819, aroused the attention of the Governments. A short

time after, a murderous attempt was made on the life of a Nassau councillor, Tibell.* Repressive measures were adopted, but it was evident that a great patriotic feeling had been awakened, which it was as impossible to arrest as it would be to curb the rolling wave on the seashore. But, to their credit be it said, the Prussian people, who revered their monarch, were actuated by the noble and generous feeling not to disturb the evening of his days—after a life of great anxieties and sorrows, in which his people had participated—by any attempt to force his hand by demanding a fulfilment of the promises he had made in the hour of danger. They were content to abide their time, to allow the aged monarch to close his eyes in peace, and to await the era of a new reign in order to claim the benefits and blessings of free institutions. The eventual introduction of a constitutional form of government at no distant date was fully impressed on the minds of all thinking persons, and of those who watched the progress of public opinion. I well recollect Lord William Russell, who was our able Minister at Berlin, remarking in 1837, on stopping in front of the University of Berlin (an imposing building opposite to the King's palace), "that it would some day be the Parliament House of Prussia."

This prophecy was uttered within a few years of

* These incidents led to a secret Conference at Carlsbad, convoked by Prince Metternich, at which resolutions were passed against the freedom of the Press, and other measures of precaution were taken against incitement to revolution and democracy.

the convocation by Frederick William IV. of the first representative body at Berlin.

I may here observe that the experience of late years has proved the expediency of removing universities beyond the pale of large capitals. Of late years all the revolutions have been—if not instigated—led by the students. At Paris it was continually the Ecole Polytechnique that first appeared on the scene of revolution; and in 1848, both at Berlin and Vienna, the students played a principal part. I remember my astonishment in March, 1848, on entering Berlin by moonlight, with Sir Stratford Canning, at seeing the students mounting guard at the Leipziger Gate; and still more astonished was I to see on the following day the students, in fancy uniforms and with Freischärler hats, in occupation of the Prince of Prussia's palace, to save which from destruction a large placard had been placed with the inscription of "*National Eigenthum.*" *

A large capital is not the place for study, while its allurements are more likely to disturb than improve the morals of the students.

* "National Property."

CHAPTER III.

Berlin in 1837—The Court—Society—Corps Diplomatic—Lord and Lady William Russell—Prussian Ministers—The Zollverein—Foreign Relations then guided by Prince Metternich—Eventual Effect of this Policy—Non-recognition of the Queens of Spain and Portugal—The Carlist Coterie; its Influence on the Crown Prince.

IN 1837 Berlin was a village in comparison with the Berlin of to-day. Socially speaking, it was a far more agreeable place. There was a primitive contentment which pervaded all classes. The spirit of speculation and the craving for amassing wealth had not invaded its precincts. People were satisfied to live simply, and enjoy life. The society was small, and chiefly composed of the Court officials, the military, and the corps diplomatic, but, though restricted in number and exclusive, it was genial and unpretending. It did not exceed three hundred—if as much—and there were receptions nearly every night after the theatre on fixed days during the winter. They danced and flirted and supped without the *gêne* of formality or the expensive luxuries of the present day.

The King dined at one, and supped at eight. Every day after dinner, even in winter, he drove with the aide-de-camp on service to Charlottenburg. Beyond an occasional dinner to the Ministers or generals—which was not frequent—no receptions or festivities were

given by the King, although *fêtes* and dinners were given by the Crown Prince, Prince William, afterwards the Emperor William; Princes Charles, Albert, Augustus; and Prince William, commonly called *der Alte Wilhelm*, the King's uncle. Once a year the King gave a *déjeuner dansant* to the corps diplomatic, which commenced at 10 a.m.; and as it was generally in the dark days of January, it was necessary to shave by candle-light. At one the dinner was served, and before six the company retired, in order to permit his Majesty to make his nightly appearance at some theatre.

I have heard it said that in the reign of Frederick the Great some quarrel had taken place at Court between two foreign Ministers in regard to precedence, and from that time the foreign Ministers and the corps diplomatic were only received at Court once a year. It seems a singular fact, but in those days the Court regulations were like the laws of the Medes and Persians, and were handed down from generation to generation.

Life at Berlin at that time was very primitive. The corps diplomatic dined at four, went to the theatre at six, which finished at nine, and then to a ball or party, which ended at twelve. These hours were very rational when compared with the London life of to-day. But in reality the luncheon now corresponds with the dinner-hour of that day, and our dinner at eight or nine corresponds with the German supper at the period I refer to.

I may here note a curious antiquated police regulation which existed then at Berlin, but which has long

since been abolished—viz., no one was allowed to smoke in the streets, although certainly the open air would appear to be the most rational place to inhale the odours of tobacco. On returning from balls and parties the smokers had to keep a sharp look-out for the sentinels on guard, or otherwise they were arrested, put into the sentry-box, and handed over to the relief guard. I witnessed several comical scenes in adventures of this sort.

In those days no one was invited to Court who was not *hoffähig*, and no Jews were admitted within its precincts. I remember a curious illustration of this. A fancy-dress ball had been given by Prince and Princess William of Prussia. There was a fancy-dress procession to usher in the various quadrilles, in which figured a stranger of the Jewish persuasion, then residing at Berlin—a member of a very wealthy and highly-respected family. The ball was so successful that the King was anxious to see the costumes, and invitations were issued in the King's name for its repetition at the palace. A difficulty arose as to inviting the Jewish stranger to the palace, although he had previously appeared at the ball of Prince William. The matter was referred to the King, who, in his laconic manner, replied, "that if he asked Jews to his Court, he preferred to ask his own Jews."

This did not advance the affair; but the difficulty was finally overcome, and the "stranger Jew" was invited.

I have already referred to Lord William Russell, who in 1837 represented Great Britain at the Court

of Prussia. He had served with great distinction in the army, and had distinguished himself at the Battle of Talavera, one of the hardest-fought in the Peninsula, and one of the greatest victories of the immortal Wellington. He much preferred the sword to the pen, although he was a keen and able diplomatist. He related to me an interesting fact—namely, that the Presidency of Bombay had been offered to him, or was intended by the Government of the day to be offered to him. By some mistake the letter was sent to Lord George William Russell, the uncle of Lord William Russell (who was afterwards murdered). He declined it; and it was only later that Lord William heard of the offer, which he told me he would have much preferred to a diplomatic post. Lady William Russell was one of the noted personages of that day, not alone for her beauty, but for her highly-cultivated and refined mind. She was in the height and charm of her beauty when the allied Sovereigns visited London in 1815, and she specially captivated the Emperor Alexander. She was a great linguist, speaking all foreign languages, even modern Greek; and the Berlin professors of that day, among whom were counted the most learned men of Europe, looked upon her as one of themselves. I am happy to seize this opportunity of expressing my grateful acknowledgment for the many kindnesses I received from them.

Sir George Baillie Hamilton was then Secretary of Legation—a genial and hospitable colleague. Mr. H.

Howard, now Sir Henry Howard, was the paid Attaché with whom I lived on brotherly terms, and from whom I first learnt the sinuôsities of diplomacy. There never was a more conscientious, hard-working, and competent public servant than Sir H. Howard, who is now reposing on the laurels he has gained.

France was then represented by the Comte C. de Bresson. He was a very agreeable, kind-hearted, and able man, of rather an irritable temper and haughty manner, but always ready to do a kind act. He was given by nature to much intrigue, but he found at Berlin but a small field for adventure. He was later moved to Madrid, a field of wider scope, and where he utilised his talents in bringing about the Spanish marriages. His great ambition was to be Ambassador in London, but after the Spanish marriages he would not have been a *persona grata* with Lord Palmerston or in England. He was subsequently Ambassador at Naples, where he committed suicide.

Monsieur Lutteroth was French Conseiller de Légation. He had married a Countess Batthyani, a charming person, and they were both most hospitable and kind to me. Monsieur Humann (son of the French Minister of Finance) was second Secretary. His wife was a daughter of General Guilleminot, French Ambassador at Constantinople, and they were very agreeable and kind friends.

The Russian Minister was Monsieur de Ribeaupierre. He had been Minister at Constantinople, and was married to a Comtesse Potemkin, the last descendant, I believe, of the great Potemkin in the reign of Catherine. She

was a distinguished person, and her daughters were very pleasing, and I was a constant frequenter of their *salon*.

Count Trauttmansdorf then represented Austria. His wife was a Countess Karolyi, aunt of Count Karolyi, late Austrian Ambassador in London. They belonged to the *crème* of Vienna society, and were perfect specimens of their high birth.

General Count Perponcher, who had taken part in the campaigns of the Duke of Wellington and fought at Waterloo, was the Dutch representative. He married Mlle. de Reede, whose mother had been Grande Maîtresse to Queen Louise of Prussia. He was quite an Englishman in his appearance and manners. His sons all entered the Prussian service, and have attained high posts at Court. They were very gentlemanly and pleasing, and I have a great regard and esteem for them.

Baron Antonini was the Neapolitan Envoy, and very much in favour with the Court. He was very agreeable, with some humour and wit, and of course devoted to the cause of absolutism, whether in France, Spain, Portugal, or Naples.

The Comte d'Aglié was the Sardinian Minister, and with the Comtesse d'Aglié dispensed their hospitalities with grace and cordiality. The day of revolution and conquest had not then set in, and the diplomatic labours of the Comte d'Aglié were extremely limited.

There were then no foreign troubles in Europe, and the corps diplomatique lived as one family, in perfect harmony and sociability.

Baron d'Ohsson, the Swedish Minister, was distinguished on all Oriental subjects, and both he and his wife, a Dutch lady with pleasing manners, were much appreciated by society.

The Ministers from the German States were able and distinguished men. The Secretary to the Saxon Legation was Count Beust, who later filled the high posts of Minister for Foreign Affairs in Austria and Austrian Ambassador at Paris.

Among the Ministers and official personages Prince Wittgenstein was the prominent figure. He was the mouthpiece of the King and his most influential adviser. He was a type of the *grand seigneur* of the old school, courteous in manner, dignified in his bearing, and with an irresistible *bonhomie*. He received on Thursdays and Sundays—the ladies to play loto, the gentlemen whist, when a hot supper was handed about without any formality.

Baron Werther was Minister for Foreign Affairs, having succeeded Monsieur Ancillon. Baron Werther had been some years Prussian Minister at Paris. He was well suited to those inactive times, and he managed his department, if not with brilliancy, with skill and composure. He was ably assisted by his wife and daughter in dispensing hospitality, and his entertainments were duly appreciated.

Count Arnim Boitzenburg was then Minister of the Interior. He was a distinguished nobleman and a large landed proprietor, and successfully administered the affairs of his department.

Monsieur de Nagler was Postmaster-General. He distinguished himself as having greatly contributed to the improvement of the high roads, and of the general management of the Post Office. In those days there were no stone quarries in Eastern Prussia, and the stone required for macadamising the roads was procured from the "boulders" that were to be found in the fields. Hence in that part of Prussia originated the proverb "*Steinreich*" (rich in stone), to designate a rich man.

During the last years of Frederick William III. the negotiations with the German States for the formation of a Customs Union—or, as it was termed, the "*Zollverein*"—were successfully prosecuted. The first treaty was signed between Prussia, Würtemberg, and Bavaria in 1828, to which the other States subsequently acceded, until finally it comprised the whole of Germany, including the Southern States of Grand Ducal Hesse, Electoral Hesse, and Baden.

In 1837 Dr. Bowring, afterwards Sir J. Bowring, was sent by Her Majesty's Government to Berlin to report on the constitution and elements of the *Zollverein*, and he drew up a most able and elaborate report on the whole question, which was submitted to Parliament.

Prussia at that time was more occupied with acquiring the dominant command of the commercial relations of Germany than in the direction of her foreign policy, which was more or less under the guidance of Prince Metternich. The political questions then occupying attention in Europe were those

relating to the Belgian fortresses on the French frontier and the succession to the Spanish and Portuguese Thrones.

The question of the Belgian fortresses was one of considerable importance to Prussia and Germany, for although the independence and neutrality of Belgium were guaranteed by Europe, still, in a strategic point of view, if certain fortresses on the Franco-Belgian frontier were not dismantled, it was evident that on the first outbreak of war they would be occupied by either France or Germany—by France, on the grounds of urgent necessity to cover Paris from an attack of Germany; or by Germany, to prevent an invasion of Belgium by France. It is true that the neutrality of Belgium should have offered a sufficient guarantee that the frontier would be respected; but still, who can answer for the exigencies of war? It was therefore better to prevent the possibility of their occupation by either France or Germany by dismantling them.

The question of Belgium entering the German Confederation, which was at one time suggested, was as preposterous as that of Belgium entering into a Customs Union with France; the former would have made Belgium German, the latter would have led to its virtual incorporation with France. Both ideas were equally discarded, and Belgium has maintained her independence and neutrality, which was exemplified when the French troops passed the frontier after Sedan. They were immediately disarmed and “interned” under Belgian authority.

On the Spanish and Portuguese succession questions Austria, Prussia, and Russia adopted the policy of abstention and non-intervention, although their sympathies and wishes were wholly in favour of what they conceived to be the legitimate rights of Don Carlos and Don Miguel, who were the representatives of absolutism. The three Northern Powers refused to recognise Queen Isabella and Queen Donna Maria, and it was only many years afterwards that they consented to do so, and to renew diplomatic relations with Spain and Portugal. A Carlist agent, the Marquis de Monasterio, was "officiously" but not "officially" received at Berlin. At this time there was at Berlin a Carlist coterie, at the head of which were Madame de Luck, wife of General von Luck, who had directed the education of the Crown Prince, afterwards Frederick William IV., and her sister, Madame Franchet, whose husband (then blind) had held office under Charles X. They had left France after the revolution of 1830, and it is not surprising that their "sympathies" should be enlisted on the side of legitimacy and opposed to revolution, for their father had perished on the scaffold during the Reign of Terror. They were both possessed of considerable talent, brilliant in conversation, and fascinating in manner, and were much in favour with the Crown Prince. To this coterie belonged also Baron Antonini, the Neapolitan Minister, and the Marquis de Monasterio, both of whom were admirers of monarchical absolutism and devotees of legitimacy. It was then surmised that the Crown Prince himself was a Carlist at heart, but

whether or not, on all festive occasions this coterie clustered round him. (It may be noticed here that when the German army arrived at Versailles in 1870, previous to the siege of Paris, the son of Madame Franchet was then Prefect of that town, and must have found among the Prussian officers many with whom he had been acquainted in his early youth.)

CHAPTER IV.

Prophecy of Mlle. Le Norman at Paris in 1815 of the Death of Frederick William III. in 1840—Legend of the “White Lady”—Extension of Berlin—Causes of Abstention of Prussian Aristocracy from visiting Berlin—Satisfactory Administration of Finances—War Fund largely increased by the Will of Frederick William III.—The King's secluded Life; his Marriage with the Countess Harrach, Princess Liegwitz; his last Reception of the Corps Diplomatic; the last Act of his Reign—Arrival of the Emperor Nicholas—Death of Frederick William III.—Importance attached by the Comte de Bresson, the French Minister, to the Change of Reign; his frequent Attempts to bring about a close Alliance between France and Russia; the probable Motives of it—Project of Prince de Polignac in 1829 for the Repartition of Europe frustrated by the Revolution of 1830.

To revert to the closing years of the reign of Frederick William III. It was generally known that the King when at Paris in 1815 had consulted Mme. Le Norman, the famous fortune-teller. She foretold that the King would die some day in June, 1840 (naming the day). On my arrival at Berlin in 1837 the prophecy was well known and frequently mentioned in society, and believed in.

It was also reported that on the 1st of January in that year his grandson (afterwards the Emperor Frederick III.), then a boy of ten years, when sitting on his grandfather's knee, said, “What a pity it is, dear grandpapa, that you must die this year!” This reminder of Mme. Le Norman's prophecy was said to have had a fatal effect on the King's mind. I was never

able to obtain a truthful confirmation of this incident, and am disposed to treat it as fiction; but it is, however, certain that the report of it was current at Berlin at the time. However, in foretelling the King's death in 1840 Mme. Le Norman may have been somewhat guided by history, and a feeling likewise that a long period of twenty-five years was to elapse from the date of the prophecy to its fulfilment. The Great Elector died in 1640, Frederick William II. died in 1740; and, viewing the King's age at that time, it was not at all unlikely that he would live to 1840, and thus complete the third centenary of the death of a Prussian monarch. At all events, all we can now say is that it was a remarkably good guess, and that the occupant of the throne in 1940 will no doubt be reminded of the fatality which has attended the fortieth year of the last three centuries.

While on this mysterious subject I may observe that there is also a legend of a somewhat similar nature attached to the old palace at Berlin. The tradition is that the death of a member of the royal family is announced by the appearance at night of the "White Lady" in the palace, and it was so far confirmed during my residence at Berlin that on several occasions the "White Lady" was said to have appeared before the death occurred. I cannot, of course, vouch for the truth of her reported appearance, as I never saw her, but I can only testify to the fact of her appearance being reported and currently believed. But this ghostly apparition is not solely confined to the Prussian royal

house. The tradition exists in many of the German States, and in Bavaria, where the "lady" is in deep mourning.

The city of Berlin has of late years been enormously extended, and is now an imposing capital. It has not the antiquity of Vienna, and although the streets are wider, and give a grander air to the town, there are not the old sumptuous palaces of the aristocracy as at Vienna. This may be somewhat accounted for by the circumstance that there being then no Parliament, and the aristocracy having no part to play in political affairs or in the administration of government, they rarely came to Berlin, and when not residing at their country châteaux passed their winters in the provincial capitals. For instance, the aristocracy and country gentlemen of Westphalia resided during the winter season at Münster. Breslau was the provincial capital of Silesia. They entertained also at their châteaux, much in the same way as is done in English country houses. Then, again, the high aristocracy—or what is termed in Germany the *höher Adel*—had no recognised position at Court, unless in the army or in the service of the Crown. Military rank was alone recognised, and alone gave precedence. All this has been considerably modified, although military rank is still the predominant element. The aristocracy, therefore, came rarely to Berlin, except on State occasions. I am alluding to what existed previous to the accession of Frederick William IV., when a new era commenced, and new life was instilled into all classes of the nation. Nor was much public interest evinced in

the affairs of State. All edicts and ordinances were issued and published in the Official Gazette, and, the Press being under censorship, they were rarely discussed or commented on. In the administration of the finances there was a rigid economy and strict probity. An annual Budget was published, but of a very meagre nature. The receipts and expenditure always balanced, but the public were not informed of the amount of the surplus (although it was considerable), nor in what way it was spent. But the finances were well administered, as was afterwards proved by the large sum left to the nation by the Will of the King.

Since Frederick the Great it had been the custom to hoard a large capital in silver in the cellars of the old château for immediate use in the event of a war, and this custom is continued to the present day. The King left in his Will a considerable sum to this fund, and I believe it was largely drawn upon, if not entirely expended, by the Revolutionary Government in 1848 in the construction of the canal round Berlin to connect the Spree with the Havel.

It appears in the present day an inconceivable idea to allow so much capital to lie idle in the cellars of the palace without producing interest ; but although this system was introduced before constitutional government was established, it is still continued, and is now, in the estimation of the military authorities, of even still greater importance to the safety of the State, for it provides the Government of the day with the means of mobilising the army, and with the

expenses of a first campaign without awaiting a vote of Parliament or the issue of a loan. It was utilised for this purpose on the outbreak of the war with France in 1870, and the sum then taken was replaced at the termination of the war out of the huge indemnity of two hundred millions sterling paid by France.

For many years after the death of Queen Louisa the King passed a secluded life, surrounded by his large family, and apparently absorbed by the melancholy recollections of the past. He was in the habit of going every year to Teplitz. During his stay there in 1824 he made acquaintance with the family of Count Harrach, a rich Bohemian magnate. The King took a fancy to his daughter, Countess Harrach, with whom he contracted a morganatic marriage, and in whom he found a sympathetic nature and a suitable companion to cheer his declining years. As under a morganatic marriage she could not assume the title of Queen, the King conferred on her the title of Princess Liegnitz. The position was one of some difficulty and delicacy for her, and, as might be expected, the marriage was at first not well viewed by his family; but she acted with so much tact, with so much devotion to the King, and with such kindly feeling to all his children, that she acquired in a short time their affection and esteem. She held no Court; she lived in seclusion with the King, and was devoted to him. In his Will he gave public testimony of his affection and of his gratitude for the unceasing care and tenderness with which she had solaced the evening of his life.

After the King's death Princess Liegnitz retired into private life, and was always treated by the royal family with the greatest distinction. Early in 1840 the King's health began to fail. I was at the last reception he gave to the corps diplomatic, and on this occasion, in referring to the marriage of our Gracious Queen, which was then announced, the King observed, in his usual short but emphatic manner, "I know and esteem Prince Albert. It is a marriage after my own heart." This was the last time I saw Frederick William III.

The last act of his reign was to be carried down to the ground-floor of the Princess Liegnitz's palace, which adjoined his palace, to witness the imposing military ceremony of laying the first stone of that beautiful monument to Frederick the Great which is in front of the late Emperor William's palace, and was designed by the famous Professor Rauch. It was an act worthy of being the dying act of a Prussian monarch—an act which had been long premeditated, and which, from unexplained circumstances, had been too long delayed.

I remember, on the day of this ceremony, walking down the Linden with the Comte de Bresson, who considered the change of reign in Prussia as of great importance both to France and Europe. There was some secrecy as to the real state of the King's health. The Comte de Bresson had taken the precaution to provide himself with an opera-glass. We stood, at some distance, opposite the window of the palace where the aged monarch was

seated. After taking a long view of the King he turned to me and said, "*Il est mourant.*"

The Emperor Nicholas of Russia, who was deeply attached to the King, his father-in-law, arrived a few hours before the King breathed his last, and was present at his death-bed.

Independently of personal feelings, the death of Frederick William III., in a political sense, was deeply felt by the Emperor Nicholas. It was felt to be the precursor of the termination of that intimate alliance which had previously existed between the Sovereigns of Russia and Prussia, and which had been cemented on many a blood-stained battlefield.

During the reign of Frederick William III. the influence of Russia had weighed heavily on the Prussian people, as well as on the whole German nation, for the Emperor Nicholas was regarded as the defender and supporter of autocratic absolutism against free institutions and constitutional government. The opening of a new reign was hailed by the Liberal party in Prussia as the commencement of a new epoch of progress and of hopeful expectations, while it was viewed with alarm by the supporters of the old *régime* as the dawn of an unknown future. By no one was the change of reign regarded with greater importance to the future of Europe than by the Comte de Bresson, the French Minister, whose efforts for some time had been directed to bringing about a closer alliance between Russia and France, and who profited of every opportunity, during the frequent visits of the Emperor Nicholas to Berlin,

to attain the objects of his wishes ; but his advances were always met with a cold indifference, if not with a sturdy rebuff. What may have been the views and aspirations of the Comte de Bresson and of his Government must be of a speculative character ; they may have been reminded of the project of Prince de Polignac in 1829, which had received the assent of Charles X., and which the French Government at that time decided to send to St. Petersburg. It may not be amiss to give here a cursory description of the ambitious views then entertained by Prince de Polignac for the reconstruction of Europe. They are fully given in the Memoirs of Baron Stockmar, published by his son, from which the following sketch is taken. It is stated by Baron Stockmar that in August, 1829, there was a general belief in the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, and that the Duke of Wellington and Lord Aberdeen shared in that belief. England and Austria, it was said, would gladly have opposed it, but how could they prevent France and Prussia from joining in an alliance with Russia ? “ *Nous avons garanti* ” (says the *exposé* of Prince de Polignac) “ *à cette Puissance (Russia), sous des conditions données, sa liberté d'action, comme elle avait garanti la nôtre en 1823* ” (intervention in Spain). Metternich then proposed a partition of Turkey in which France was left out. Prussia (Bernstorff and Ancillon) thought that the phantom of a Turkish Empire should be kept up as long as possible. Russia addressed France, asking for her opinion. “ I do not wish the fall of Turkey,” said the Emperor Nicholas, “ but it is not to be averted.

If France and Russia could agree, they would be masters of the situation." It will be remembered that this same argument was used twenty-three years later by the same Emperor to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

Prince de Polignac advised that "the Russian proposal should be entertained. In every combination connected with the fall of the Ottoman Empire," he said, "the one object that must be kept in view is the breaking-up of England's dominion of the sea." At the Vienna Congress this error had been committed, and England had maintained her maritime supremacy. Now France could reassert her traditional policy of the freedom of the seas. "England," said Prince de Polignac, "had frightened Europe with the phantom of Russia, yet her offensive power had proved itself unimportant. But the Vienna Congress had committed another error—viz., of leaving Europe too much open to the attack of Russia, and Prussia too weak; whereas Russia should have been driven towards Asia, and Prussia should have been strengthened. Lastly," he said, "the treaties of 1815 had inflicted bitter injury on France, which had a right not only to the restoration of the frontiers of 1789, but to territorial aggrandisement beyond those frontiers."

The memoir presented by Prince de Polignac to the Council in September, 1829, was founded on these ideas. In it the Prince claimed Belgium for France as far as the Meuse, the Scheldt, and the sea. Belgium, it was stated, was necessary to France to cover Paris against an invasion. At the first sitting of the Council

the Dauphin objected that England would never consent to let Antwerp fall into the hands of France, and he proposed that, instead of Belgium, the Rhine provinces should be annexed. De Polignac replied, "This only proves that we must have Antwerp. Either we consent for ever to be saddled with the treaties of 1815, or we must make up our minds to incur the hostility of England. In alliance with Russia, Prussia, Bavaria, and Germany, we can force England."

At the next Council Prince de Polignac read a memoir on the relative value of Belgium as compared with the Rhine provinces. He said that the Rhine provinces were not so well situated geographically, and would be more difficult to defend and administer than Belgium; for Belgium would strengthen the maritime power of France, and she might then place herself at the head of an alliance for the freedom of the seas. The acquisition of the Rhine provinces "would involve an aggressive attitude against Germany. If France should content herself with the Rhine provinces, it would be construed as the result of a fear of England, and her credit would suffer in consequence." Thereupon the Dauphin withdrew his proposal.

Russia, according to Prince de Polignac's memoir, was to be extended in the direction of Asia. He gave her Moldavia, Wallachia, Armenia, and as much of Anatolia as she wished. She was to cut a passage to India, and take up a maritime position in the Mediterranean against England

Austria was to have Bosnia and Servia.

The rest of European Turkey was to constitute a Christian kingdom under the King of the Netherlands, by which an important maritime Power would be created to counterbalance England.

Egypt, Syria, Arabia, and the Barbary States were to be formed into a Mohammedan State under Mehemet Ali.

The North of Europe was to be reorganised with a view of increasing its maritime strength, and for this purpose Holland was to be united to Prussia. "The union of Holland with Belgium," says the memoir, "was only invented by England in order to strangle Holland's maritime power and cause its absorption by Belgium."

The nucleus of the Prussian monarchy was to be strengthened by the kingdom of Saxony, and the King of Saxony transferred to Aix-la-Chapelle as King of Austrasia, and to receive the Prussian territories between the Meuse and the Rhine.

Prussia to retain her northern part of the Rhine provinces for the purpose of keeping up communication with Holland. The southern portion to devolve on Bavaria, in order to connect the two parts of that kingdom in case of war between France and Austria. Bavaria, if taking part with France, was to obtain the Inn Viertel, Hausrich, and Salzburg.

England's consent to the whole plan was to be brought about by the cession to her of the Dutch colonies.*

* See Baron Stockmar's "Memoirs," vol. i., p. 136, chap. vii.

The project was approved by the Council, and received the assent of Charles X., and it was decided to send it to St. Petersburg to be submitted to the Czar.

When it is considered that this ambitious and nefarious project, the aim of which was directly hostile to England, was proposed by Prince de Polignac, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Charles X., only fourteen years after the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty by the gigantic efforts and unceasing perseverance of Great Britain, no language is sufficiently expressive to denounce such base treachery and ingratitude, and it would almost appear as a providential act that this scheme was frustrated by an event which crushed the projectors of it before even it had been submitted to the Czar. It is no less a remarkable example of irony that the Sovereign who had assented to it should within a few months be expelled from his throne and driven for shelter to the very country against which this hostile policy was directed.

It was, however, defeated by the Revolution of 1830, when Charles X. was dethroned. It not only portrays a strong hostility and hatred to England, and bears the stamp of the grossest ingratitude, by the wish to deprive England of the supremacy of the seas, but it also displays the inordinate ambition of aggrandisement on the part of the French Government of that day, and the lurking desire, even at that time, to abolish the treaties of 1815, which had replaced the Bourbon dynasty on the throne of France.

I have entered into this digression as explanatory of the object which I conceive instigated the Comte de Bresson in his repeated efforts to captivate the Czar and to bring about a more cordial understanding, if not a secret alliance, between France and Russia. But the Emperor Nicholas, whose sympathies and feelings were on the side of legitimacy and in favour of the direct line of succession, could not approve of the accession of a Sovereign by revolutionary means, and although recognising Louis Philippe as sovereign *de facto*, he declined in his official letters to address him in the usual form of "Monsieur Mon Frère."

CHAPTER V.

Eastern Affairs—Quadruple Treaty to arrest the March of Mehemet Ali—Indignation of French Government—M. Thiers's Attempt to gain Allies—War imminent—Change of Ministry in France—Secret Courier to order Bulow not to Sign the Treaty, but he arrived too late—Mission of Zea Bermudez to obtain Recognition of the Queen of Spain counteracted by Austria—Conversation with Prince Metternich on the Creation of the Germanic Confederation; its Nature and Defects—Prince Metternich's Recommendation of Count Rechberg as Successor to Count Beust—Prince Metternich's Relation of his Saving the Life of Prince Louis (afterwards Emperor Napoleon III.)—Prince Metternich's Admiration of Queen Hortense—Character of Prince Metternich: his Policy—Funeral of Frederick William III.—The Mausoleum at Charlottenburg—Funeral of Prince Sigismund at Potsdam.

SHORTLY after the accession of Frederick William IV. the affairs of the East occupied the attention of Europe. Mehemet Ali, Governor of Egypt, had placed himself in open rebellion to the Sultan, and was advancing to occupy Syria. It was no secret that he was encouraged by France, and looked to France for support.

The time was critical and pressing. There seemed no possibility of securing the co-operation of France with the other Powers, and Lord Palmerston saw that if no immediate action were taken, the delay in doing so might be productive of serious consequences. He accordingly entered into a convention with Austria, Russia, and Prussia to arrest the advance of Mehemet Ali. France was not included in this alliance, but it was left open to her to accede to it. This isolation of

France in a great European question was deeply resented by the French Government, at the head of which was Monsieur Thiers. War seemed imminent, and the Comte de Bresson openly announced the expectation of receiving his letters of recall. He even charged me to tell Lord Russell that his establishment would be broken up, and his effects and wines sold by auction. Monsieur Thiers made every attempt to gain allies in Europe, and even made a brilliant offer to the Southern States of Germany, but was wholly unsuccessful in his endeavours; and, failing to induce Louis Philippe to engage in war, had to resign, and was succeeded by M. Guizot. I learnt some time afterwards—from a person to whom it was told by Baron Bulow himself, who was then Prussian Minister in London—that a few hours after he had signed the Convention in London he received a secret courier direct from the King, Frederick William IV., forbidding him to affix his signature to it. But the act was done, and could not be undone. If Prussia had not joined the alliance, there can be no doubt that France, under M. Thiers, would have gone to war, notwithstanding the pacific disposition of Louis Philippe. How remarkable it is that the destinies of nations are often governed by incidents of the most trivial character!

Previous to 1840 Oriental affairs had not much interested Prussian statesmen. They now became impressed with the importance of maintaining the Ottoman Empire and the *status quo* in Europe, and of thereby avoiding a general conflagration. Till that

period there had been no Turkish representative at Berlin, although a Prussian Envoy was accredited to the Sultan. It was accordingly decided at Constantinople to send a Turkish Envoy to Berlin, and Kiamil Pacha was appointed by the Sultan as his representative at the Court of Prussia. I remember that previous to his arrival it was discovered that the last Turkish representative had died at Berlin many years ago, and had never been replaced. It was, therefore, thought desirable to look for his tomb, or to select one for the occasion if it could not be found. At last a tomb was discovered where it was said the deceased follower of Mahomet had been buried, and it was repaired and put in order, to be shown to the new Turkish Minister on his arrival.

Kiamil Pacha was an intelligent gentlemanly man—a Turk of the old school—with good manners, great calmness and self-possession, never flurried or taken aback, imperturbable, as all Orientals are—the result probably of their being fatalists. He was lively in conversation, with some humour and sarcasm. I recollect shortly after his arrival he gave a dinner to the Foreign Ministers—at which the English, French, and Russian Ministers were present. The two latter were senior in precedence to my chief, Lord William Russell, having presented their letters of credence anterior to him. The Pacha was annoyed at not being able to place Lord William on his right hand, the place of honour. However, he devised the means of rectifying this. On taking their places, he

motioned to Lord William Russell to take the seat opposite to him, observing at the same time that "*Les bons amis se regardent toujours en face.*"

A difficulty has occasionally arisen in regard to the appearance of Turkish representatives at religious ceremonies in their "fez," when all others are bare-headed. The last occasion I remember was at St. Petersburg, at the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh, when the Turkish Ambassador was Rustem Pacha, now the much-esteemed representative of Turkey in London, who is a Roman Catholic. By custom, and the laws of the Koran, I believe, no Turkish official is allowed to appear on any ceremonious occasion without wearing the fez. In fact, it is a part of his uniform, and can no more be dispensed with than any other article of his dress. These difficulties have always been harmoniously arranged, to the mutual satisfaction of all concerned; and I may add that with one of so conciliating a character, and so perfect a gentleman as Rustem Pacha, no serious difficulty could possibly have occurred.

At the time to which I am referring, and during the whole reign of Frederick William III., Austria and Prussia were in close alliance. Their policy was based on the principles which had dictated the Holy Alliance, formed at the close of the War of Liberation. Prussia, with remarkable foresight (to which her present position at the head of the German Empire is chiefly due), was contented to leave the direction of her foreign policy in the hands of Prince Metternich—Austria, on the

other hand, giving to Prussia entire freedom to regulate the commercial relations with the German States. An instance of this occurred in 1839. Monsieur Zea Bermudez had been sent to Berlin and Vienna to obtain the recognition of Queen Isabella. Having been a Minister of Ferdinand VII., it was supposed that his influence would ensure success. He was accompanied by Monsieur de Marliani as colleague, a man of great ability. On their arrival at Berlin he could obtain no satisfactory reply, but was referred by the Prussian Government to Prince Metternich. On reaching Vienna Monsieur Zea Bermudez was informed that his companion, Monsieur de Marliani, an Italian by birth, who had been mixed up with the revolutionary party in that country, had been condemned *in contumaciam*, and was liable to be arrested. He accordingly had to leave Vienna *instantly* for London; and the mission of which he had been a member utterly failed in its object.

It was in 1828 that Prussia first commenced negotiations with the German States for the formation of a Customs Union, or Zollverein. This formed the basis on which, later, the superstructure of German unity was raised, and laid the foundation of Prussian supremacy in Germany. This work, so ably conceived and so skillfully accomplished, bound the commercial interests of the German States so closely with those of Prussia that they formed that link which could not be separated from their political interests, and hence, when duly matured, gave Prussia that overwhelming influence in Germany which completely overshadowed Austria and

rendered her powerless when the moment of the political struggle for supremacy arrived.

I recollect Prince Metternich telling me in 1859, not long before his death, that the creation of the Germanic Confederation owed its origin to him. He said that at the Congress of Vienna it had been proposed to the Emperor of Austria to resume his title and position of Emperor of Germany, and he had strongly dissuaded the Emperor from accepting it. He (the Prince) had then formed the idea of creating a confederation of all the German States in the form of a Germanic Diet, which would act as a powerful body in the centre of Europe, and by its united military forces be enabled to resist any external attack, whilst it would equally serve as a security for the maintenance of peace. Prince Metternich even said to me then, "You will see—I may not—that the Germanic Diet will yet prove to be the saviour of Europe." Within six years it was dissolved like a ball of snow, and disappeared without causing a protest or a regret. It was a cumbersome machine, which kept alive the petty dissensions and rivalries of the minor States, and sowed the seeds of jealousy between the two great German Powers. It was purely an assembly of the representatives of the Governments, and not of the peoples. It had no firm root in the hearts of the German people, who never viewed it with confidence or affection; and consequently, when the storm came, it was swept away because its foundation rested on the sand of absolutism, and not on the rock of popular support.

When Count Buol Schauenstein, who had succeeded Prince Felix Schwarzenberg as Foreign Minister in Austria, retired from office on the close of the Franco-Austrian War, Count Rechberg, at the recommendation of Prince Metternich, was appointed his successor. On the evening of his appointment I was at a reception of Prince Metternich's. The venerable and distinguished statesman used to sit at the end of a long table, around which were assembled for conversation and knitting a coterie of elderly ladies, who were his relatives and intimate friends. There was a chair placed next to the Prince on his right hand, which was taken by the first visitor, and occupied by him until a new arrival. On the occasion I refer to Prince Metternich, on my arrival, led me into an adjoining room, much to the astonishment of those present. He then said that he had recommended Count Rechberg as the successor of Count Buol, and he was very anxious that he should be viewed with confidence by her Majesty's Government. He requested me therefore to convey his strong recommendation of Count Rechberg to her Majesty's Government, and begged me to say on his behalf, "*Que c'est un élève de mon école.*" Of course, I immediately assented to the Prince's request, and said that, from having known Count Rechberg personally for many years, I felt the greater pleasure in fulfilling his wish, and that I felt confident he would fully realise the Prince's expectations. I felt, however, some doubt in my own mind whether the Prince's recommendation of Count Rechberg as "*un élève de son école*" would have

the weight with Lord Palmerston which the Prince attached to it.

It was on the same evening that Prince Metternich related to me the circumstance of his having saved the life of Prince Louis Napoleon and restored him to his mother. Prince Louis, with his elder brother—who were both living at Florence with their father, the Comte de St. Leu, ex-King of Holland—had openly taken part in the revolution which took place in the Papal States, and were taken prisoners at Forlì. The elder brother, Prince Napoleon, died of fever, and his brother was captive in the hands of the Austrians. Their mother, Queen Hortense, wrote to Prince Metternich entreating his clemency for her son, and requesting for herself permission to go to Forlì to nurse him. The Prince spoke in raptures of the Queen Hortense, of her cleverness, and of the charm of her society, and said that her appeal, so touching, so eloquent, was irresistible. He sent her the permission to pass the Austrian lines to Forlì, and by his intercession Prince Louis's life was spared, and he returned with his mother to Arenenberg. There was a chivalry, a nobleness of character, and a magnanimity about the Prince which endeared him to everyone who knew him.

All that can be said in regard to his statesmanship is that he never progressed beyond 1815, and that he lived a hundred years too late. His character and nature were more suited to the days of Louis XIV. than to modern times. He was a *grand seigneur* in all his thoughts and actions, dignified and courteous, with a

charm of manner that was most captivating. He was of a noble and generous disposition, and with the immense power he possessed (for he ruled for many years the vast empire of Austria) history cannot record any act of his of an ungenerous or revengeful nature. In regard to his policy, it must be borne in mind that he was born and educated at a period when arbitrary rule was the order of the day, and when neither enlightened civilisation nor education had reached its present standard. He was brought up in the school of absolutism, and it cannot be denied that he remained steadfast and faithful to its principles to the last. At his age it was difficult, not to say impossible, for him to change the convictions of his early youth, or to accept the new principles of constitutional government which mark the progress of the age, and to which the French Revolution of 1789 had given birth. But it is not the less true that he foresaw in his latter years, with horror and alarm, the great changes which were impending in Europe, and which were to herald the introduction of Liberal institutions. To the saying of Prince Metternich, shortly before his fall in 1848, "*Après moi le déluge*," the Red Socialists replied, "*Et après le déluge, nous*." He had failed to see, with that prescience which is the mark of genius, that the oak which does not bend to the storm is uprooted. He held to the principles of the Holy Alliance, which linked together the absolute Sovereigns for common protection against the wave of democracy and the rising power of the people.

To this Alliance Great Britain was no party. She

kept aloof, and although she was represented at the Congress of Troppau and of Laybach, she declined to take any active part in a policy of which she disapproved. At that time a Neapolitan revolution was crushed by the arms of Austria acting in the name of the Holy Alliance. Similar action was suggested when another Bourbon Sovereign was threatened in Spain. A Congress was then summoned to meet at Verona, and England was represented by the Duke of Wellington; but the masterly hand of Canning, in conjunction with the influence of the Duke of Wellington, checked the spirit of intervention. The Congress separated without any result, and it proved to be the closing scene of the Holy Alliance.

From this date Prince Metternich appears to have given up all action on the principles of the Holy Alliance, and to have adopted the more rational course of "non-intervention." During the period of the French Revolution of 1830, and subsequently during the dynastic troubles in Spain and Portugal, Prince Metternich abstained from interference, but did not on that account abandon his principles, for during his tenure of power the Queens of Spain and Portugal were never recognised by Austria.

The funeral of Frederick William III. took place with great military pomp. The service was performed in the Dom near the old Schloss, and the coffin was conveyed at night by torchlight to Charlottenburg, followed by all the members of the royal family, where it was deposited in their presence, next to his

beloved Queen Louisa. It is said that the late King left special directions in regard to his funeral, giving in minutest detail the military dispositions of the troops to be observed on the occasion.

The mausoleum at Charlottenburg, expressly built by Frederick William III., with the beautiful recumbent statue of Queen Louisa by Rauch, has now been enlarged, and the Emperor William I. and the Empress Augusta repose in it with their illustrious parents and predecessors. It is said that no further additions are to be made to it. The remains of Frederick William IV. are deposited in the Friedens Kirche at Potsdam, where the Emperor Frederick III. is buried. It was built by Frederick William IV., and the two young Princes, Sigismund and Waldemar, sons of the Emperor Frederick III., are also interred there.

I was at Berlin when Prince Sigismund died on the 18th of June, 1866, a few days after the Crown Prince had left for the seat of war. He was a charming, intelligent, sweet boy, and I could not refrain from tears when I saw his angelic form placed in the coffin. It was sad that at such a moment the father should have been deprived of a last embrace of his dearly-loved child by his duty to his country, and that the Crown Princess should have been without his comforting support and consolation. The funeral was an impressive scene—the Crown Princess alone with the coffin in the carriage; only one other carriage for her ladies; the procession on foot, headed by Field-Marshal Wrangel and Baron Schleinitz, Minister of the Household, on

either side of me. Thus we walked from the New Palace down the beautiful avenue leading to the Friedens Kirche. The sun shining brilliantly, the birds singing, and all Nature resplendent with the brightness of a summer's day, contrasted with the solemn but simple pageant consigning a youthful prince of great promise to his last resting-place! It made a grave impression on me, and I felt deeply for his illustrious and loving mother.

CHAPTER VI.

Political Position of Prussia on the Death of Frederick William III.—Character of Frederick William IV.—Mrs. Fry and Richard Allen—Peaceful Disposition of Frederick William IV.—Queen Elizabeth's Visit to St. Petersburg—Recall of Baron Bulow—Appointment of Chevalier Bunsen—Bulow appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs—Recall of Lord William Russell—Appointment of Lord Burghersh—Visit of the King of Prussia to London—Return Visit of Her Majesty the Queen to Stolzenfels.

I WILL now resume my observations on the position of Prussia at the death of Frederick William III.

The accession of Frederick William IV. to the Throne of Prussia was an event of more than ordinary importance to Europe, and was looked forward to with hopeful aspirations as the dawn of a new and brighter era for the Fatherland.

The War of Liberation, the vast losses occasioned by it, and the large indemnity paid to France, had weighed heavily on all classes.

Prussia had now recovered in some measure from its direful effects, and the life of the nation was assuming—financially, morally, and physically—a fresh vigour after the period of stagnation through which she had passed. The finances, by the able and parsimonious administration under the late King, had been greatly restored, and the creation of the German Customs Union (commonly called the Zollverein) had

given a great stimulus to the commerce and wealth of the nation. After twenty-five years of peace Prussia was resuscitated as from a long slumber, and was prepared to enter on a fresh struggle in the cause of political liberty.

The germs of freedom and of constitutional government had been sown, and although their growth had been slow, it had been progressive, and time and opportunity alone were wanting to bring them to maturity. This time had now arrived, and the accession of Frederick William IV. was the opportunity so long and so ardently looked forward to by the nation.

For some time there had been those unmistakable signs of impatience and discontent, of a restless spirit, and of a craving yearning for free institutions, which are the precursors of progress and the promoters of national life. Under the old *régime* of absolute government, however paternal that government may have been, there was a torpor, a want of energy and vitality, which paralysed the whole body of the nation. The Press was under strict supervision, and even though the censorship was mildly exercised, its very existence was sufficient to deaden the moral energies and heart of the people. Thought had no free vent. The right of public meeting was interdicted, and every patriotic feeling was crushed. The natural result was that secret societies were formed; revolutionary pamphlets were circulated by stealth; and principles and intentions in themselves harmless and loyal to the Throne were envenomed by the opposition they encountered, and

were thus forced into other and more dangerous channels.

Frederick William IV. was possessed of great virtues, of remarkable abilities, and of a cultivated mind. He was a very religious man, and his actions were governed by a deep religious feeling of duty—of duty to his God and duty to his country. He was devoted to classical literature and philosophical studies, and his greatest pleasure was in the society of the celebrated professors of the day—Tieck, Grimm, Lepsius, and others—who used of an evening to read aloud his favourite classical authors, amongst them the plays of Euripides and Sophocles (translated by Donner), as also Shakespeare. He caused *A Midsummer Night's Dream* to be produced, and had arranged for representation on the stage, entirely on the ancient Greek model, the Greek plays of the *Antigone* and of the *Medea*, for which Felix Mendelssohn was entrusted to compose the music.

Frederick William IV. was passionately fond of architecture, and was a fair draughtsman. He had a great love of art in all its branches, and was a liberal patron of artists. He was in many things an idealist, and his imagination was always of a poetical and romantic character, sometimes of a classical turn, and but rarely of that nature to be of practical use in the exercise of his high functions. He was kind-hearted, noble-minded, generous, fond of the society of learned men, brilliant in conversation, with a remarkable flow of wit and repartee. He was a great admirer of the

Church of England and of its Liturgy, which he often expressed a wish to introduce into the Lutheran service. I recollect the visit of Mrs. Elizabeth Fry and Mr. Richard Allen to Berlin, when they received marked attention from the King, who took great interest in them and assisted in their philanthropic work for prison reform. Baron Alexander Humboldt was also a great admirer of Mrs. Fry, and I recollect meeting him at dinner at her residence, where the only other guest was Miss Gurney, her niece, a very prepossessing young lady, who was then only what is termed a "wet" Quakeress, as she had not yet adopted the solemn apparel of the full Quakeress. On his visit to London Frederick William IV. paid a visit to Mrs. Fry, accompanied by Baron Humboldt.

But however brilliant these qualities of Frederick William IV. would have been in a private individual, they were not such as were suited for a Sovereign of Prussia at the momentous epoch when he ascended the Throne. Although liberally inclined, and with large and noble views, he was of a vacillating character, unable to form a decided opinion, but constantly wavering and allowing his actions to be guided by the impulse of the moment. Hence it was order, counter-order, and the natural result—disorder. His mind was influenced by divergent impulses, and his acts consequently bore a desultory character. Thus it was said during the Crimean War that in the morning, after his devotions, he was an admirer of the English; but at night, after a cup of Russian tea, he went to bed in favour of Russia.

Frederick William IV. was no soldier. He was devoted to peace, on Christian principles, and it was natural therefore that he should have no predilection for the engines of war. But Prussia is a military nation; it has grown by military exploits; all the traditions of the country and its Sovereigns have been military. It was not, therefore, to be expected that great military achievements would take place during his reign; still it was felt that Prussia could alone attain the ascendancy she aspired to in Germany by means of the army. This is the real interpretation of Prince Bismarck's phrase, "*Blut und Eisen.*" As a proof of the repulsion which the King felt for war, I may mention that on taking leave of the general who had been appointed commander-in-chief of the army in Hesse-Cassel in 1844, his last words to him were, "I hold you responsible by your head that no blood is shed." It was on this occasion that the Prussian troops at Bronzell retired when the Austrian troops advanced. An arrangement was come to, and no conflict took place.

Frederick William IV. had for consort Princess Elizabeth of Bavaria, sister to the Archduchess Sophie, mother of the Emperor Franz Joseph, a princess of a most amiable disposition, devoted to the King, and greatly and deservedly beloved by all classes. She was a Roman Catholic by birth, but on her marriage became a Protestant. The King and the Queen were models of purity and goodness, and there never existed a better or a happier couple. They had no issue, and at

the King's death the crown devolved on the Prince William, his next brother, who had borne the title of Prince of Prussia as Heir-Presumptive.

I may here mention that in December, 1840, I was sent up by Lord William Russell with despatches for Lord Clanricarde, our Ambassador at the Court of Russia. Lord Bloomfield was acting as Chargé d'Affaires in the absence of the Ambassador, and I delivered the despatches to him. There was no railway at the time, and I had to post all the way from Berlin. I was nine days and nights on the road, in intensely cold weather, and was much delayed by the bridges across the Vistula and Niemen being removed. I was thus obliged to leave my carriage at Riga and cross in an open boat—a very risky and dangerous operation when large blocks of ice are floating down. I was further delayed by having to put my hired carriage on a sledge where the snow was deep, and to replace it on wheels where the snow was not sufficient for a sledge. The post-houses were then chiefly kept by Germans, and were clean and comfortable; but the Russian ones were, from their dirt and discomfort, quite impracticable. In those days it was necessary to have a *Padoroschna* (an order for post-horses). This and the passport were copied into a book at each station, which caused unnecessary delay in travelling.

At St. Petersburg I went to an English lodging-house, in the Galernoi Olutz, recommended to me by Count Matuschévitz, which was most comfortable. Captain Shakespeare, who had arrived in charge of the

Russian prisoners who had been in captivity at Khiva, and had been liberated through the instrumentality of the British Government, was staying there. He was an Indian officer of distinction (afterwards Sir Richard Shakespeare), and had conducted the Russian captives as far as Orenburg. He there delivered them over to the Russian authorities, and proceeded direct to St. Petersburg. We were presented on the same day, but separately, to the Emperor Nicholas at the Winter Palace. His Majesty received me very graciously, made many inquiries as to the health of the King of Prussia (Frederick William IV.) and in regard to the Court and society. He referred in kindly terms to English persons of note whom he had known—the Duke of Wellington, Lord Durham, and others—and inquired after a Colonel Ponsonby, who had been reported dead on the field of Waterloo, but who had miraculously revived. There was something eminently imposing and grand about the Emperor Nicholas, and notwithstanding his sternness of expression, there was a charm in his smile and in his manner which was very pleasing. He was a fine character, noble-hearted, generous, and much beloved by those in his intimacy. His severity was rather obligatory than voluntary; it arose more from his conviction that it was necessary to govern and control his nation with a firm and vigorous hand than from any innate feeling of cruelty and oppression. The tragic death of his father, the Emperor Paul; the mysterious death of his elder brother, the Emperor Alexander, in a remote town of

the empire ; and the troubles which threatened the accession to the Throne on the abdication of his elder brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, could not fail of producing a hardening effect on a strong and vigorous mind, and of disposing him, in governing with an iron hand, to dispense with the velvet glove.

The death of the Emperor Alexander has always been a mystery which has never been explained, and has given rise to many false reports of his having been poisoned, of his self-destruction, and of assassination. The real circumstances regarding it were related to me by a personal friend of Sir C. Wyllie (who was the Emperor's physician and friend), to whom they were related by Sir C. Wyllie himself.

It appears that the Emperor Alexander had been secretly informed of a conspiracy being formed against him, and that a plot had been made to seize him on his return from Moscow to St. Petersburg very much of the same description as had led to the assassination of his father, the Emperor Paul. It may have been hallucination, for the Emperor Alexander was eccentric in many respects. However, whether real or imaginary, the Emperor acted under its influence, and instead of returning to St. Petersburg by the route which had been decided on, he directed his way southward to Taganrog. He was there laid up with a bilious fever. Nothing would induce him to follow the advice and course recommended by his physician, Wyllie, and supported by the entreaties of the Empress. It seemed as if he courted death, and would take no means to avert

it. He ordered a priest to be sent for. The Empress and Wyllie both impressed on the Emperor the duty of following his medical adviser's prescription, and at the earnest solicitation of the Empress he finally agreed to do so.

The priest severely admonished the Emperor on the sin of seeking death, stigmatising it as suicide, and refused to administer the rites of the Church until he had complied with the Empress's and doctor's advice. The Emperor then consented to have leeches applied to allay the congestion of the brain which had set in. The Empress on visiting him kissed his hand, and expressed her thanks for his adopting the remedy ordered by Wyllie. He then called Wyllie, and asked the Empress and Wyllie whether they were satisfied. On their expressing their satisfaction, he suddenly tore off the leeches and prevented their action, which was the only means of saving his life. The disease thus left to run its course, the Emperor shortly after expired.

Wyllie was a young surgeon,* and was first brought to notice by his skilful treatment of one of the combatants in a duel (between Stroganoff and Galitzin, the latter of whom had been wounded in the thigh).

But Wyllie was more especially brought into notice by another incident. The Emperor Paul before his accession to the Throne had a great friend and confidant in a Baron Blome (I think, a Swede). After his accession he wrote to the King of Sweden to ask him to

* In those days the title of "surgeon" was not known in Russia; they were termed "operators."

appoint him, with the title of Count Blome, as his Minister to the Imperial Court. The King of Sweden immediately acceded to the request. Count Blome fell dangerously ill; the Emperor was in great grief, and implored Wyllie to use all his endeavours to save him. Under his able treatment Count Blome recovered. The Emperor, out of gratitude to Wyllie, appointed him to be his surgeon, and he never travelled without him. Wyllie thus attained a high position at Court, and became the medical adviser of the Emperor Alexander. I remember in 1840 making his acquaintance at a dinner at Prince Butéra's, then Neapolitan Minister at St. Petersburg. Count Nesselrode was one of the guests. On the *menu* was inscribed "A saddle of English mutton." It was in the depth of winter, and I could not imagine how (considering that the quickest communication between London and St. Petersburg required at least a fortnight) a saddle of English mutton could find itself at a dinner in St. Petersburg. I was then told that many *bons vivants* imported by the last steamer from England some fifteen or twenty sheep, and fed them during the winter till required for the table. The fatted sheep was killed for this Christmas *festino*, and never shall I forget the exclamation of Count Nesselrode on his discovering that the saddle of English mutton had been "piquéd" by the Prince's renowned *chef*! I enjoyed the joke and the mutton exceedingly.

I was very hospitably received at St. Petersburg. I had a *couvert* daily at Monsieur and Mme. de

Lazareff's. She was *née* Princesse Biron de Courlande—a descendant of the Biron raised to opulence and ennobled by Catherine II. Monsieur de Lazareff owes his fortune to his grandfather, who in Persia became possessed of a very valuable diamond of great size. He knew that he could get a very large price for it in Russia, but there was difficulty and danger in its leaving the country. He devised a plan of doing so by making an incision in his thigh, and therein concealing this valuable stone, covering it with a plaster. On his arrival at St. Petersburg it was purchased by the Empress Catherine at a fabulous price, which was the foundation of the wealth of the Lazareff family.

Among the invitations I received to dinner was that of Monsieur de Barante, then French Ambassador to the Imperial Court, a very distinguished man with prepossessing manners of the old school. The Secretary of the French Embassy was then Casimir Périer, who afterwards played a considerable political part in France. He was very agreeable and popular in society, notwithstanding the tension then existing between the two Courts (for I may here observe that whoever does not enjoy in Russia the Imperial smiles is not favourably viewed by society). I was also very hospitably received by Count and Countess Woronzoff-Dashkoff and Princess Helen Béloselski, who afterwards married Prince Basile Kotchoubey. Without any regular traits of beauty, she had an indescribable charm of manner which was most fascinating. She was Grande Maîtresse to the

present Empress of Russia until her death. Her son, Prince Béloselski—the largest mine-holder in the Ural Mountains—married a sister of the famous General Skobeleff, and her daughter is Princess Élise Troubetskoi, well known in the political world of Paris.

I was also present at the ceremony in the Winter Palace of the *fiançailles* of the Czaréwitch, afterwards Emperor Alexander II., with the Princess of Hesse—or, as it is termed in Russia, the “exchange of rings”—a very imposing ceremony, as are all the religious ceremonies of the Greek Church. I went with Lord Clanricarde, and, curiously enough, stood (for all the religious ceremonies of the Greek Church are conducted standing or kneeling) in the same place where I stood thirty-four years after as Ambassador at the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh. In the evening we returned to the palace for a Presentation Court, held by the betrothed couple, which was followed by a *bal polonais*, which only lasted an hour.

Lord Clanricarde was most kind to me, and arranged that I might pass a few days at St. Petersburg before returning to Berlin. No one could be more agreeable or popular in society, nor a more distinguished diplomatist than Lord Clanricarde; and he was ably supported by his charming and clever wife, who was a daughter of George Canning. After a fortnight's enjoyment of St. Petersburg I returned to Berlin, which I reached in six days and twenty hours.

In 1841 a change took place in the Prussian

Legation in London. Baron Bulow, who had been many years Prussian Envoy at the English Court, was recalled, and appointed to represent Prussia at the Germanic Diet. But shortly afterwards the Ministry for Foreign Affairs became vacant by the death of Count Maltzan. He was a man of high aristocratic tenets, of refined manner, and of an amiable and kind disposition. He had been for some years Prussian Envoy at Vienna, where his daughter, of great beauty and charm, had married Lord Beauvale, afterwards Viscount Melbourne, the British Ambassador at the Imperial Court.

Baron Bulow was then appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it is said that he owed this appointment to the influence of Baron Humboldt, who was the intimate friend of the King. His long residence in England had initiated him in the important foreign questions of the day, and it gave emphasis to the King's ardent wish to maintain the most friendly relations with England. The appointment was not viewed with satisfaction either at Paris, Vienna, or St. Petersburg. At Paris it was remembered that Baron Bulow had signed the Quadruple Treaty in 1840 which had excluded France, and it was, therefore, supposed that his political sympathies were more inclined towards England than to France. At Vienna and St. Petersburg it was feared that in the English atmosphere in which he had so long lived, and with his daily associations with British statesmen, he had imbibed those ideas of Liberal and constitutional

government which at that time were not in harmony with the views or feelings of Austrian and Russian statesmen. Baron Bulow had married in early life a daughter of Wilhelm von Humboldt, a most distinguished lady, in whose *salon* I have passed many an agreeable hour.

By the recall of Baron Bulow the post of Minister in London became vacant. The King was very anxious that the candidate to be selected should be a *persona grata* to the Queen. Accordingly three names were submitted to her for selection. They were those of General Count Kanitz; Count Dönhoff, then Minister at Munich; and the Chevalier Bunsen, a personal friend of the King, who had been successfully employed in the negotiations with England for the creation of a Bishopric of Jerusalem. His Majesty, in reply, was informed that any appointment by him would be agreeable to Her Majesty; but that should the selection fall on the Chevalier Bunsen, the appointment would be viewed with satisfaction. The name of Chevalier Bunsen was well known in England from his literary works. He had spent some years at Rome with his friend Niebuhr and in Switzerland, and was personally acquainted with many English families of note. He was thoroughly conversant with the English language, with English literature and English customs; and his appointment was, therefore, favourably regarded in official circles, as well as by his many friends.

The change of Ministry in England in 1841 brought about also a change in the British Legation at Berlin.

Lord William Russell, who had ably filled the post of Envoy to the Prussian Court, was recalled by Lord Aberdeen, and Lord Burghersh, afterwards Earl of Westmorland, who had been for many years British Minister at Florence, was appointed his successor.

Lord Burghersh's appointment was well viewed at Berlin. He was a military man, and had been Military Commissioner to the Austrian army under Prince Schwarzenberg in the campaigns of 1813, 1814, and 1815, and was decorated with the distinguished Cross of Maria Theresa. He had taken part in the battle of Leipsic. He was also a musician, and had composed an opera. He was a great patron of the Arts, and I have seen assembled at his hospitable board dukes, Excellencies, and counts, all intermingled with musicians, poets, philosophers, and artists—which was a novelty to the “sedate” and formal Prussian aristocracy. Simultaneously with his Excellency von Humboldt would be announced at a dinner party Herr Taglioni, Director of the Ballet. It was very amusing, but somewhat *bizarre* in formal German society, but the manners of Lord Westmorland were so captivating that nothing was taken ill from him. I recollect on one occasion an English gentleman called to see Lord Westmorland on particular business. He was at breakfast, and, receiving him with his usual urbanity, asked the object of his visit. The gentleman said that he felt somewhat aggrieved that he had brought an official letter of introduction to him from the Foreign Office, and having learnt that his lordship had given a great dinner the

night before was surprised and hurt at receiving no invitation. Lord Westmorland exclaimed, with his usual heartiness, "God bless me, sir, I am really quite distressed. I think I received the letter of which you speak. I will send for it." Accordingly the letter was brought to him, and on reading it he said to the stranger, "Ah! I thought so. There, sir, is the letter, but there is no mention of dinner in it," on which the gentleman rose, and backed out of the room in confusion. Lord Westmorland never admitted the possibility of a refusal. He exercised such power by his geniality and good-humour that any request from him was looked upon as undeniable, and incapable of being met with a negative. He was very fond of music, and was possessed of considerable musical genius. I have been told that at Florence he was accompanied in his rides by a distinguished artist, and that he used to hum certain bars of music as he cantered on horseback, directing the artist on his return to score them for the opera he was then composing.

Lord Westmorland was possessed of versatile genius. He is said to have once written a pamphlet to prove that St. Peter never went to Rome. I have not read it, and cannot, therefore, express an opinion on its merits; and I only mention it, to prove the extensive area over which his active mind travelled.

The visit of the King of Prussia to England, on the invitation of her Majesty the Queen to be godfather to the Prince of Wales in 1842, attracted the

attention of Europe, and was an event which strongly marked the friendly feelings on the part of the King towards England. But, notwithstanding the jealousies and the groundless suspicions to which it gave rise, it was but natural that on so auspicious an occasion the ruler of a great Protestant country should graciously profit of the opportunity of evincing to the world the intimate relations existing between the two great Protestant countries of Europe, and of offering a happy omen of their future continuance.

The King was accompanied by a numerous suite, of whom Count Stolberg and Baron Alexander von Humboldt were the chief personages. The visit was most successful in every way, and left a deep impression on the mind of the King. The Queen conferred on the King the Order of the Garter, the motto of which the King had entwined on the star he wore of the Black Eagle.

The visit was returned by the Queen in the following year at the castle of Stolzenfels, the beautiful residence on the Rhine.

CHAPTER VII.

My Appointment—Stuttgart—Observation of Lord Brougham on visiting the Royal Stables of the King of Würtemberg—Prince Jerome Bonaparte—Society—Prince Gortschakoff—The Grand Duchy of Baden—Visit to Baden-Baden—My Marriage—The Grand Duchess Stephanie—"Caspar Hauser"; the Mystery concerning Him—Visit with the Grand Duchess Stephanie to the Lichtenthal Convent—Lines on the Grave of a Nun—Our Visit to the Grand Duchess at Mannheim; her Family—The Grand Duchess Sophie of Baden—Marriage of the Prince of Leiningen to the Princess Marie, Daughter of the Grand Duke—Destruction by Fire of Carlsruhe Theatre—The Revolution of 1849—My Encounter with the Soldiers of the Free Corps—Battle of Gernsbach—The Advance of the Prussian and German Army under the Prince of Prussia.

IN 1844 I was appointed, by Lord Aberdeen, paid Attaché at Stuttgart, having been seven years on the list of those patriotic servants who had served their country without any salary. Although I left Berlin with regret, I was not sorry to become acquainted with other portions of Germany, and to study on the spot the political, commercial, and industrial relations of Southern Germany. Coming from the arid sandy plains of Brandenburg, a stranger is much struck by the rich fertility and vineyards of Southern Germany. Stuttgart is a curious old town, part of which is very picturesque. There is a handsome palace, on which there is a large gilt crown, which looks as if it had fallen from the clouds. Its situation in the valley of the Neckar is very beautiful, with vineyards sloping down to the town. There

is a beautiful villa near to the town, with a Moorish garden, on which the late King expended vast sums. When the railway was constructed—although it could have been easily carried, and with less expense, on even ground by another line into the town—a tunnel of some distance was made, exactly under the dining-room of the King's villa. This tunnel was not absolutely necessary, but the Würtembergers of that day thought it a proud thing, in imitation of other countries, to possess a railway tunnel.

The King had a magnificent stud of Arab horses, which he procured at great expense from Syria, and of which he was very proud. When Lord Brougham visited Stuttgart, he was taken round the stables by the King's Master of the Horse. It was a bitterly cold day, and Lord Brougham, slightly clad, and with trousers scarcely reaching to his ankles, ran hastily through the stables, never looked at a horse, and on coming out merely observed to the Master of the Horse, "That the money spent on the stables would be more advantageously spent in building a suitable university for the education of the nobility." The Master of the Horse, unaccustomed to receive any but loud encomiums of praise and admiration, was reduced to dumb silence.

The late King of Würtemberg was a very clever man and the best general in Germany. He had distinguished himself in the campaign of Napoleon, by whom the Electorate had been raised to the rank of a kingdom. His sister, Princess Pauline, had married

Jerome Bonaparte, then King of Westphalia, and was the father of Prince Napoleon and Prince Jerome. The latter was residing at Stuttgart at the time I speak of, and I was personally acquainted with him. He was clever, but eccentric. He had a strange hallucination that he had taken part in his uncle's campaigns, and had headed a charge of cavalry at Waterloo. It reminds me that George IV. was gifted with a similar hallucination, and on one occasion, when Prince Regent, had referred to the Duke of Wellington, who was sitting opposite to him at dinner, to confirm his statement that he had commanded a cavalry corps at Waterloo. His Grace merely replied, "That he had always heard his Royal Highness say so."

In those days the society at Stuttgart was, though limited in number, very agreeable and sociable. There was a very good opera, chiefly maintained at the expense of the King. The Court was hospitable and brilliant, and the corps diplomatic well composed. Prince Gortschakoff, afterwards Chancellor, represented Russia. France was represented by Monsieur de Fontenay, who had been there some twenty years, and was a perfect specimen of the old French school of diplomacy. Great Britain was ably represented by Sir Alexander Malet, of whom and of his distinguished wife I shall ever retain the fondest recollections.

The King of Würtemberg was a staunch Protestant. I remember once, in speaking of the power exercised over the masses by the Catholic priesthood, and contrasting it with the freedom of the Protestant religion,

his Majesty said, "*La différence entre les deux religions est que le Catholicisme est une Église sans religion, le Protestantisme est une religion sans Église.*"* I rather imagine, however, that this observation was not original, but a citation from Pascal.

It might have been supposed that, on the grounds of his strong Protestant feelings, the King would have been attached to Prussia, the great Protestant Power of Germany; but he was one of the strongest opponents of Prussian hegemony, and on a memorable occasion publicly stated that "he would never place himself under a Hohenzollern"—"*Er würde sich nie einem Hohenzollern unterwerfen.*" From whatever cause, whether of jealousy or of fear, for many years the King of Würtemberg strongly resisted the attempts of Prussian supremacy. But even in those days democracy and a desire for unity had made great progress in Würtemberg and in the Grand Duchy of Baden, and had deeply impressed the public mind. Although constitutionally governed by two Chambers, the light of civilisation and of progress and a cry for extended freedom had poured into these countries, and aroused into action the hitherto lethargic energies of the Swabians.

The introduction of railways had greatly diminished the area in regard to distance, and consequently the importance of the smaller States of Germany. Formerly it took one or two days to traverse a small State, whereas by rail it became only a matter of a few hours.

* "The difference between the two religions is that Catholicism is a Church without religion, Protestantism is a religion without a Church."

Each State had its own currency, which represented different values, and was attended with loss to those engaged in trade. There were dollars and florins, *gute groschen* and silver groschen. They had also separate laws, and different weights and measures, and all these occasioned much confusion in the transaction of ordinary business.

These obstructions in the movement of trade operated on the public mind in favour of unity. They placed a formidable lever in the hands of the Radical and democratic party, and greatly assisted them in working out the patriotic cry for liberty and unity.

The King was an enlightened Sovereign, and was cognisant of the spirit of the age. He ruled with firmness, but with justice, and was deservedly respected and beloved by his people.

The Legation at Stuttgart was then also accredited to the Grand Duke of Baden, and during the summer months I accompanied my chief to Baden-Baden. The Grand Duke Leopold was attached to Baden-Baden, and made it his summer residence. He restored the Château there, which had been neglected, and was falling into decay. He preserved its mediæval style and the architecture of the period when it was originally built, and the furniture is of the same epoch. It had been left to the Grand Duchess Stephanie for her life, but she exchanged it for a smaller palace belonging to the Grand Duke in the town, which she arranged and furnished with great taste and elegance. It then was for some years the residence of the Duchess of Hamil-

ton, and has now passed to her daughter the Countess Festetics, who occasionally resides there.

Those were happy days; and they were rendered still more joyful to me in 1845, when I won the great prize in the lottery of life. In that year I was married to Miss Greville, daughter of Admiral Greville (then Captain). Although forty-five years have elapsed, I feel in regard to that happy time, in the words of the poet, that—

“The memories of the past remain,
And all their joys renew.”

To her I owe forty-five years of happiness, unsullied by a cloud. She has been the partaker of my joys and my sorrows, and her affection for myself and devotion to my children have been to me a constant source of happiness and gratitude. Her sister Sophie, remarkable for her beauty, was then residing with the Grand Duchess Stephanie as a friend, but not attached to her Court, and I consequently enjoyed the intimacy of one of the most charming and intellectual princesses of the epoch. She was a near relative of the Empress Josephine, and was brought up at the Court of the Emperor Napoleon I. She accompanied the Empress to Mayence, and resided with her during the absence of the Emperor on his campaigns in Italy. Her marriage with the Grand Duke of Baden was arranged by the Emperor Napoleon. It was a marriage of *convenience*, and not of affection; and although the first years were not the happiest of her life, his constancy and tenderness succeeded in gaining not only

her esteem, but her affection. She had two sons, both of whom died in their infancy, and suspicions have been entertained that a party at the Grand Ducal Court of that day, favourable to the next heir (the Grand Duke Louis), were instrumental in removing the obstacles to his succession to the throne. I was told by an old servant of the Grand Duchess Stephanie that it was generally supposed that the second son—a fine child—was exchanged for an infant that was on the point of dying during the momentary absence of the nurse, who was devoted to the Grand Duchess. The act was never clearly proved, and the mystery remained. A curious incident occurred some years afterwards, which in many respects was similar to the famous story of "*L'Homme au Masque de Fer*." A boy of some thirteen or fourteen years of age appeared one morning at the gate of Nuremberg. He was unable to communicate as to who he was or where he came from. He was unable to converse, for he knew no language, never having conversed with any human being. He appeared to be an idiot without mental cultivation or powers of speech, and could give no account of himself. He, however, fell into charitable hands, and gradually was taught and educated, so far as his circumstances allowed. The incident at the time created some sensation in Germany, for he was supposed to be of high birth, and thus deprived of his inheritance. The late Lord Stanhope, grandfather of the present Earl, took great interest in the case, and spared neither trouble nor expense to unravel the mystery. He even published a pamphlet

on the result of his researches. Nothing, however, conclusive was discovered, and it has remained, and will probably remain, a mystery till the end of time.

By some it was supposed that he was one of the sons of the Grand Duchess Stephanie, who had been exchanged for a dead child, and this belief was strongly impressed on the mind of the Grand Duchess, who was most anxious to see the young man. An interview was accordingly arranged at Frankfort-on-Main, and my sister-in-law was to have accompanied her. The interview was, however, frustrated by the young man being found murdered in a garden at Donaueschingen when on his journey to Frankfort. The whole story is one of tragic romance. On the death of Lord Stanhope during his researches to discover the origin of "Caspar Hauser"—the name he bore—his cause was taken up by the Hon. Keppel Craven (whose father had married the Margravine of Anspach-Bareuth), and his researches were actively carried on at some expense till the young man's tragic death. Various other speculative suggestions have been put forth as to the personality of Caspar Hauser, but nothing absolutely certain has been discovered. I relate the story as it was told me, and I have reason to know that the Grand Duchess Stephanie was firmly impressed with the idea that this Caspar Hauser was her son.

The Grand Duchess Stephanie was very devoted to the Emperor Napoleon III. He allowed her a handsome appanage on the restoration of the French Empire,

which she enjoyed up to her death. As a young man he had often stayed with the Grand Duchess at Baden, and at Umkirch in the Brisgau. My wife recollects having been at Umkirch with the Grand Duchess when Prince Louis was there, shortly before his attempt at Strasburg. He was then a stripling, with buoyant spirits and a daring character.

I once accompanied the Grand Duchess with my sister-in-law to visit the Convent of Lichtenthal. It is a fine establishment, and is richly endowed. No one is allowed to visit the interior except with a member of the Grand Ducal House, and I was much interested in this, my first and only inspection of a convent. They regaled us with cake and wine. The sherry was excellent, and was a proof that the inmates appreciated some of the good things of this world. One of the nuns, of a noble family and a friend of my sister-in-law, had died a few days before, and we were shown the grave, in a beautiful garden attached to the convent, where all the nuns are buried. It was a melancholy, but a peaceful and romantic spot. On leaving the cemetery the Grand Duchess asked me to write some English lines descriptive of the grave we had visited. I replied that, although I was not gifted with poetic inspiration, I would do my best to obey Her Royal Highness's commands, and I accordingly sent her next day the following stanza:—

O holy spot, where now repose
These earthly bodies from all worldly woes!
The silvery willow bends o'er their tomb

Its weeping branches in silent gloom ;
The dreary cypress rears its mournful head,
And marks to man the tenement of the dead.
With solemn awe I tread thy hallowed clay,
Where all that rests of human greatness moulders in decay.

O tranquil spot, no earthly sounds intrude
On the sacred silence of thy solitude ;
No worldly thought can here infest
The blissful stillness of thy peaceful rest ;
No mortal cares can interpose
To harm the slumbers of thy sweet repose.
All, all is still, for, doomed no more to weep,
Their sainted spirits rest for ever in their Saviour's keep.

O God of Heaven, Father of Light,
Omnipotent, Omniscient, Lord of all Power and Might,
Deign in Thy goodness guard this holy place ;
Preserve and bless it with Thy heavenly grace.
Grant unto those whose ashes here recline
Th' unbounded mercy of Thy love divine,
That they, released from cares of mortal strife,
May ever dwell with Thee in everlasting life.

The Grand Duchess then lived in a small pavilion situated on an eminence in a beautiful garden and commanding a lovely view. It had been presented to Her Royal Highness as a marriage gift by the town of Baden. She received without formality every evening her intimate friends and strangers of distinction. I passed many an agreeable evening there, and became thus acquainted with some of the most eminent men of European note in art, literature, and science ; and it was in her *salon* that I was presented by her to the Em-

peror Napoleon III. The object of the Emperor's visit to Baden was, I believe, to ascertain whether he could obtain the hand of Princess Carola (daughter of Princess Vasa), who is now Queen of Saxony; but the Princess had no wish to embark in so frail a boat, and preferred a marriage *d'inclination* to one of *convenance*. She did not even appear at the reception given by the Grand Duchess in honour of the Emperor. The Grand Duchess was very clever—or, as the French would say, *spirituelle*—with a wonderful memory, and was deeply versed in history. She had a charm of manner most fascinating, and was fond of relating anecdotes of the First French Empire, and of the period when she was at the Court of the Empress Josephine. She had an adoration for the Emperor Napoleon, and evinced great emotion when she spoke of him and of his captivity at St. Helena. She passed her winters at the palace at Mannheim, occupying a wing of that vast building, which has now been converted into government offices. In 1846 the Grand Duchess invited my wife and myself to Mannheim, and we passed several days at the palace which were most agreeable. Her manner of life was simple. The guests breakfasted in their own rooms, and only appeared at one o'clock for dinner. After dinner we generally drove with the Grand Duchess. On our return we retired to our rooms till seven, when we reassembled for tea and supper, retiring at ten. It was at these evening repasts that Her Royal Highness conversed on all subjects of interest, past and present, with that grace and charm of manner and exquisite

eloquence of language which so captivated her audience, and gave them an insight into events and a knowledge of the famous personages of the First Empire which is not to be acquired in books—for they are not always the best means of imparting that knowledge which gives brilliancy to social intercourse. Conversational power is rather a gift, and is chiefly possessed by those who have lived constantly with clever people, in an atmosphere of life and action, when the impressions produced by genius and a highly-cultivated mind are more easily imbibed and retained. I have felt this when I have been in company with distinguished men like Baron Alexander Humboldt, Professors Ranke, Raumer, Lepsius, Rauch, Hoffman, Liebig, and others of a similar stamp, who in the forcible and clear language in which they spoke on scientific subjects, or related events of history, or anecdotes illustrative of great men, produced an indelible impression on my mind.

No one had greater opportunities of storing with knowledge a mind already richly endowed than the Grand Duchess Stephanie, and no one had profited more by them, or possessed in a higher degree the fascinating charm of utilising them ; and I have never met anyone whose society was more genial, attractive, and intellectual.

The Grand Duchess Stephanie had three daughters—Princess Louise, married to Prince Vasa, the last member of the Swedish Royal House of Vasa, whose only daughter is now Queen of Saxony ; the second daughter, Princess Josephine, married to the Prince of

Hohenzollern ; and the third, Princess Mary, married to the late Duke of Hamilton. The Grand Duchess had only two sons, both of whom, as I have already related, died in their infancy.

The Grand Duchess Sophie of Baden, wife of the Grand Duke Leopold, was a sister of Prince Vasa of Sweden. She was a princess of distinguished beauty and talent. Her eldest daughter married the Duke of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, brother of the Prince Consort. Her second daughter married the Prince of Leiningen, and her third the Grand Duke Michael Nicolaievitch.

In the winter of 1846-7 General von Radowitz was the Prussian representative at Carlsruhe. He was a man of great erudition, of classical taste, and of a powerful mind, though somewhat tainted with metaphysical ideas, and with a philosophic disposition which in the days of Frederick the Great would have entitled him to be enrolled among the *illuminés*. He was a personal friend of Frederick William IV., over whom he exercised some influence, and by whom he was called to the Councils of the State. He was an enlightened and good man, and, although a strict Roman Catholic, was tolerant in his religious opinions. He was most agreeable, not to say brilliant, in conversation, full of anecdote, and with a peculiar talent of deeply impressing his views and opinions on those with whom he conversed. His son is now the German Ambassador at Constantinople, and is regarded in Germany as one of its most able diplomatic representatives.

I had the honour of representing Her Majesty the Queen at the marriage of Prince Leiningen in 1859. The ceremony took place in the chapel of the palace at Carlsruhe, with much state. After the marriage a grand banquet was given by the Grand Duke, to which all the Court officials, Ministers, and nobility were invited. On the following day a ball was given at the palace, and on the next a gala representation at the Opera House. The theatre had been lately constructed, the previous one having been burnt in 1846. I was then officially residing at Carlsruhe, and witnessed the sad catastrophe, in which above one hundred persons lost their lives. The only vestige of the theatre which was left standing was the *affiche* in a grating, as is usual in Germany, announcing the performance on that Sunday evening of the play called *Ein Glas Wasser*.

The corpses that were removed from the ruins to the mortuary passed my house for several days, and the constant tramp of the stretcher-bearers produced a sad impression, and a feeling of compassionate horror that so many unfortunate victims should have died so cruel a death in a theatre on a Sunday evening.

I had previously witnessed the destruction of the Opera House at Berlin in 1839. It was first discovered by Countess Rossi (the "Sonntag"); but as it took place after a representation, no lives were lost. The construction of a new Opera House had been long decided on; but as the existing one was built in 1740, and as the Germans have a sentimental respect for anniversaries, the commencement of the work was de-

ferred till 1840, in order to complete the hundred years of its existence. The destruction by fire therefore only facilitated its demolition.

The frequency of the destruction of theatres by fire is somewhat remarkable ; and were it not that no place is more exposed to that element than a theatre, it might be supposed that such events were specially decreed by Providence. But the same remark would equally apply to the frequency of the destruction of churches. I remember that when I was in Australia a subscription of £50 was with some difficulty extracted from a millionaire who was very averse to parting with his wealth. A short time after paying his £50 he was again called upon for a small extra sum to provide a lightning-conductor to the same church. This he positively refused, observing that he could not suppose that the Almighty would permit His lightning to destroy a building erected for His service.

The Grand Duchy of Baden may justly be termed the "Garden of Germany." It is a lovely country, highly cultivated, through which the Rhine flows, forming a rich valley, backed by the dark woods of the Black Forest.

This "Valley of the Rhine" extends from Mannheim to Basle, and its rich soil produces wine, tobacco, maize, and other valuable products. A considerable quantity of beet is also grown, which feeds the large sugar manufactory at Waaghäusel.

Along the valley are large and prosperous towns. Mannheim, since the introduction of the railways, has

become an important commercial port; Heidelberg, from its University and its beautiful position as well as its mild climate, has largely increased and become a favourite residence of English families; Offenburg and Freiburg are also large and thriving towns. At the latter there is a University. Being in the Brisgau (which formerly belonged to Austria), it is Catholic, whilst the population at Heidelberg is chiefly Protestant. It is from this cause I presume that the two Universities are maintained, although attempts have lately been made to abolish that of Freiburg.

Politically, the Grand Duchy of Baden has always been in the front rank of Liberalism. From whatever cause—whether from their proximity to France and Switzerland, or from other local circumstances—the German States bordering Switzerland have been impregnated with advanced political opinions and democratic feelings.

Thus, when the National Assembly were compelled to quit Frankfort, they adjourned to Stuttgart, and continued to hold their sittings there, to which was given the name of the “Rump” Parliament. In the meantime Frederick William IV. of Prussia, having declined the offer of the Imperial Crown, agreed with Austria to reconstitute the Diet at Frankfort; and the withdrawal of the Archduke John, who had been the Imperial Administrator, under the title of “Reichs Verweser,” closed the labours of the Constituent Assembly at Frankfort.

On his first arrival with his morganatic wife to enter on his functions, there was a discussion as to her title and position, and it was humorously proposed that she should bear the title of "*Die erste Deutsche Frau*,"* thus placing her on an equality with Eve, the mother of us all.

Although it is not my intention to enter into the complicated questions which at that time occupied the attention of the German Governments and of the National Assembly, I may state cursorily that the Archduke John displayed great judgment and prudence in the administration of affairs at Frankfort. One of the most conspicuous of his Ministers was Heinrich von Gagern, who was the chief of his Ministry, and possessed the confidence of a large majority of the National Assembly. Among other politicians of note was Herr von Bismarck, who may be said to have commenced his political career in the National Assembly at Frankfort; Prince Leiningen, who was the Minister for Foreign Affairs; General von Radowitz, a personal friend of Frederick William IV.; General Jochmus von Schmerling, Prince Lichnowski, General von Auerswald (the two latter were murdered by a mob at Frankfort), and many others who have since taken a distinguished part in the affairs of Germany.

The popular, and numerically the stronger, portion of the Assembly was doubtless on the side of Prussia. But the fruit was not then ripe, and the hegemony of Prussia, or the Unity of Germany, could only then

* "The first German Lady."

have been attained by an armed conflict, or, in other words, by Civil War. The Southern States, as was afterwards proved in 1866, held to Austria, and neither Saxony nor Bavaria, nor Würtemberg nor Baden, were then prepared to place themselves under Prussian Imperial rule. Nevertheless they had to defend themselves against the revolutionary torrent, and they were finally saved from destruction by the conjoint aid of Germany and of Prussia.

In 1849 riots broke out at Dresden, and were put down successfully with the aid of Prussian troops. But the most serious revolution was that which occurred in Baden, owing to the whole of the Baden army going over to the insurgents, with the exception of one regiment of Dragoons, which remained faithful to the Grand Duke. This regiment is the only one in the Grand Ducal army which has preserved its original uniform. In the previous year the Grand Ducal army, which amounted to 20,000 men, had been raised to 30,000, and the Baden artillery at that time was regarded as the best in Germany.

To this revolutionary army was added a large number of Free Corps, all well armed, and to a certain extent drilled, but they were indifferently officered. Nevertheless they formed, numerically, a strong body of some 70,000 men, with an efficient artillery.

The revolution broke out one night without any previous warning, and so sudden was the movement that the Grand Duke and his family were obliged to

fly from Carlsruhe, His Royal Highness escaping on the limber of an artillery waggon.

A German army was immediately formed at Frankfort by the Government of the Archduke John, and placed under the command of a (Prussian General) von Peucker, to which a Prussian army was annexed under the command of the Prince of Prussia (who had the supreme command of the two armies), with General von Schreckenstein as Chief of the Staff, and in which Prince Frederick Charles commanded a brigade of cavalry. Several severe encounters took place. The most serious were at Waaghäusel and Wiesenthal, at which latter place Prince Frederick Charles was slightly wounded.

I was then residing at Baden-Baden with my family. I had occasion to go to Stuttgart, where there was great excitement, but no open disturbance. Free Corps were forming and drilling, and the most revolutionary of them were distinguished by red cravats and red sashes. On returning by the diligence from Stuttgart to join the rail at Durlach I journeyed with two of these violent Republicans. They were armed to the teeth with pistols and swords and carabines. We were only three in the carriage, and I thought it desirable to show them that I was armed with a life-preserver, and was not entirely defenceless. I listened to their conversation without a remark, and they, seeing that I was a stranger, thought that I did not understand German. They complained bitterly of the bad quarters they had had

at Pforzheim, and indulged in high Republican talk. When we reached Durlach I endeavoured to console them by saying "that the Prussians would shortly arrive to relieve them from their cares." They were very affronted by this remark, and went to the inspector at the station to propose my immediate arrest as a *schlecht-gesinnter* (one evil disposed to their plans), but the inspector, knowing me, warned them against the danger of interfering with me, and I separated from these bellicose individuals at Carlsruhe.

Two days afterwards I was at Marx's Library, on the promenade at Baden, talking with Mlle. Marx, and I remarked to her on the sadness and futility of this revolutionary movement. At the time my conversation was overheard by two armed men outside; one was of the Baden Free Corps, and the other of the same Würtemberg fraternity, with red cravat and red sash, both armed with sword and pistol. They immediately rushed in, and, addressing me in a violent tone, threatened to arrest me. I maintained my calmness and my seat. I allowed them to finish their peroration, and then quickly informed them that, having long resided in Germany, I had such confidence in the good-feeling of the nation that I had been one of a few who had remained at Baden during this tumultuous time; that I was an Englishman, and had nothing to do with their internal affairs; that I was under the protection of the Commissary at Baden; and that, if they attempted to molest me, I would complain to him, and they would be punished. They were taken aback

by my calmness, and after some expostulations conveying their denunciation in violent language against the former Government and system, the Baden man shrugged his shoulders and said, "*Es ist Nichts zu machen mit dem Herrn*" ("There is nothing to be done with this gentleman"), and with an "adieu" bolted. I continued to converse with his accomplice, the Würtemberger. I asked him what he expected to get by this revolution. He was only acting a very subordinate part, and under the most favourable circumstances was certain to get nothing by it. Should he, on the other hand, fall into the hands of the Prussians, who were close at hand, it was pretty certain that he would be shot. I advised him to take off his red cravat and his red sash, and abandon the perilous line he had taken. I made such an impression on him that he acknowledged the truth of what I had told him, thanked me, saluted me, and went off. Thus ended a curious, and what might have been a tragic, scene, had I lost my temper and shown fight to these armed Republicans, for I heard afterwards that a Frenchman two days before had been seized at Rastatt as a spy and shot.

I remained at Baden with my family during the whole of the revolution, much to the surprise of the Prince of Prussia (afterwards Emperor William) when he arrived. I told him that the authorities who had been appointed by the Provisional Government had preserved perfect order, and although the town had been filled with Free Corps, of which the

Württembergers were the worst, nothing had occurred to disturb the peace of the town. During the whole time I did not see a drunken man.

The rebel army offered some resistance to the advance of the German army, and at Gernsbach there was much loss of life on both sides. The German army had to cross the river Murg, and to storm the heights above it, where the rebel army had taken up a strong position. The rebel army was finally dislodged and dispersed. We had heard all day the heavy firing, and saw the curling smoke of the field artillery rising behind the "Mercury" Hill, and towards evening groups of the defeated troops, many of them wounded, passed our house in the Lichten-thaler Allee on their retreat on Rastatt. On their arrival in Baden there was much alarm, lest the town should be pillaged by the large number of armed men, infuriated by defeat and half-famished. They all assembled in the square in great agitation, and clamoured for food and drink. To oppose them in this state of frenzy would have been madness. The communal authorities provided them with necessary food and liquor, and, wishing to get rid of them, resorted to the ruse of sending a man dressed in the Free Corps costume on horseback a short way from the town, who returned galloping into the square to announce that the Prussian troops were rapidly marching on the town, and were not more than half an hour distant from it. The whole body of armed men were so petrified with alarm that they bolted at once,

and we were thus relieved of our fears. If this ruse had not been adopted, there is little doubt that the usually tranquil town of Baden would have been the scene of a frightful confusion—possibly carnage.

Captain Greville and I rushed down to the square, and were witnesses of all that took place, and right glad were we when we saw the whole band march away.

Later, an engagement took place in the plain between Rastatt and Kuppenheim, of which we had a view from the top of the Old Château at Baden. A *tête de pont* had been erected by the insurgents at a bridge over a small rivulet, and strongly defended by artillery. It lay just under the Old Château, from which we had a view of the action, but it was speedily stormed and taken by the Prussians at the point of the bayonet. The rebel army, thus repulsed on all sides, were forced to retreat, and a portion of it took refuge in the fortress of Rastatt, the other portion, including all the insurgent Baden artillery, continued their retreat southward toward the Swiss frontier.

On leaving Baden, as related above, the insurgents took up a position on the high ground along the road from Baden to Oos, and in the skirmishing which took place on the following morning many lives were lost, and for days afterwards corpses and wounded men were found in the adjoining woods and the standing corn. From the Old Château we witnessed this combat. In the early morning after the Battle of Gernsbach a division of the German army, composed principally of Hessian

and Nassau troops, halted to rest and breakfast in the Lichtenthaler Allee. Had they pushed on to Oos, where the plain opens out, and not incurred some hours of delay, they would have intercepted the whole of the insurgent Baden artillery on their retreat southward. Some months afterwards I related this circumstance to the Prince of Prussia on visiting the old castle of Ebersteinburg. If this had been effected, the difficult question which subsequently arose with the Swiss Government for the extradition and restoration of the Baden artillery would have been avoided. His Royal Highness was much interested in the details which, as an eye-witness, I was able to give him.

The Prince of Prussia, with his staff, established his headquarters at La Favorite, a small Grand Ducal château, almost within cannon-shot of the fortress of Rastatt. The Prussian and German forces encircled the fortress, and awaited the arrival of the siege-guns to reduce it. They might have effectually bombarded it, and thus reduced it to submission; but, the fortress having been only lately finished at a heavy expense to Germany, the Prince of Prussia was anxious to bring about its surrender with as little damage to the works as possible. There were frequent sorties at night, but the insurgents were unable to pierce the lines of the German troops. There was constant heavy firing on both sides at night and in the early morning, and on several occasions Captain Greville and I went up at three o'clock in the morning to the Old Château, under the idea that a battle on the plain was imminent. The

siege lasted several weeks, and the booming of the guns in the evening, mixing with the music which played as usual on the promenade, formed a singular contrast.

The insurgents, having exhausted their provisions, at length were obliged to surrender ; but they were forced to do so unconditionally and at the mercy of the victors. The whole insurgent body marched out to the Glacis, and in the presence of the German army laid down their arms and were marched back to the casemates of the fortress under a strong escort as prisoners of war.

Thus terminated the siege of Rastatt and ended the Baden Revolution of 1849. We drove out to see the ceremony of the insurgents laying down their arms, which was outside the fortress, and from indiscreet curiosity we followed the military cavalcade into the town. We found no obstacle in doing so, but we found it more difficult to get out of the town than into it. At length I came across a Prussian general officer on the Prince of Prussia's staff with whom I was personally acquainted, and he escorted us through the gates. The strictest orders had been given that no one should be allowed to leave the town, as it was feared that many of the leaders, and especially the Poles, would try to escape in the general confusion. The Prince of Prussia afterwards told me that we had acted very rashly, for it was generally reported that portions of the town had been mined, and that we were thus exposed to serious danger. But "all's well that ends well" ; and although the experience we had gained was valuable, it was not

likely that we should ever again have the opportunity of entering a fortress immediately after its surrender.

I may here observe that there never was a more insensate or reprehensible act than that of the Baden revolution. But I do not believe that the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy were the faulty parties. There were really no grounds of complaint against the Government or system of administration. The Grand Duke was a mild, paternal ruler; the government was strictly constitutional; the laws emanated from, and were subjected to the strict scrutiny of, Parliament; taxation was extremely light—about a half of the present rate under the Empire; trade had greatly increased; and the population were well off and well cared for. The revolution was produced by Socialist agitators, adventurous Poles, and those ambitious and restless spirits who love to fish in troubled waters, and whose aim was to bring about confusion for their own personal gain. The young peasants who were led to enrol themselves in the Free Corps were quite ignorant of the grounds on which they were called to arms, or for whom they were to fight; and from several with whom I conversed I found that they were under the belief that they were called out to fight for the Grand Duke, their Sovereign.

It was astonishing to see the obedience and order preserved by these Free Corps. Not a theft was committed, not a drunken man to be seen, not an outrage of any sort attempted. They were seduced by vile agitators for their own purposes, under the fascinating

promise of becoming a great nation ; and they were captivated by the attraction of military glory, the hope of gain, and in some degree also by the picturesque costume in which they figured—viz., a loose brown holland coat, with a white felt wideawake hat garnished with cocks' feathers. There was not a cock to be seen in the neighbourhood of Baden which had not been divested of its tail to add beauty to the insurgents' headgear.

The general in command of this rebel army was General Microlaffski, a Pole, a man above the ordinary cast of such adventurers. I remember that as I was going up one day to the Old Château, which was the most prominent watch-tower, commanding a view of the Rhine Valley for many miles, I overtook a man on horseback in the costume of the Free Corps. We entered into conversation, and it appeared that we were both on the same errand—viz., to ascertain if any of the advancing German army were in view. He was not dejected by the expected arrival of the German army, and expressed himself hopefully of the result of the revolution, basing his hopes, as far as I could gather (for I was cautious not to express any opinion on the approaching struggle), on the support, sooner or later, of France. We parted courteously, and it was only afterwards that I learnt that the stranger was no less a person than General Microlaffski. He managed to escape into Switzerland, and, I believe, is still living in Paris.

Since writing the foregoing, I have found* a more

* See a book entitled "Celebrated Children," by Michel Masson, translated by Mrs. L. Burk from the French.

detailed account of Caspar Hauser, which may interest my readers, and which I give textually ; but there are some portions which are incorrect. Caspar Hauser was murdered at Donaueschingen, and not at Frankfort, when he was on his way to have an interview with the Grand Duchess Stephanie of Baden at Frankfort. At least such was the story related to me by Miss Greville, who was then living with the Grand Duchess, and was to have accompanied her to Frankfort, where her interview with Caspar Hauser was to take place.

Whether the murder took place at Frankfort or Donaueschingen is not of material importance, except as regards the last words reported in the following account, said to have been used by Caspar Hauser.

Until the age of eighteen, Caspar Hauser knew nothing of social life, or even of the light of the sun. On the 26th May he reached the Gates of Nuremburg in Bavaria—by what means it was not known. Finding himself alone and abandoned at the entrance of that city, he tried to walk, leaning on a stick. He advanced one foot before the other, tottering at every step. And this young man of eighteen years of age, who was now walking for the first time, soon felt his legs give way, for they were not accustomed to support the weight of his body, and he fell down in the middle of the street.

He was carried to the police station. When questioned, he gave no answer. Pen, ink, and paper were produced. He took the pen and traced his name in legible characters. This gave rise to the suspicion that

his conduct was the result of imposture, and he was sent to the common prison, usually filled with vagrants and beggars. Among those who followed him to prison was a worthy man, Dr. Daumer. He requested the gaoler to give him some food. The gaoler brought a plate of meat and a jug of beer. Caspar Hauser, who was seated on the ground in a corner of the cell, seeing what was placed before him, was seized with such a violent convulsion that, uttering a cry of horror, he overturned the jug of beer and the plate of meat. When he came to himself, he found a piece of bread and a glass of water, which he ate and drank with avidity.

He was visited in prison by numerous persons out of curiosity. Some brought cakes, others toys. He was not moved by either; but one of the visitors brought a little wooden horse. Caspar seized it with joy—caressed and pressed it in his arms as if he had found an old friend. From this it was conjectured that in his infancy he must have possessed a similar plaything.

By degrees his eyes became accustomed to light, and his ears to sound. The striking of a neighbouring clock, the sound of which at first had been indistinct, at last excited him even to tears. On one occasion he was taken to the window when a wedding party was passing, headed by a number of violinists. The sound of the instruments produced a still more powerful emotion. Finally, having seen a regiment, the band of which played a March, Caspar Hauser fainted.

Dr. Daumer obtained permission to adopt him, and

commenced his education. The progress was slow, but at the end of a year he was enabled to arrange in his mind his early recollections, and to relate his history as follows :—

I know not for how long a time I have existed, for as I was ignorant of what days and nights were, it was impossible to calculate years; but for a long time—a very long time—I felt that I lived in a room where all was dark, and where no one approached me, when one day I felt that I was not alone in the world. I say one day—perhaps it was one night—but a being—a man, though then I knew not what man was; he, however, of whom I wish to speak, entered my dungeon by an opening which I had not before observed. I heard a sound; it proceeded from this man. He had spoken, but neither did I understand the sound of human voice. He brought my customary food, bread and water. He placed beside me a wooden horse, an object which I did not understand, but whose form pleased me. The man left me : I saw him open and close the aperture, and I wanted to walk as I had seen him walk, but after a few steps I felt my head violently struck; the blow was occasioned by my stumbling against the wall, for as yet, knowing nothing about open or closed doors, I thought that I could easily pass through the opening by which the man had passed. For the first time I learnt that suffering existed, for I long suffered from this blow, but still without being able to account for the pain I experienced.

I now understand how from time to time I found myself in my dungeon with cleaner clothes, my hair in better order, and my hands whiter. I imagine that the man must have mixed with my food some substance capable of plunging me into a profound sleep, and that during this sleep he changed my linen and clothes. It is also a very long while since he brought me, for the first time, some paper, a pen, and some ink. He traced in my presence some characters, and after many attempts, which may, perhaps, have occupied a year, I succeeded in

imitating those characters that were constantly before my eyes, and which formed my name. This name, doubtless, is not my true name. My father must have borne another, but this, perhaps, I may never know. But I ought to thank that man who charitably bestowed on me the one I have hitherto retained, for it is owing to his foresight that I shall not have graven on my tomb—"The Unknown."

I doubtless became a burthen to him who took care of me; for one day, at the hour at which he usually brought my food, he came, but without bringing the bread and water which I impatiently awaited. He placed a bandage on my eyes, took me on his shoulders, and I felt myself carried away, without even asking myself what they intended doing with me.

Here my memory fails me. I suppose that the effect of the air must have been so painful that I fainted almost immediately on leaving the house. Did the man come from Nuremberg? or from a greater distance? I cannot tell; all that I can say is that he put me down at the gate of Nuremberg, after having removed the bandage from my eyes.

When Caspar Hauser's story was spread abroad, strangers came to Dr. Daumer in crowds to visit him. Amongst them a man succeeded in furtively gaining an entrance into the house, and, happening to be for a moment alone with Caspar, he struck him with a poniard, but with so false an aim that his victim escaped with a wound in the forehead. At the cries of Caspar, the people of the house hastened to the apartment, but the man had disappeared, and no traces of him could be discovered.

This murderous attempt sufficiently proved that Caspar Hauser was not safe in Nuremberg. Lord Stanhope, who was much interested in him, determined that he should accompany him to Anspach, there to com-

plete his studies ; after which his new protector was to take him to England. Caspar Hauser passed four years in the house of the celebrated Dr. Fuhrmann, under whose care he became a clever and amiable young man. The period of his departure for England was approaching. One day, while taking his accustomed walk in the gardens of the Palace at Anspach, near the Monument of Uzen, he was accosted by a person who begged him to read a paper. Caspar took it, and while glancing over it, he felt two poniard thrusts in the region of the heart. The assassin took flight, and Caspar, though mortally wounded, had sufficient strength to drag himself to the house of Dr. Fuhrmann. The unfortunate victim uttered only these words—palace, Uzen, Monument, purse.

The officers of police were sent to the Monument of Uzen. There they found, indeed, a violet silk purse containing a paper on which was written :—

Caspar Hauser, who was born on the 30th April, 1812, dies on the 14th December, 1833. You will know that I come from the confines of Bavaria on the River of ——. These are the initials of my name. M.L.O.

Lord Stanhope promised a reward of five thousand florins to whomsoever should discover the murderer of his *protégé*. All the investigations made were fruitless, and Caspar Hauser, who will never be avenged by the justice of men, expired during the night of the 17th December, 1833.

CHAPTER VIII.

Influence of Two Political Events in 1846-47 (namely, the Incorporation of Cracow and the Spanish Marriages) on the Public Mind—Forebodings of Revolution—Vacillating Policy of Frederick William IV.—Sudden Outburst of Revolution at Berlin—Withdrawal of Troops from Berlin—Their Retirement to Potsdam—Flight of the Prince of Prussia—"Berliner Witz"—King and Queen remove to Potsdam.

HAVING digressed in order to give a cursory review of the Baden revolution, I must now return to the years preceding the revolutionary period of 1848.

There were two political events in 1846-47 which tended to give an impetus to the restless spirit then pervading Europe, and to give encouragement to the hopes of the revolutionary party, which was admirably organised under central committees sitting at Geneva, Paris, and London.

The two political events to which I refer were, first, the incorporation of Cracow by Austria, with the consent of Russia and Prussia. This act, without any appeal to England or France, was a flagrant violation of the treaties of Vienna, which at that time still formed the basis of European law. It was regarded as an act of arbitrary and despotic power. The transfer of a large and civilised population to another ruler without their assent recalled to memory the partition of Poland, and was ill-viewed by the grow-

ing Liberal and constitutional feelings of Germany. It gave rise to a distrust in Sovereigns and in their governments, and added to the discontent, the germs of which were already overspreading Europe.

The second political event was the Spanish marriages, brought about by intrigue and selfish ambition to satisfy the personal and dynastic policy of Louis Philippe. It was evident to the French nation that this policy was not dictated by any desire to further the interests of France, but simply to further those of a dynasty. The two leaders of the Opposition of that day, MM. Thiers and Odillon Barrot, gained considerable strength by this short-sighted policy of Monsieur Guizot, the final result of which ended in 1848 by his overthrow and the fall of Louis Philippe.

I thus cursorily refer to these events, as their influence reacted on Germany. They blew the cinders of discontent, which had been smouldering for some time, into the flame of revolution, and aided in producing that revolutionary storm which swept over Europe in 1848.

I was not at Berlin during the years preceding 1848, and am not therefore able from personal testimony, to enter on the various phases which led to the insurrection there on the 18th of March, 1848. But during my residence at Carlsruhe in 1846-47 I gained sufficient knowledge of a general existing uneasiness in the public mind, and of that political excitement and patriotic ardour which foreboded a coming storm. In front of my window (at

Carlsruhe) noisy meetings were nightly held at a restaurant, where speeches were made and patriotic songs were sung with an animation which proved how deeply rooted were the feelings which they expressed. One of those songs was that of Professor Arndt. It contained that significant stanza which so forcibly displayed the national wish for German unity :—

“ Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland ?
Ist 's Preussenland ? Ist 's Schwabenland ?
O Nein ! O Nein ! O Nein !
Das Vaterland muss grösser sein.”

The vacillating policy of Frederick William IV., and the want of statesmanlike foresight on the part of his Ministry, caused great regret and disappointment, and precluded all hopes on the part of the anxious and loyal patriots that the regeneration of Germany would be brought about peacefully under the hegemony of Prussia. Frederick William IV. could not divest himself of the idea that Austria was the legal and traditional dominant power in Germany, and that it would be a dishonourable and even a sacrilegious act on his part to supplant her. He still clung to those principles of absolutism which had dictated the Holy Alliance, and he was disinclined to place Prussia in that position for which the German patriots were clamouring. He was wholly averse to war, and more especially to a war with Austria, which, in his eyes, would have borne a fratricidal character. He was eminently a man of peace—alike unwilling

to be governed by the stimulus of personal ambition, or driven by the force of popular passion. Hence, when the storm burst suddenly on him, he was wholly unprepared to meet it, as subsequent events proved.

In the proclamation of 1848 he published his decision to satisfy public opinion by reforming the Germanic Diet, but in a manner and on a basis which was not calculated to calm the existing agitation or to satisfy the just aspirations of the national will.

On the 18th of March, 1848, the revolution broke out at Berlin. No one knows what was the immediate cause which gave rise to it, but it is said that a vast crowd had collected before the palace, and that a shot was fired—no one knew by whom—which was followed by a general cry “To arms!” Thus the conflict began. The military appeared on the scene, barricades were hastily raised, and it is said that many foreigners in French blouses were seen in the crowd.

The struggle between the people and the troops lasted all that night. The barricades were stormed and taken by the troops after hard fighting and great sacrifice of life. Towards early morning the troops had been entirely victorious, and in a few hours the city would have been in possession of the military, when suddenly an order was sent—no one to this day knows by whom or from whom—ordering the troops to retire, thus leaving the insurgents in possession of the town.

The whole garrison retired to Potsdam, the King

and Queen being left entirely in the hands and at the mercy of the people. If the King and royal family had retired with the troops to Potsdam, events might have taken another turn; but being now in the hands of the revolutionary party, the King was powerless, and had to succumb to the will of the people.

On the following morning the revolutionary party paraded the corpses of the people who had fallen in the struggle before the palace, and forced the King to come into the balcony, bareheaded, to salute them.

A procession was then formed, headed by members of the democratic party and Poles, who conducted the King on horseback through the principal streets of the town, with the German tricolour flags (black, white, and gold) flying.

Students in fancy costumes mounted guard at the various palaces and public offices. The Prince of Prussia escaped to Hamburg in disguise, and fled to England. His palace was saved from destruction by a huge placard being placed on the balcony with the inscription "*National Eigenthum.*" *

Such were the lamentable events of the revolution at Berlin.

On all occasions the *Berliner Witz* is irrepressible. I remember seeing a proclamation of the King's, after the revolution, addressed "*An meine lieben Berliner,*" † pasted over a cannon-shot that had lodged in one of the pumps, a wooden structure, which exist in all the Berlin streets.

* "*National property.*"

† "*To my dear Berliners.*"

For some weeks the King and Queen remained at Berlin. It was an anxious time, but, although treated with respect, the King was scarcely a free agent, being entirely governed by the popular will and a Radical Ministry. Eventually their Majesties removed to Potsdam, and the King breathed more freely, feeling that he had the support of his loyal and faithful guards.

CHAPTER IX.

My Appointment by Lord Palmerston to the Special Mission of Sir Stratford Canning—Brussels—Hanover—King Ernest; his Court; Anecdotes with respect to it—Injudicious Policy of King George—Indemnity voted to Him sequestrated—Injudicious Course taken by the Present Duke of Cumberland; Arrangements may still be Possible if He will follow the Advice tendered to Him.

PREVIOUS to the French revolution in February, 1848, I had the good fortune to be appointed by Lord Palmerston, at the personal request of Sir Stratford Canning (afterwards Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe), to his special mission to the Courts of Europe on his way to his post at Constantinople. The chief object of his mission at the time when it was first originated related to Greece, and it was hoped that his influence and knowledge of Greek affairs would be of use in conciliating the conflicting interests, and in bringing about a reconciliation between all parties in that kingdom. In the meantime the revolution broke out at Paris, which was consecutively followed by the revolution at Berlin and by disturbances at Vienna, Munich, and in other parts of Germany.

The mission therefore of Sir Stratford Canning assumed a greater importance, as he arrived in the

German capitals at a moment when the revolutionary movement was in full effervescence.

We left London on the evening of March 18th, having previously learnt the happy intelligence of Her Majesty's safe delivery of a Princess (Princess Louise), and we arrived at Brussels on the following day. Some alarm was then felt lest the revolution at Paris might react prejudicially in Belgium; but in consequence of his wise and judicious rule the King had completely gained the confidence and affection of the nation, who were determined to adhere to their Sovereign, of whom they were justly proud.

We only remained three days at Brussels, for Sir Stratford Canning was anxious to proceed with as little delay as possible to Berlin, after the grave intelligence he had received of the events which had taken place in that capital. During our stay at Brussels we were hospitably entertained by Lord and Lady Howard de Walden (Lord Howard de Walden was then British Minister at Brussels), whose *chef de cuisine* was renowned; and the result of his culinary art left a most favourable impression on me, but not greater than the distinguished qualities of our noble hostess. I have rarely met anyone more agreeable or more highly gifted than Lady Howard, who, although singular in some respects, was, above all, *grande dame* in the full expression of the term.

From Brussels we proceeded to Hanover, where Sir Stratford found at the hotel Count Flahaut on his way to Paris from Vienna, where he had been French Am-

bassador. He gave a deplorable account of the state of affairs in the Austrian capital—the flight of Prince Metternich, and the general disaster and confusion that had followed it. It seemed to him as if the real deluge prophesied by Prince Metternich had actually arrived.

On the following day we dined at the Palace. King Ernest was much depressed by the news from Berlin. He passed severe comments on the withdrawal of the troops after having so faithfully performed their duty, though at a great sacrifice of life, and when they would have completely put down the insurrection and occupied the town. He prided himself on the quiet and order reigning in his own capital, but expressed his fears for the future in the event of the revolutionary party gaining the upper hand in Germany. The King of Hanover was, I have reason to believe, always distrustful of Prussia, and often expressed his fears of the “Black Eagle” which hovered over him. There is a saying of La Rochefoucauld, “*Que dans le malheur de nos meilleurs amis, il y a toujours quelque chose qui ne nous déplaît pas.*” So it was, I think, with King Ernest. In the disabled state of Prussia he considered that his safety was increased, and he gained from this feeling a small amount of temporary consolation.

The Court of Hanover was certainly, in regard to its proportion, the best organised and most luxurious of any in Germany. The palace is handsome, without being over-sized. The plate, of which there is a prodigious quantity, is the finest in Europe; and under the admirable administration of Baron Malortie the

order and regularity of the household was very remarkable. The Court dinners were exquisite. On the *menu* with which each guest was furnished the name of the cook who produced the dish was inscribed, and woe betided him should he fall under the censure of his sovereign master.

I had been personally known to the King when he was Duke of Cumberland, and as boys my brothers and I had been frequent playmates with Prince George of Cumberland (afterwards King George, the last Sovereign of Hanover). My father had also been sent by George III. with his three sons—the Duke of Cumberland, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Duke of Sussex—to the German University at Göttingen between 1792 and 1793.

A curious incident happened to me on the first arrival at Berlin of the King of Hanover after his accession to the Throne. There had never been much good-feeling in England between the Duke of Cumberland and the Whigs, on account of the Duke's Tory politics. On his arrival I felt that I ought to show some respect to His Majesty by writing my name down, but before doing so was careful to refer the matter to Lord William Russell, my chief. He told me to call and to ask his Minister to inform the King that I wished to present my respects to him; but he also told me to go as a private individual, and not in uniform. On all points of "form" and "uniform" the King was most sensitive and inexorable. I accordingly went the next day in evening costume and an incomparable white tie.

I found the ante-room crowded with official personages, all in uniform—amongst them the old Prince Wittgenstein, who had always been extremely courteous to me. He came up to me, and, eyeing me from head to foot, inquired, “*Quel est, mon cher, le costume que vous portez ?*” (He knew well the foible of the King in regard to uniform.) I replied, “*C’est le costume d’un gentilhomme anglais ;*” and he said no more. I waited for two hours, until all the swell personages who had preceded me had retired. General Berger, the Hanoverian Minister, then told me that the King could not receive me, and hinted that I should return in uniform. However, acting by my chief’s directions, I did not return.

Some two years afterwards the King came again to Berlin, and held a Court for the corps diplomatique. Of course I went in uniform, and when the King espied me he called me out and said he was sorry not to have seen me on the previous occasion. In thanking His Majesty I said that “the fault was not on my part.”

On another occasion, when the King and Queen held a Court at Berlin, the announcement was simply inserted in the *Staats Zeitung*. Lord William Russell received no special invitation, nor did any of the Foreign Ministers. Lord William then informed the Hanoverian Minister that unless he received the invitation in a form which he considered due to the British Minister, he should not attend the Court. None came, and Lord William abstained from appearing at the Court. It was a perplexing position for me, quite a youngster, inexperienced in such matters, and I accordingly asked

Lord William what I should do ; and I was instructed by him that if Sir George Hamilton, then Secretary of the Legation, attended the Court, I was likewise to do so—which I did. I think that Sir George Hamilton should not, in the absence of his chief, have gone to the Court ; for when the chief of a mission decides not to attend a Court function from what he considers to be want of respect shown to him in his official position, every member of the mission is bound to conform to the course he takes. But I presume that Lord William considered that, although abstaining himself, he did not wish that his whole mission should take that course.

What would King Ernest say, how many oaths would he give vent to, were he now to rise from his grave and view the absorption of his kingdom by Prussia, and the spoliation of his family ? But it must be said that there have been also errors of judgment on the part of the late King George which, in some degree, account for the vindictive spirit shown by Prince von Bismarck to a fallen foe. The late King inherited that resolute will of his father which, in the present circumstances, amounted to ill-judged obstinacy and want of judicious foresight. He would take no advice ; he saw the storm impending over him ; he must have known the consequences of the dangerous path he was pursuing ; and in lieu of bending to the storm he thought himself strong enough to meet it. He selected to shelter himself under the “Double-headed Eagle,” which was far off, when he might have conciliated and harmonised with the “Single-headed Eagle” close at hand, which

was ready to pounce down on him with an irresistible force. By following in the wake of the latter he would have saved his kingdom and his position as a reigning Sovereign, although his wings might have been somewhat clipped; by joining the former he was utterly crushed and ruined. A liberal offer was made to him as indemnity for the loss of his family property, and a sum of over sixteen millions of thalers (about £2,400,000) was voted for this purpose by the Prussian Parliament. To be deducted from that sum, however, were five millions of thalers which King George had carried off in Hanoverian and other State bonds, thus leaving a capital still due to the family and agnates of the house of eleven millions of thalers, or about £1,650,000. When these negotiations were proceeding, King William (afterwards Emperor) caused me to be informed, through a friend, that he considered the sum of sixteen millions of thalers to be "colossal"; to which I could only reply that His Majesty must bear in mind that the property was equally "colossal." The same friend also conveyed to me a fear that the Prussian Chamber would decline to vote the sum stated. I replied that I could not doubt but that the Chamber would be guided by the principle, "*Qu'il faut rendre à César ce qui est à César.*" This citation, I have reason to think, had its desired effect.

King George was ill-advised after his withdrawal to Vienna. The five millions he took from Hanover were wasted in establishing a newspaper at Paris on behalf of his cause; in endeavouring to form a foreign legion,

with a view to regain his kingdom; and, report says, in speculations on the Bourse at Vienna. The indemnity was consequently sequestered, and the interest on the eleven millions of thalers was likewise suspended. The payment of the capital and the interest was made dependent on the King's formal renunciation of his rights. The administration of the capital, and the employment of the annual interest derived from it, were solely committed to Prince von Bismarck, to utilise as he thought desirable, without having to give any account of the expenditure, not even to his own Sovereign. Thus a sum of at least £80,000 a year has been received for twenty-four years—nominally, to defray the cost of preservative measures against the attempts on the part of King George to regain his throne. It is generally believed that this money has been employed to pay detectives and secret agents, and also to pay the Press; and in regard to the latter the fund so utilised acquired the name of the "Reptile Fund." For the honour of Prussia it is time that this abuse of power should cease. It is further desirable, in the interest of his family and descendants, that the Duke of Cumberland should come to an arrangement with the chivalrous young Emperor of Germany, who is ready, I believe, to extend the hand of conciliation to him, and to treat him with every liberality.* He must know that the restoration of Hanover is an impossibility;

* It is needless to point out that these lines refer to a state of things which had ceased before the publication of these volumes. See Note on next page.

but the Duchy of Brunswick may be open to him as Sovereign ruler, if he will only follow the advice tendered to him on all sides.

I remember, on the publication in the *Official Gazette* of the sequestration of the Hanoverian Indemnity Fund, referring to it in conversation with the late Emperor, and expressing a fear that it might be looked upon as confiscation; to which the Emperor observed that it simply had been suspended, or sequestered, and that there was no question of confiscation. I said I was fully aware of His Majesty's gracious intentions, but that his Minister of Finance had the reputation of retaining all funds that came within his grasp; to which the Emperor smilingly replied, "*Admirable Ministre de Finance!*"

NOTE.—Since writing the foregoing the question of the Guelph Fund has been satisfactorily settled by the submission which the Duke of Cumberland made in the letter which he addressed to the German Emperor on the 10th of March, 1892, and which was published in the *Times* of March 14, 1892. The arrangement of this question is honourable to both parties, and the magnanimity of the German Emperor is deserving of all praise.

CHAPTER X.

Departure from Hanover—Halt at Brunswick—Arrival at Berlin—Visit to Lord and Lady Westmorland—Sensitiveness of Lords Westmorland and Ponsonby on Sir Stratford's Mission—Sir Stratford's Audiences of the King and of the Princess of Prussia—Departure for Dresden—Arrival at Vienna—State of Vienna—Nightly *Charivaris*—Students at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, clamouring for Count Fiquelmont's Resignation.

On leaving Hanover we continued our route to Berlin. A short halt was made at Brunswick, to see the town and the church containing many of the tombs of the ancestors of our Royal Family, amongst them that of Queen Caroline, a Brunswick princess, wife of George IV. It is a pretty, clean town, with an enormous palace, which externally appeared to me large enough to lodge half the population of the town. The people seemed a quiet, orderly, and loyal population, and devoted to the reigning Duke, who is a beneficent ruler and very popular. In all times the Brunswickers have been noted for their loyalty to their Sovereign, with the exception of Duke Charles, who was certainly not in his proper mind, and was forced to abdicate in favour of his brother in 1830. He never returned to Brunswick, and lived principally at Paris, receiving a considerable income from his brother. He amassed a large fortune, the bulk of which, at his death, he left to the city of Geneva.

On the death of his brother, the reigning Duke, in 1886, the direct succession would have passed to the Duke of Cumberland, with the large property attached to it, had he had the wisdom to make his peace with the Emperor of Germany. But Prince von Bismarck profited of the opportunity to occupy it in the name of Prussia, not wishing to have a member of the Guelph family so contiguous to Hanover. A Regent was appointed to administer the Duchy, and the Regent selected was Prince Albert of Prussia, nephew of the then Emperor, William I., who still continues to hold the post. Whether the Duchy will ever revert to its ruler or his son will depend on their deciding to come to a satisfactory arrangement with Prussia, and to recognise *les faits accomplis*, which are irrevocable.

We did not arrive at Berlin till midnight, and found only one carriage to convey our party to the hotel. In the confusion produced by the revolution there were no cabs—or, as they are termed, “droskys”—and there was only place for Lady Canning and her three daughters and governess. Sir Stratford decided to walk to his hotel under my guidance. It was bright moonlight, and as we entered the Leipziger Gate we were astonished to find, in lieu of the ordinary military sentinels (for the troops had all retired to Potsdam), a group of students in fancy uniforms mounting guard. We quickly passed on, and proceeded to the Hôtel des Princes in the Behren Strasse. I could not but reflect how, under the same bright moon only a few nights before, the city had been the scene of a terrible carnage;

that valuable lives had been sacrificed; and that grief and mourning had desolated many a home—and for what? To gratify the ambitious views and aims of political agitators, impelled by unrestrained passions and heated imagination. Well may the preacher have said, “O vanity of vanities, all is vanity.”

On the following day Sir Stratford called on Lord and Lady Westmorland. I found my old chief very inquisitive in regard to this special mission of Sir Stratford Canning, and very anxious to ascertain how long he purposed remaining at Berlin. He was very sensitive on this subject, as was also Lord Ponsonby at Vienna, considering that it was very unusual to send an “itinerant Ambassador” to the great Courts where English representatives were already accredited, and that there was no precedent for it. I think that, unless under extraordinary circumstances, the practice would be inconvenient and embarrassing, and likely to do more mischief than good: while it tends to diminish the influence of the Minister accredited to the Court, it is calculated to produce confusion in the diplomatic relations of the two countries, and should therefore never be resorted to, unless under very special circumstances. I explained, however, to Lord Westmorland and Lord Ponsonby that the affairs to which Sir Stratford’s mission referred related only to Oriental questions and the affairs of Greece, on which they knew that Sir Stratford was specially informed, having been with G. Canning, one of the creators of the independence of Greece. Both Lord and Lady Westmorland were

most kind and hospitable to Sir Stratford and Lady Canning, and everything passed off harmoniously.

Sir Stratford had audiences of the King, and was also received privately by the Princess of Prussia at Charlottenburg, where she had taken refuge since the Prince of Prussia's departure for England. He found the Princess in great depression, and taking a very dark view of the political situation; but with that strong courageous mind which so distinguished her, she determined not to leave the country, and she continued her residence at Charlottenburg till she moved to Babelsberg, at Potsdam. I have reason to believe that Sir Stratford used his best endeavours to console her and to reassure her as to the future. He may have represented to her—as he frequently did to me—that the present excited state of Germany was ephemeral; that the agitation which reigned was chiefly in the capitals and large towns; that it was the result of democratic influences; that this evil was but temporary, and would pass away; that the heart of the nation was loyal and sound; that the army was faithful and could be depended upon, and that the great majority of the nation were devoted to the Crown and opposed to the proletariat, who were inciting the people to insurrection. But Sir Stratford, no doubt, did not forget to add that the position was critical; that the general cry of the nation was patriotic and in favour of constitutional government, of more extended liberties; and of the creation of a United Germany; and that the moment had arrived for that action which

would place the leading reins in the hands of Protestant Prussia.

Sir Stratford, after his audiences of the King and his interview with Baron Heinrich von Arnim, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, decided on continuing his journey to Dresden. We only remained three days at Dresden, and Sir Stratford, after having audiences of the King and Queen, and taking a cursory view of the Saxon Switzerland, we continued our journey to Vienna, where apartments had been taken for us at the Archduke Charles's.

Sir Stratford and Lady Canning were kindly and hospitably received by Lord and Lady Ponsonby. We dined with Lord Ponsonby on the following day, there being no other guest but his private secretary, Mr. George Samuel. Lord Ponsonby (who claimed cousinship with me, and always called me "Cousin Loftus") was the best type of an English—or, rather, Irish—nobleman. He was a keen diplomatist, and had learnt the fine arts of diplomacy by a long residence at Constantinople. He was a shrewd observer, with a sharp insight into character, a man of large views, of a strong and decided will, and with a courageous and firm maintenance of his opinions. He was a diplomatist of the old school, such as was represented by Prince Talleyrand and Prince Metternich—a school which has wholly passed away, and would not be accepted or pass current in the present day. He exercised great influence at Constantinople, and woe betided the Grand Vizier of that day if he thwarted his counsels. When the siege of

Vienna commenced, under Prince Windischgrätz, and the batteries were about to open on the city, Lord Ponsonby was the last to leave it, and walked composedly through the Kärnthner Thor. Nothing upset him; nothing disturbed his equanimity. Lady Ponsonby, who was a sister of Lord Jersey, was a *grande dame* with very distinguished manners, very agreeable, and very well informed; but her whole aspect was quaint, of the mediæval age. She quite repudiated the fashions of the day, and retained to the last the style of dress which had existed fifty years ago—even to the high cap, which was a “monument of art.”

They were very kind to me, and I had a *couvert* at their table during my stay at Vienna. But here, again, I had to soften down the feathers of the noble Ambassador, who felt somewhat jealous of an “itinerant Ambassador,” with whose opinions he was not wholly in unison. However, things went smoothly, and nothing occurred to disturb the harmony of the relations between the two.

Vienna was at that time in the throes of revolution. Count Fiquelmont was the Minister for Foreign Affairs, an honest and upright man, but who had not the nerve or the spirit of action required for troublous times. Prince Metternich had fled, and left chaos behind him. The students were masters of the situation. Every night they met and appeared before the houses of the Ministers or unpopular personages, to give what was a *charivari*, or, as it was then termed, *Katzen Musik*, which consisted of hideous noises produced by every species of infernal machine.

On the night we dined with Lord and Lady Ponsonby the carriage was ordered early, as Lord and Lady Ponsonby played whist every evening. Sir Stratford accepted a rubber of whist, and was to walk back with me to the hotel. I placed Lady Canning and her daughters in the carriage, and thought they would be safely landed at the hotel. In the course of half an hour they returned to the Embassy in a state of trepidation, being unable, on account of the crowd and the students with the *Katzen Musik*, to reach the hotel, and they found even some difficulty in getting out of the crowd. Lord Ponsonby called me and said, "Cousin Loftus, do me the favour to conduct these ladies to their hotel." I accordingly conducted them to the carriage, and instructed the coachman not to go by the streets, but to go round by the boulevards through the Kärnthner Thor to the hotel. This succeeded, and the ladies were safely deposited at their hotel. I then had to return on foot through the streets to accompany Sir Stratford. So dense was the crowd that they were completely blocked and almost impassable. However, with some difficulty I reached the Embassy. The serious question then was how to get Sir Stratford home. I reported to him that the students were then bombarding the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and calling for Count Fiquelmont to appear on the balcony and to resign his post. Nothing would satisfy Sir Stratford but to witness this action of the students. It was not far from the Embassy

and on our way to the hotel, and we accordingly proceeded there. We found a large assemblage of students howling and clamouring for Count Fiquelmont to appear at the balcony. No Count Fiquelmont appeared, and the students seemed inclined to force an entry into the Ministry. Some of the students saw us, and evidently recognised Sir Stratford. It was known that an English Ambassador had arrived, and from his English and stately appearance they concluded that he was the new arrival. I overheard them talking in German of making a demonstration. I quietly told this to Sir Stratford, and suggested to him to take his departure by some steps leading to the rampart of the fortress, by which means he could reach the hotel without passing through the streets. If he slipped away quietly, I would continue talking to the students, and would then rejoin him. This he did, and we finally reached the hotel without any further adventure. On the following day Count Fiquelmont resigned to the Emperor, but not to the students.

CHAPTER XI.

State of the Austrian Empire—Hungary—Bohemia—Departure from Vienna—Arrival at Munich—Lola Montez—Riots at Munich—Abdication of King Louis—Accession of Maximilian I.—Arrival at Trieste—Dinner at the Governor's—Intelligence of a Revolution at Venice and Departure of the combined Italian Fleet for Trieste—Communication with the Fleet—Military Preparations by General Gyulai—Departure for Corfu—Hospitality of Lord and Lady Seaton.

THE state of affairs in the Austrian Empire was deplorable. The flight of Prince Metternich had produced chaos. Law and order were disregarded. The students were masters of the city, and no opposition was offered to their wanton breaches of the peace. The whole machinery of government had been brought to a standstill; there was no head of the government, and, in fact, no government at all. Barricades had been erected, and they were defended by the revolutionary party and the students, whose tumultuous proceedings were unchecked. The popular cry was chiefly directed against the *Ligorianer*, the term used to describe the Jesuits, who were accused of having been the agents of Prince Metternich and the Court party to suppress the liberties of the people. There was no one to command, as the Emperor was quite incapable of action at so critical a juncture.

The state of Hungary was most alarming. A provisional government had been established, under

the presidency of Kossuth, and the country was in open insurrection against Austria. Riots took place at Prague. Venice had also proclaimed its independence, and Manin was elected president of the republic. The army, fortunately, remained faithful to the House of Hapsburg, and it was to the army that Austria owed its salvation. On the 17th of May the Emperor Ferdinand retired to Innsbruck. The new Ministry had conceded liberty of the Press, the establishment of a *Bürgerwehr* (or national guard), and the convocation of a constitutional assembly.

We had an agreeable dinner at Prince Esterhazen's, and we met there Count Batthyani, who was implicated in the Revolution and was afterwards shot. He was a man of noble appearance, with a fine head, indicating great mental powers. He was a patriot, and honestly devoted, like others of his stamp, to his country, but was not disloyal to his sovereign; but, in troublous times, it was difficult to draw the line of distinction between patriotism and disloyalty.

The Emperor Ferdinand returned to Schönbrunn for the opening of the Diet on the 22nd of July. Energetic measures were then taken against the insurgent government in Hungary, and martial law was proclaimed. This produced a fresh insurrection in Vienna, during which, on the 6th of October, the Minister of War, Count Latour, was murdered. The Emperor then retired to Olmutz, having given orders to Prince Windischgrätz to reduce Vienna to submission.

Prince Windischgrätz had previously put down a revolt at Prague. There the Czechs, in community with Moravia and Austrian Silesia, had summoned a Slavonic Congress for the formation of a separate Slavonic kingdom. He then marched with a considerable force against Vienna, which he took by storm on the 31st of October, after several days' hard fighting. Many of the rebels were shot, and amongst them a well-known demagogue and agitator, Robert Blum. He was a member of the Frankfort National Assembly, and not an Austrian subject, and his execution created much sensation in Germany.

Order was thus restored at Vienna, and the monarchy saved.

A new Ministry was formed under Prince Schwarzenberg. The Emperor Ferdinand abdicated in favour of his nephew, the Archduke Franz Josef, the present Emperor—the next heir, the Archduke Franz Carl, having renounced the succession in favour of his son. The constitutional assembly was transferred from Vienna to Kremsier in Moravia, where it continued to sit till it was dissolved in March, 1849, and a general constitution was proclaimed for the entire Austrian Empire. This continued till the victories of Field-Marshal Radetzky over Sardinia and the reduction of Hungary by the aid of a Russian army under Marshal Paskewitch had relieved Austria from any further fears of revolutionary movements. The constitution which had been granted in 1849 was withdrawn in 1851. The military power had proved

its supremacy, and there was no further question of constitutional government.

I was personally acquainted with Prince Windischgrätz. He was a fine chivalrous character, combining all the noble qualities of a soldier, the wisdom of a statesman, and an innate loyalty to his Sovereign and his country. He was a true chevalier—like Bayard, *sans peur et sans reproche*. He was the saviour of Austria at the most critical period of her history.

Having made this short digression explanatory of the state of Austria during 1848-49, I must resume the itinerary of Sir Stratford Canning's special mission. In the then state of affairs at Vienna there was, of course, no probability of the Austrian Government giving their attention to Greek affairs. They had more than enough to look after their own. But the moment was an extremely interesting one for a statesman with the enlarged views and experience of Sir Stratford Canning. He often expressed to me his conviction that in a country so highly civilised and educated as Germany the storm now bursting over it would be transitory. He considered that the heart of the nation was sound, that the present state of fever would pass away, that the army was loyal and faithful, and that peace and order would eventually be restored. He lamented the short-sightedness of the Governments and statesmen of the day, who had not foreseen the signs of the times, and had permitted acknowledged grievances to remain unalleviated till the clamours of the people reached the very steps of the throne.

The Hungarian nation were a loyal people—very sensitive and impressionable, and, like the Irish, impulsive and warm-hearted. They claimed the restoration of their constitutional rights, dating from a thousand years, and nearly contemporaneous with our Magna Charta. If these had been granted, they would have been as loyal to the House of Hapsburg as they were to Maria Theresa when they passionately exclaimed, “*Moriamur pro nostro rege.*”

Sir Stratford Canning only remained a few days at Vienna, and then we continued our route to Munich *via* Linz. From Linz Lady Canning and her daughters separated from Sir Stratford, and were to meet us on our return at Bruck to continue our journey to Trieste, whilst Sir Stratford and I posted to Munich. The revolutionary epidemic had also appeared in that otherwise tranquil city. An adventuress named Lola Montez had acquired a great ascendancy over King Louis of Bavaria, who conferred on her the title of Countess of Landsberg, and lavished large sums of money on her. It was not a moment for a German Sovereign to trifle with the feelings of his people, particularly with so stubborn and determined a race as the Bavarians. They resented the evil influence of this intriguing foreigner, and insisted on her leaving the country. She escaped—happily, without personal injury—and the King finally abdicated in favour of his son, the Crown Prince Maximilian. On his accession the political agitation calmed down, and on our arrival perfect tranquillity reigned. King Maximilian was very popular, and he

acted with great judgment in appeasing the popular excitement.

It was during our stay at Munich that the famous address of Lamartine, then head of the French Ministry, was published. On returning to the hotel one day I found Sir Stratford in a most excited state. He was pacing the room rapidly (as was his custom when agitated) in a state of furious wrath. I asked him what had happened, and he replied, with violent gesticulations, "That life in Europe would be intolerable; that he would emigrate to Australia, Canada, or some other distant country; that he would not live with Socialists, demagogues, and red Communists;" and dashed down the newspaper he had been reading violently on the table in a paroxysm of indignation. I then learnt that he had been reading Lamartine's address, which certainly savoured strongly of Communist doctrines and democratic principles. I succeeded shortly in restoring him to calmness; but it was the first outburst I had witnessed, and I confess that I viewed it with surprise and dismay. But such was this distinguished man. He was of that fine and sensitive nature that the smallest jar on his high notions of what was just and right in the sight of God and man excited his whole nervous system in such a manner that he was unable to restrain his passions or control his feelings. Never was there a man more actuated by the highest principles of honour, of truth, and of justice; never was there anyone more anxious to do a kind and generous action, or to recall any expression

which in a moment of irritation might have given offence.

Although an impressive writer, he was not an orator, like his distinguished relative, George Canning. He often said to me that this want of oratorical power had been the greatest mortification to him through life. He said that on several occasions the subject on which he had wished to address the House of Commons had been most carefully prepared, that the question was known to him in every detail, but that the moment he rose to address the House the whole vanished from him, leaving his mind and memory in a state of mist. He felt like the man who once rose to address the House, and got no further than "Mr. Speaker, I conceive," and after repeating that three times, sat down; on which the next speaker said, "The hon. gentleman who has just sat down has conceived three times, and has brought forth nothing."

We rejoined Lady Canning at Bruck, on the railway from Vienna to Trieste, having traversed the plains of Hohenlinden, where the famous battle took place between the Austrians and the French, and thence through the beautiful valley of the Inn to Bruck. We then proceeded to Trieste, where Her Majesty's vessel *Antelope* (Captain Smith) had been awaiting Sir Stratford for some weeks to convey him to Constantinople. On arrival at Trieste Sir Stratford called on the Governor, Count Salm, who hospitably asked us to dinner on the following day. There was a large party of officials, and among them General Gyulai, the Com-

mandant, who subsequently commanded the Austrian army in the Austro-Franco-Italian War of 1859. I discovered, with much pleasure, that the Countess Salm was an old friend of mine. She was a Comtesse Clary, sister of Princess W. Radziwill and of Princess Boguslav Radziwill, and I had been intimate with all her family. On returning from dinner we embarked on board the *Antelope*, Sir Stratford wishing to sail at daybreak. At midnight Sir Stratford received news from Her Majesty's Consul at Venice, stating that a revolution had broken out there, and that a provisional government had been formed, of which Manin was elected president. He further informed Sir Stratford that the Neapolitan fleet had joined the Sardinian fleet, and were in full sail for Trieste with hostile intentions.

Sir Stratford immediately instructed me to land and to give the intelligence to the Governor. I went therefore straight to the Governor's palace, and wandered through the corridors without finding anyone to conduct me to the Governor. I eventually found his room, when I communicated to him the intelligence which Sir Stratford had received. Having been suddenly wakened from his sleep, he appeared somewhat dazed by the gravity of the situation. The Austrian fleet had left the harbour a few days previously only half-manned, all the Venetian sailors having struck. The fleet was becalmed a few miles from Trieste, and the combined Italian fleet, under Admiral Albini, were using every endeavour to reach and to take it. I mentioned this to Count Salm, and I advised him to send immediate orders to

the Austrian Lloyd steamers then lying in the harbour (they had ceased running, fearing capture) to get up their steam at once and to tow the Austrian ships into harbour. This he did, and in a short time the Austrian Lloyd's left the harbour for that purpose. I was awakened about nine o'clock in the morning by loud cheering, caused by the whole of the Austrian fleet being safely conducted into harbour. If the Italian fleet had not been becalmed, the Austrian fleet would undoubtedly have been captured. It was a very near thing, and the Lloyd's steamers only reached the Austrian vessels in the nick of time, and carried them off in sight of the Italian fleet.

In the early morning great preparations were made by General Gyulai for the defence of the harbour. Earthworks were thrown up, protected by sand-bags; cannon were placed, and everything that could be devised to prevent the landing of an enemy. There were only two English ships of war in the harbour besides the *Antelope*—namely, the *Terrible*, Captain Ramsay senior officer, and another frigate commanded by Captain Symonds. A request was sent in the early morning by the military commandant to Captain Ramsay to change the berths of the British ships of war then lying in the harbour so as not to interfere with the batteries. Captain Ramsay then decided to take up a position outside the harbour in a line at the entrance to it. He was later in the day joined by, I think, the *Mutine*, Commander Moore, so that the three British ships of war appeared by their position as if intending to defend the

entrance of the harbour. It is my belief that the position taken up by Captain Ramsay prevented the Italian admiral from attacking Trieste.

About midday the Italian fleet, numbering some thirty vessels, were visible in the offing. Captain Ramsay decided to send Captain Symonds to communicate with Admiral Albini, and to ask what his intentions were; to this the Admiral replied, as I was informed, that "He hoped to take his coffee at Trieste." Captain Symonds was conveyed to the Italian fleet on board of the *Antelope*. He had conferred with Sir Stratford before carrying out Captain Ramsay's instructions, as also on his return, but I was not informed of what took place. When we reached the Italian fleet, we found it prepared for action, the tomkins out of the guns, and the fighting-nets all prepared. After Captain Symonds's interview with Admiral Albini we conveyed Captain Symonds back to Trieste, and having placed him on board the *Terrible* we started for Corfu. Sir Stratford, on receiving at Trieste the news of the revolution at Venice, entertained an idea that his presence there might possibly be of use in conciliating the contending parties and restoring harmonious relations between them.

He mentioned the idea to me, and asked my opinion on it. I said that I felt very incompetent to give an opinion on so important a subject, and one on which his superior judgment and greater experience were of far greater weight. As he had, however, appealed to me for my opinion, I could not refrain from stating that I

considered his idea of going to Venice at such a moment, when the city and the government were in the hands of the revolutionary party, as inopportune, if not even as liable to be productive of serious consequences. His object was a most laudable one—to do good; but under the circumstances his presence there, as an English Ambassador, was not only certain to be misinterpreted, but even calculated to do harm. The revolutionary party would look to him for sympathy and support, while the Austrian party would evince suspicion and distrust. He would have the confidence of neither party, and in lieu of producing harmony between them, he would probably give greater intensity to their discord. I further said that without instructions from his Government and previous communication with the Austrian Government it was not a light responsibility to place himself in communication with the rebels of a friendly State, and that by so doing he might gravely compromise the relations of his Government with that of Austria. Sir Stratford appeared to concur in my views, and finally abandoned the idea of going to Venice. Events afterwards proved that not even an archangel, let alone the great “Eltchi,” would have succeeded in calming the excitement of the revolutionary party at Venice, and inducing them to listen to the voice of the charmer.

We had lovely weather on our voyage to Corfu—a bright sun, a blue sky, a blue sea, and the softest balmy air—which was a great relief after the turbulent and troubled scenes we had witnessed in the German

capitals. We coasted along the shores of Istria and Dalmatia to Zara, where we landed to visit the town, and our only consolation after a steep ascent to that picturesque but dirty town was quaffing some delicious Maraschino. The country around was arid rock, with scarcely a vestige of cultivation ; and were it not for the more fertile country bordering the Eastern frontier of Dalmatia, the population would be reduced to starvation.

On leaving Zara we proceeded direct to Corfu, where we anchored on the following day. The approach to Corfu is very picturesque, the mountains of Albania on the one hand, and the green fertile island of Corfu on the other.

The town is situated on an eminence, and the Governor's palace, a very imposing building, gives an air of civilisation, if not of grandeur, to the scene. Opposite to the palace is the fortress, where are the Commandant's house and the officers' quarters. In the centre is a large square, utilised for the drilling and parade of the troops ; and in the background, in a semicircle, are the principal houses with arcades. The Governor—or Lord High Commissioner, as he was termed—had another residence beyond the town, close to the sea-shore, and with a very pretty garden attached to it. Lord Seaton was then the High Commissioner, who, as Sir J. Colburne, had distinguished himself by his prompt action in quelling the insurrection in Canada. Nothing could be more hospitable or kind than Lord and Lady Seaton and the members of their family during our stay at Corfu. Immediately on our arrival

Sir Stratford and Lady Canning and his daughters were invited to stay at the palace, and I was also included, but I preferred remaining on board. I visited the palace every morning, to take Sir Stratford's orders, and dined every day with Lord and Lady Seaton. In addition to official dinners, a grand ball was given, which was very handsomely done; and the beauty of the scene was greatly enhanced by the picturesque Greek costumes worn on the occasion. During his stay at Corfu Sir Stratford Canning was subject to innumerable applications for pecuniary assistance from Greek subjects. These appeals were supported by flattering terms of gratitude for the services rendered by "George Canning" and himself to the cause of Greek independence. I was at last obliged to represent to Sir Stratford that a limit must be put to these calls on his purse—calls to which he responded with a lavish hand; and at length I succeeded in checking these claims on his generous liberality.

CHAPTER XII.

Visit to Vostitza—Visit to Corinth—Embarkation at Kalamaki for the Piræus—Arrival there at Midnight—Incident in regard to General Church—Dinner at Sir Edmund Lyons'—Differences between Sir Stratford Canning and Sir Edmund Lyons—Departure from Athens—Passage to Dardanelles—Gallipoli—Sea of Marmora.

ON leaving Corfu, after a most agreeable sojourn of some days with Lord and Lady Seaton and their estimable family, we started for the Gulf of Lepanto, passing by the beautiful island of Cephalaria. At Corfu we picked up the renowned artist, Mr. Lear, and Sir Stratford gave him a passage to Athens. We landed for a few hours at Vostitza, a small village, the centre of the currant-producing country, where there was a British Vice-Consul. It was a Greek fête day, and the wife of the British Vice-Consul and her sister were dressed in their national costumes. They were strikingly handsome, with classical profiles and those dreamy eyes which are a distinguishing mark of Oriental beauty. The impression they made on Sir Stratford and myself was probably the same which the "Maid of Athens" had produced on Lord Byron.

They regaled us with fruit, cake, and wine, and insisted on sending down to our boat two sacks of dried currants for Sir Stratford; and we took leave of them with a very pleasurable appreciation of their kind

reception and of their beauty. I may here say that they were the handsomest Greek women, and the finest type of Greek beauty, that I saw during my stay in Greece. The topic of beauty reminds me that I was very curious to see the famous "Maid of Athens," the heroine of Lord Byron. She was then the wife of Mr. Black, the British Vice-Consul at the Piræus. I went to the Piræus for the express purpose of making her acquaintance. She was then an elderly lady, with unpretentious manners and some traces of past beauty, but the poetry and romance had fled, and she simply personified Mrs. Black!

From Vostitza we steamed up to the Bay of Corinth, where we landed early to enable us to get up to Corinth to see the old fortress, and to reach Kalamaki in time to embark on a man-of-war steamer which had been sent to convey us to the Piræus. During our stay at Athens the *Antelope* was to rejoin us at the Piræus, to convey Sir Stratford to Constantinople.

The ladies and Sir Stratford were mounted on ponies, but I preferred walking across the plain, and then mounting the rather steep ascent to the fortress. It is a curious place, and I should say before artillery was brought to its present state of perfection would have been impregnable. There is at the summit a marvellous well, many hundred feet deep, which had evidently in olden times supplied the garrison with sufficient water to withstand any siege. In partaking of it we found it was of a far purer and superior kind to that now furnished by the London water-companies.

A carriage of a questionable character was provided for Sir Stratford and the ladies to convey them from Corinth across the Isthmus, to where the steamer was awaiting them, and I mounted a rough pony which, though not a Pegasus of beauty, fully answered my purpose. The village of Corinth—for it cannot be called a town—is a wretched place. I could not but reflect on the changes which must have taken place in Corinth since the days of St. Paul, when it must have been a town of some consideration, of wealth, and of commercial activity: now, an almost deserted village, with a sparse population, which apparently had not made any advance in civilisation or culture since the early days of Christendom.

On going on board of Her Majesty's ship I had hoped to find some refreshments, for I was famished; but the ship had been so long waiting for Sir Stratford that the provisions were exhausted, and the crew had been reduced to live on land-tortoises, of which there was a great number on the isthmus. However, I regaled myself with a biscuit and some pale ale.

We steamed within view of the shore, and crossed the Bay of Salamis, of classical repute. It was near midnight before we reached the Piræus. Sir Stratford and the ladies disembarked immediately, and I followed with Mr. Lear afterwards. On such occasions I was always with Sir Stratford, but at this late hour I thought that my services would not be required. However, it was unfortunate that I was not with Sir Stratford on his landing, as will be seen from the following circumstances.

On landing I found Sir Stratford pacing up and down the quay in a state of irritation. I asked what had happened. Sir Stratford replied, "You must get that man out of the carriage. He cannot go up with Lady Canning to Athens." I asked, "What man?" He said, "General Church."

Now, General Church was an old friend of Sir Stratford's, and I had often heard him speak of him in terms of affection, and he had come down at that late hour to welcome him on his arrival. I expostulated with Sir Stratford, but it was no use. I then went to the carriage in which General Church and Lady Canning were seated. I was not personally acquainted with the General, and the question of extracting a perfect stranger from the carriage (which, by-the-by, was his own) was a difficult matter. I appealed to Lady Canning, and said that it was absolutely necessary that she should go up in the same carriage as Sir Stratford. Lady Canning said she was very intimate with General Church, to whom she introduced me, and begged me not to derange her. I was at my wits' end: Sir Stratford fuming and insisting on General Church not accompanying Lady Canning, and Lady Canning refusing all compliance with my proposals. At last I was obliged to appeal to General Church, and to request him to allow Sir Stratford to accompany Lady Canning to Athens in his place. The position was a singular one, both for me and General Church—at midnight under a bright Athenian moonlight. By dint of my persuasion he got out of the carriage, and I put Sir Stratford in his place.

The cavalcade then moved on, and we reached Athens at two o'clock a.m. But this was only the beginning of woe; it led, later, to a breach in the friendly relations between Sir Stratford and Sir Edmund Lyons.

I was quite as much puzzled as was Lady Canning to comprehend the cause of all this manœuvring and irritation. It appears that there had been for some time past at Athens two rival political parties—the one called the English party, with which Sir Edmund Lyons, then English Minister at Athens, was supposed to be connected, and of which General Church was the moving head; the other was the “French” party, which in reality was composed of various elements supposed to be antagonistic to British policy. The first object of Sir Stratford was to endeavour to conciliate the two parties, and to moderate, if not extinguish, the jealous rivalry between them, so injurious to the interests of Greece. It was his wish to present himself to the King as wholly impartial and entirely free and independent of any political parties, hoping thereby to exercise a salutary influence on His Majesty. On his arrival at the Piræus he was warmly accosted by his old friend, General Church, for whom he had a sincere regard; but he was afraid that the presence of General Church in his suite might be misinterpreted as indicating his intention to ally himself with the English party, and thus frustrate the object he had in view of being strictly impartial and of maintaining an entire freedom and independence of action. If I had been on the spot, he would have appealed to me, and probably I should have convinced him

that at that hour of the night no one would have known with whom he had entered Athens. I should have further submitted to him the imprudence of raising a question of this nature in regard to General Church, which was sure to be spread abroad and exaggerated, and would certainly be more productive of evil than of good. As ill-luck would have it, he appealed to Mr. Green, the Consul, who of course was heart and soul with his Minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, and the so-called English party. Every word which Sir Stratford, in his moment of irritation, addressed to Mr. Green was certain to be reported the next day to Sir Edmund Lyons, who interpreted it as being the declared intention of Sir Stratford to undermine and thwart the policy which he was then pursuing. A report of this nature had likewise reached Sir Edmund Lyons by indirect means before the arrival of Sir Stratford, and, coupled therefore with the incident I have related, naturally tended to produce a feeling of irritation and distrust on the part of Sir Edmund Lyons.

On the following day Sir Stratford and Lady Canning and his daughters dined with Sir Edmund and Lady Lyons. Everything was *couleur de rose*, and the most friendly relations apparently existed between the two diplomatists. But it was, unfortunately, a calm before the storm. On the following day Sir Stratford received a letter from Sir Edmund Lyons, which was the commencement of an angry correspondence, that finally produced a rupture in their friendly relations. I did my best to restore

harmony, but in vain : neither was of a yielding disposition. I represented to Sir Edmund Lyons that the suspicion with which his mind had been imbued—that Sir Stratford had the intention of thwarting his policy, and undermining his position—was wholly erroneous ; that Sir Stratford, as he must well know, was far too conscientious and too straightforward to be capable of taking such a course ; and that he indignantly repelled such an insinuation. I added that any differences between two public servants of such high position and of such known ability and patriotism, if known, would greatly prejudice the effect of Sir Stratford's mission.

I regret to say that my conciliatory efforts to re-establish harmonious relations between Sir Stratford and Sir Edmund Lyons were unavailing. In the meantime Sir Stratford was laid up with a rather severe attack of gout, and this, combined with the intense heat of Athens in July, was not conducive to a spirit of conciliation.

Sir Stratford had several audiences of the King before his attack of gout, and went with Lady Canning and his daughter to a *partie de campagne* given by the King and Queen. He had also interviews with all the leading statesmen of Greece ; and if good counsels could have been of avail, they were not wanting.

Before closing this episode it affords me much pleasure to add that during the period of the Crimean War, when Sir Edmund Lyons played a distinguished part in the command of the *Agamemnon*, and subsequently

as the successor of Admiral Dundas in the command of the British fleet, the unfortunate estrangement to which I have referred was completely removed and buried in oblivion, and that they both worked harmoniously together as true patriots for their country's good. The ancient friendship was restored, and continued ever after.

At the breaking out of the Crimean War Sir Edmund Lyons was British Minister in Sweden, and the last time I saw him was on his passage through Berlin to London to seek active naval employment. His expression to me was that in the event of war "his very fingers would itch" to fight the enemy of his Queen and country. He was a noble character, and a fine sailor.

The heat of Athens in midsummer is intense. It was quite impossible to venture out in midday, and the myriads of flies were most tormenting. I had much work to do for Sir Stratford, and to be in constant attendance when he was laid up with the gout. I adapted, therefore, my own *régime* of life to his; I rose at daybreak, and then visited the places of note in and about the city. After seven o'clock a.m. the heat obliged me to return. I never dined till after dark, except when it was full moon, as there was no possibility of strolling about the town after sunset. It was not then lit with gas, and there is barely any twilight after sundown, so that strolling in the dark was neither agreeable nor safe. But with an Athenian moonlight it was glorious. The Parthenon stood out

with all its classic form in sublime beauty, and the outlines of the Acropolis were marked in a cloudless atmosphere by the soft and glowing beams of an Athenian moon. The beauty of the scene cannot be described in words. It must be seen—it must be felt. The admiration and enjoyment of the marvellous beauties of Nature strike a sensitive chord in the heart of man, and awaken feelings akin to the supernatural, which can find no vent in words. In beholding such a scene my thoughts strayed back to past generations, and the classic ground on which I stood, in view of the monuments of departed genius, seemed as if re peopled with those heroes and statesmen who have left behind them an imperishable name.

I could not give a more graphic account of this classical city than the following, which I reproduce from the pen of a distinguished writer:—

It would be impossible to enlarge upon the many places of interest here. Every spot of ground has its classical interest. First of all there stands the Acropolis, which is grand and sublime above all description, and must fill every mind with wonder and admiration. To the architect and lover of art it offers the chastest and grandest specimen. To the reflective mind it presents a link which connects the most ancient of histories with the tales of modern days. To the religious mind it is associated with many feelings, and may offer a worthy example of the devotion and respect of a heathen nation to her divinity by the erection of the finest temple that was raised in the heathen times.

On a rock almost immediately connected with it stands the Parthenon, which is even far more interesting than all the historic associations of glory and renown. It was there that

St. Paul was taken up by the Athenians to preach to them the knowledge of Christianity and the true God, and the very spot itself is corroborated by the mention of the temple. The statue of Minerva must have been before his eyes, towering above the Parthenon, when he said, "God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that He is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men's hands;" and where he says, "We ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold or silver or stone graven by art and men's device." The statue of Minerva was gilt, so likewise the fluting of the pillars of the temple. Eighteen hundred years have passed since this almost divine appeal was made to the Athenians; and since that period that very temple which, in St. Paul's time, was dedicated to a heathen goddess, became for a time a Christian Church, was afterwards a Mussulman's mosque, and is now a heap of ruins:

"Remnants of kings that have passed away,
Fragments of stone reared by creatures of clay."

The Temple of Theseus is perhaps the most perfect of all the antiquities, it having been preserved from that modern element of destruction—gunpowder—which destroyed the Parthenon, and against which the ancients could never have thought of providing. Had it not been for gunpowder, the Acropolis, with the Parthenon and the Temple of Victory, would have been transmitted to us "fresh from Nature's hands," for they had stood proof against every other element.

The Greek dresses are beautiful and very graceful—the men's costumes as much, if not more so than those of the women. The scenery around Athens is fine, with high distant mountains and a distant view of the Ægean Sea, and some nearer mountains composed of a dry, parched, arid rock, upon which the golden sun shines with a glare unimaginal; but the heat was such

that it was barely possible to look out of the windows during the daytime.

Mount Hymettus was visible from my windows, and, notwithstanding its classical name and its honey-productiveness, is not inviting to look at under an August sun. It is wild and rugged. I hoped to visit Eleusis, Ægina, and Sunium on our route to Constantinople. At Sunium is the tomb of Themistocles, and opposite, at Poros, Demosthenes died. I went the same path to Phalerus that he had trod when he used to practise oratory by the sea-shore.

No one who has not been in a southern clime can form any idea of the beauties of an Athenian moonlight, and we were fortunate in having the full enjoyment of it during our short stay at Athens.

After a stay of some three weeks, which had been somewhat prolonged in consequence of Sir Stratford's attack of gout, we again embarked at the Piræus on board of the *Antelope*, which had in the meantime come round from the Gulf of Corinth, and we proceeded on our way to Constantinople. We passed by the famous Temple of Ægina, and through the lovely islands of the Archipelago, within view of Skyros and Lemnos, to Tenedos, where we were obliged to anchor for the night, as no vessel could then enter the Dardanelles after dark. On our voyage we had a distant view at sunset of Mount Athos, the seat of the renowned Greek monastery. We passed also within view of the plains of Troy, which had the appearance of a wild uncultivated swamp.

Soon after entering the Dardanelles we came to the town—or, rather, village—bearing that name, which appeared to be composed merely of low-roofed houses, with the flags of the respective Consuls. The Asiatic side of the Dardanelles is flat, but the European side is high land and rocky, and the fortifications are cut out of the rock, and completely command the approaches by water. I cannot conceive it possible that any ships of war, even an ironclad, could pass through the Dardanelles, if the fortifications and artillery were well manned, without being annihilated by the numerous batteries ensconced on the rocky shore, and on a level with the water.

I have always been of opinion that this highway of commerce should be opened to all nations and all vessels and ships of war, and that all fortifications should be razed. It would thus prevent the Black Sea from being a *mare clausum*; it would, too, give facilities and expansion to the trade with Russia, Persia, and Central Asia, and at no distant date also with India when the railway communication is extended from the Caspian to the Indian frontier. In the meantime, however, there is every likelihood of a railway being made from Resht to Teheran, and from thence to Bushire on the Persian Gulf.

I look forward to Constantinople becoming a free port and the centre of trade to the East, and Turkey in Europe being transformed into a Christian State, and placed, like Belgium, under a European guarantee of neutrality. It will then cease to be the battledore of

party rivalry among the Powers of Europe, and the focus of Oriental intrigue.

On passing the Dardanelles, and before entering the Sea of Marmora, we saw the spot where Byron swam across the Hellespont. The distance did not appear so great, although distance by water is very deceptive ; but the difficulty and danger were caused by the force of the stream and the eddies.

We passed also Gallipoli, which was occupied by English troops during the Crimean War, to safeguard the possession of the Dardanelles and the approach of an army by land to Constantinople. The strategic position appeared to me, a pacific civilian, as admirably suited for the above purpose.

On entering the Sea of Marmora we altered our direct course to Constantinople by going round the island of Marmora. There had been some piracies of late, which, it was suspected, had been committed by the inhabitants of this island ; and it had been thought that the unusual appearance of a British man-of-war would give a wholesome feeling of fear to these marauders. It seemed to be sparsely inhabited, and that the chief occupation of its population appeared to consist in fishing.

CHAPTER XIII.

Arrival at Constantinople—Therapia—Bujukdere—Mysterious Flocks of Birds—Cholera—Official Visit to Rifaat Pasha—Sir Stratford's Audience of the Sultan—Palace of Tcheragan—The Sultan Abdul Medjid—The Mosque of Santa Sophia—The Sweet Waters of Asia—Changes produced by the Crimean War—Turkish Statesmen.

On a gloriously bright sunny morning we came in view of Constantinople; and on rounding the Seraglio Point the magnificent view of the Golden Horn, with Pera on one side and Galata on the other, opened on us. I was deeply impressed with the beauty of the scene, the crowd of vessels, the numerous *caïques* with the picturesque boatmen, and the gilded minarets and mosques which shone in the morning sun, as also by the quaint appearance of the Turkish women, whose faces were carefully protected by the *yashmack* from the inquisitive gaze of man.

We only halted for a few minutes for some formalities in regard to the Custom House and other matters, and proceeded direct to Therapie, the summer residence of the Ambassador, about ten miles from Constantinople. It is beautifully situated, close to the Bosphorus on the European side, and adjoins the residence of the French Ambassador. There is a large garden attached to it, in which are several small houses where the members of the Embassy are lodged.

Adjoining the Ambassador's residence is another house, which it was then intended to fit up and arrange for servants, kitchen offices, etc.

Towards the entrance into the Bosphorus, in a bay forming a semicircle facing Therapia, is Bujukdere, where the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors reside during the summer. On the hottest days in summer a delightfully cool breeze sets in after midday from the Black Sea, which I found most refreshing during my stay there, for the heat was intense. I remarked a curious flock of birds flying close to the water. They were continuously in flight from one end of the Bosphorus to the other. They are never seen to rest, nor to go beyond the limits mentioned. There is a curious mystery attached to these *âmes errantes*, as they are called, and it has never been discovered where they breed. They are held as sacred by the Turks, and the superstition is that they are the souls of the Dragomans, who have taken this form and are doomed to this existence as a punishment for their deeds on earth.

The cholera was then raging in Constantinople, and the mortality was considerable, probably from the insanitary state of the city. The dirt and stench of the streets of Pera were indescribable, and the filth and poisonous atmosphere of the bazaars must have greatly aided the propagation of the malady. As I had no fear of cholera, and had already been in towns infected by it, I visited the bazaars and the places of interest in the city. I took certain precautions as to diet, avoiding raw fruits and acids, but I especially avoided being out of

the house at sunset and during the hour after it, and I feel sure that it was the best preservative against cholera. In all climates the miasma arising from the earth at sunset is most pernicious to health, and should be avoided. Two hours after sunset the miasma has passed away, and then the cool evening air is most refreshing.

I accompanied Sir Stratford on his first official visit to the "Porte." Rifaat Pasha was the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was extremely courteous, and welcomed Sir Stratford with apparent cordiality. He spoke French; consequently there was no necessity for a Dragoman. He regaled us with coffee and ices, after which we departed with the same official state with which we had been ushered in. He was a poet, and he gave me the impression that his poetic strains were mostly devoted to the fair sex.

On the subsequent day I accompanied Sir Stratford, with a large suite composed of the members of his Embassy, Captain Smith of the *Antelope*, and other officers, on the occasion of his official audience of the Sultan.

He was received with great state at the palace of Tcheragan on the Bosphorus. It was quite a modern palace, built in the French style, and furnished from Paris with rich silk damask and innumerable French mirrors and gilt frames.

The *salon* where the Sultan received us was all white and gold with arabesques, similar to the *salons* of many of the French villas near Paris.

The Sultan was seated on a divan ; behind him and near him stood the officers of State. We formed a semicircle in front of him, Sir Stratford being in the centre, with the Dragoman of the Embassy next to him. Sir Stratford then read out his speech, which the Dragoman translated into Turkish by paragraphs. The Dragoman, however, outstripped Sir Stratford instead of following him, and reached the end of the discourse before Sir Stratford. This small *contretemps*, however, was scarcely observed. The Sultan replied in a few words expressive of his pleasure at Sir Stratford's return, and making complimentary inquiries in regard to the health of Her Majesty the Queen.

The Sultan Abdul Medjid had a pale and sickly appearance. His expression was mild and beneficent, but without character. He appeared to be in very delicate health, and exhibited a listlessness and indifference which may possibly have resulted from it, although vivacity is not a quality in which an Oriental abounds. Before the audience we were served with pipes, coffee, and sherbet. The pipes were very handsomely mounted with diamonds and precious stones, the value of each pipe being commensurate with the official status of each guest. We were rowed up to the Sultan's palace in the eight-oared state-barge of the Ambassador ; and a bright sun and the gay appearance of the Bosphorus, with its countless caïques flitting in every direction, added to the exhilarating beauty of the scene.

I visited the mosque of Santa Sophia, which was originally built for a Christian church by the Emperor

Constantine. It is externally a fine building, but internally without any attraction, it being merely coloured white and red, with no architectural ornament. I was taken over the mosque by Signor Salviati, an Italian architect who had been employed to renovate it. He showed me that on removing the white and red colour from the principal and the various smaller domes, he discovered that they were all encrusted with mosaics in glass, similar to the dome of St. Mark's at Venice, which was built at the same time as the mosque of Santa Sophia.

On the conversion of the Christian church into a Mahomedan mosque, the dome had been coloured red and white, in order to conceal the cross and other Christian symbols. The difficulty, Signor Salviati said, was how to appease Turkish sensibility and to preserve at the same time the Christian mosaics. He cleverly arranged to enclose the cross in a circle, thus giving it an architectural character without the Christian symbolism, and he was thus enabled to retain the mosaics without giving religious umbrage to the followers of Mahomet; and whenever the church is restored to its Christian origin, the symbols of Christianity can be restored to their primeval form.

I visited on a Friday (which is the Turkish Sabbath) the sweet waters of Asia on the Asiatic side, where the ladies of the Sultan's harem were in the habit of resorting. It is a lovely spot in enclosed grounds, with a beautiful green lawn like velvet, and shaded by trees. The *arabas*, or coaches, in which these

ladies are conveyed are drawn by white oxen. I was under the protection of a very pretty Greek lady, Madame Frédérici; or otherwise, as a stranger, I should have been subjected to immediate expulsion, or possibly to something worse. As it was, I incurred very menacing scowls and threatening gestures from the black attendants under whose charge these precious and immaculate daughters of Eve were placed. The ladies on our arrival were seated on Turkish carpets, surrounded by their slaves, and protected by the black gentlemen in the rear. They occupied themselves with arranging their dress, which was very elaborate and expensive. They removed their *yashmaks*, and arranged their hair and headdress by hand-glasses. I cannot say that I was much struck with their beauty, and I came to the opinion that the *yashmack* created the delusion of beauty where none at all existed. But before arriving at this opinion I approached rather too close to an establishment on the grass, and was ordered off with menace by one of the black protectors. My Greek lady friend deemed it advisable to depart, and we consequently left the sweet waters of Asia and the sweet goddesses enjoying its balmy air.

It must be borne in mind that the Constantinople of 1891 is very different from that of 1848, when I was there. Since the Crimean War great changes have taken place in the manner of life and in the customs of that Oriental nation. The mixing with foreigners has given the Turks more enlarged views, and has rendered

them more disposed to adopt the modern ideas of civilised life. The introduction of railways is also awakening them to greater industry and activity. They are a docile and an intelligent race, but their indolence and their apathy, coupled with their fatalism, are insurmountable obstacles to their advancement in wealth and civilisation. It is proved that a Mahomedan population can live happily under Christian rule, as in Russia and in India; but in the nineteenth century, and under the laws of the Koran, it is next to an impossibility for a Christian population to live under Turkish rule. The Koran acts, in regard to the introduction of reforms in the Turkish Empire, very much as the *non possumus* affects the Papacy. The result is, stagnation as regards the progressive introduction of good government and the advance of civilisation. I have been personally acquainted with many distinguished Turkish statesmen—namely, Reschid Pasha, Mehemet Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha—but they have all passed away, and left no school of young politicians of the same stamp to succeed them. I have also known Musurus Pasha, so many years the respected Turkish Ambassador in London; Prince Callimaki, late Ambassador at Vienna; Rustem Pasha, the present amiable and respected Ambassador in London—all highly cultivated and able statesmen (they were Greeks or Roman Catholics), who have rendered great services to their country.

With the variable changes which are now taking place in Europe, I cannot believe that the present state of things in the East can long remain as it is. The

Christian population in European Turkey has largely augmented, whilst the Mahomedan has decreased.

The Eastern Question, with all its varied complications, has not yet been solved, and it still hangs like Damocles' sword over an expectant Europe. No one can say where a convulsion may take place, or, when it comes, in what state it will find Europe. The Slavonic Question, of which Bulgaria and Servia form the nucleus, is the great question of the future. It is the apple of discord between Russia and Austria, each striving for the predominating influence over this numerically powerful race. I will not now enlarge on this very interesting and important question, but will revert to it again later in these Reminiscences, when I shall have occasion to treat the Eastern Question more in detail.

I cannot omit to mention here Mr. Alison, who was then Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, and afterwards Her Majesty's Minister at Teheran. He was a distinguished Orientalist—speaking Turkish, Arabic, and Persian—extremely clever, and a most agreeable companion. He was thoroughly versed in Oriental politics, a powerful writer, and an able assistant to Sir Stratford Canning. The staff of the Embassy also included Lord William Clinton; the Hon. Percy Smythe, afterwards Lord Strangford; Count Pisani, the Oriental Secretary and Dragoman (all of whom have since died); and Mr. Moore, whose obliging services are well known and appreciated by many English visitors to Constantinople; and I passed a very agreeable time with them. After a stay of ten days I

left Constantinople in the *Antelope*, which was ordered to return to Malta. As I had despatches from Sir Stratford for Lords Ponsonby and Westmorland at Vienna and Berlin, I had to leave the *Antelope* at Corfu, where I had to undergo quarantine. I landed with my servant in the afternoon on the Quarantine Island, the only inhabitants of which were a "guardian" and a goat. There was not a stick of furniture, and no food of any description. In the course of the evening a bed, table, and chair came, and dinner and wine were provided from the hotel at Corfu. Fortunately I had some books, and Lady Seaton provided me daily most kindly with fresh butter and cream and such-like delicacies. My only amusement was rowing about with the guardian under a yellow flag, and fishing; but I felt very much as Robinson Crusoe may have felt on his desert island. Happily Lord Seaton put me on board a man-of-war steamer that was going to Trieste, so that on my arrival there I should have completed the full term of my quarantine.

On landing at Trieste I immediately started for Vienna, and, after delivering my despatches, continued my journey to Berlin, and then to London.

On my arrival in London I had an interview with Lord Palmerston. He made many inquiries as to the past events in Germany—the state of public opinion, of the army, and the finances—to which I was able to give him satisfactory answers.

In reply to his inquiry as to the course for England to pursue, I said that we ought to be silent observers of

passing events, without expressing any opinion or taking any part in them ; that our Ministers abroad should confine themselves to keeping a vigilant eye on all that was passing around them, and to reporting their observations to his lordship. He asked my opinion in regard to Austria. I replied that the State was impoverished, but the country was prosperous.

After six months' absence I was happy to rejoin my wife and child, and to enjoy the quiet repose of "sweet home."

CHAPTER XIV.

Return to Baden—Dinner to the Prince of Prussia—Appointed Secretary of Legation at Stuttgart, 1852—Transferred to Berlin in 1853—Rivalry between the Latin and Greek Churches the Cause of the Crimean War—Countess Kisseleff—Presented at Berlin as Chargé-d’Affaires—Meeting of Conference at Vienna for Adjustment of Differences between Russia and Turkey—The Vienna Note: Negotiations respecting It—Baron Manteuffel—The Czar’s Invitation to Frederick William IV. to Warsaw, and Correspondence between the two Sovereigns—The Czar’s Visit to Berlin—Firmness of Baron Manteuffel.

ON the expiration of my leave of absence I resumed my diplomatic duties early in 1849 at Carlsruhe, and resided at Baden-Baden during that eventful year.

I have already in a preceding chapter related the stirring incidents which came under my notice during that period. I will only now mention that on the occasion of the Prince of Prussia visiting Baden in December, 1849, for the inspection of the Prussian troops, then in occupation of the Grand Duchy, I received a telegram from Count Goltz, A.D.C., announcing His Royal Highness’s wish to dine with us on a certain day. I had but a short time to invite those guests suitable and agreeable to His Royal Highness. I was fortunate, however, to secure the presence of Prince and Princess Hohenlohe-Langenberg, Prince and Princess Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Prince Egon Fürstenberg, General Fredericks (a Russian of

distinction), Count Nicholas Pahlen, and M. de Bacourt, who were residing at Baden, the latter occupied with the compilation of the "Talleyrand Papers." His Royal Highness, gracious as he always was, expressed his satisfaction at the dinner I had arranged, and told me he was specially pleased to make the acquaintance of Prince and Princess Hohenzollern, with whom, although they were members of his House, he had not been previously acquainted. In the evening we all went to a ball at General Fredericks', in honour of the Prince of Prussia, which was very gay and enjoyable.

I continued to reside at Baden during 1850 and 1851. In the latter year my second son, Augustus, was born, and the Princess of Prussia graciously offered to be his godmother. The christening took place in my small house, when Her Royal Highness held the infant at the font. After the ceremony the Prince and Princess of Prussia honoured us with their presence at dinner, when Sir Alexander and Lady Malet, Count and Countess Blücher, M. and Mme. de Savigny, and a few others formed our party. We presented to the Princess on the occasion a purple velvet prayer-book, which she used to the day of her death.

In January, 1852, I was appointed by Lord Granville, who had succeeded Lord Palmerston as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Secretary of Legation at Stuttgart, to reside at Carlsruhe, in the place of Mr. Augustus Craven, who had resigned. The official duties were not laborious, and I utilised the leisure I enjoyed for study to prepare myself for more important duties.

In February, 1853, Lord Clarendon was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Administration of Earl Russell. I was transferred by him on the 20th of May to the Legation at Berlin. I was young, active, and ambitious, and I felt that the post of Stuttgart, where there was no political interest, was like being down a well, or in the centre of a railway tunnel with light at each end, but the centre of which was in utter darkness. I was delighted, therefore, to find myself in a more interesting sphere of duty, and especially to serve under my old and valued friend Lord Bloomfield, then Minister at the Court of Berlin. It was also an important and critical moment, both as regarded the internal progress of constitutional Prussia and the reopening of the Oriental Question by the demands of the Emperor Nicholas on Turkey, which would have made the Czar of Russia the protector of the Christian subjects of the Sultan.

The rivalry between the Latin and Greek Churches had always been a thorn in the side of Turkey, but so long as both parties allowed the question to slumber there was peace between them ; and that peace would not probably have been disturbed if the French Ambassador, the Marquis de Lavalette, had not imprudently raised the question of the Holy Places. It was a sore point, which greatly agitated the Russian Orthodox Church, of which the Emperor was head. It was a question on which there could be no compromise ; and when the formal demand had been made to the Porte, it was difficult, not to say impossible, for the Czar, in

face of his people and in view of the great influence exercised by the Russian clergy over a sensitive and somewhat fanatic people, to withdraw. The secret mission of Count Leiningen on the part of Austria to Constantinople had also excited the jealousy and roused the suspicion of the Czar, and was one of the causes of Prince Menschikoff's being sent by the Emperor Nicholas with his preposterous demand. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who had been on leave of absence at this period, told me that during all the years he had been at Constantinople he had studiously avoided raising any question which could involve the rights or claims of the rival Churches, and that M. de Lavalette's action was most impolitic, unnecessary, and regrettable.

I passed the early part of 1853 at Baden-Baden, where Prince Gortschakoff, then Russian Minister at Stuttgart, was residing with his wife and family, and with whom I was on intimate terms. There were also many Russians of distinction among my acquaintance, and amongst them Countess Kisseleff, wife of the Russian Ambassador at Paris. She had then only lately returned from Constantinople, where the clouds of future complications in the East were gathering and presaged a coming storm. She was a clever woman, and well informed on political questions; but her talents were, unfortunately, wholly concentrated on the seductive attractions of the "green table." She then told me (in June) that war was inevitable; that the religious sympathy of Russia had been awakened to a sensitiveness that precluded any hope of the Czar receding from

his demands, however peacefully inclined. Matters had gone too far for him to recede. In "Holy Russia" the religious question predominated over every other, and even the Czar could not act independently of the influence of the Orthodox Church. She foresaw, therefore, in this question very serious troubles for Europe and for her own country.

I arrived at Berlin shortly before Lord Bloomfield's departure on leave, and at the time when the Conference of the European Powers was sitting at Vienna in the hope of finding a solution of the differences between the Czar and the Porte. The Conference had drawn up a Note for acceptance by Russia and Turkey, commonly known as the Vienna Note, as the basis of an agreement which it was hoped would be accepted by both parties as the means of averting war. Russia accepted it. The Porte demurred, and required some amendments explanatory of certain ambiguities in that Note. The Russian reply to the modifications suggested by the Porte, in lieu of smoothing difficulties, increased them, and the despatch of Count Nesselrode* so far justified the hesitation of the Porte by again setting forth the claims of Russia to the Protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. War was then declared by the Porte, Russia having in the meantime occupied the Danubian Principalities. If, in this conjuncture, the four Powers had acted together, and had addressed a firm remonstrance to Russia, intimating common action in case of refusal, there is no doubt that Russia would

* See Appendix.

have withdrawn from the Principalities, as she subsequently did on the summons of Austria. But the misfortune was the weakness and vacillation of Frederick William IV., the Russian proclivities of the Prussian Court party (not the Ministry), and the rivalry and jealousy then existing between Austria and Prussia. This prevented any firm and common action of the four Powers against Russia, and checkmated every hope of arriving at a pacific solution of the question. If Austria and Prussia had been cordially united, they would have carried all Germany with them ; but their disunion and rivalry gave strength to the smaller German States, who formed a coalition among themselves, under the name of the "Bambergers," solely with a view to enhance their own importance. Thus the inaction of both the German Powers frustrated all hopes of maintaining peace, neither daring to act as a great Power independently of the other.

In regard to Prussia it may be observed that she had some reason for jealousy and ill-will towards Austria. Only three years before, Prussia had undergone the humiliation of signing with Austria the Convention of Olmütz, when a collision had been on the point of occurring in Hesse between the Austrian and Prussian armies. At Brouzell some shots were exchanged ; but the Prussian general retired, in order to avoid an open rupture with Austria.

It was then agreed between the Prussian Government and Prince Schwarzenberg that a Conference should be held at Olmütz for the arrangement of the

differences between the two Governments. Prince Schwarzenburg and Baron Manteuffel were the plenipotentiaries who signed the convention, by which Prussia agreed to give up the "Three Kingdom Alliance,"* to evacuate Electoral Hesse and Baden, to support the Austrian Policy in the Holstein Question, and to submit to the decision of the Dresden Conference, by which the German federal relations should be decided by the plenipotentiaries of all the German Governments.

This submission to Austria was most galling to the pride of the Prussian nation and to the army, and to no one more so than to the Prince of Prussia. But it was the choice of peace or war with Austria; and the pacific proclivities of Frederick William IV. were so well known that a daring Minister like Prince Felix Schwarzenburg was able beforehand to count on the acceptance of his terms. But, as events have subsequently proved, it may have been fortunate for Prussia that war was averted, for at that time the Prussian army had not been reorganised, as was later effected by the late Emperor William I. (the necessity of which was proved by the mobilisation in 1850), and the fruits of which were reaped in 1866 and 1870.

I was presented by Lord Bloomfield as *Chargé-d'Affaires* on the 20th of September, 1853. It was a critical moment, for the chances of peace or war were hanging in the balance; and I confess that I was somewhat impressed with the heavy responsibility of the moment. Baron Manteuffel was Minister for

* Commonly called "Die Drei Königen Bündniss."

Foreign Affairs—a shrewd man, of an elastic character, but not endowed with those qualities which distinguish a brilliant statesman. He was a thorough bureaucrat, a good man of business, but not possessing that knowledge of foreign affairs, nor that foresight which may be termed “genius,” which are the distinctive qualities of a great Minister.

At my first interview with Baron Manteuffel I found him very despondent in his hopes of peace since the publication of the Russian interpretation of the Vienna Note. He looked upon it as *une affaire désespérée*. He was very anxious that the Vienna Conference should not be broken up; and feared that if war broke out on the Danube, it would re-echo on the Rhine. I observed to His Excellency that he had been aware of the moderate and conciliatory course which Her Majesty’s Government had pursued from the commencement of these negotiations; that Her Majesty’s Government had deeply at heart the pacific solution of the differences between Russia and Turkey, in a manner consistent with the honour of the Sultan and the independence of Turkey; that with this view the Note drawn up at Vienna had been recommended to the acceptance of the Porte; and that the modifications in that Note which had been proposed by Turkey had been considered as unimportant and as bearing the same interpretation as contained in the Vienna Note; whilst Her Majesty’s Government in adopting these views had placed confidence in the declaration which the Emperor of Russia had repeatedly put forth—namely, that he sought for

no new rights or increase of power in Turkey. I then observed that the reason put forth by Count Nesselrode, in his despatch to Baron Meyendorff,* for the rejection of the modifications proposed by Turkey, were of a nature to awaken fears; that the interpretation of the Note was viewed otherwise by Count Nesselrode than by the framers of that Note; and that Russia seemed to put a different construction on the terms of that Note from the one entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

I said to His Excellency that the object which the four Powers had been labouring to attain was to establish both now and hereafter permanent friendly relations between Russia and Turkey; that it was obvious that the interpretation of the Note, which was to be considered as the basis of reconciliation, should be one and the same; that it should bear the same sense in the opinion of both parties; and that it was highly important that no differences of interpretation should hereafter arise which might lead to fresh disputes.

I added that, after the repeated declarations of the Emperor of Russia that he sought no new rights and no further extension of power in Turkey, it might be confidently hoped that His Imperial Majesty would not hesitate to give those assurances which would quiet the present fears of Turkey, and which, if happily the present differences were adjusted, would tend to consolidate on a firmer and surer basis the future friendly relations of the two States.

* See Appendix.

He listened carefully to my observations, and, without expressing any decided opinion, seemed to assent to the justice of the view I had expressed.

The Conference at Vienna still continued to search for means to bring about an arrangement between the contending parties, and Lord Clarendon did all that was humanly possibly to avert a war, the proportions of which at that time it was impossible to foresee.

Various projects were drawn up and proposals made, of a nature sufficient to have satisfied the Czar, but in vain; and after the failure of these tortuous negotiations it was evident that the Czar was determined on war. A meeting took place of the Emperor of Russia with the Emperor of Austria at Olmütz in October, 1853, when the Emperor Nicholas tried every means of inducing the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia to support him morally and physically. It was reported at the time that at Olmütz an offensive and defensive treaty was submitted for their signatures, and an urgent invitation was sent to the King of Prussia by the Czar to meet him at Warsaw. I learnt from an undoubted source that the King had addressed a letter to the Czar when at Olmütz through Count Münster, in which His Majesty had expressed his anxiety that a good understanding should be arrived at between England and Russia, advising the Czar to evince a conciliatory and pacific spirit, and further proposing to him to send Count Nesselrode to London for the purpose of removing all further misunderstanding between the two Governments on Eastern affairs. To this letter the Czar

replied, in the most friendly terms, that both in consideration of Count Nesselrode's age and of other circumstances the proposal was not practicable. The Czar indulged in professions of peace and conciliation, and in the warmest manner invited His Majesty to Warsaw. The King sent for Baron Manteuffel to consult him as to his acceptance of the invitation. Baron Manteuffel at once advised him not to go to Warsaw. He stated that as His Majesty was anxious to act in the Eastern Question with England, his visit to Warsaw at this moment could not fail to be viewed with suspicion in London. His Majesty should at all risks seek to maintain a neutral position, free from all engagements; that, besides, it was not becoming to his dignity, or suitable to the interests of Prussia, to be dragged into any concert or alliance with Russia; that his visit to the Emperor of Russia would be unfavourably viewed by public opinion in Prussia; and that he could never advise His Majesty to take such a step.

Baron Manteuffel stood alone in giving this advice to the King. Even the Queen observed that a refusal to go to Warsaw would create a coldness and displeasure with the Emperor; that it would reopen those sores * which had only lately been healed; and that although she was no politician, yet on family grounds, and out of personal regard for the Emperor, she wished the King to accept the invitation. All the Court party united their opinion with that of the Queen. Baron Manteuffel

* This refers to the part taken by the Emperor of Russia at Olmütz 1852.

maintained his opinion unflinchingly, and the King consented to follow his advice. The King desired Baron Manteuffel to draw up a letter of reply to the Emperor. This he did, but the King not approving of it (as he said he was not in the habit of addressing the Emperor in the terms employed by Baron Manteuffel), he indited one himself. In this letter the King expressed his unwillingness at this moment to take any step which might bear an important political sense in the eyes of Europe; that His Majesty wished to maintain a position of neutrality, when perhaps his influence at a later period might be of service to the Emperor in tendering his good offices and impartial advice in the differences between England and Russia; and he therefore deeply regretted on these grounds to be obliged to decline his invitation.

On despatching this letter, the King informed Baron Manteuffel that if the Emperor again urged him, he should feel himself called upon to accede to the Emperor's request.

The Emperor Nicholas in reply to this letter stated that nothing political would be treated at Warsaw; that it was but the visit of a brother-in-law; and, expressing himself in the tenderest terms, renewed again the invitation to the King, adding that he had specially invited the Emperor of Austria to meet His Majesty.

On receipt of this letter by Count Münster, the King, in a somewhat impatient tone, said, "*Eh bien ! je partirai ce soir.*" Before leaving, the King gave the most positive assurance to Baron Manteuffel that he

was fully determined to take no engagements and give no promises whatever of a political nature, and that his great object at Warsaw would be to prevent the Emperor of Austria from engaging himself too deeply with the Czar.

The King started the same evening, attended only by an aide-de-camp and one or two minor officers of his household. Whatever may have been the object of the Czar in thus inviting the two German Sovereigns to Warsaw, it was evident that he was unsuccessful in attaining it; but he was not to be foiled. He determined to make another assault on the citadel of Prussia, and His Majesty came in person to do so. Baron Manteuffel, in his audience of the Emperor, stood his ground manfully, and maintained his opinions with unflinching firmness. The King, I learnt, was present during the first interview, and was very excited—more particularly against France, even to the length of wishing to publish a manifesto, and to open a crusade against her. I was secretly informed that a Protocol was ready for signature, a triple alliance between Austria, Russia, and Prussia—in fact, a resuscitation of the Holy Alliance, which would have been a dangerous experiment in Germany after the events of 1848.

When the Emperor of Russia went to Olmütz for the Austrian manœuvres, it was evidently with a view to a conference of the three Sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. As the King of Prussia was unable to go to the manœuvres, he deputed the Prince of Prussia and Prince Frederick William to do so. As

I have previously mentioned, on an urgent invitation of the Emperor of Russia, the King finally decided to go to Warsaw to meet the Emperor of Austria; and the Czar returned with him to Potsdam, in the hope of being able to gain over Baron Manteuffel to his cause. As I have stated, nothing resulted from the Emperor's visit to Potsdam, notwithstanding all the influence of the Queen and the Court party, further than to prove to him that he could expect no aid or assistance from Germany. At the audience of Baron Manteuffel with the Emperor, His Majesty referred to the entry of ships of the allied fleets into the Dardanelles, and observed, "*Voilà les flottes qui sont entrées dans les Dardanelles, est-ce que vous souffrez ainsi une infraction du Traité de 1841?*" Baron Manteuffel replied that "Prussia had likewise witnessed the occupation of the Danubian Principalities."

The Emperor stated to Baron Manteuffel that his last rouble and his last man were, and would be, at the disposal of Prussia, and inquired what he could expect in return. Baron Manteuffel replied that "Prussia was not in want of either; that her interests demanded that she should remain neutral; that it was impossible for her to sacrifice her position, and to act in concert or in alliance with Russia in the Oriental Question; and that in preserving a neutral course Prussia hoped that she might be better enabled to tender her impartial good offices in the cause of peace."

The Prince of Prussia stood by Baron Manteuffel, and was his chief support at Potsdam, although the

whole Ministry were equally opposed to a Russian alliance. The Queen of Prussia and her sister, the Archduchess Sophie, were entirely in favour of Russia, and exerted all their influence on behalf of the Emperor Nicholas, who left Berlin much disappointed not only in the hopes he had entertained of gaining over Prussia, but by the ocular proofs he had received that a Russian alliance would be displeasing to the Prussian nation.

December 10th, 1853.—I met Baron Budberg at dinner last evening. He was very bitter against England. I remarked to him that he need not single us out—we were four—and that the public opinion of Europe disapproved of the Russian policy in the East. He said, “*Nous nous fichons de l'opinion publique ; nous irons notre chemin. Nous ferons la guerre à vous seuls.*” He then said, “Kisseleff writes that he receives all sorts of *égards* at Paris, and that the French are very different in their conduct, whereas Brünnow says that ‘his position in London is untenable.’”

CHAPTER XV.

Occupation by Russia of the Principalities—Emperor Nicholas misled by Brünnow, Kisseleff, and Princess Lieven—Vienna Conference—Terms of Vienna Note—Acceptance by Russia and Rejection by Turkey without Modifications—Lord Clarendon's Reasons for not urging the Porte to accept original Vienna Note—Austro-Russian Proposal rejected by Manteuffel—Austrian Summons to Russia to Evacuate the Principalities, supported by Prussia—Russians retire behind the Pruth, August, 1854.

ON July 3rd, 1853, the Russian army crossed the Pruth with the avowed intention of occupying the Principalities as a "material guarantee" for the satisfaction of her claim against Turkey. It was the moment for action on the part of the four Powers. Had they declared collectively to the Emperor Nicholas that the passage of the Pruth would be regarded by them as a *casus belli*, it is very certain that the Emperor would not have crossed the Pruth, and in every probability war would have been averted. But the Emperor had been misled by the reports he had received from Baron Brünnow in London and from Count Kisseleff at Paris, who both expressed the opinion that an alliance between England and France would not be brought about. Princess Lieven, who was in correspondence with Lord Aberdeen, also wrote to the Czar, saying that England would not embark in war; and these reports, confirmed by a deputation of English Quakers

representing the Manchester Peace Party, who were received by the Czar at St. Petersburg before his departure for Germany, exercised great influence on the Emperor, and thus he was emboldened to resort to the *ultima ratio regum*.

War was declared by Turkey on September 26th, 1853, and Omar Pasha, an Austrian by birth, was appointed to the command of the Turkish army on the Danube. In the meantime a conference of the four Powers—viz., England, France, Austria, and Prussia—had assembled at Vienna for the purpose of seeking means to adjust the differences between Russia and Turkey, and of thus averting war. They accordingly framed a Note, to which I have previously referred, as the basis of an arrangement which, if acceptable to both parties, would have peacefully solved the difficulties. It was accepted by Russia on August 3rd, 1853. The Porte, however, demurred to its acceptance; and suggested modifications—or, rather, explanations—of certain ambiguities in the Note, it being evidently necessary that both parties should interpret the Note in the same sense. Russia refused the proposed modifications, and the despatch* of Count Nesselrode, in which he renewed the claims made by Prince Menschikoff, only proved the justice of the grounds on which the Porte demurred to the acceptance of the Vienna Note.

The Vienna Note as accepted by the Emperor of Russia was as follows:—

His Majesty the Sultan, having nothing more at heart than

* See Appendix.

to re-establish between himself and the Emperor of Russia the relations of good-neighbourhood and perfect understanding which have been unfortunately impaired by recent and painful complications, has diligently endeavoured to discover the means of obliterating the traces of those differences.

A Sovereign Irade having made known the Imperial decision, the Sublime Porte is happy to be able to communicate it to His Excellency Count Nesselrode.

If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans have never refused to confirm them by solemn acts testifying their ancient and constant benevolence towards their Christian subjects.

His Majesty the Sultan Abdul Medjid now reigning, inspired with the same disposition, and being desirous of giving to His Majesty the Emperor of Russia a personal proof of his most sincere friendship, has been solely influenced by his unbounded confidence in the eminent qualities of his august friend and ally, and has been pleased to take into serious consideration the representations which his Highness Prince Menschikoff conveyed to the Sublime Porte.

The undersigned has in consequence received orders to declare by the present Note that the Government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain faithful to the letter and spirit of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, relative to the protection of the Christian religion, and that His Majesty considers himself bound in honour to cause to be observed for ever, and to preserve from all prejudice either now or hereafter, the enjoyment of the spiritual privileges which have been granted by His Majesty's august ancestors to the Orthodox Eastern Church, which are maintained and confirmed by him; and moreover, in a spirit of exalted equity, to cause the Greek rite to share in the advantages granted to the other Christian rites by convention or special arrangement.

Furthermore, as the Imperial Firman which has just been granted to the Greek Patriarch and clergy, and which contains

the confirmation of their spiritual privileges, ought to be looked upon as a fresh proof of these noble sentiments, and as, besides, the proclamation of this Firman, which affords all security, ought to dispel for ever every apprehension in regard to the rite which is the religion of His Majesty the Emperor, I am happy to be charged with the duty of making the present notification.

The Turks refused to accept the proposed Draft Note after it had been agreed to by the Emperor of Russia, unless with the following modifications :—

In paragraph 3 to substitute the following after “active solicitude” :—“for the religion and Orthodox Greek Church, the Sultans have never ceased to provide for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities which at different times they have spontaneously granted to that religion and to that Church in the Ottoman Empire, and to confirm them.”

To substitute in paragraph 5, from “faithful” to “Christian religion,” the following :—“to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, confirmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protection by the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion; and he is, moreover, charged to make known,” etc. etc.

To substitute in paragraph 5, from “advantages” to the end, the following :—“granted, or which might be granted, to the other Christian communities, Ottoman subjects.”

Such were the modifications of the famous Vienna Note resolutely insisted upon by the Porte. They were at first viewed by England as unimportant and of a trivial nature, and hopes were entertained that the Porte, on reflection and on the advice of England and France, would have agreed to withdraw these modifications, and accept the Note as a final settlement of the differences with Russia.

But a despatch from Count Nesselrode to the

Russian Minister at Vienna, accompanied by an analysis of the three modifications* proposed by the Porte, entirely altered the situation, and clearly proved that the interpretation of the Note by Russia was opposed to the interpretation of it by the Vienna Conference, who were the framers of it, and thus proved that the objections of the Porte were fully justified.

On this subject Lord Clarendon wrote to me as follows :—

After all that has passed, it is not reasonable to ask us to join in urging the Porte to accept the original Vienna Note. First, because the Turks, rightly or wrongly, determined not to sign it without modifications; and, secondly, because after Count Nesselrode's despatch we could not, as honest men, recommend a Note so interpreted to the Turks, nor as prudent men could we recommend, as a permanent basis of reconciliation, that which must be a source of constant disagreement.

Negotiations still continued at Vienna in the hopes of discovering some means for averting war, but they were always in the rear of events; and it was evident that the Emperor of Russia was bent on war, and that either he could not or would not recede from the position he had taken. A new proposal, concocted between Count Buol and Baron Meyendorff (his brother-in-law), the Russian Minister at Vienna, was launched—namely, “That Russia and Turkey should arrange their differences directly without foreign interference.” Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at Berlin, asked Baron Manteuffel to support this

* See Appendix.

proposal, and that, in the event of its rejection by the Western Powers, Austria and Prussia should "retire from any further co-operation with England and France." Baron Manteuffel considered this proposal as perfectly illusory and impracticable. He said that it would be delivering over the weaker to the mercies of the stronger body, or, as he termed it, "an arrangement between *le chat et la souris*."

At this critical moment a crisis occurred in the English Cabinet. Lord Aberdeen had been a strong partisan of peace, and from associations of a generation past preserved his sympathies for Russia. At the same time, however repugnant to war, he was a true and faithful patriot when the interests and honour of his country were at stake. The resignation of Lord Palmerston, then Home Secretary, from his inability to support Lord J. Russell's Reform Bill, created a great sensation in England, whilst abroad it was received with visible signs of satisfaction. He was generally regarded as the leader of the war party, and was feared as the promoter of commotion. His secession from office would have undoubtedly weakened the Cabinet, and given cause for the rejoicing of the enemies of England. Fortunately, however, matters were satisfactorily arranged before his official resignation had been accepted, and he consented to resume office in the post he had previously filled.

During the summer of 1854 the Prussian Government were desirous of raising a loan of thirteen millions of dollars (something short of two millions sterling). The representatives of the Rothschild firms in London,

Paris, Vienna, and Frankfort came to Berlin for the purpose of ascertaining on what terms the loan was to be negotiated—namely, Baron Lionel from London, Anselm from Vienna, James from Paris, and Carl from Frankfort.

The Prussian Government offered it at 93—4½ per cent. The Rothschilds were not prepared to give more than 90—4½ per cent., and the negotiations fell through. It was afterwards taken up by the See Handlung, under the auspices of Mendelssohn and Bethman, at 93—4½ per cent., the price offered by the Prussian Government. It was the first occasion on which overtures for a loan had been made to Prussia by the great firm of Rothschild. Baron Lionel (whom I sat next to at a dinner given to the four great financiers by Baron Manteuffel) then told me that there was no business to be done with the Prussian Government, as they were too parsimonious and exacting. They (the Rothschilds) wished to have the whole or none, and had even offered to send a large amount of bullion to Berlin.

I also met at the same dinner General Meyerhofer, who had arrived from Vienna on a secret mission to Berlin. He seemed very distrustful of Prussia, and dispirited as to the success of the object of his mission, whatever it may have been—for he did not disclose the nature of it. He only remarked to me that “events would soon produce more results than the most powerful arguments.” This probably referred to the withdrawal of the Russian troops behind the Pruth and the occupation of the Principalities by Austria.

On the 14th of June, 1854, a report reached Berlin of the serious illness of Prince Paskiewitch, who was in command of the army of occupation in the Principalities, and who was reported to have been wounded. I was also informed that he had reported to the Emperor that the position of the Russian army in the Principalities was untenable.

Shortly after the declaration of war against Russia by England and France, Austria took the resolution of addressing a summons to Russia to evacuate the Principalities. Colonel Manteuffel was sent to St. Petersburg by the King of Prussia to move the Emperor to peace and to accede to the Austrian summons. It was hoped at Vienna that by this step of warning to Russia the avenue to peace might be more easily effected, for the act of aggression on the part of Russia would be cancelled, and there would only remain the original cause of dispute—viz., the protectorate of the Christians in the Turkish dominions—to be arranged between Russia and Turkey. I was then informed that the following had been suggested to the Emperor as a probably successful basis of peace :—

1. Withdrawal of the Russian troops behind the Pruth.

2. Congress at Vienna.

3. Joint protectorate of Austria with Russia and Turkey over the Principalities; and

4. A general guarantee of Turkey by the European Powers.

General Benkendorff, the Russian Military Pleni-

potentiary at Berlin, left for St. Petersburg for the purpose of laying before the Emperor the real position of Germany, and of proving to him that he could not look for German sympathy or support unless he acceded to the Austrian summons, which was his only means of detaching Germany from the Western Powers. Russia agreed to the Austrian summons, evacuated the Principalities, and withdrew her troops behind the Pruth. It was a politic measure on her part, and there is no doubt that the withdrawal of the Russian occupation enabled Russia to concentrate larger forces in Bessarabia, from whence they were, later, moved down to the Crimea, Austria taking their place in the Principalities, and thus acting as a buffer between Russia and Turkey. It was also a protection to the Turkish Danubian frontier, and precluded the possibility of the passage of the Balkan by a Russian army. But it was a heavy weight on Austria. The expenses were enormous, and the losses of her army by fever were more than the cost of a campaign, without the concomitant advantages of war if attended with success.

Having given *in extenso* the Vienna Note and the modifications required by the Ottoman Porte, I think it necessary that I should likewise give *in extenso* the despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff, the Russian Minister at Vienna, with an analysis of the Turkish modifications and the objections to them by the Russian Government; as also the Earl of Clarendon's despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour and the Earl of Westmorland, stating the views of Her

Majesty's Government in respect to them. They will enable the reader to form an impartial judgment as to the cause which led to the failure of the persevering efforts of the European Powers to settle peacefully the differences between Russia and Turkey, and to avert the impending war. I also annex copy of the correspondence between Baron Brünnow and Lord Clarendon on the entry of the Allied Fleet within the Dardanelles.

It may not be amiss to consider here the motives which apparently actuated the policy of the Emperor Nicholas, and which influenced his decision in regard to the question of peace or war.

The Emperor Nicholas had always been an unflinching enemy to revolutionary ideas, and a strong opponent to the introduction of free and Liberal institutions. He had been brought up in the principles of the Holy Alliance, from which he never deviated, and he was always ready to uphold the doctrine of legitimacy and the divine rights of Sovereigns. He saved the Austrian Empire in 1849 by arresting and subduing the Hungarian rebellion, when Prince Paskiewitch, in command of the Russian army in Hungary, after the defeat of the Hungarian General Görgei telegraphed to the Emperor Nicholas, "*La Hongrie est à vos pieds.*" It was by the intervention of the Emperor Nicholas that war between Austria and Prussia was averted in 1850, and that an arrangement was agreed to between the two Powers at Olmütz; for the Emperor foresaw that in the event of war between the two leading States of Germany,

it could only benefit the revolutionary party, and give it increased strength, and he was gratified by the successful results of his policy. The Emperor Nicholas was then at the summit of his power, the defender of law and order, and the protector of the monarchical principles which had been so gravely impaired by the events of 1848. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Czar considered the opportunity favourable for the realisation of his ambitious designs in the East, and the fulfilment of what had been considered, since the time of Peter the Great, as the traditional policy of Russia. This was clearly proved by the proposals he made to Sir Hamilton Seymour for a thorough understanding with England before the "Sick Man" died.

He counted on Austrian support in gratitude for past services ; he felt confident of Prussian sympathy and acquiescence, from the traditional policy and the family ties which had so closely linked the two States ; he was indifferent in regard to France, being inimical to the principles of elective monarchy, and still more so to the restoration of the French Empire in contravention of the treaties of 1815 ; and he had at that time gained, from the official reports from Baron Brünnow and Count Kisseleff, the strongest conviction that an alliance between England and France could not be brought about.

All these considerations doubtless induced the Czar to seize the opportunity which now offered itself, and which seemed so favourable to the realisation of his plans ; and they no doubt led him to send Prince

Menschikoff on a secret mission to Constantinople, the real object of which was to obtain for Russia the protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, which would have been tantamount to reducing the Sultan to the position of a vassal of the Czar. The original cause of dispute was the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, but this was amicably arranged by the forbearance of France; and then it was that Prince Menschikoff showed the real aim of his mission by addressing an ultimatum to the Porte, on the rejection of which the Prince left Constantinople; and as a significant proof of the Czar's premeditated rupture with the Porte, Prince Menschikoff, on leaving, carried with him the archives of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople.

The departure of Prince Menschikoff, as may be supposed, caused considerable alarm in London and Paris, and the public press added fuel to the flame by sounding the tocsin of war. In this conjuncture the Emperor Louis Napoleon foresaw that his only mainstay was in an alliance with England. He felt that a war would draw off the attention of the French nation from the evil effects so lately produced by the *coup d'état*. It would give activity to trade; it would reanimate the army, and give it occupation; and the fact of defending a weaker against a more powerful State would popularise the war in the eyes of the nation.

The Anglo-French alliance was really the pivot on which future action could alone be taken; and it was to the great satisfaction of the Emperor Napoleon, and to the surprise and disappointment of the Czar, that this

alliance was formed on a solid basis for the interests of both contracting parties. As I have already related, every nerve of diplomacy had been put in action at the Vienna Conference to adjust peacefully the differences between Russia and Turkey; but in vain. The Emperor of Russia was equally deaf to the entreaties of his friends and to the threats of the Western Powers.

He was greatly influenced by the religious enthusiasm of a fanatic clergy, who impressed him with the belief that he was acting in a righteous cause, and that he had been selected as a divine instrument in behalf of Christianity; and it was under this feeling that he probably concluded his manifesto with the following words:—"In Thee, O Lord, have I trusted; let me never be confounded."

But events marched more rapidly than the negotiations, and they proved to be more powerful than arguments. The news of the destruction on the 30th of November of a Turkish squadron in the harbour of Sinope, consisting of seven frigates, one sloop, one steamer, and five transports, and the capture of the Vice-Admiral Omar Pasha (only one Turkish steamer escaping), produced in London and Paris a feeling of horror at the great loss of life (above four thousand Turkish lives were sacrificed), and of indignation that this attack had been made under the nose of the English and French squadrons, which had been sent by their respective Governments to protect the Turkish flag and territory, and of which official notification had been made to the Russian Government. This untoward

event put an end to the continuous stream of Notes, Protocols, and fruitless proposals of pacific solutions which had been flowing to and fro at Vienna. It would almost appear as if war had been from the outset inevitable, and that the object of Russia had been to await the opportunity for decided action. The Sinope tragedy was this opportunity. Immediately on receipt of this sad intelligence the English and French Governments instructed their Ambassadors at St. Petersburg to notify verbally to the Russian Government that orders had been sent to the admirals of the combined fleets to enter the Black Sea, to warn all captains of Russian ships of war that they might meet to return to a Russian port, and, if necessary, to compel them by force.

This was a severe blow at Berlin to the Court party, but they profited by it to further their own views. Every iron was heated, every effort made to arouse the compassion of the King in behalf of his imperial brother-in-law, by representing him as an aggrieved man, as the only and most steadfast supporter of monarchical principles and the stern antagonist of revolutionary and Socialist doctrines, and by describing in glowing colours the dangers to which Prussia would be exposed if she did not make common cause with him. Every artifice was resorted to in order to induce the King to throw over Baron Manteuffel and to renounce his present policy.

When the King received information from the Chevalier Bunsen of the instructions sent to the

admirals of the combined fleets in the Black Sea, he indited a letter to the Chevalier Bunsen on the spur of the moment and under a feverish irritation, in which he stated that "all he had done, and his disposition towards England, had been in favour of peace; that he could not conceive how the destruction of some Turkish frigates could change the policy of England; and he specially instructed the Chevalier to inform the British Government that he could not go against Russia if England continued in the path which, to judge from his (Chevalier Bunsen's) last despatches, she was now pursuing."

Baron Manteuffel expostulated with His Majesty, and stated, after an audience of three hours, that if the opinions His Majesty had then expressed were to be carried out, he must decline to be the organ and to act as a servant of the Crown.

The King observed with considerable warmth that when he had signed the Vienna Protocol he had not thought to sign a declaration of war against Russia; that the entry of the fleets into the Black Sea and the instructions to the admirals were a *soufflet* to the Emperor of Russia, to which His Majesty could only respond "*par des coups de canon*"; that he (the King) would never allow himself to be carried away by the *fantaisies* of England; and he expressed even a *menace* of arming and leaning on Austria.

Baron Manteuffel replied to the King that the Protocol signed at Vienna conveyed no such meaning as His Majesty attributed to it; that it was an Act which

related to the present territorial arrangements of Europe, and more especially to Turkey ; that it bore testimony to the collective unanimity of the four Powers, and to those principles in the maintenance of which they were all alike interested. He then entered into and explained at length to His Majesty the gravity of the step he was about to take. He depicted in forcible terms the financial and political position of Prussia ; he conveyed to the King that in the present state of public opinion His Majesty would be unable to carry out a policy of alliance with Russia to the detriment of England ; and he gave His Majesty to understand that such a policy would not be in harmony with the feelings of the nation. With respect to leaning on Austria, Baron Manteuffel stated that Austria was, and could be, no support to him—that she herself required support, but could offer none to Prussia.

His Majesty finally recognised the justice and value of Baron Manteuffel's arguments. His Majesty confessed that he had indited that letter to Chevalier Bunsen in stronger terms than he really felt, but that he had done so intentionally, as he was aware that the Chevalier would only virtually take account of half of what he had expressed ; and His Majesty finally consented to withdraw his letter to Chevalier Bunsen, assuring Baron Manteuffel that he continued fully to enjoy his confidence, and that, concurring in his views, he would maintain the system (of neutrality) on which his present policy was based.

Shortly after the foregoing incident the King of

Prussia decided to send a special mission to London. The idea, I believe, was first initiated at St. Petersburg, in the hope of a member of the Court party being selected, and with a view of counteracting the Chevalier Bunsen, who was suspected of being hostile to Russia; but Count Albert Pourtales was selected by the King for this important and confidential mission, the object of which was (1) to confer with Chevalier Bunsen on the present state of the Oriental Question, and to explain the present position and policy of Prussia, and (2) to endeavour to concert with England for a more complete understanding with Prussia in any eventualities which might arise, and to learn the views and intentions of the English Cabinet. Count Pourtales was not charged with any powers to sign an agreement, but solely to report to the King the result of his conferences with Her Majesty's Government.

Although this mission was not productive of any positive result, yet it was not wholly without good effect. It calmed the fears of the King, it strengthened the position of the Chevalier Bunsen, it weakened to a certain degree the influence of the Court party, and it confirmed the King's policy of "perfect neutrality" in opposition to the efforts of that party to bring about an alliance with Russia.

The King, on religious grounds, was averse to war, and had fully made up his mind not to be drawn into offensive hostilities; but he was continually under the fear of being attacked—especially on the part of France—and this was in great part the cause of his vacillation

and indecision. His great hope was to play the part of mediator between England, France, and Russia when a favourable moment should offer itself.* In the interviews which the Duke of Saxe-Coburg had with the Emperor Louis Napoleon in September, 1855, this idea was reverted to, and it is related that the Emperor Napoleon had observed that "Austria had played her cards so badly that nothing could be arranged with her, and that it was desirable to gain over Prussia for the cause of the Western Powers." He said that he had lately remarked to M. Von der Heydt (then Prussian Minister of Finance), "*Je trouve toujours que la Prusse est un peu trop maigre.*" In speaking of the two great German Powers, the Duke observed that "only one could undertake the part of mediator;" to which the Emperor agreed, and said that "Prussia would be to him the most desirable." "It is better," he said, "to stick to a woman that hates you than to one who has once deceived you, which is the case with Austria."

It is evident that the Emperor's plans for a war with Austria for Italian independence were then forming.

* Bismarck's "Denkwürdigkeiten."

CHAPTER XVI.

Rivalry of Austria and Prussia at Germanic Diet—Herr von Bismarek ; his Character ; his Statement to Mr. Disraeli ; his Conversation with Russian Chargé-d’Affaires at Frankfort ; Russian, Prussian, and French Alliance, his Ideal—Fraternity of Russian and Prussian Courts—Deathbed of Emperor Nicholas—Mutual Services of Russia and Prussia—Repudiation by Russia of Article in Treaty of Paris.

THE disunion of the two great German Powers, and their repeated attempts to thwart and oppose whatever either proposed at the Diet, as likewise in the councils of Europe, most injuriously frustrated all attempts to bring about a peaceful arrangement of the differences between Russia and Turkey.

In October, 1853, Austria, supported by some of the Southern States, proposed to Prussia that a statement of the differences pending between Russia and Turkey, with a report of the steps which had been taken by Austria and Prussia towards a pacification, should be laid before the Germanic Diet, and that the German States should pronounce through that body, their common organ, their determination to maintain a policy of neutrality.

I then reported to the Earl of Clarendon that Baron Manteuffel did not appear to concur with Austria in this view, although he received with satisfaction this proof of the neutral line which Austria would pursue.

Baron Prokesch, the President of the Diet, came to

Berlin in order to persuade the Prussian Government to assent to a joint communication to the Diet, and informed Baron Manteuffel that should the Prussian Government not accede to this proposal Austria would not be deterred from it, and would inform the Diet of the steps which the Austrian Cabinet had taken to avert war, and their determination to maintain a perfect neutrality in the impending contest.

It appears that Austria had two objects in view—first, to shelter herself behind the Diet in order to counteract the action of Prussia; and secondly, that, being on the eve of raising a loan, she considered she would be able to effect it more advantageously by proclaiming a policy of perfect neutrality, thereby reassuring and giving confidence to the German commercial and financial world.

The Prussian Government declined to join in the proposed communication, considering that it would deprive Prussia of her independent action as a great Power, and that it would be placing her in a secondary position at the Diet, where Austria had the majority.

A personage of some note even then, from the active part he had taken in the National Assembly at Frankfort, but who was destined later to play a brilliant part on the European stage, now took a prominent place in the direction of the foreign policy of Prussia. I refer to Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian representative at Frankfort. He was a consistent and strenuous opponent of Austria, and his great ambition was to place the

leadership of Germany in the hands of Prussia.* I may here mention that at a dinner given in London in 1861 by Baron Brünnow to the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, Herr von Bismarck, who was one of the guests, had a long conversation with Mr. Disraeli, then leader of the Opposition. He then said that he should shortly be obliged to undertake the direction of the Prussian Government; that his first duty would be to reorganise the army; that he would then take the first best pretext to declare war against Austria, to dissolve the Germanic Diet, to overpower the middle and smaller States, and to give a national unity to Germany under the leadership of Prussia. "I am come here," he said, "to say this to the Queen's Ministers."

Mr. Disraeli's remark on this extraordinary programme, which was later literally fulfilled, was, "Take care of that man; he means what he says."

In September, 1854, I was privately informed that the King wrote to the Prince of Prussia from Munich, saying, "*Que les affaires allaient à merveille; qu'il était à la tête des 'Bambergers'; que les rois de Wurtemberg et de Bavière donnaient leur complète adhésion à sa politique; et que l'Empereur de Russie lui écrivait qu'il était le Souverain le plus éclairé de l'Europe.*"†

The Prince, it is said, answered him by relating a

* Bismarck's "Denkwürdigkeiten."

† "That affairs were proceeding admirably; that he was at the head of the 'Bambergers'; that the Kings of Wurtemberg and Bavaria gave their complete adhesion to his policy; and that the Emperor of Russia had written to him that he was the most enlightened Sovereign of Europe."

conversation with King Leopold. The Prince, on mentioning to King Leopold the evacuation of the Principalities by Russia, remarked, "*Que c'était le commencement de la fin*"; to which King Leopold replied, "*Pas du tout; ce n'est que la fin du commencement.*" *

In the early part of the Crimean War a Prussian gentleman was asked, "*Où la Prusse finit, et où la Russie commence*"; to which was replied, "*Je sais où la Prusse commence, mais je ne saurai vous dire où la Russie finit,*" referring to the Russian influence, which then weighed so heavily on Germany.†

During the period of the Crimean War Herr von Bismarck, then Prussian Minister at Frankfort, was the virtual director of the foreign policy of Prussia, although Baron Manteuffel was the ostensible Minister for Foreign Affairs. He enjoyed the full confidence of Frederick William IV., and was called to Berlin whenever it was feared by the Court party that the King was leaning towards the Western Powers. His sympathies were neither for Russia nor for the Western Powers, but he had a strong political antipathy to Austria, and his great aim was to resist any line of action which could give to Austria a preponderating influence in Germany. Thus it was that he opposed the Austrian proposal to submit the Oriental Question to the Diet at Frankfort, to be followed by a declaration of neutrality on the part

* "That it was the beginning of the end"; to which King Leopold replied, "Not at all; it is only the end of the beginning."

† "Where Prussia ends, and where Russia begins"; to which was replied, "I know where Prussia begins, but I cannot say where Russia ends."

of Germany, it being his principal object to maintain for Prussia her independence as a great Power, and to liberate her from Austrian control.

Herr von Bismarck was endowed with a great mind, with extraordinary foresight, and a daring courage. He had an iron will to carry through his ambitious views, and was never checked in their execution by principles or scruples of any kind. He was the first Prussian Minister who had the courage to use the military power which had been in constant preparation since the peace of 1815. He was aided in this policy by the confidence and support of the King (William I. in 1866) and the military counsels of Field-Marshal Moltke, the first strategist in Europe. His iron will contrasted also favourably for his views with the remarkable lack in Europe of great statesmen equally gifted with himself, and with the general apathy and weakness of foreign Governments, so aptly described by Prince Gortschakoff on the occasion of the Danish War, when he used the memorable phrase, "*Il n'y a plus d'Europe.*" But, however daring, Bismarck was ever cautious, and had the patience to await the favourable moment for the development of his long-projected plans.

In private life he was genial, brilliant in conversation, and well versed in historical facts and anecdotes. He was difficult of approach; but when with him, it was as difficult to get away. His misfortune was to have an ungovernable temper, which greatly marred the other fine qualities of his character. His fiery temperament prevented him from enduring any opposition to his will,

and oftentimes destroyed the exercise of his judgment. Had he possessed the calm and equable temperament of Count Moltke, his other qualities would have shone with greater lustre. In transacting business with him I found him extremely clear-sighted, seizing every point with remarkable lucidity, and always selecting the proper word when expressing himself in English. He was a good friend, but a bitter enemy. He was haughty and arrogant in his manner, and unforgiving and vindictive towards those who opposed him; but with all these defects, he has proved himself to be the most remarkable man of the age, and in future history will be regarded as the regenerator of Germany.

I always considered him to be hostile to England, however much he may occasionally have indulged in admiration of her. He was jealous of her naval supremacy, of her commercial wealth, and of the moral power she exercised in the world.

On his first arrival at Frankfort his jealousy of the Austrian presidency of the Diet, and the secondary part played by Prussia, gave rise to frequent irritation at the sittings of that body, even on trivial questions. To cite an instance: no member at the sittings of the Diet had hitherto enjoyed the privilege of smoking except the Presidents. Herr von Bismarck was an inveterate smoker, and was determined to break through a custom resting on no legitimate grounds. Seeing the President smoking one day, he astonished his German colleagues by taking from his pocket a cigar and coolly asking the President for a light. For a time only Austria and

Prussia smoked, but gradually Bavaria and the other German representatives were determined not to be outdone by the two great German Powers, and all joined in the enjoyment of the fragrant weed.

On the 21st of April, 1854, Baron Manteuffel sent a despatch to Herr von Bismarck, acquainting him that the Austrian and Prussian Governments, in consequence of the war, had entered into a mutual guarantee of their non-German possessions, and had signed an offensive and defensive convention to that effect. Austria wished to have the treaty submitted to the Diet; but it was successfully opposed by Bismarck, who viewed it as an attempt of Austria to place Prussia in her wake.

On the 2nd of December, 1854, Austria signed a treaty with the Western Powers for certain eventualities. Bismarck then wrote as follows:—

My fear is that by the march of events we shall be gradually drawn into a war with Russia in Austrian interests. I am not one of those who think that the interests of Russia are identical with ours. On the contrary, Russia is much dependent on us; and even in regard to any fears of revolution, we can do without Russian protection.

On the 1st of January, 1855, Bismarck wrote confidentially to Manteuffel * :—

Till now the Western Powers have hoped to get our co-operation without permitting us to exercise any influence in their decisions. They reckon largely on the influence of public opinion in Prussia, on the effect of our anxiety in regard to the so-termed “isolation,” and the fear of a war with the three

* Bismarck, “Denkwürdigkeiten.”

contracting parties (England, France, and Austria). To correct this, our agents in London, Paris, and Vienna, should convince those Governments that we are quite free from those anxieties, and that we are firmly determined to maintain our independence and position as a great Power with the strongest measures against everyone. We should make it doubtful as to our joining Russia or the Western Powers, and this would increase our influence on the march of affairs.

We thus see how effectively Bismarck had studied Machiavelli.

In 1854 the policy of Prussia was taking a leaning towards the Western Powers. Bismarck, at the call of the Court party, went to Berlin, and brought the Ministry back to the policy of neutrality. On his return to Frankfort he was welcomed and congratulated by M. de Glinka, the Russian Chargé-d’Affaires, with whom he was on intimate terms, and to whom he related on his return all that had taken place at Berlin. The Russian diplomatist spoke of a “*rapprochement* to France; that she should be convinced that her proper position was with Russia and Prussia, and not with England;” to which Bismarck replied that “an alliance between Russia, Prussia, and France was his political ideal, and the only combination which could accord with the necessities of the three countries, observing that he had almost fallen into disgrace with the Prince of Prussia for having given expression to this idea.

When Count Bismarck first mentioned his idea of a Russo-Prussian French Alliance to the Prince of Prussia (afterwards the Emperor William I.), the Prince was so opposed to it that he wrote to Baron

Manteuffel to ask how he could confide the interests of Prussia to a man whose ideas were those of a school-boy. But, however impracticable they may then have appeared to be, who can now guarantee, since the Franco-Prussian War, that this Triple Alliance may not some day be brought about? It might dispose of the present insolvable question in regard to Alsace and Lorraine, which gnaws at the heart of every Frenchman, and is one of the chief causes of the constantly recurring fear of war, and of the necessity arising therefrom of maintaining the enormous armies which are ruining the finances of every country in Europe. But the day when such an alliance could have been formed seems to be gone by, for the reason that there is no longer a Louis Napoleon on the political stage, nor a Bismarck at the helm in Prussia—both saturated with ambitious schemes and unscrupulous in their mode of execution.

If the illness of Frederick William IV. had not intervened, Bismarck would probably have induced the King to take this course. After the peace of Paris Bismarck used all his endeavours to bring the alliance about.

The Emperor Nicholas on his deathbed said to his son, "Say to Fritz that I hope that he will always remain the same for Russia, and that he will not forget papa's words" (Frederick William III.)*; to which Frederick William IV. replied by telegram as

* "*Sage Fritz, er möge für Russland stets der selbe bleiben, und papa's worte nicht vergessen.*" (See Will of Frederick William III.)

follows:—"We embrace the dear Alexander [then Cesarewitch], and declare to him that the words of the Emperor will always be sacred to us."

The Emperor Alexander II., on ascending the throne, wrote to Frederick William IV.:—

DEAR UNCLE,—Be convinced that I shall always be deeply grateful for the fine position in which you have kept Prussia during the entire crisis, and which has been of such utility to us. May God reward you!

It was about this time that Baron Manteuffel was heard to say in a private circle, "*Ah, ces messieurs*" (meaning the Western Powers) "*croyent que nous allons leur tirer les marrons du feu. Pas du tout; c'est eux qui les tireront, et nous les mangerons.*" *

In a speech addressed to the Prussian Chamber in 1878, Herr von Bismarck related that during the Crimean War he was constantly summoned to Berlin when the pressure of the Western Powers was too strong, and the Government too weak to oppose it; he had then to compose for His Majesty a friendly despatch to Russia; that Baron Manteuffel then asked for his dismissal; and that when the missive had been despatched, he followed Manteuffel to his country seat and induced him to resume his portfolio.

During this time Bismarck thought to make political capital out of the Oriental Question, looking forward to the period when Austria would be excluded

* "Those gentlemen" (meaning the Western Powers) "think that we are going to take the chestnuts out of the fire for them. Not at all; it is they who will take them, and we shall eat them."

from Germany, and the leadership of Germany placed in the hands of Prussia. At an earlier date Bismarck would probably have been satisfied with a parity of position with Austria in the Germanic Diet, "*mais l'appétit vient en mangeant*," and the political events in Europe moved so rapidly that he soon foresaw the opportunity at no distant date of carrying out his full ambition of annexing the Danish Duchies and of securing for Prussia the leadership of Germany. His combinations were crowned with success, but at the cost of two wars.

From the services rendered to Russia by Prussia during the Crimean War, it is not surprising that at a later period, previous to the Franco-German War, Bismarck was justified in counting on the benevolent neutrality of Russia, which enabled Prussia to concentrate all her forces on the western frontier, without requiring to provide any extra protection on her eastern frontier.

Prince Gortschakoff passed through Berlin just at the opening of the Franco-German War. Some communications passed between him and Count Bismarck, but, of course, of a secret and confidential character. The Russian neutrality was then already assured, but that of Austria could not be so securely counted upon; and on this point it is very probable that opinions were expressed, and promises given, favourable to Prussia in certain eventualities.

But there was another question which Prince Gortschakoff had most at heart, and for which he must

have been anxious to secure the support and aid of Herr von Bismarck in any European Congress that might be held at the termination of the war; but to secure this support it was indispensable for him to take action before the conclusion of hostilities. I refer to the article* of the Treaty of Paris limiting the number of Russian ships of war in the Black Sea, and forbidding the construction of forts and naval arsenals. Prince Gortschakoff had set his heart on obtaining a revocation of those clauses of the Treaty, which were humiliating to a great Power. He had already succeeded in obtaining the retrocession of the lost territory in Bessarabia; there only remained the question in regard to the fleet and fortresses. Some time previous to the Franco-German War, foreseeing that the first favourable opportunity would be taken by Russia to repudiate this article of the Treaty, either with or without the consent of the other signatory Powers, I suggested to Lord Clarendon (in 1861, I think) that it would be desirable for England and France to take the initiative in proposing to relieve Russia of this article of the Treaty. I represented to him that although it was of importance when the Treaty was signed in order to allow Turkey breathing-time to reorganise her defensive system, it was impossible to expect that a great Power like Russia would remain for long under the stigma it imposed, and it was evident that she would profit by the first favourable opportunity to break loose from it, even at the risk of war. I

* See Treaty of Paris, 1856.

observed that this clause of the Treaty had to a certain extent fulfilled the object for which it had been formed, and that, viewing the complications to which it might give rise if Russia should take the initiative for its renunciation (which she subsequently did), I considered that it would be a politic as well as a generous and magnanimous act of England and France to offer to Russia, collectively with the other Powers, to relieve her of this humiliating condition of the Treaty. Nothing, however, came of the suggestion. Russia abided her time and opportunity; and during the siege, and before the conclusion of peace, whilst France was crippled, Prince Gortschakoff announced by a circular to the Powers signatories of the Treaty of 1856 that Russia repudiated that clause of the Treaty. Prince Gortschakoff took care to take this step before the conclusion of the war, probably to ensure the fulfilment of his agreement with Prince Bismarck.

The question was satisfactorily arranged by a Conference held in London (Paris being then closed by the siege), and Prince Gortschakoff obtained the object of his ambition in a legitimate form without war.

The following anecdote was told me when it was doubtful what part Austria would take at the commencement of the Franco-German War. The Duc de Gramont, who had been French Ambassador at Vienna, had formed very delusive hopes of Austrian and South German assistance, completely ignoring the strong anti-French feeling of the German nation.

It was said that on an appeal of Austria to the Emperor Louis Napoleon for assistance at the outbreak of war with Prussia in 1866 the Emperor's reply was in the following laconic and satirical terms :—

“Croyez-vous que je m'allie avec un cadavre ?” *

The opportunity for retort was given when an appeal was made to Austria by France for aid against Prussia in 1870. The reply then was :—

“Croyez-vous que je m'allie avec une maison de fous ?” †

Se non è vero, è ben trovato.

In the previous pages I have somewhat digressed from the regular course of this work, but it was scarcely to be avoided, the details of political events and their results embracing too wide a scope.

At the end of January, 1854, Lord Bloomfield resumed his duties as Minister at Berlin, and I retired into the shade, but was much gratified by receiving the following from Lord Clarendon :—

[*Extract.*]

FOREIGN OFFICE, *January 18th, 1854.*

As this may be my last letter to you for the present, I will not omit to say how entirely I have been satisfied with the zeal, ability, and judgment with which, at a most critical moment, you have performed the duty that devolved upon you.

I can assure you that this opinion is shared by all my colleagues.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

* “Can you think that I should ally myself with a corpse ?”

† “Can you think that I should ally myself with a madhouse ?”

CHAPTER XVII.

War declared by England and France on the 27th of March, 1854—Evacuation of the Principalities by Russia—Siege of Silistria Raised—French Expedition into Dobrudscha—Council of War at Varna—Expedition to Crimea—General Todleben—Naval Campaign in Baltic—Bombardment of Bomarsund—Impracticability of Attacking Cronstadt—Blockade of Russian Baltic Ports.

EARLY in 1854 an ultimatum comprising four points for opening negotiations of peace was presented to Russia by the Austrian Government, but it was not supported by Prussia. On its rejection by Russia war was declared by England and France on the 27th of March.

Previous to the arrival of the allied armies at Varna, the Russian troops had evacuated the Principalities and the siege of Silistria had been raised. It was nobly defended by the Turks under the direction of two English officers. The Russians suffered great losses, and completely failed in their repeated attacks on the fortress.

Shortly after the arrival of the French troops at Varna an expedition under General Espinasse was sent into the Dobrudscha (which from its insalubrity caused severe losses), and it returned to Varna without having achieved any other result than a considerable diminution of men from sickness.

At a council of war held at Varna of the English and French commanders and admirals, it was decided to undertake an expedition to the Crimea with a view to attack Sevastopol on the land side.

It was a gigantic and perilous undertaking, requiring an enormous flotilla to transport the armies and materials of war. It was marvellously and admirably organised, in face of a large Russian fleet in the harbour of Sevastopol. It was a daring enterprise, for if the Russian fleet had come out, although certain of destruction by the allied fleets, it would have produced great confusion, and might have seriously obstructed the progress of the flotilla and the landing of the troops.

But it was the theatre of war most advantageous to the allies. It would have been madness for them to have marched into Bessarabia, or to have invaded Russia through the Principalities. The season was too advanced for such operations, and the defensive means of Russia would have rendered such a campaign of very doubtful issue, and profitless even with success.

As it proved afterwards by the prolonged siege of Sevastopol, the allies encountered there the greater portion of the whole Russian army, whose troops were continuously moved up from the interior and from great distances, and at great sacrifices of men and treasure; whilst the allies had the sea as the basis of their operations, by which the provisioning of the allied army and the supply of the war material were more easily supplied.

There were then no railways in Russia leading to the

south. Troops had to march thousands of versts from the interior in the depth of winter, when whole regiments were lost in snowdrifts.

It is not my intention to enter into a description of the military events, nor of the siege of Sevastopol, nor am I competent to do so. They have been ably and graphically described by Mr. Kinglake; my vocation has been the pen, and not the sword. I will only observe that this unnecessary war, which but for the ambition and obduracy of the Emperor Nicholas could have been averted, cost above 200 millions sterling and a million of lives; and when we now look back and calmly consider the results of it, they are simply *nil*.

The two scourges of the world are said to be war and fire, but they are also said to be "civilisers." I cannot, however, discover that this war has proved to be a "civiliser;" nor can it be said to have produced any man of marked genius or of great military note, although it produced many heroes of indomitable courage, of unsurpassed patriotism, and of fervent loyalty. There is one exception, however, which I may make to this observation—viz., that of General Todleben, who from his able defence of Sevastopol rose from the position of a lieutenant of engineers to the rank of full general.

In later years I was intimate with General Todleben, and can bear testimony to the noble qualities of his character. He often expressed to me his appreciation and gratitude for the cordial and hospitable reception he had met with in England after the Crimean War. When the Russo-Turkish War broke out, to the great

surprise of many Russians of note General Todleben received no command—probably from jealousy on the part of the Grand Duke Nicholas (Nicolaivitch); but when the determined resistance of the Turks at Plevna baffled all the military genius of the Grand Duke Nicholas, General Todleben was summoned by the Emperor, and in a short time Plevna was taken.

The fortifications of Plevna were not of stone or brick, but were simply earthen defences with batteries, similarly formed to those which General Todleben had suddenly and hastily raised on the approach of the allied armies to the southern side of Sevastopol, and which enabled the besieged to hold out so long against the combined forces of England and France. Repeated assaults against Plevna were successfully repulsed by the Turks behind their entrenchments, and it is doubtful whether it would have been taken, so long as the communications were open in the rear to enable it to be provisioned.

Our fleet in the Baltic in 1854, under the command of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, did not fulfil the expectations entertained on its sailing from England. It was evident that Sir Charles Napier had lost that nerve which in previous times had enabled him to achieve great deeds. He carried out successfully the bombardment of Bomarsund. The Russian fleet did not come out to meet him, but remained under shelter of the Cronstadt Forts, which were unapproachable on account of the shallowness of the water.

There was a passage to the north of Sevastopol

navigable only for gunboats, against which no guns of the fortress could be directed, and from which the fortress could have been bombarded, and much damage done. It was reported later that the supply of powder in the magazines at Cronstadt was very small, the government contractor having filled them up with sand, placing only on the top a small stratum of powder, which would not have sufficed for the defence if continued firing had been long kept up; but, of course, the Admiral could not have been aware of this. This northern passage in the rear of the forts has been filled up since the war, and all the approaches to Cronstadt have been so fortified that an attack against that fortress by sea is now almost impossible.

The blockade of the Russian Baltic ports caused no serious loss to the export trade of Russia, but, on the other hand, it acted prejudicially to our commerce, and threw the carrying trade into the hands of Prussia. Memel, which was connected by rail with all the main lines into the interior of Russia, mostly belonging to the State, became a Russian port, and Russian produce was exported thence in Prussian bottoms, the flag protecting the cargo. In short, the blockade was more costly and prejudicial to us than to the Russians, and a Channel fleet would have equally sufficed to have prevented the exit of the Russian fleet from the Baltic. Since the introduction of railways, the export trade of every country in Europe can now be carried on through a friendly port under a neutral flag; and the establishment of a blockade appears to me to be

objectless, and a very doubtful means of weakening the enemy.

On the eve of the opening of the Conference at Vienna the Emperor Nicholas expired at the Winter Palace at St. Petersburg, from the effects of a chill taken in the *manège* while inspecting troops. His medical adviser strongly urged His Majesty not to risk his health by attending this inspection, but the Emperor was callous to his warning, and paid the sad penalty of his imprudence. It was reported at the time that the intelligence of his troops having been beaten by the Turks at Eupatoria had deeply mortified him, and that grief at this defeat, added to the grave malady under which His Majesty was suffering, greatly tended to accelerate the fatal issue.

However severely the Emperor Nicholas may be judged as a Sovereign, no one can deny that he was endowed in private life with great and noble qualities. He was an affectionate husband, a kind father, a steadfast friend. He was beloved in his family circle, and by all those who enjoyed his intimacy; and putting aside the severity which characterised his government, he was of a noble and generous disposition. It is no easy matter to be the Czar of All the Russias. "The throne of Russia is no bed of roses."

His son, the Emperor Alexander II., succeeded to the throne under circumstances of more than ordinary difficulty and of great national depression, the causes of which were not created by him, but inherited from his father. He found his country engaged in a hopeless

contest with England, France, Sardinia, and Turkey, without an ally, and with the public opinion of Europe strongly opposed to the policy which had initiated the war. He found his armies beaten; his navy powerless to cope with that of his enemies; his coasts blockaded; and his great fortress, the supposed impregnable creation and pride of his father, on which millions of roubles had been lavished, being gradually demolished by the ceaseless fire of the enemy's artillery. This was a sad position for a young Czar on his accession to the throne of a vast and mighty Empire. But the position was inherited, not created by him, and, to his credit be it said, he seized the earliest moment compatible with the honour of his country to bring this unfortunate and sanguinary contest to a close.

It was during the passage through Berlin in March, 1855, that Lord John Russell, who had been appointed to act as British Plenipotentiary at the Vienna Conference, learnt the death of the Emperor Nicholas. Various opinions were held as to whether the change of Sovereign in Russia would facilitate or not the success of the Conference. But it must be borne in mind that Sevastopol had not then fallen, and it was scarcely to be expected that the conditions of peace required by the allies would be granted so long as Sevastopol remained in the possession of Russia. This difficulty proved to be the insurmountable obstacle to the success of the Conference. The Conference broke up and separated without any result further than the evidence of a general wish on all sides for peace.

When Lord John Russell was at Berlin, I had a conversation with him on the Prussian system of national education. I observed to him that public education was far more advanced in Prussia than in England; that it was rare to find any male adult over twenty-one years of age unable to read or write, and that this higher state of education in Prussia was chiefly attributable to two causes—(1) that attendance at the public schools was compulsory, and (2) that as every male was obliged to pass through the ranks of the army between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, anyone who could not read or write was obliged to attend the military school for instruction during the period of service, thus giving to the military service the character of a civiliser and instructor. No more efficient school could be found, for during that time they learnt discipline, obedience, order, cleanliness, etc.—qualities which enabled them in after-life to become useful members of society. I observed that no such system prevailed in England, and I considered it a stain on England that the education of the lower classes had been so neglected and was so far behind that in Prussia.

Lord John replied that the feeling of personal liberty was so strong in England that it would be impossible to pass a compulsory law to enforce the attendance of children at school. But I said, “You (Lord John) passed a law compelling a parent to vaccinate his child; why should you not compel him to educate him?” Lord John was rather struck with the remark, and admitted that it was certainly very desirable that

such a law should exist, but he doubted the possibility of passing one.

This was in 1855. At the time I am now writing this (in 1891), State education has made an enormous advance. Compulsory education has been introduced, and it is now intended to introduce a system of "Free Education," which does not exist either in Prussia or in any part of Germany. I think unrestricted Free Education is a mistake ; it should be free for the poor and lower classes. In Prussia a small minimum rate is charged, and on any parents proving before a magistrate or communal officer their inability to pay the school-fee, it is paid by the parish or commune. The next popular demand will be to clothe and feed them !

CHAPTER XVIII.

Suffering of the Allied Armies during the Severe Winter of 1854-55—Death of Lord Raglan—Battle of Inkerman—The Bombardment of Fort Constantine—Ships *versus* Forts—Russian Attack on Balaclava repulsed.

THE winter of 1854-55 was one of terrible trial to the allied armies. It was the severest winter which had been experienced for many years. In 1877 I crossed the plateau, coming from Yalta, under a bitter cold east wind, and was thus enabled to form some idea of the amount of suffering to which our army must have been exposed during that long, eventful siege.

On the 28th of June Field-Marshal Lord Raglan, Commander-in-Chief of the British army in the Crimea, died after a short illness, said to have been cholera. This melancholy event was deeply lamented not only by the army, by whom he was beloved, but by the British nation, by whom he was respected. He was one of the last remaining pupils of the Wellington school, and had served under the great Duke for many years. His name will be handed down to posterity not only for his military deeds, but as one who had endeared himself to all classes by his noble character, his devoted loyalty, and his genial and warm-hearted disposition.

I may quote here an order of the day issued by General Pelissier, Commander-in-Chief of the French

army in the Crimea, on the death of Lord Raglan. It was as follows :—

Those who knew Lord Raglan—who knew the history of that noble pure life, so full of services rendered to his country—those who witnessed his intrepid attitude in the days of Alma and Inkerman—who recall the calm and stoic grandeur of his character during this rough and memorable campaign—all men of heart, in short—will deplore the loss of such a man, a companion-in-arms whose cordial spirit we loved, whose virtues we admired, and whose frank and anxious assistance we were always sure of.

The above is a noble eulogy, passed by an honest and brave soldier on a companion-in-arms; and these hearty and kindly feelings of Marshal Pelissier entirely obliterated all recollection of the military antecedents of Lord Raglan, who had been the A.D.C. and trusted friend of the Duke of Wellington during all his campaigns against Napoleon I., and had lost an arm at Waterloo.

May the former feuds between the two nations be equally obliterated; may the French nation, for the present as well as for many future generations to come, appreciate us as heartily and sincerely as we appreciate them !

At this time, and previous to the final attack by the French, a sortie was made by the Russians in the valley of the Tchernaiia. I had received private information that an attack in this quarter was meditated, and my telegram reporting the probability of an early attack was received just a few hours before the battle, and in time to warn the French and Sardinian commanders.

The struggle was severe, and occasioned great losses on both sides, but the Russian attack was bravely repulsed. It was a heavy blow to the Russians. Four generals were killed, eight wounded, and scarcely a single officer escaped unscathed. The loss of men was between seven and eight thousand.

On the 5th of November, at the break of day, fifty thousand Russians marched out of Sevastopol by several roads, all converging on one point—viz., the plateau of the British encampment—in the certainty of driving the allied armies into the sea. The British force did not much exceed six thousand men. The plan of attack had been drawn up at St. Petersburg immediately under the eye of the Emperor. On the 4th of November the Emperor passed three hours in the chapel of the palace, praying for the success of his troops. On the morning of the 5th of November Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at Berlin, walking down the Linden at noon with General Benkendorff, the Russian Military Plenipotentiary, took out his watch, and, turning to General Benkendorff, said, “*A l’heure qu’il est le plateau devant Sevastopol est balayé des alliés*”—so confident were the Russians of success.

In the early morning there was a dense fog, which so far was propitious to the assailants, as it concealed their approach and movements from the allies, but it caused a fatal mishap to their attack. A Russian corps—under General Liprandi, I believe—took a wrong turning at a cross-road, and lost its way, and by this accident failed to occupy the position

which had been assigned to it in the St. Petersburg programme.

It was a hard and sanguinary struggle. The unflinching bravery of our troops is indescribable, and they manfully held their ground against larger numbers and against continued fresh reinforcements of the enemy till the arrival of a French corps under General Bosquet, when the English and French, fighting shoulder to shoulder, hurled the enemy down the steep ravine which they had so shortly before ascended in full confidence of victory. The Russian losses were enormous, whilst ours were very considerable, and especially of officers in the brigade of Guards.

I cannot omit to insert here some touching lines which were written in memory of the gallant heroes who "with unflinching zeal and faith unbroken" sacrificed their lives for their country and their Queen :—

THE MEMORY OF OUR DEAD.

A year has vanished, bearing down the tide
Which flows not back—the ocean of the past—
Hopes, fears, joys, sorrows, dreams of human pride
And passion, all irrevocably cast
Within the inexorable keeping
Which yields not up its trust
For threat or prayer or weeping
Of earth's poor sons of dust.

A year has vanished, and the treasures
She gathered on her varying round—
The sparkling schemes, the bright-hued pleasures
That, scattered o'er her path, she found.

Alas ! the reckless year
Hath flung away the store
Of all she garnered here,
Whence it may rise no more.

The memory of our dead, the slain
On Eastern height and battle-plain,
The glory of our gallant-hearted,
Bought with their sweat and blood,
Has it, too, with the year departed,
To sink and perish in that flood,
The abyss of time, still deepening on for ever,
Engulphing all things, and disgorging never ?

There is no past for them—their deathless fame
Is present now, and shall be present still
So long as England owns a nation's name,
And English hearts with patriot-feelings thrill.
They sleep afar in foreign earth ;
But English maids shall sing
Their dirge by many an English hearth,
And feel that 'tis a glorious thing
To be of English birth.

The English sire shall teach his son,
Through age succeeding age,
To scan their deeds on history's page,
And do as they have done ;
And English children at their play
Shall pause to think upon the story
Their mothers told with tears that day
Of English bravery and glory.
Where'er the English tongue is spoken,
Where'er men honour noble deeds,
Unflinching zeal and faith unbroken,
And valour that for freedom bleeds,
Their memory shall be a token
For victory—till Time's o'erflowing sea
Mingle its waters with eternity.

January 1st, 1856.

The severe losses which our troops had incurred from illness, caused by the extreme cold and the want of warm clothing and food, and the suffering and hardships they had undergone, produced at this time in England a general feeling of discontent and indignation. Severe blame was attributed to the War Department, and the sympathies of the nation were roused in behalf of our suffering heroes.

A Patriotic Fund was established, and a very large sum was raised to provide the necessaries as well as the comforts of life to our poor soldiers. On the meeting of Parliament in January, 1855, Mr. Roebuck submitted a motion for a "Select Committee of the House to inquire into the condition of the army before Sevastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it had been to minister to the wants of the army."

Lord John Russell, then Lord President of the Council in Lord Aberdeen's Administration, felt himself unable to oppose the motion, and consequently resigned without any previous concert with his colleagues.

Mr. Roebuck's motion was carried by a majority of 157. This caused the fall of the Aberdeen Coalition Ministry. Lord Derby and Lord John Russell, when called upon by the Queen to undertake the Government, failed in their efforts to do so, and the Queen then sent for Lord Palmerston, who formed a strong Ministry, comprising Lord Clarendon, Lord Granville, the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Gladstone, Lord Panmure, Sir J.

Graham, Sidney Herbert, Sir C. Wood, Sir W. Molesworth, and Lord Lansdowne (without a portfolio, but in the Cabinet).

Lord Palmerston enjoyed the full confidence of the nation, and it was now felt that the war would be prosecuted with vigour and energy.

In December, 1854, a treaty had been signed between England and France and Austria.*

Prussia did not enter into this treaty, and consequently was not invited to take part in the conferences of the three Powers with Russia which were held at Vienna in 1855. The fact was, as I have previously observed, that the real director of the foreign policy of Prussia was then M. de Bismarck Schönhausen, and his sole object was to thwart Austria, to weaken her influence in Germany, and to prevent Prussia from taking any common action with her in the Oriental Question in support of the Western Powers; calculating that this benevolent policy towards Russia would, later, secure the good-will of Russia when the time arrived for carrying out his ambitious designs. As the sequel proved, he was not mistaken in his calculation; for the benevolent neutrality of Russia in the Austro-German and Franco-German wars may fairly be said to have represented an auxiliary force to Prussia of a hundred thousand men. It enabled Germany to dispense with that number of troops, which would otherwise have been indispensable

* This treaty was not an "offensive and defensive treaty," but it engaged Austria to a certain basis as the minimum of the conditions of peace. (See Appendix.)

for the protection of the extended eastern frontier of Prussia. By his previous combinations with the Emperor Napoleon, and the expectations he had held out to him, M. de Bismarck was able to count on the neutrality of France with the confidence that in the coming struggle with Austria no augmentation of defensive measures was required on the Rhenish frontiers of Prussia.

I reported to Lord Clarendon on the 25th of August, 1855, as follows :—

Last night Baron Manteuffel, throwing off the character of Minister, stated to me in the most earnest manner that he had been unjustly accused and suspected of Russian sympathies; that he was convinced that if at certain periods he had attempted to push matters in the manner he had wished, it would only have produced a stronger reaction, which might have been attended with serious danger; that he personally was most desirous of a *rapprochement* towards the Western Powers; and that he could assure me that the King felt warmly towards England, and that he was well disposed towards France. All that His Majesty asked was to be treated with confidence, and the result would prove that it would not be misplaced.

I replied in the same conciliatory tone, assuring him that there existed a cordial desire on our part for a good understanding with Prussia, and that the interests and sympathies of the two nations were closely interwoven. I said that now was a good moment for the King to give proofs of his assurances and expressions of goodwill towards the Western Powers. I ventured to observe that the position of Prussia, though perhaps maintainable for the moment, must necessarily become at a later period complicated, if not untenable. If the war should continue, Prussia stood isolated without an ally; if peace should happily be concluded, then Prussia would be in the same

difficulty as she had lately experienced at Vienna.* She might therefore now seek to place herself as regarded the Western Powers on the same level with Austria.

I felt that I was talking to a cipher, for I knew full well that M. de Bismarck Schönhausen, the agent of the Russian Court party, would never allow the King to make any approaches towards the Western Powers, and especially if those approaches should combine any common action with Austria. The game was skilfully played. The policy and feelings of M. de Bismarck Schönhausen, who was behind the curtain, were diametrically opposed to the Western Powers, and were favourable to Russia. The part which Baron Manteuffel, the ostensible Minister for Foreign Affairs, had to play was to pacify and gull the Western Powers.

On another occasion I reported to Lord Clarendon as follows :—

I endeavoured to sound Baron Manteuffel as to whether the King really had any intention of an alliance with the Western Powers. He said in a vague and mysterious manner, "If there was to be any treaty or alliance, we must know exactly to what we engage ourselves, and what are the real objects and intentions of the alliance. It is very well to say, To weaken Russia ; but does that imply marching to Moscow?" I replied to him that the object of war was to arrive at peace, and that the most effectual way now to attain peace would be to isolate Russia by the formation of a European Coalition, and by thus forcing her to accept such terms as the voice of Europe demanded. I observed that it was wholly impossible in war to foresee events and to define with precision the eventualities which might arise. I said, "You must accept principles, and to them you are bound. No Sovereign, no Government of the present day, could allow their policy to be diurnal—to depend on the events of the day—but it must rest on a basis which is in harmony with the interests of the nation and of Europe." He repeated to me again the desire of the King to draw nearer to England, but

* She was excluded from the conferences.

was reserved on the subject, and seemed to have no fixed purpose or idea as to the *modus operandi*.

During 1854 some disappointment and dissatisfaction were current in England, and severe comments were passed by the press upon the inactivity of our fleet in the Black Sea, and reproaches were made against our naval commander-in-chief, Admiral Dundas. In concert with the French admiral, action was at length agreed upon, and on the 17th of October the combined fleets opened fire on the forts of the northern side of Sevastopol, the most important of which was Fort Constantine.

The action lasted several hours, and when darkness set in the combined fleets retired, having really caused little or no damage to the forts. Each line-of-battle ship had a steamer as tender attached to it. When the order was given to retire, the *Trafalgar*, 120 guns, commanded by Captain Greville, was unable to get the anchor up. He immediately ordered all lights to be extinguished, and in the darkness the enemy could not see that he was alone left, "anchor-bound"; otherwise they would have directed the whole fire of Fort Constantine on the *Trafalgar*, with certainty of destruction. She was finally enabled to retire, with no other damage than the loss of her anchor.

The following is copy of a letter from Captain Greville, commanding the *Trafalgar*, 120 guns, relating the naval attack on Sevastopol:—

October 18th, 1854.—Yesterday the allied army opened fire on the fortress. Admiral Dundas had concerted a plan of action,

which was the best that could be adopted under the circumstances, with a view to support the land attack; but the French Admiral wished to change it at the eleventh hour, and, in spite of the remonstrances of Sir E. Lyons and all the captains, Admiral Dundas would hear of nothing but the French proposal. I told the Admiral plump and plain that if he pushed his ships into the positions he intimated, we should probably be destroyed without the power of doing much harm. However, to make a long story short, I anchored the *Trafalgar* in the middle of the harbour of Sevastopol, as far as the sunken ships would permit, and soon had the pleasure of finding myself under the tremendous fire of 1,200 guns—the other ships were quite as pleasantly placed as myself—and such a cannonade I never heard before. Luckily, I enveloped myself in a thick cloud of smoke—the roar of our guns shook the ship to the very centre—and I fully expected that the result would end in the destruction of the whole fleet. The shot fell round us, over us, and sometimes into us, doing, comparatively speaking, very little damage, and only wounding a few men. The shell exploded not two feet from us, and it seemed as if there was a special Providence watching over us. At dark I was left alone, from a difficulty of getting up one of my anchors; but I extinguished all lights and ceased firing on the Russians, and the Russians thought I had gone with the rest. Had they suspected my presence, the whole concentrated fire would have been directed towards me. Many of the ships have suffered severely. The *Albion* and *Sans-Pareil* are in a very bad plight, but to-morrow I shall be all right again. The combined fleets lost about one hundred killed, and six hundred wounded; and we ought to be very thankful it is not worse. . .

I am much afraid our damage done to the enemy was only momentary, and of no real importance. It is impossible to tell you what the issue of this terrible siege will be. As I write, the dreadful fire on both sides is ringing in my ears. It makes me mad when I read in the papers and my letters that England looks upon Sevastopol as already taken. I think it will be subdued, but many of us will be numbered with the dead before it submits. The army suffers the most; but we have a naval

brigade and all our marines on shore, and fifty guns, and I believe the sailors work even the artillery guns.

The question of ships *versus* forts has been frequently discussed by those competent to do so, but without any positive result. I have observed that forts built of stone at great cost have generally been found to be in the wrong place when required for defensive purposes, and have failed to fulfil the objects for which they were constructed, in consequence of the constant changes occurring in the art of war, and in the discovery of more powerful artillery. Take, for instance, the enormous sums expended by Louis Philippe for the fortifications of Paris, and how utterly they failed in preventing its investment by the German army in 1870. If Metz had not existed, the army of 170,000 men would not have been shut up and rendered useless. Look at the millions spent by the Emperor Nicholas on Sevastopol, and when the allied troops moved round to the south side their attempts to take it were baffled for many months by the earthworks skilfully raised in an incredibly short time by the genius of Todleben. During the night the Russians repaired the damage done to the earthworks during the previous day. Even in England our Martello forts round the coast, constructed at great cost, have become completely useless.

Armed defences are necessary to protect naval arsenals and harbours and military depôts; but such defences, as was proved by the experience at Sevastopol, would be equally efficient if constructed of earthworks, and at an incomparably smaller cost than if constructed of

stone. I feel it rather presumptuous in me (a man of the pen) to make these observations, but they are worthy of consideration by those who are competent to treat this interesting military question.

Shortly after this bombardment, and possibly encouraged by the failure of the allies to silence Fort Constantine, the Russians made a serious attempt on Balaclava (with a view to cut the allied army from the basis of their operations), which was repulsed, and in which our cavalry made two brilliant charges—more daring than prudent—on witnessing which the French general in command exclaimed, “*C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre*”; but nevertheless it saved Balaclava. This attack and attempt on the part of the Russians to obtain possession of the port and shipping of Balaclava was probably intended to precede the still more serious attack on the British encampment on the plateau at Inkerman, which it was confidently expected would be successful. I may here mention that the last station of the railway before arriving at Sevastopol is “Inkerman,” and when I heard the Russian railway conductor announcing this name it recalled to me, with deep emotion, the names of many a friend who had fallen in that fearful battle, when every British soldier had fought for his Queen and his country with undaunted bravery, and whose heroic deeds will be inscribed in the remembrance of a grateful country for generations to come. Alas! how sad it is to think of the many hopeful lives which have been sacrificed in the bloom of youth by the scourge of war! Is it not time (in the nineteenth

century, with the progress of civilisation) that means should be discovered to settle all national disputes without recurring to human destruction, the vestige of a barbarous age? What a blessing would it not be if the vast sums now spent for armies in peace could be devoted to the development of the industry and prosperity of the people! It will come; but too late, I fear, in a financial sense, to retrieve the extravagance and follies of the past.

I have not yet referred to the campaign in Asia, which had no satisfactory results for the Turks. They had looked for aid to Persia, hoping that as a Mussulman Power they would find, if not support, at least sympathy with them in their struggle against Russia. But the Persians belong to the Schiite section of Islamism, and are therefore opposed to the Turkish Mahomedans, who are Sunnites, and there is a deadly feud between the two sects. But, independently of this, the weight of power, aided by the action of fear, as compared between Russia and Turkey, largely preponderated in favour of the former. Russia has in peace time an army of 120,000 men in the Caucasus, which at any moment could be largely augmented. Prudence, therefore, dictated to Persia a policy of neutrality, and she wisely decided to hold aloof in a war in which her interests were not concerned.

After various repulses, the Turkish forces retired to Kars. In this stronghold they had the advantage over the Russians, who were superior to them in the field; and they had further the good-fortune to have the

services of General Williams to direct the defence. Fruitless attempts were made by General Mouravieff to take it by assault, but it was gallantly defended by the Turks under General Williams (afterwards Sir W. Williams of Kars), and it only fell when reduced by famine.

Colonel Teesdale (now Sir Christopher Teesdale) was A.D.C. to General Williams, and during the siege displayed an heroic bravery and an untiring energy, and performed daring acts of courage which justly earned for him the distinguished decoration of the Victoria Cross. I cannot abstain from inserting here a letter addressed by General Williams to Colonel Teesdale's father in admiration of his son's gallantry, dated Kars, September 30 :—

MY DEAR TEESDALE,—Just one line to say that, if possible, I love my A.D.C. more than ever. He lived through a storm of shell and bullets for seven hours yesterday without a scratch. When going into action he was hit with a fragment of a shell, but it did not even tear his trews. He was artilleryman when wanted, and twice sprang out of the redoubt and led the infantry to the charge. Three Russian officers were killed on the platform of the guns he was working. I am proud of him—what must you be? Three thousand of the enemy lie in heaps round the position, and their dead and wounded were carried off in immense numbers. We have refitted ship, and are again ready for Mouravieff. They went at last like sheep, completely beaten.

Yours,

WILLIAMS.

This letter came into my possession at the time quite accidentally, through a friend of mine, and I have thought it worthy of a place in these Reminiscences.

Sir Christopher Teesdale is of that stamp which has raised England to the pinnacle of her power, and he has given a noble example of unflinching courage, of indomitable perseverance, and of devotion to duty, the memory of which will last for generations to come. I knew personally a near relation of General Mouravieff, and he told me that the General had spoken with the greatest admiration and praise of General Williams and of his gallant A.D.C. A word of recognition may not be out of place here, and is due to the Russian troops for the loyalty, courage, and devotion shown by them to their Sovereign and their country.

During the summer of 1855 the Baltic fleet, under Admiral Dundas, effected little or nothing; nor was there much to be done further than shutting up the Russian navy and blockading their ports.

On the 9th of August Admiral Dundas reported that Sveaborg had been attacked by the allied squadrons. In a few hours heavy explosions took place, and extensive fires, which destroyed all the storehouse and magazine, leaving the arsenal. The Governor, General Berg, had everything packed up at Helsingfors for retreat if the allied forces had attempted a landing, as he had only 10,000 men to oppose them.

In a private letter from St. Petersburg it was stated that the bombardment of Sveaborg had created there some consternation. I was told that a Russian who had been at Helsingfors during the bombardment had said that the firing was wonderful, and that they (the Russians) were a long way behind the English in marine

artillery. He said that the heat was so great, more especially when the pitch and tar caught fire, that the men could scarcely remain at their guns, and that the guns were almost too hot to handle.

The besieged or bombarded must have been of remarkable intelligence, for they pretended to give an exact account of the number of shots fired per minute—something, it appears to me, as easy as counting the drops during a shower of rain. And all this firing took place, as it was asserted, “*sans nous faire aucun mal.*”

The fortress of Sveaborg is on an island about a mile and a half in front of Helsingfors, the capital of Finland and the residence of the Governor. This achievement, in addition to the destruction of the forts between Viborg and Helsingfors, terminated the naval operations in the Baltic. Although the results were of no practical importance, still they were sufficient to keep the enemy in constant alarm, and to prove to the populations that there is nothing along these shores of the Baltic which is beyond the reach of the naval artillery of the present day.

CHAPTER XIX.

General Pelissier's Despatch announcing the Fall of Sevastopol—Emperor of Russia's Order of the Day to his Army—Peace Currents—Failure of Secret Endeavours of Russia to gain the Emperor Napoleon for Peace independently of England—Prussian Action for Peace at St. Petersburg unsuccessful—Austrian Ultimatum; its Acceptance by Russia—Protocol signed at Vienna stipulating Meeting of a European Congress at Paris within Three Weeks—Abstraction of Secret Despatches at Berlin—Prince Gortschakoff's Opinion of Treaty between Sweden and Western Powers.

THE fall of Sevastopol on the 9th of September, 1855, was an event which electrified Europe. The bombardment had recommenced on the 5th of September. The Malakoff tower was taken by the French on the 8th, and the Redan and the central bastion by the English; but being overpowered by numbers, and no reserve being at hand, they were unable to hold it. During the night Prince Gortschakoff, with the whole of the Russian garrison, retired, and crossed over to the northern side, having first set fire to the town, destroyed the fortifications, and sunk the remaining Russian ships in the harbour. They destroyed also the bridge of boats over which they had passed, in order to prevent pursuit.

In General Pelissier's despatch announcing the capture of Sevastopol he writes as follows :—

Measures were taken for enabling us to repulse the enemy in case he should attempt a nocturnal attack against us; but we were soon relieved from our uncertainty. As soon as it became

dark, fires burst forth on every side, mines exploded, magazines of gunpowder were blown up. The sight of Sevastopol in flames—which the whole army contemplated—was one of the most awe-inspiring and sinister pictures that the history of war can have presented. The enemy was making a complete evacuation. It was effected during the night, by means of a bridge of boats constructed between the two shores of the roadstead, and under cover of the successive explosions, which prevented me from approaching and harassing the enemy. On the morning of the 9th the whole southern side of the town was freed, and in our power.

Thus terminated one of the most memorable sieges recorded in history, during which the loss of life on both sides had been enormous. It was a relief to all parties to feel that the terrible carnage which had been going on since the opening of the bombardment (justly termed by Prince Gortschakoff "*un feu d'enfer*") had ceased. Europe was also relieved of that weight of suspense which had lasted for so many months, and was buoyant with hope that this great victory of the allies might pave the way to an early peace.

The siege of Sevastopol differed from other remarkable sieges recorded in history. In the first place, the forts and batteries had been only planned against an attack by sea, and it had never been imagined possible that it would be exposed to attack by land; consequently there were no defences of a nature to resist a besieging army on the southern side. Secondly, the fortress was never completely invested, as, from the shallowness of the water, and for other reasons, it was found impracticable by the allies to occupy Perekop, the narrow isthmus connecting the mainland with the Crimea, through

which the army was reinforced and the fortress provisioned. It could only, therefore, be reduced by engineering and the force of artillery, and the difficulties of the former were greatly increased by the stony character of the soil. I have walked over the ground over which our brave soldiers had to rush in their attack upon the Redan, and it is to me inconceivable how, under the hottest fire of grape and shell and musketry, our soldiers were able to advance a distance of two hundred and eighty-seven paces over this rugged and stony ground.

The Emperor of Russia addressed the following order of the day to his army at Sevastopol on its evacuation by Prince Gortschakoff :—

The defence of Sevastopol, which has been so prolonged, and which is perhaps unexampled in military annals, has attracted the attention not only of Russia but of all Europe. From its very outset it placed its defenders in the same rank as the most illustrious heroes of our country. For a space of eleven months the garrison of Sevastopol has disputed with a powerful enemy each foot of ground, and each of its enterprises has been distinguished by acts of the most brilliant bravery.

The obstinate bombardment, renewed four times, and which has been justly called “infernial,” shook the walls of our fortifications, but could not shake or diminish the zeal and perseverance of their defenders. They fought the enemy or died with indomitable courage, and with an abnegation worthy of the soldiers of Christ, without once thinking of yielding. In regretting with all my heart the loss of so many generous warriors, who have offered their lives as a sacrifice to their country, and in submitting myself with reverence to the judgment of the Almighty, Who has not been pleased to crown their acts with complete success, I believe it my sacred duty to express on this

occasion, in my own name and in that of all Russia, to the brave garrison of Sevastopol, the most profound gratitude for their indefatigable labours—for the blood which they have shed in the defence for nearly a year of the fortifications which they raised in the course of a few days. But there is an impossibility even for heroes. The 8th of this month, after six desperate assaults had been repulsed, the enemy succeeded in obtaining possession of the Korniloff bastion, and the General-in-Chief of the army of the Crimea, desiring to spare the precious blood of his companions, which under these circumstances would only have been uselessly shed, determined on passing to the northern side of the place, leaving to the enemy only bloodstained ruins. These heroes—objects of the general esteem of their comrades—will no doubt offer, on re-entering the ranks of the army, new examples of the same warlike virtues.

With them and like them all our troops, with the same unlimited faith in Providence and the same ardent love for me and their country, will always and everywhere combat with courage the enemies who touch the honour and integrity of the country; and the name of Sevastopol, which has acquired immortal glory by so many sufferings, and the names of its defenders, will live eternally in the hearts of all Russians with the names of the heroes who immortalised themselves on the battle-fields of Pultowa and Borodino.

(Signed)

ALEXANDER.

When I visited Sevastopol on my way to Yalta in 1877, on a mission to the Emperor Alexander at Livadia, it was a piteous sight to see the ruins and the roofless state of the houses in that beautiful town. Nothing had been done to restore the town to its pristine beauty. The extensive barracks on the north side were unroofed, the theatre—a beautiful building—a mass of ruins, and several of the churches severely damaged. But these damages were partly caused by

the Russians themselves, who on abandoning the southern side set fire to the town. The scene was so harrowing to the late Emperor that on his visits to Livadia he invariably embarked at Odessa. It is probable that the Russian Government decided to leave the restoration of Sevastopol until they had succeeded in rescinding that clause of the Treaty of Paris imposing a limitation to the construction of fortresses on the Black Sea, which was eventually cancelled at a meeting of the European Conference held in London in 1871.

After the fall of Sevastopol, hopes of an early peace were very generally entertained. Peace was in the wind, and proposals and suggestions were flying about.

The financial and military strain on Russia caused by carrying on war at the extreme ends of the Empire had weighed heavily on her; and although her defensive powers were great, it was generally felt that a prolonged continuation of the war would be attended with inevitable ruin to the country.

The war also was becoming less popular in France, for it was evident to the nation that no material advantages could be gained by it commensurate with the sacrifices which it had cost.

The financial question and the deficient harvest in France were disposing the nation for peace, and the Emperor was unable, beyond a certain point, to disregard public opinion. Endeavours were made by Russia secretly to move the Emperor Napoleon to a peaceful action, independently of England, but the

Emperor, however desirous of peace, was too loyal to listen to such overtures.

When Prince Gortschakoff was asked whether Russia would take the initiative in the direction of peace, he replied, "*La Russie est muette, mais elle n'est pas sourde.*"

Prince Gortschakoff (I was then told) had had several interviews with Baron Bourgueney, the French Ambassador at Vienna, and it was currently reported and believed that the Emperor Napoleon was most anxious for peace, and that he would accept the basis of the four points (which had been discussed during the Conference at Vienna in 1853) without the cession of any territory or the demand for any indemnity.

As may be supposed, the King of Prussia, who had always looked forward to be the mediator and archangel of peace between Russia and the Western Powers, was the first to start on this pacific pilgrimage. I was privately informed that advice had been sent (though not in an official form) by Baron Manteuffel to St. Petersburg with suggestions as to the terms on which peace might be made. Baron Manteuffel never alluded to them in conversation with me, but he said that he was anxiously expecting intelligence from St. Petersburg. I was subsequently and privately informed that Baron Manteuffel had received a private letter from Count Nesselrode, which, although it contained nothing in regard to concessions which Russia was prepared to make, laid down three negatives referring to points which she could not accept. He said—

“(1) If we are asked to cede the Crimea, our answer will be ‘No.’

“(2) If we are asked to take an engagement not to rebuild Sevastopol, we shall say ‘No.’

“(3) If we are asked to limit the extent of our navy in the Black Sea, we shall say ‘No.’ ”

In December, 1855, Lord Bloomfield returned to Berlin, and consequently my chargéship *ad interim* of Her Majesty's Legation ceased. At the same time Sir Hamilton Seymour (who on the resignation of Lord Westmorland had been appointed Minister to the Imperial Court) arrived at Vienna. He entered on his duties at an important crisis. The Cabinet of Vienna had decided, with the knowledge and sanction of the Western Powers, to make a fresh effort in favour of peace, and to submit fresh proposals to the Government of Russia. The Austrian Government had lately reinforced their army, both on the Galician frontier and in Lombardy, and appeared firmly decided, in the event of the rejection by Russia of the fresh proposals for peace—which bore the character of an ultimatum—to take action in support of the Western Powers. This ultimatum was strongly supported by Prussia, both in a private letter from the King to the Emperor Alexander and by instructions from Baron Manteuffel, which were greatly instrumental in deciding their acceptance by Russia.

The proposals of Austria, forwarded by Count Valentin Esterhazy, to form the basis of peace between the Western Powers and Russia, were as follows :—

(1) The relinquishment of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities.

(2) Cession of a portion of Bessarabia, so as to remove Russia from the Delta of the Danube.

(3) Neutralisation of the Black Sea, without any Russian fortresses and arsenals.

(4) Common protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

Should these proposals be rejected, diplomatic relations between Austria and Russia were to be broken off.

On receipt of the Russian acceptance, a Protocol was drawn up at Vienna by the four Powers, and it was agreed that the Congress—in which Sardinia would be represented—should meet at Paris within three weeks.

This intelligence was received in Europe with general satisfaction, and full confidence was felt that the Congress would restore to Europe the blessings of peace.

In November, 1855, some sensation was created at Berlin by the discovery of the abstraction of General Gerlach's and M. Niebuhr's secret correspondence and official despatches from St. Petersburg, including the confidential reports of Count Münster, then Prussian Military Plenipotentiary to the Czar; and, of course, the Russian Court party attributed it to the Legations of the Western Powers. It appears that the two servants of General Gerlach and M. Niebuhr had been bribed by a retired Prussian official, and that the correspondence and official papers were delivered to him by them, copied by him at night, and replaced in the early morning in the drawers from whence they were taken. An

individual (H——) was one of the men to whom the papers were given, and who afterwards went to Paris, where he was placed under arrest. It appears that he had been recommended to the Russian Legation at Berlin to act as a spy on the Poles residing in Paris, and to report on their doings and any other matters of interest to Russia. But this individual had at the same time accepted a similar offer of the French Legation at Berlin to act as a detective at Paris to watch the doings of the Russians. When this became known to the Russian Legation, it was necessary before employing him to ascertain whether his statement of being employed by the French Legation was true. To test his veracity, it was arranged that a Russian agent should be concealed in the room where H—— was to receive his French passport, his French instructions, and his French money. These were duly delivered to him in the presence of the Russian agent (who was concealed), and his statement was confirmed. He accordingly started for Paris in the double capacity of a Russian spy and a French detective. Which of the two he served honestly, I am unable to state. I learnt that on his arrival at Paris he was arrested, and all his papers and some interesting documents fell into the hands of the French police.

The most searching investigation was made into the abstraction of the secret papers and correspondence, but it was carried on most secretly, and nothing more was heard of it. It was said that the practice had been going on for above two years, and that many persons of high standing were implicated in it, for the purpose of

obtaining information as to the secret plots and intrigues of parties at the Court who were trying to undermine each other. It is natural to suppose that when valuable papers and correspondence are thus furtively and ignominiously obtained, they would be offered for sale to the highest bidder, and it was therefore presumed and feared that they must have reached foreign Cabinets.

Everything relating to this untoward affair was kept so secret that it was impossible to ascertain what revelations—if any—had taken place. The King was extremely annoyed by the occurrence, but was entirely relieved of any fears that any of the papers abstracted could compromise His Majesty. The whole question shortly died away, and the inquiry appears to have collapsed.

I am not aware of any similar incident occurring of late years. The only one recorded in history (which was of a more daring and open character) was that of Hugh Elliot, the British Minister at Berlin, who had the desk of the French Minister forced open, and obtained a copy of the French treaty recognising the independence of America, which was the first intimation our Government had received of it.

It is only lately that I have perused Count Vitzthum's "*Reminiscences*," and have, to my surprise and regret, become acquainted with a statement in regard to myself which is entirely false, and a pure—or, rather, impure—invention of his own. In vol. i., p. 89, Baron Vitzthum refers to the plan for the Russian attack on the English at Inkerman which had been

elaborated at St. Petersburg under the eyes of the Emperor. He writes as follows :—

The allies' position was known well enough. It was known that the English left wing was much exposed—in the air, so to speak—while the French and Piedmontese were too far off to be able to frustrate in time the intended surprise. It could be hoped, therefore, to take the English unawares, to crush them by superior numbers, and then on the following day to attack the French separately, beat them, and drive them back upon their fleet. The superiority of numbers once assured, the execution of this attack seemed mere child's play ; and so delighted was the Emperor Nicholas at the prospect of undoubted success that he did not hesitate to confide to Count Münster the plan in all its details. Count Münster only did his duty in immediately reporting to the King of Prussia what the Czar had told him. He fancied that in so doing he had prevented some indiscretions at home, and could not be aware that it was the very Cabinet of his own Sovereign at Potsdam from which the English and French Embassies were then obtaining the best materials for their despatches. Just as Frederick II. before the Seven Years' War had received copies of the most private documents of the Saxon Cabinet through their clerk at Dresden—Menzel—so Lord Augustus Loftus had a Menzel at Potsdam who sent him copies for which an honorarium was duly paid according to the value of their contents. Thus the English Ambassador promptly received the despatch of Count Münster with the Russian plan of the battle of Inkerman. Loftus, perceiving its importance, had the despatch telegraphed in cipher to London, whence, after being deciphered, it was immediately forwarded to Lord Raglan. It was the first direct telegram (so it was then said) that had been sent from London to the Commander-in-Chief of the British army in the Crimea, and it arrived just at the right moment to enable Lord Raglan to make the necessary dispositions and inform Marshal Canrobert of the danger. The latter immediately ordered up Bosquet's division, while Lord Raglan sent for the Piedmontese."

The whole of Count Vitzthum's statement is false from beginning to end as far as it regards the English Legation and myself.

1. The battle of Inkerman was won by the intrepid bravery of our troops, aided by the generous assistance of General Bosquet's division, and not *lost* by the *talkativeness* of the *Emperor Nicholas*.

2. Lord Bloomfield was Minister at Berlin at the period, and I can answer for him that the statement of Count Vitzthum is utterly unfounded.

3. I can as positively state that no information of an intended attack on the English position was ever received by the British Legation, and therefore no telegram of any kind relating to it could have been sent to the Foreign Office; nor did the Commander-in-Chief of the British army in the Crimea receive any premonitory information regarding it. The British camp was entirely taken by surprise.

4. It is utterly false that I ever bribed, or paid any "honorarium" to, *anyone* for secret information, or for copies of despatches or documents of any kind, and it is a false and calumnious statement of Count Vitzthum.

I have taken the same mode of denying this false statement as Count Vitzthum has chosen for propagating 'it. In writing history, truth is the primary consideration, or otherwise it becomes fiction.

I heard about this time that the King of Prussia was in great alarm at the reported accession of Sweden to the Western Alliance, and at the Austrian armaments.

In writing this to Lord Clarendon I observed that

“His Majesty trusted to Providence to extricate him from his increasing difficulties, and that I might add with truth that His Majesty takes great care to keep his powder dry. He imagines, I believe, that when the moment of extreme danger arrives, he will be caught up to heaven like another Elijah.”

On hearing of the Swedish treaty with the Western Powers, Prince Gortschakoff said, “*J’ai souvent entendu parler d’un traité offensif et défensif, mais jamais d’un traité offensant.*”

In 1855 I received information that the plan of a submarine boat had been submitted to the Russian Government by the inventor, who was an American. It was designed for the purpose of attaching a barrel of combustible matter under the keels of ships, and of exploding it by an electric wire. It is propelled by machinery worked by hand several feet under the water, and supplied with an air-pump for raising or lowering it, and also for breathing. I forwarded to the Government a detailed plan of this boat, with instructions for preserving vessels from its action. This drawing must be in the archives of the Foreign Office, and is probably, if not the first, one of the earliest ideas of a torpedo-boat.

CHAPTER XX.

Visit to Paris of Baron Beust and Herr von der Pfordten—The Bamberg Coalition—The State of Germany in 1855, contrasted with the Formation of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1803.

DURING the summer of 1855, the year of the first International Exhibition at Paris, M. de Bismarck again made his appearance at the Court of the Emperor Napoleon. Paris was then the rendezvous of statesmen and politicians of all countries, and amongst them there appeared on the scene two Ministers of the Minor German States, Baron Beust and Herr von der Pfordten—the former the Minister of Saxony, the latter of Bavaria. Both had private audiences of the Emperor, and laid before him their views in regard to the pending negotiations for peace between the Western Powers and Russia. On Baron Beust leaving the Emperor,* His Majesty observed to Count Walewski, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, in speaking of M. de Beust, "*C'est un génie profond et pénétrant.*" On the subject of M. de Bismarck the Emperor was silent.

On the 4th of December, 1855, I reported to Lord Clarendon the following observations, referring to the

* Bismarck's "*Denkwürdigkeiten.*"

visit of Baron Beust and Herr von der Pfordten to Paris:—

Your lordship will have been informed from other quarters that the late visit of Baron Beust and Herr von der Pfordten to Paris has caused much sensation in Germany, that various interpretations have been attributed to it, and that it has been viewed with much jealousy and suspicion by the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna. It is undoubtedly an incident of novelty—and one which would certainly have never occurred in former days—that two Ministers of the Minor German States should have gone to Paris, and should have entered personally with the Emperor Louis Napoleon into an explanation of the policy of the Germanic Confederation, without having previously obtained the assent of the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets. Such an event would never have occurred previous to 1848 without the consent of Prince Metternich.

But what is perhaps a still more extraordinary fact is that *de jure* they were the German statesmen most entitled to explain to His Majesty the course which the Federal Diet had pursued during the Oriental crisis, for the policy of that body has been virtually dictated by them and their confederates. Neither the Austrian nor the Prussian policy has prevailed at Frankfort. The jealousies of the two great German Powers, and their constant disunion, have given life and vigour to a third element in Germany, which has lately been termed the “Bamberg Coalition,” of which Baron Beust and Herr von der Pfordten are the originators and directors, and whose policy on the Eastern Question has been accepted by the Federal Diet.

It appears to me that when the question of a reform of the Diet is mooted in the sense referred to by Austria and Prussia, a very great change, amounting almost to a new organisation, has already taken place, and it may probably be this change which has prompted Austria to support the ideas put forth for a reform of the Diet, in the hope that she may thereby control this rising “Third Power,” and regain somewhat of her ascendancy in Germany.

Your lordship is aware that the principal object of the meeting of the Emperor of Austria and of the King of Prussia at Tetschen in the summer of 1854 was to concert together the attitude they should assume towards the "Bamberg Coalition"; and it may be observed that at that conference Count Buol's proposals for an energetic and determined policy towards the Minor German States were overruled by Prussian counsels.

It is now, however, an indisputable fact that since the re-establishment of the Diet after the revolution, the Minor States have assumed a greater freedom of action and independence. They first profited of the differences between the two great German Powers on commercial matters to form themselves into a Coalition, and, by throwing their weight into the Austrian scale, forced Prussia to accede to their wishes. What then constituted the Coalition of Darmstadt for a commercial aim has now again appeared for a political aim, under the name of the "Bamberg Coalition"; and the success which has again attended their endeavours enables them to appear in the political arena in Germany, and likewise at Paris (as the visit of Baron Beust and Herr von der Pfordten has lately testified), as the representatives of a Third Power in Germany.

. . . . Having called your lordship's attention to this remarkable change which has of late taken place in the political organisation of Germany, and which calls to mind the former association of States known as the "Rheinbund," or "Confederation of the Rhine," I now venture to offer a few observations on the political motives by which the States forming the "Bamberg Coalition" are apparently animated.

Their first and primary care is the preservation of their own independent sovereignties. They feel that they are placed, as it were, between two fires, and are thus exposed at any time to be consumed by either. Their natural policy, therefore, is to lean for protection on external aid. Hitherto Russia presented herself to them as their most natural ally and defender. To Russia, therefore, they looked not only for safety from without, but likewise for the maintenance of their internal tranquillity. To Russia they

were bound by many ties of historical recollections and of family interests. The Russian Emperors for a series of years have carefully fostered and promoted these sympathetic feelings, and by intermarrying with the German dynasties have sought to increase and consolidate their influence over them. So it has been, and so it was on the breaking out of the present war; and we have witnessed the remarkable fact that whereas the dynasties, from the causes aforementioned, have been the submissive devotees of Russia, the people have, on the contrary, expressed their sympathies with the West. The fall of Sevastopol and the successes of the Western Powers have, however, produced a great moral effect on the German Minor Courts. The "Colossus of the North" has completely deceived all the hopes and ideas which the German States had formed of its gigantic strength and power. If its frame be of metal, its limbs have been proved to be of clay; and those who counted most on its protection and aid in case of need, now see, to their great dismay, that it is unable even to defend itself against an external foe.

The Minor States of Germany, awakened to a sense of their danger, now see the necessity of conciliating the good-will of France, and there is no doubt that the visit of Baron Beust and Herr von der Pfordten to Paris was intended in this sense. Those statesmen may possibly have represented to the Emperor Napoleon that they were well disposed to France; that the position of the Minor States of Germany rendered them averse to war; that they had not been influenced in the policy they had pursued by any sympathies for Russia, and still less by any hostility to France; that they (the Bamberg Coalition) could render services to France, inasmuch as their disinclination to war, and the dangers to which their sovereignties would be exposed by a Continental convulsion, would lead them equally to oppose any coalition which might hereafter be formed against France; and on the same grounds that they had opposed taking part in the war against Russia. Such I believe to be the sentiments and policy of the Bamberg Coalition. All they ask for is

peace; for the maintenance of which they will league themselves with those who appear the strongest, and by whom they are likely to be left in the enjoyment of their sovereign independence.*

(Signed)

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

With reference to the subject-matter of the foregoing despatch, I will now give the following memorandum, which I wrote in 1855, contrasting the position of Germany at that period with that of the Minor German States at the period of the formation of the "Rheinbund" under Napoleon I., and tracing to its origin the disunion and rivalry of the two great German Powers, which then led to the subjugation of Germany by Napoleon I., and in latter years has acted so perniciously to the interests of Germany and of Europe.

What has been generally termed the "German Question" may be defined in the latter years as a continual rivalry and friction between the two great German Powers for supremacy in Germany. It has shown itself at various times and in different forms since 1848, and while assuming a passive character when no prominent agitation existed, it has on every occasion of political excitement in Europe burst out afresh with greater intensity.

To endeavour to seek its origin, we may perhaps trace

* It must be borne in mind that this despatch was written eleven years before the Austro-German War in 1866, the result of which was the entire defeat of Austria and the South German States, the dissolution of the Germanic Confederation, the exclusion of Austria from Germany, and the formation of the North German Confederation—Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau being annexed to Prussia. The South German States paid large war indemnities, and they signed a secret treaty with Prussia by which they were bound in the event of war to place their armies at her disposal.

it as dating from the period of the victories of the great Frederick and the conquest of Silesia. In the subsequent wars in the early part of this century the disunion of Austria and Prussia was the cause of the subjugation of Germany by France, each having been vanquished in turn by Napoleon. By turns each looked to Paris for support, instead of joining in a common alliance against their common enemy. It was not till the German nation was moved to throw off the yoke of the invader that the independence of Germany was achieved. During the period alluded to the smaller States coalesced with Napoleon under the name of the "Rheinbund" or Confederation of the Rhine, and through their aid Napoleon was enabled to march to Vienna, to Berlin, and even to Moscow. It was from this period that may be said to date the power of the Minor States of Germany. Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Saxony were raised to the rank of kingdoms by Napoleon; Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt to the rank of Grand Duchies; and from having been previously Electors and dependents of the Emperors of Germany, they now assumed an independent rank and position as Sovereigns.

On the termination of the War of Liberation in 1815, and on the creation of the Germanic Confederation, these Sovereigns and Princes preserved the independent position which they had acquired by treachery to Germany, and to each was granted an independent position in a Confederation in which all the members were on an equal footing of sovereignty.

The position of Germany at the commencement of the Oriental crisis was much the same as at the period of the "Rheinbund"; and on the dissolution of the German Empire Austria and Prussia were disunited, the smaller States (from fear, compulsion, or ambition) looked to foreign protection, and Germany, weakened by internal divisions, fell an easy prey to the ambitious rule of Napoleon.

Is not the present condition of Germany a very similar

one? * Does not the rivalry, not to say discordance, between Austria and Prussia now, as then, inspire both with hopes of acquiring French aid under another Napoleon for the realisation of their respective ambitious plans in Germany? The Germany of to-day is, equally with the Germany at the formation of the "Rheinbund," divided into three groups—namely, Austria, Prussia, and the group of Minor States comprised under the title of the "Bamberg Coalition." This latter group, jealous of their sovereignties, and fearful of any internal changes which might reduce them to dependencies of either of the great Powers, endeavours to hold the balance between Austria and Prussia, without, however, throwing themselves entirely into the hands of either. This triplicate organisation, so adverse to the national interests and the national aspirations, renders the Confederation powerless both at home and abroad, and arrests every attempt which may be brought forward for its regeneration.

The evils and dangers resulting from this unfortunate division in Germany, however ignored apparently by the Governments, are fully recognised by the German people. The great aim of the German nation is "Unity," and the enlightened portion of the nation is making every endeavour to bring their views and aspirations to a successful result. A society has been formed, under the title of the "National Verein," which has made and is making great progress in acquiring influence and power over the masses. Their object is, through legal and constitutional means, to bring about united action for all practical purposes of internal government, and for giving to Germany that weight in the direction of external policy which appertains to a great Power. They have no wish to uproot the existing smaller dynasties, but they look to the cession by them into the hands of a central Power of such rights of sovereignty as will render Germany united, both with regard to internal and external relations. For instance, they desire to see the

* This was written in 1855.

military power of the Confederation vested under one authority; they wish that all diplomatic representations abroad should be centred in one body; they look to a national representation at the seat of the central Power.

The difficulties of realising such a plan are no doubt considerable, and great opposition will be raised to it on the part of the several Sovereigns and Governments; nor, it is feared, will the accomplishment of the national will be achieved without internal commotions; but the current of public opinion has irrevocably set in this direction, and even the most timid and sceptical appear to entertain no doubts of its ultimate success.

No one can foresee how, or by what means, or when, the hoped-for change may come; but politicians of all colours coincide in the opinion that the present state of things cannot long continue without danger to the internal safety of Germany.

The future policy of Prussia is looked to with mixed feelings of hope and fear. The Liberal party in Prussia has acquired a position and an influence which, if judiciously managed, must inevitably tend to place in her hands the future destinies of Germany.

Since this was written, in 1855, the popular aim of the German nation has been attained, and in the mode graphically prophesied by Prince Bismarck—"mit Blut und Eisen."

Germany can now claim to rank among the foremost of the great Powers of Europe. I shall have occasion, later in this work, to revert to the great events by which the national aspirations, so long and so ardently looked for, have been happily realised.

CHAPTER XXI.

The Congress of Paris—Admission of Prussia—Peace signed on March 30th—Secret Treaty between England, France, and Austria—Satisfaction of the Emperor Napoleon at Conclusion of Peace; Reasons for It—Russia and France—Betrothal of the Princess Royal to Prince Frederick William of Prussia—Birth of Prince Imperial—Results of the Crimean War—Future Abstention of England from Continental Wars.

EARLY in 1856 the Congress met at Paris to arrange definitely the terms of peace between the Western Powers and Russia, on the basis of the Protocol which had been signed at Vienna in December of the preceding year. England was represented by Lord Clarendon and Lord Cowley, France by Count Walewski and Baron de Bourgueney, Austria by Count Buol and Baron Hübner, Sardinia by Count Cavour and Count Villa Marina, and Russia by Count Orloff and Baron Brünnow. Prussia did not at first receive an invitation, and was only admitted on the 18th of March, when the preparatory work had been concluded.

The Russian Plenipotentiaries were received with marked distinction by the Emperor Napoleon, and it was reported at the time that at the first audience of Count Orloff with the Emperor, on referring to the terms of concessions by Russia, Count Orloff held out his hand to the Emperor, saying, "*Prenez, sire, ce que vous croyez juste.*"

Peace was concluded on the 30th of March. A separate secret treaty was signed also on the 15th of April between England, France, and Austria, by which the contracting parties guaranteed the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire as stipulated by the Treaty of Paris of the 30th of March, 1856, and any infraction of that treaty "would be considered by the contracting parties of the present treaty as a *casus belli*. In such event they will come to an understanding with the Sublime Porte as to the necessary measures, and will decide without delay the employment of their military and naval forces."

We have since seen how little the terms of this treaty have been observed. Russia has regained possession of the territory ceded in Bessarabia, and the clauses limiting the Russian naval forces and prohibiting the construction of fortresses on the coasts of the Black Sea have become a dead letter.

The conclusion of the war was a cause of great satisfaction to the Emperor Napoleon. The war had served his purpose, but it imposed a heavy strain on the finances of France, and without the possibility of his reaping those advantages to which he aspired. He was hampered by his engagement with England not to seek extension of territory or other advantages independent of the object of the war. He had, therefore, nothing to show the French nation which could compensate it for the great sacrifice of men and treasure. The great aim of the Emperor Napoleon was to wipe out the treaties of 1815, and he felt that this could never be

effected with the consent of England. There was a burning flame within his breast — originating in his early youth — to liberate the Italian nation from the Austrian rule and influence, which weighed so heavily on it, and to restore to France her southern frontiers. By the conclusion of peace, therefore, he was relieved of the unselfish policy which England during the late war had imposed.

Russia now appeared on the stage with an olive-branch in her hand, and obsequiously sought the friendship of France. Russia had expressed sympathy with Italy, and thus offered to the Emperor Napoleon the services of a friend, though not, perhaps, those of an ally.

The Emperor Napoleon further was convinced that Austria would never assent to the realisation of his plans, neither as regarded the obliteration of the treaties of 1815, nor the freedom of Italy ; and it was therefore that, profiting by the coldness of the relations between Austria and Russia, he was desirous of securing the friendship of the latter, with the assurance that Russia would take no part in opposing or counteracting his plans.

The Emperor thus fell an easy prey to the seductive attempts of Russia to break up the Anglo-French alliance.

Early in 1856 two events of interest and importance took place—namely, the betrothal of the Princess Royal of England to Prince Frederick William of Prussia, and the birth of the Prince Imperial of France on the 16th of March.

The marriage of the Princess Royal was not dictated by any political motives, but was purely and solely one of mutual affection. Frederick William IV. gave his hearty approval to this marriage, although at the time there was a party at Court which was opposed to it on political grounds. The public opinion of Prussia was much in favour of the marriage, and hailed it with delight; but I regret to say that the English press, under the influence of narrow-minded and political feelings, was opposed to it, and commented severely on it. But in after-years they condoned their errors, and no royal persons have ever been more highly appreciated or more beloved, or have been more cordially received in England, than the Crown Prince and Princess of Germany.

On the conclusion of the war the Emperor Napoleon was at the summit of his power. Paris was the rendezvous of all that was renowned in Europe in fashion, wealth, the arts, and literature. Statesmen and politicians of all creeds flocked to Paris, and sought the favour of the Emperor while basking in the sunshine of the Imperial Court, which was the most brilliant in Europe.

At Berlin the participation of Prussia in the Congress of Paris had given satisfaction, and the conclusion of peace had relieved all minds of the painful feelings which the sad devastation of the war had inflicted. Reconciliation dinners were given at the British and Russian Legations, and while the past was obliterated, harmony and goodwill were restored.

I may here mention a curious incident—namely, that

it was mainly through a secret agent, L—— (who was personally known to the Emperor Napoleon), that Prussia was invited to the Congress, for which he received a gold snuff-box with the Emperor's *chiffre*. This secret agent had been previously employed by Baron Manteuffel in matters of a private and delicate nature, and was utilised likewise by the Court party for similar purposes.

The admission of Prussia to the Congress was a prudent and politic step. In opening negotiations for peace after a war, it should never be forgotten that the enemy of to-day may become the friend and ally of to-morrow. In the case of inviting Prussia to the Congress, there were special circumstances which rendered it doubly politic for England to forget and obliterate the past, and to enter on a path of reconciliation. In view of the approaching marriage of the Princess Royal to the future heir of the Prussian throne, it was not for the interest of England to evince a feeling of ill-will by an act which would humiliate Prussia in the eyes of the German nation; nor would it have been politic to have thrown her into the arms of France or Russia, both of whom were favourable to her admission to the Congress. Our Government acted wisely in assenting to her admission; for without the signature of Prussia to the treaty, serious complications and difficulties might have arisen later. It was of great importance, therefore, that a treaty of such grave consequence should bear the signatures of all the leading European Powers.

The invitation to Prussia to join the Congress was favourably received by the King; and Baron Manteuffel,

the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Count Hatzfeldt, the Prussian Minister at Paris, were appointed to represent Prussia.

Baron Manteuffel had been the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs in Prussia since 1850. He had been the Prussian representative at Olmütz, and had signed the convention with Prince Schwarzenburg which then prevented the outbreak of war between Austria and Prussia. This convention, by which Prussia, to avoid war, yielded to the demands of Austria, was regarded by the Prince of Prussia and the Prussian generals as a deep humiliation to Prussia, from which she only recovered by her victorious campaign of 1866.

In 1854, on declaring in the Chamber the policy of Prussia on the Eastern Question, Baron Manteuffel stated that Prussia adhered to the Vienna Note (the same which had been accepted by the Emperor of Russia), adding that Prussia would maintain an independent attitude, and would resist every attempt to force her hands from whatever quarter, and that she would only defend German interests. This policy was dictated by M. de Bismarck Schönhausen, then Minister at Frankfort, who was the leading spirit of the Court party and the adviser of Frederick William IV.

Before closing this chapter I venture to make a few observations on the results of the Crimean War. In the first place, I may say it broke up the old alliances of Europe, and gave the *coup de grace* to the Treaties of Vienna. In my early days in diplomacy, whenever a

dispute or difference arose on a question of European law, reference was made to the Treaties of Vienna; but since the revolution in France they have been completely set aside and expunged. It is not surprising that the Emperor Napoleon was adverse to them, and wished their extinction, for they contained an express stipulation that no member of the Buonaparte family should ever be recognised as the Sovereign of France.

Another result of the Crimean War was to further the principle of "nationalities," and, to use the words of the Emperor Napoleon, to favour "*les grandes agglomérations.*" The Danubian Principalities, which since the war have been formed into an independent State, offer an example of the first; the German and Italian unities portray the latter.

A great stimulus has been given to freedom of thought, to a spirit of independence, and to a desire for liberty. During the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, both the Russian officers and men imbibed the Liberal ideas and feelings which animate the populations of those Principalities, and contrasted them with the servitude under which they lived in Russia; and on their return to their homes it is natural to suppose that these Liberal ideas found vent, and were widely circulated. Their effect among their countrymen must have been to produce discontent, and among the more enlightened to encourage the principles which have produced "Nihilism." Even in Turkey the Russian soldiers discovered that the much-despised Turk was better fed,

better lodged, and in better circumstances than their own class in Russia.

These ideas will gradually spread and penetrate among the masses, and must inevitably, sooner or later, by violence or not, lead to a change in the system of government.

Another result of this war, it may be hoped, will be to induce Russia to abstain from future aggressive action against Turkey. She has had a severe lesson and suffered severe losses, and she has discovered that Europe will never permit her to be possessed of Constantinople. She may be assured that that inheritance will not fall to her.

As regards the results of the war to the victorious allies, beyond the accomplishment of the object for which the war was undertaken—namely, the withdrawal of the Russian occupation of the Principalities, and the renunciation by Russia of the protectorate of the Christian subjects of the Porte—and the glory of victory, they are *nil*. The Western Powers demanded no indemnity for the war expenses, which, I think, was a mistake, although offering a noble proof of their disinterestedness.

In the later wars in Europe M. de Bismarck gave them the character of a commercial transaction, and imposed on France an indemnity of 250 millions sterling; and when Jules Favre expressed to Count Bismarck at Versailles his utter astonishment at this announcement, observing that there had not been as many minutes since the birth of our Saviour, Count

Bismarck cynically replied, *J'ai bien pourvu pour cela ; je vous amène quelqu'un qui date de la création*" (a Jew).

Finally, I may observe that the Crimean War and the subsequent wars in 1866 and in 1870 have entirely transformed the European alliances, or what was formerly termed the "balance of power in Europe." Italy—once termed by Prince Metternich "*une expression géographique*"—has become a great Power; United Germany now represents a Power of over forty millions of subjects; and Austria-Hungary of, I believe, over thirty millions. These three Powers have joined in a convention for the preservation of peace. This formidable league is solely for defensive purposes, and offers no threatening attitude to any but a wilful disturber of the European peace.

England, under the able administration of foreign affairs by Lord Salisbury, may be satisfied that her interests, her honour, and her dignity will be thoroughly safeguarded in his hands.

I am strongly of opinion that the moment is propitious for England to place herself on a thoroughly good footing with Russia. We are, as Lord Beaconsfield once said, the two Asiatic Powers. We ought, therefore, to have common interests in the promotion of civilisation and in the development of industry and commerce in our extended spheres, without jealousy and without seeking aggrandisement. There has been too much distrust on either part, and I cannot but think that by a frank and unreserved understanding we could work

harmoniously together, and thereby eradicate all past feelings of enmity and distrust.

The constitutional form of government in England precludes her from entering into alliances with foreign Powers, unless for a special object defined at the time by the circumstances which have originated it. The policy pursued by England is to be free from all binding engagements, and to treat questions of foreign policy, as they arise, according to their merits, in conformity with the principles of equity and the interests of the country as evinced by public opinion. England is only bound by two guarantees—namely, the guarantee of the neutrality and independence of Switzerland and of Belgium—but both these guarantees are naturally dependent on the fulfilment by the other contracting Powers of similar engagements; for it would be a Quixotic policy for England alone to intervene if other European Powers, co-guarantors with her, refused to do so.

There is no longer any European law as laid down by the Treaties of Vienna in 1815, to which the weaker States can appeal, as formerly, against the strong. It is the law of might, and not right, which is now the deciding arbiter. The treaties of Zürich between Austria, France, and Italy, and of Frankfort between Germany and France, are separate treaties between the belligerent Powers, and have never been formally recognised by the great Powers of Europe, and cannot therefore be said to bear a European character. In fact, it was justly observed by Prince Gortschakoff on the occasion of the Schleswig-Holstein dispute, "*Qu'il n'y a plus d'Europe.*"

As regards the future external policy of England, we have the experience of the costly and sanguinary wars of Mr. Pitt against Napoleon I., which continued scarcely without interruption for above fifteen years, which crowned England with glory, but imposed on her future generations a colossal debt, for which we are now suffering (for when we did not fight, we subsidised). This policy is, I hope, happily discarded. The public opinion of England is daily becoming more averse to war, more averse to the participation of England in Continental disputes in which her interests are not directly concerned, and she can see with perfect indifference and without detriment to herself a change of frontiers among the European Powers. Although we have adopted a policy of Free Trade, which permits the free admission into England of European products with few exceptions, nearly all the Continental States have responded to our generous system by an increase of Protective duties, thus annulling the very name of Free Trade by giving it a unilateral character. I trust therefore that when the "deluge" predicted by Prince Metternich shall come—and come it will—we may be calm and patient observers of the storm, with a powerful fleet to protect our shores, our colonies, and our commerce, but without participating in a crisis which we have not created, and in which neither the honour nor the interests of our country are involved.

CHAPTER XXII.

The Neufchâtel Question ; Conversation thereon with the Prince of Prussia in 1856 at Coblentz—Mission of M. de Bismarck Schönhausen to Paris—Visit of Prince Napoleon to Berlin—Audience of His Imperial Highness—Ball at French Legation—Conversation with His Imperial Highness ; his Reception at Berlin.

IN 1857 the Neufchâtel Question came on the European *tapis*. It was one of those questions which Lord Clarendon once observed “resembled a small *allumette*, which could set fire to the house.” M. de Bismarck, the confidential adviser of Frederick William IV. and the trusted agent of the Court party, was then sent on a secret mission to Paris to confer with the Emperor Napoleon relative to the passage of Prussian troops through France should a military expedition against Switzerland be decided on.

The Principality of Neufchâtel had been a fiefdom of the Crown of Prussia since 1707, though not forming an integral portion of the dominion of Prussia, and was connected with Prussia solely by a personal union through the Sovereign. In 1848 the revolutionary party in Neufchâtel cast off their allegiance to Prussia, and introduced into the Principality the republican institutions of Switzerland, of which it was constituted a new canton. In 1855 the royalist party in the new canton, with the aged Count Pourtales at their head, endeavoured

to restore the former state of things, and to reinstate the sovereignty of the King of Prussia. They seized the town and castle, but they were overpowered by numbers from the adjoining cantons, and their attempt utterly failed, the greater part being made prisoners. The King (Frederick William IV.) determined to go to their rescue by military force, and the question in 1857 was assuming grave proportions.

In the month of December, 1856, I was sent by Her Majesty's Government to inspect and report on the state of the British Consulate at Cologne.

The Prince and Princess of Prussia were then residing at Coblenz, and, having been intimate with their Royal Highnesses for twenty years, I took the opportunity of paying my respects to them. I was graciously invited to the royal table, and requested to come before the dinner-hour, as His Royal Highness wished to speak to me on certain matters.

His Royal Highness opened on the Neufchâtel Question—a question, he said, that he had deeply at heart, and which regarded the dignity of the Crown and the honour of the country. I found His Royal Highness calm, though with a determined and exalted view of the Prussian rights and the exigencies of Prussian military honour. He went through the question, laying stress always on the incontestable rights of the Prussian Sovereign, the legality of the royalist insurrection, the illegality of the existing government of the canton, and deducing therefrom the necessity for Switzerland to acknowledge her wrong towards Prussia by a release of the royalist prisoners, which would amount to a recognition by the Swiss Government of the Sovereign rights of the King. His Royal Highness set forth prominently the great moderation of the King, saying that he would never have

conceded as much as His Majesty was disposed to do. His Royal Highness observed that the question had been continually argued on a false basis, "*Qu'elle ne sortait pas d'un cercle vicieux.*" He said he took his stand on the Protocol of 1852, which Protocol had lately been again accepted and recognised by all Germany and Europe; that all the Powers had thereby acknowledged the just and incontestable rights of Prussia, and, having done so, could not justly oppose her in asserting her rights—at the point of the sword if other conciliatory means failed. "But," said His Royal Highness, "if you (England), in consequence of coercive measures, threaten to blockade our ports, and if France were to place an army of observation on the Rhine, we could not, of course, expect to carry out our measures of coercion." His Royal Highness also dwelt largely on the increased opposition of Switzerland in consequence of the difference of views entertained by England and France. "So it was," said His Royal Highness, "at the commencement of the late war. If, on the first violation of the Turkish territory by Russia, all Europe, with Germany, had held a decided and united language, Russia must have given way. It was the want of unity and energetic language that brought on that war, and the same may occur in Switzerland." He repeated that the King of Prussia had given verbal assurances both to the English and French Governments that he would renounce his rights, but it was evident that nothing would satisfy Switzerland but a humiliation of Prussia.

I replied to His Royal Highness that it appeared to me that much misconception and many illusions existed at Berlin as to the part which England and France had taken in this question. England, I said, had acted as the true friend of Prussia by attempting to effect what was possible. France, wishing to appear as the dominant actor on the European stage, had, without even consulting England, taken a line of her own, which was certainly the most flattering to the King of Prussia, but was useless, and had since proved to be wholly without result. Then, again, the information received at Berlin and that received in London wholly differed as to the assent or willingness of the Emperor Napoleon

to assent to Prussian coercion. For my part—whatever personal concessions the Emperor Napoleon might be disposed to make to the King of Prussia—I did not think that public opinion in France would be favourable to an invasion of Swiss territory by Prussia, and I referred to the guarantee of Swiss neutrality by the European Powers in the Treaty of Vienna.

I observed that the German States were lukewarm on the subject, and for a natural reason—namely, from an indisposition to arouse the democratic feeling in Germany, which would inevitably occur in favour of the Liberal and Republican cause of Switzerland.

I referred to the anomalous position of Neuchâtel. It might happen, by the old constitution which was recognised by Prussia, that if Switzerland were engaged in war with Prussia, the Neuchâtel contingent of the Swiss army, subjects of the King of Prussia, might be called upon to take up arms against their legitimate Sovereign; and this had once actually occurred, for the Neuchâtelois had taken part against Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War. Was, therefore, a Principality of this nature worth the loss of a single human life?

The Prince with warmth referred to the shameful manner in which the King had been robbed of Neuchâtel, and said that in his opinion a corps of 15,000 men should have been sent at the time to occupy a portion of Swiss territory as a *gage matériel*. He said that this had been proposed at a council, but the King had determined not to act without previous concert with the Powers who had signed the Protocol.

My object was to urge a conciliatory and peaceful settlement of this question in the interest of Prussia and of Europe, for it was a spark which might have produced a revolutionary flame if military coercion had been resorted to by Prussia. On my return to Berlin I addressed an official report of my conversation with the

Prince of Prussia to my chief, Lord Bloomfield, which he forwarded to the Secretary of State.

Early in 1857 Herr von Bismarck Schönhausen was sent to Paris on a secret mission to confer with the Emperor Napoleon, and to ascertain how far it would be possible to obtain the sanction of the Emperor to the passage of Prussian troops through France to Switzerland. It is more than probable, from revelations which have since come to light, that M. de Bismarck did not go on this occasion empty-handed, and that he profited on his own responsibility of the opportunity *pour tâter le terrain*, and to discover how far the views of the Emperor in regard to the European position could be utilised or brought into harmony with his ambitious designs.

It was once said—it may have been on this occasion—that M. de Bismarck, on being asked the object of his visit to the Emperor Napoleon at Paris, replied, “*Il est trop honnête ; j’y vais pour le corrompre.*” Whether true or not, it is doubtful whether the pupil had much to learn from the preceptor.

The Emperor was friendly, but could not assent to the passage of a Prussian army through Alsace, as it would have caused too much excitement in France. The reason for thus applying to the Emperor was that Austria had raised difficulties as to the right of Prussia to take military measures of this character without the assent of the Germanic Diet. Consequently Austria had instigated the South German States to refuse the passage of a Prussian army through their territory.

These negotiations were, however, happily solved by the King of Prussia having come to an arrangement with Austria and Switzerland. A Conference of the Powers which had signed the Protocol of 1852 was held at Paris, and a treaty was drawn up and submitted for the acceptance of the King of Prussia. In the meantime the royalist prisoners had been released.

On the 2nd of May, 1857, I wrote to Lord Clarendon as follows :—

[*Extract.*]

In reply to my inquiry of Baron Manteuffel in regard to the Neufchâtel Question, he said that the King had determined to abandon altogether the indemnity of one million of francs from Switzerland, and was contented to waive the question of the title of Prince of Neufchâtel, provided that concessions were made in regard to the Church property and the elective franchise. In regard to the Church property, the King felt that it had been alienated from that Establishment by an act which he considered to be illegal, and that he felt himself in conscience bound to provide for the restitution of that property to its legal possessors and administrators.

During the progress of these negotiations, Prince Napoleon arrived at Berlin charged with a letter from the Emperor Napoleon to the King of Prussia. The ostensible object of his visit to the Prussian Court was to present the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour to the Prince of Prussia. The real motive was to induce the King to accept the treaty drawn up by the Conference at Paris, which had been submitted to him for the settlement of the Neufchâtel Question, as also to sound M. de Bismarck as to the “compensation”

scheme of the Emperor Napoleon for France in the event of the Prussian territory being enlarged.

Prince Napoleon was received at Berlin with great cordiality and distinction by the King and Royal Family, with much curiosity and respect by the people. The King ordered the same apartments to be prepared for him in the "Alte Schloss," which had been occupied by Napoleon I. in 1806. His Imperial Highness received the diplomatic corps, who were presented by the French Minister, the Marquis de Moustier. When I was talking in the embrasure of a window on this occasion with the aged Baron Alexander von Humboldt, he observed to me that he had stood on that very spot fifty years before at the Court held by the Emperor Napoleon I. in 1806, and that I could well understand his reflections on the present occasion.

After the general presentation the Prince signified to the Marquis de Moustier his wish to receive Baron Brünnow and myself in a private audience. We were the only members of the diplomatic corps to whom the Prince paid this compliment. The following is the report of my audience to Lord Clarendon :—

[*Extract.*]

Berlin, May 12th, 1857.

On the termination of Baron Brünnow's audience, which lasted three-quarters of an hour, His Highness received me alone, in the most friendly and cordial manner referring to the happy alliance which existed between our two nations, and which had been productive of such beneficial results. The Prince at once opened on the Neuchâtel Question. He said that he had

brought a letter from the Emperor to the King in which, in the most amiable terms, the Emperor expressed his great desire for a settlement of that question by the acceptance by His Majesty of the treaty which had been submitted to him by the Conference of Paris. The Prince stated that he had already had a conversation with the King on the subject, in which he had represented to His Majesty that no change could be made in the treaty, and that Switzerland by her prompt adherence to it had placed herself in an advantageous position as regarded the Conference. His Highness said that "he had found the King well disposed to bring the question to an end, and that on leaving His Majesty he had said to him, '*Quant à l'affaire de Neuchâtel elle est donc arrêtée ; je vous enverrai demain Mantouffel.*'"

On closing his conversation on the Neuchâtel Question, His Highness reverted to his visit to the Prussian Court, stating that it had no other object but as an act of courtesy to their Prussian Majesties. He said that he had taken occasion to assure them (here, I presume, His Highness referred to the King and his Government) that the alliance between England and France was on the firmest and most cordial footing; that it was the anxious desire of the Emperor to maintain the alliance, for that it was of mutual value to the interests of both countries, and was likewise the best guarantee for the peace of Europe. He said that the Emperor was also desirous of maintaining the most friendly relations with Prussia, but he added that he had clearly given them here to understand that it could only be in community with their alliance with England, and not apart from it ("*et pas en dehors de cette alliance,*" were His Highness's exact words); and he had stated that he felt that this would be received with the greater pleasure inasmuch as the relations of Prussia with England were shortly to be consolidated by a personal union between the two families.

I expressed the gratification it afforded me to hear these sentiments from His Imperial Highness, and declared that I should have the greatest satisfaction in reporting them to Her Majesty's Government. I said that it was the more gratifying to me to

receive these assurances from his own lips, as I knew that attempts had been made—and, indeed, were still being continued—in a certain quarter to loosen, if not to sever, the intimate alliance between England and France, but that I felt convinced that it rested on too firm a basis to be removed or endangered by trivial circumstances, and that the two nations, having fought and bled together in one cause for the liberty of Europe, would be as cordially united in peace for the safety and repose of Europe and for the benefit of their common interests.

Prince Napoleon observed that it was true that such illusory hopes had been entertained, but he said that no direct proposal of such a nature had been made—referring, I presume, to the frequent reports which had been spread of an alliance between France and Russia.

Prince Napoleon said that in his opinion England and France should always act in concert on all European questions, remarking that they had common interests. He especially referred to Italy and America, stating that when differences of opinion arose, they should be settled by friendly and mutual concessions. I cordially concurred in His Highness's opinion, observing that to maintain complete harmony neither should advance on any political question without previous concert with the other.

His Highness then referred to the visit to Paris of the Grand Duke Constantine, saying that he had been received with the courtesy and distinction due to an Imperial Prince, who not long since had been their enemy; but that the Emperor Napoleon was most careful on this—as he was on all occasions—to prove his regard for Her Majesty by immediately, on learning the death of the Duchess of Gloucester, putting off the fêtes which were to have taken place in his honour.

His Highness then touched on the question of the Danubian Principalities. I observed to His Highness that here was a question where the principles he had laid down were essentially applicable, for England and France could only have one common object in view—namely, that of establishing the governments of those provinces on such a footing as would best secure their happiness and prosperity.

His Highness replied that the question of the union of Wallachia and Moldavia had been first broached and partially agreed to at the Congress of Paris; that in his opinion the first object was to prevent their falling under the influence of Russia; that for this reason he personally was in favour of the union, but solely on one condition—namely, that these provinces should be formed into an independent State, with a foreign prince at their head, who should be selected by common agreement between England and France with hereditary succession.

I replied to His Highness that I was not informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government on this question, as they had implicitly reserved their opinions, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, until the reports of the Commissioners had been received.

His Imperial Highness, in again referring to the necessity of a strict alliance between England and France, made use of a very remarkable phrase. He said frankly to me that France did not wish to see an intimate alliance between England and Austria: "*Laissez tomber cela, et nous laisserons tomber la Russie: mettons les dehors, et entendons nous.*" *

To this observation I made no reply. After a conversation of a full hour's duration my audience terminated, the Prince observing that he was no diplomatist, and that his observations were solely to be regarded as the expression of his own personal opinions.

Three days after this interview I had another interesting conversation with Prince Napoleon at a ball given in his honour by the Marquis de Moustier, at which their Majesties and all the Court were present. The Prince on this occasion wore for the first time the order of the Black Eagle, which he had just received from the King.

* From this observation it is evident that His Highness was cognisant of the Emperor Napoleon's designs for the liberation of Italy, and of the plans then brewing in the Emperor's mind against Austria; and no doubt he found in M. de Bismarck an able and willing listener.

On the 15th of May I reported as follows to Lord Clarendon :—

In the course of conversation His Imperial Highness referred to the question of Denmark and the Duchies. He stated his opinion that the only possible solution of the differences which had arisen between Denmark and the Duchies on the one hand, and with Germany on the other, would be the entire separation of the Duchies from Denmark. He remarked that in such an event Denmark proper should be added to Sweden, to form with Norway one great Scandinavian State, of which Gothenburg would be the central capital.

His Imperial Highness added that it was for our interest, as well as for the interest of France, that there should be a Northern State capable of resisting the encroachments of Russia. "There are," said His Imperial Highness, "three points to be guarded against as regards Russia—namely, (1) the Black Sea and Turkey; (2) Warsaw, where she pushes into Germany; and (3) the Baltic. We have checked her in the East, and provided against her aggrandisement in that quarter. By creating a powerful Scandinavian State in the Baltic, which would necessarily lean for support on the Western Powers, we should establish a firm bulwark against her in the North."

I replied to His Imperial Highness that it appeared to me that such a plan for controlling Russia was illusory and impracticable. For its realisation the present Danish dynasty must become extinct; and even in such event, to whom were the Duchies to fall? for I believed that they were far less disposed towards Prussia than towards Denmark. I addressed these observations to His Highness with a view to learn rather his views than to express my own opinions. His Highness said, with some animation, that there could be no question of their reverting to Prussia. He said they might be given to Prince Christian, who has been named as the eventual heir to the throne of Denmark.

His Highness terminated the conversation with remarking that it was his conviction that this question would be some day solved in the way he had mentioned, but that it was apparently

neither a question for Germany nor Sweden, but solely for Denmark to decide.

I was not edified by His Highness's speculative and imaginative ideas, and I replied to His Imperial Highness by quoting the French maxim, "*L'homme propose, Dieu dispose.*"

Before his departure Prince Napoleon honoured me by his presence at dinner, to which the Marquis de Moustier, the French Ambassador, Count Bismarek, and other distinguished personages of the Court and society, were invited.

In the year 1857 the King of Prussia was suddenly taken ill at Pillnitz on his return journey from Vienna. His Majesty had been for some time in failing health, and was said to be suffering from a commencement of a softening of the brain. Being unable to carry on the affairs of State, and his medical advisers having recommended the strictest repose and abstinence from mental occupation, His Majesty committed the transaction of all business of State to the Prince of Prussia as his representative and as acting in his name. These powers were only conferred for three months, and were repeatedly renewed till 1858, when the King, finding himself unable to resume the reins of Government, definitively committed them to the Prince of Prussia with the title of Regent.

Since the signature of the Convention with Austria at Olmütz, by which Prussia, to preserve peace, had ingloriously yielded to all the demands of Prince Schwarzenburg, and which was considered by the Prince of Prussia as humiliating to Prussia, the relations

between the Prince and his brother the King had become very strained. The opinions His Royal Highness had expressed during the Crimean War, unfavourable to Russia and the policy pursued by Prussia, had produced a schism, which gradually alienated him from the Court and from the intimacy of the King. There had been likewise formed a small party of politicians, members of the Prussian Legislature, in opposition to the Government, who clustered around the Prince, and were regarded as his counsellors and advisers, and who were designated as the "Prince's Party." It was composed of Herr von Usedom, Count Albert Pourtales, Count Robert Goltz, Herr von Bethman Hollweg, Herr von Auerswald, Baron Schleinitz, Herr von Bunsen, and others. They were opposed to the policy of Baron Manteuffel and to the reactionary doctrines of General von Gerlach and others who formed the (Russian) Court party.

The position of the Prince of Prussia was therefore one of difficulty and delicacy, but the principles of honour and fidelity to the King which so distinguished His Royal Highness would never allow him to permit any intrigues, or to take any action in opposition to his Sovereign. He therefore retired to Coblenz, and was appointed by the King Governor-in-Chief of the Rhenish Province.

During his provisional administration of the affairs of State from 1857 to the 7th of October, 1858, he governed in the King's name, continuing Baron Manteuffel in power, and refraining from any changes in the administration of affairs.

On the 26th of October, 1858, His Royal Highness was solemnly installed as Regent in the White Hall of the palace, and in the presence of both Houses of the Landtag, before whom he took the prescribed oath to observe the constitution of the monarchy.

On the 5th of November following, he dismissed the whole Manteuffel Ministry, and appointed the Prince of Hohenzollern Sigmaringen President of the Council, and Baron Schleinitz Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The members of the new Ministry included Herrn von Auerswald, Flotwell, General von Bonin, Patow, Pückler, Bethman Hollweg—all of Liberal principles, many of whom I have already referred to as enjoying the confidence of the Regent.

This change of administration was received with great satisfaction by the country. It was termed the "New Era." It was generally hoped that after the nerveless, colourless, weak, and vacillating policy, both internal and external, of the previous Administration, a vigorous and patriotic policy would succeed in giving life to Prussia, and through her to Germany. Herr von Bismarek, the Prussian Minister at Frankfort, was immediately recalled and appointed Minister at St. Petersburg.

The Prince Regent was now enabled to give his attention to the reorganisation of the Prussian army, to which his mind had for some time been devoted. At the last mobilisation of the army during the Hessian difficulty, it had exhibited the serious defects of the system then existing. The Regent introduced an

entirely new organisation, which not only tended to increase the efficiency of the army, but greatly to increase its strength, and by his perseverance—regardless of all obstacles and opposition of the Second Chamber—raised the army to that strength and efficiency which enabled it to achieve the triumph of victory in the wars of 1866 and 1870.

The change of Ministry in Prussia was viewed in England with great satisfaction, and the government of the Prince Regent was looked to with hopeful expectation. The dismissal of the Manteuffel Ministry and the introduction of the “New Era” were, however, differently viewed by the other European Governments. At Paris it made an unfavourable impression on the Emperor Napoleon, who was then much engrossed with the thought of a Russian alliance, and who hoped through that alliance to counteract the currents which predominated at Berlin in opposition to his policy. It was known that the new Ministry was composed of men who had been strongly opposed to Russia and to the policy of the Court party, and were supporters of the Liberal and National policy of the Prince Regent. The Emperor Napoleon—who even at this period had decided on war with Austria, and regarded that war as a prelude to a campaign on the Rhine—felt that this change of Ministry in Prussia completely crippled his ambitious schemes and hopes, attributing it to the influence of the Prince Consort, and as indicating the formation of a German *ligue* against France. Full light has never fallen on the secret political machinations which were

discussed between the Emperor and Count Bismarck at Biarritz and elsewhere in 1856 and later years; but some clue has been given to them by the revelations which have since been published in regard to confidential communications that passed between Count Bismarck and Monsieur Benedetti, the French Ambassador, previous to the war with Austria on the question of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, to which I shall later refer more fully. The fact is that Count Bismarck, with the change of Ministry, had ceased to be the ruling adviser on foreign affairs, as he had been under Frederick William IV., or the confidant of Persigny, as he had been as early as 1851, when the latter offered to Prussia Holstein, Hanover, and Electoral Hesse for her support in the Italian War. This offer was renewed in February, 1859, but the Prince Regent rejected the proposal, without even giving it a moment's consideration. This occurred at the very time when Lord Cowley arrived at Vienna, bearer of the pacific intentions of the Emperor Napoleon.*

Nor was the change of Ministry in Prussia less distasteful to Count Cavour, and he expressed, in writing to Count Barral, the Sardinian Minister at Frankfort, his fears that it might have serious consequences in regard to his policy. He accordingly sent the Marquis de Pepoli to Düsseldorf to see his relative, the Prince of Hohenzollern, to endeavour to gain the support of Prussia in the future war between Sardinia and Austria, or her neutrality. The Marquis de Pepoli

* Bismarck's "*Denkwürdigkeiten*."

visited Paris on his route to Düsseldorf, to acquaint the Emperor Napoleon with the nature of his mission. The Prince of Hohenzollern received his relative with much cordiality, but declined to take any binding engagement.

Count Cavour, on receiving Pepoli's verbal report, said: "What may not be signed to-day, will be signed in the future. Prussia will inevitably be later drawn into the circle of the 'nationality ideas.' The alliance of Prussia with an extended Piedmont is inscribed in the book of the future."

Subsequently, in July, 1858, after his interview with the Emperor Napoleon at Plombières, at which were arranged the secret plans for the war against Austria, Count Cavour visited Baden-Baden, where the Prince of Prussia was then residing. In writing from Bâle on the 25th of July to General La Marmora on the subject of his conversation with the Prince, he said:—

I am very pleased with the Prince of Prussia and his diplomatists. It is generally felt that Prussia will seek to revenge the moral defeat she suffered in 1850, by which she lost nearly all her influence in Germany. Austria counts with certainty on the assistance of the Minor German States, especially on Bavaria and Saxony. Many are of opinion that even these States, should affairs become serious, would not take up arms against France, contrary to the wish of Prussia.

To Villa Marina he likewise wrote as follows:—

The sympathetic communications of the Prussians have agreeably surprised me. Thank God that Austria, by her falseness, has turned the whole Continent against her!

After the war neither the King nor the new Ministry showed much favourable disposition to the Italian struggle for "unity," and they did not recognise the new kingdom of Italy for some years. In 1860 General La Marmora was sent on a confidential mission to Berlin to effect this recognition, but failed, much to the surprise and disgust of the Turin Cabinet.

In Austria the new Ministry was hailed with satisfaction, and hopes were entertained that the relations between the two German Powers would be placed on a more satisfactory footing. The Russian Government viewed the fall of Manteuffel as a misfortune and as a defeat. The Prince Regent had been opposed to Russia during the Crimean War, and his sympathies were supposed to lean towards England, and his first Ministry was known to be Liberal and anti-Russian.

Russia, however, received some compensation by the appointment of Count Bismarck as Prussian representative, who was doubly welcome at St. Petersburg as having been an admirer of the late Emperor Nicholas, and for his known aversion to Austria.

On his leaving St. Petersburg the rare distinction, for a foreigner, of the Grand Cross of St. Vladimir was conferred on Count Bismarck. At a Court reception King William expressed his surprise at his having received this high distinction, when, it is said, Count Bismarck replied that "it was only the fulfilment of the saying—a prophet is not without honour save in his own country."

CHAPTER XXIII.

Conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the Union of the Danubian Principalities; Difference of Opinion thereon between England and France satisfactorily arranged by a Visit of the Emperor Napoleon to Osborne—My Reports to Lord Clarendon of the Visit of the Emperor Alexander to Berlin—Intended Meeting of the Emperor of Russia and Napoleon—Russian Aims for a French Alliance—The Origin and Character of the Schleswig-Holstein Question—The Danish War and its Results—Marriage of the Princess Royal; State Entry into Berlin—The Queen's Visit to Babelsberg—Baron Stockmar—Bismarck's Opinion of England.

SINCE the conclusion of the war Russia had been unremitting in her endeavours to gain the goodwill and friendship of France, and to break up the Anglo-French alliance. There were many minor questions, of which the general principles and outline had been laid down by the Treaty of Paris, but which had to be completed by Commissioners appointed by the respective Governments. The principal question was that relating to the future organisation of the Danubian Principalities. A difference of opinion arose between the English and French Governments on the question whether Wallachia and Moldavia should be united into one, or should form two separate States. England, Austria, and Turkey were opposed to the union; Russia, France, and Sardinia were in favour of it. Prussia, though undecided, apparently supported Russia and France. The King of Prussia wished that his Government should take no

decision till the Commissioners had reported to the Conference, and instructions were also sent to the Prussian Commissioner in this sense. The questions for decision were—(1) Whether they should be joined in one State; (2) if so, whether under a foreign prince or a local magnate; and (3) whether for a term of years, or for life, or hereditarily.

In conversation with Baron Manteuffel on this subject I observed "that this was a question of principle. It may not signify to Prussia whether there are two Hospodars or one, or whether for a term of years, or for life, or hereditarily; but if you once sever the link between the Principalities and the Porte, you undermine the whole fabric of the Ottoman Empire. Then, again, behind this question is that of the nationalities. You will raise an agitation among the neighbouring States, including even Poland. You cannot give independence to the Wallachians and Moldavians under a foreign prince without giving a stimulus to the other Slavonic races to attain the same independence; and with the hatred existing between the Germans and the Slavs you will be provoking, sooner or later, a fearful collision. Be careful, therefore, to maintain the principles of the Treaty of Paris; it is the anchor to which we must cling."

These arguments appeared to have some weight with Baron Manteuffel, but I learnt soon after (and subsequent to the visit of the Emperor Alexander to Berlin) that the French Minister, the Marquis de Moustier, had been instructed to convey to Baron Manteuffel the thanks of

his Government for the support given by the Prussian Commissioner at Bucharest to the French views.

A similar friction took place in regard to the questions of the rectification of the Bessarabian frontier, the Danube navigation, the position of Bolgrad, when the correspondence of Lord Palmerston with the French Government assumed a very acrimonious tone, and was gradually tending to an open rupture. It was at this conjuncture that the Emperor Napoleon expressed the wish to have a personal interview with the Queen, and to endeavour to settle these differences in a conciliatory sense, in order to prevent any rupture of the alliance between the two States which had hitherto so happily subsisted, to their mutual benefit. The result of the visit was satisfactory. A compromise of conflicting opinions was successfully agreed to, and the relations between the two Governments resumed their former status.

It is very evident that at this time, while the attention of Lord Palmerston was mainly directed to questions of Eastern policy and to counteracting the designs of Russia, the Emperor Napoleon's thoughts were wholly occupied with the future of Italy and with his plans for the aggrandisement of France. The neutrality of Russia, should war break out between France and Austria, was of the greatest importance to the Emperor Napoleon. It was, on the part of the Emperor Napoleon, the cause of his friendly approaches to Russia, and his chief object in seeking the alliance of Russia. Having obtained that assurance, the future policy of France was riveted with that of Russia, and hence

arose the discordance of views between England and France.

At this time the Empress (mother) of Russia arrived at Berlin, being on her return to Russia *viâ* Stettin. The Emperor Alexander likewise arrived at Berlin, attended by Prince Gortschakoff.

In reporting their Imperial Majesties' arrival here to Lord Clarendon I wrote as follows :—

There have been sundry conferences between the Emperor of Russia and Baron Manteuffel, and between the latter and Prince Gortschakoff, at Potsdam, the result of which it is of course impossible to ascertain. I am, however, privately informed that there has been really nothing of importance done—nothing signed nor sealed; that the *entente cordiale* between Russia and Prussia was the continual string on which Prince Gortschakoff harped; that no engagements have been entered into further than those already existing; and that the result of the visit has been only to refresh and renew the intimate relations between the two States.

There is one point deserving your lordship's notice—namely, that great endeavours have been made to alienate Prussia from Austria, and the Russian aim is clearly to unite Russia, Prussia, and France.

The ill-will of Russia towards Austria has not, I am told, abated in the least, and my informant says it was strongly apparent at Potsdam. Attempts have been made, and are making, to utilise Prussia as a bridge between Russia and France. As evidence of this, attempts have been made to bring about a meeting between the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor Napoleon—if not at Berlin, elsewhere in Germany. This has been hitherto staved off here, but not without difficulty, but I cannot say what will be the effect of the late Russian influence at Potsdam.

I believe also that the question of democracy in Europe, and

the measures for suppressing it, were also discussed at Potsdam, but with no practical result.

The visit of the Emperor of Russia to Germany has been evidently to soothe and gain the goodwill of the German people. It has been very generally remarked how strong the contrast is between the amiable and seductive deportment of the present Russian Court and followers and the haughty and imperious tone of the Russians under the Emperor Nicholas. The object and policy of Russia is to regain her popularity and influence, which have been greatly on the wane in Germany. Russia under the Emperor Nicholas was feared, but not loved; as the influence of fear has vanished, she is now trying to re-establish her influence by an appeal to other sympathetic feelings.

I wrote to Lord Clarendon on August 28th, 1857, as follows:—

The intended meeting of the two Emperors, which is now definitely settled, is causing here great fears and doubts. The Russians are using every influence to induce the King of Prussia to make up the trio, and Bismarck Schönhausen is, I hear, supporting it. Your lordship will recollect that I have previously mentioned that his political dream was an alliance between Russia, Prussia, and France. The King is undecided. His personal feelings towards Russia would lead him to say Yes; but his fears of displeasing Austria and England, and of compromising his position, lead him to waver. The King finally decided not to join the meeting.

I wrote to Lord Clarendon in May, 1857, as follows:—

I had a long visit lately from General Gerlach, the leader of the Court party and one of the confidential advisers of the King (Frederick William IV.). I congratulated him on the official announcement of Prince Frederick William's marriage to the Princess Royal (an event which is the bitterest gall to the Russian party), saying that I trusted it would be the means

of strengthening the relations between the two great Protestant Powers of Europe. He replied that he was really glad at the marriage, as he considered England to be the natural ally of Prussia. He then remarked that he felt this alliance was the more necessary as he foresaw European complications and dangers likely to arise from a Russo-French alliance. I replied that it was possible for States to live in harmony with each other without an actual alliance; that I did not partake of his fears, as I knew how solid was our alliance with France, and the great importance which the Emperor Napoleon attached to it. My answer rather disconcerted General Gerlach.

On another occasion—to one of the same party who made the same observation—I replied: “You do not—you cannot—really entertain any such fears; but should you do so, pray relate them to your friends the Russians, and not to me, who do not partake of them.” He laughed, and confessed that he really did not consider the danger as serious.

In reporting these conversations to Lord Clarendon I remarked as follows:—

The object of both my interlocutors, knowing that I should officially report their observations to your lordship, appears to have been to create a distrust of France with a view to weaken the Anglo-French alliance. The fear of a Russo-French alliance is the language current here of the *Kreuz Zeitung* and its partisans, but it in no way harmonises with the Russian propensities of this journal, nor with the policy of Monsieur de Bismarck Schönhausen, its principal inspirer.

The question of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, which had been slumbering for some months, again commenced to occupy the attention of Germany. In

1848, on the death of Christian VIII., serious differences arose between Germany and Denmark, and war ensued.

At that eventful period the Prussian Government were not sorry to direct the popular mind from the sad events of the revolution at Berlin, and to concentrate it on a question which deeply engaged the sympathies and public opinion of Germany.

The Danes were beaten, and negotiations were commenced for a settlement of the differences. In 1852 the question of the succession to the Danish monarchy occupied the attention of the European Powers, and a treaty was signed in London by which the possession of the Duchies was guaranteed to the next king (Frederick VII.), and at his death, in default of male heirs, they were to fall to Prince Christian of Augustenburg. But neither the Germanic Diet nor the Duchies recognised this treaty.

Frederick VII. on his accession, in order to bind the Duchy of Schleswig to the monarchy, and in violation of the treaty, unadvisedly, and under the influence of a Radical Ministry, determined to incorporate it with the monarchy, and shortly before his death the Danish Parliament declared Schleswig incorporated with Denmark. He was succeeded by Christian IX., the present Sovereign, who, yielding to the demands of the Copenhagen populace, ratified that Act. Prince Frederick of Augustenburg, not having recognised the Treaty of London, immediately claimed the Duchies.

This question was very complicated and unfathomable, and was rendered more so by the endless disserta-

tions of German professors and lawyers in their attempts to elucidate it. Lord Palmerston said that there had been only one man—a German professor—who had mastered and unravelled this entangled web, and he had died mad in consequence.

It is not my intention to bore my readers by entering into its winding and wearisome details. I will, therefore, only give a very cursory outline of it.

The Duchy of Holstein was German territory, and the King of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein, was a member of the Germanic Confederation. The Duchies comprised Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg. In Holstein the population was wholly German, but the population in Schleswig was mixed. The Danish population in Schleswig was so intermixed with the German that neither was confined to any particular portion of the Duchy, and it was considered mainly German. By an enactment of some years' standing the union of the two Duchies had been declared indissoluble; and when the male line to the Danish monarchy expired, the Duchies were to fall to Germany.

After several years of protracted negotiations, during which Austria and Prussia competed for popularity with the German nation, a "Federal execution" was determined on. Bismarck cleverly managed to engage Austria to join Prussia in acting in their capacity as great Powers, and irrespectively of the Germanic Confederation. This was not well viewed by the South German States, who were in favour of the rights of the Prince of Augusten-

burg, and who further distrusted Prussia as secretly aiming at the acquisition of the Duchies for herself. I was Minister at Munich in 1862-3, and at that time so strong were the popular feelings in favour of the rights of the Prince of Augustenburg that an attempt was made to induce Maximilian, the King of Bavaria, to place himself at the head of a Federal army of 50,000 men, composed of the troops of the Southern States, to march to the Duchies in support of the rightful heir. But the attempt failed by the King of Bavaria declining the proposal. He foresaw that it would lead to civil war, and that it would be a suicidal step to take. Meanwhie, Austria and Prussia having agreed to act together, hostilities commenced, and the former with 20,000, and the latter with 25,000 men, crossed the Eider. I wrote at that time from Munich a despatch to Lord Russell, in which I stated that "if in 1853 the four Powers had declared to the Emperor Nicholas that the passage of the Pruth by his armies would be regarded by them as a *casus belli*, it is probable that no passage of the Pruth would have taken place, and that if England, France, and Russia were now to declare to the German Powers that the passage of the Eider would be regarded by them as a *casus belli*, no German army would probably cross the Eider." But windy despatches foreshadowing the "most serious consequences," which never followed, and vague speeches that "Denmark would not be alone," thus raising illusory hopes that were never realised, produced no effect on Bismarek's iron will. He counted successfully on the weakness

and vacillating policy of Europe, and pursued his course undismayed.

The Danes, who fought most bravely, were unable to withstand the united forces of Austria and Prussia; an armistice was brought about, and a Conference of the European Powers assembled in London in 1864, at which the Germanic Confederation was represented for the first and last time, and it was represented by Count Beust.

Previous to the meeting of the Conference in London, attempts were made to bring about an understanding with France for common action with England, but they were not cordially responded to. The Emperor Napoleon at that time was not disposed to join England in the Danish cause, as he was desirous of securing the neutrality of Prussia and Germany in his then premeditated war against Austria, and was therefore disinclined to arouse German susceptibilities. Another incident likewise occurred at the time which tended to prevent the Emperor from acting in common with England. He had lately addressed a proposal to the English Government suggesting the convocation of a European Congress to arrange all pending and international questions, which in reality foreboded the reconstruction of Europe and the abrogation of the treaties of 1815 by peaceful arrangement in lieu of by war. The idea, however commendable in theory, would have proved wholly impracticable with the ambitious views which the Emperor was known to entertain; on the contrary, it was certain to provoke the war which it was

his assumed object to avoid. Lord Russell replied in his usual dry, tart, and caustic style, declining the proposal, when a negative answer in courteous terms would have equally accomplished his object. The Emperor was much hurt by the tone of Lord Russell's answer, and when applied to declined any joint action with England on the Danish Question. Lord Clarendon subsequently went to Paris, and by his diplomatic skill and his genial and conciliatory manner smoothed the ruffled feathers of the Emperor.

The hopes entertained that the labours of the Conference would result in peace unfortunately failed. They were frustrated by the unyielding spirit of Germany and the obduracy of Denmark. The war was renewed, and it was not till the capture of the island of Alsen that Denmark yielded to the irresistible forces brought against her. A treaty of peace was signed by the belligerents at Vienna on October 30th, 1864, by which the King of Denmark surrendered the Duchies to Austria and Prussia.

No sooner was the war concluded than, as might have been foreseen, fresh contentions arose between Austria and Prussia in regard to the division of the spoil. These differences were, however, momentarily settled by a Convention between Austria and Prussia, signed at Gastein in 1865, by which Holstein was to be administered by Austria and Schleswig by Prussia, while the Duchy of Lauenburg was made over to the King of Prussia for a pecuniary indemnity.

The question of the inheritance had still to be

decided, and this was the point on which Bismarck counted for the realisation of his ambitious schemes. Austria was in favour of the rights of the Prince of Augustenburg to the two Duchies. Prussia withheld her consent until the claim had been subjected to legal examination and proof, which simply meant that Bismarck fully intended to annex them to Prussia.

The dual administration of the Duchies led to continual friction between Austria and Prussia; and when the pear was ripe, Bismarck determined to gather and appropriate it.

Prussia had long cast a covetous eye on the possession of Kiel—the finest harbour of the Baltic—of the greatest value to Prussia in the anticipation of a canal to connect the Baltic with the North Sea, which would give to Prussia an exit during all seasons for her fleet.

In the disputed question of the inheritance to the Duchies Bismarck also foresaw the means of engaging a conflict with Austria for supremacy in Germany, for which he had been long preparing.

He had secretly made all his plans for this inevitable struggle. He had secured the neutrality of France in the coming war with Austria during his repeated interviews with the Emperor Napoleon at Biarritz and elsewhere, by specious hopes and allurements which were not destined to be fulfilled. Italy, in the expectation of gaining Venetia, thus fulfilling the original compact of the Emperor Napoleon of a “free Italy from the Alps to the sea,” gladly responded to the offer of an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia. The

entire reorganisation of the Prussian army, under the able and persevering efforts of the King, had been completed, and it had been only lately armed with a new rifle, called the "needle gun," of great power and efficiency. Never was an army in a more complete state of organisation and discipline. All these considerations proved to Bismarck that the moment was come to contest with Austria the leadership and supremacy of Germany. His chief difficulty was to overcome the scruples of the King, but in this respect he confidently and successfully counted on the march of events and the effect of time.

I have been led beyond my intention of giving a cursory narrative of the origin and character of the Schleswig-Holstein Question into the wider field of relating the results of the Danish War—results fraught with such grave importance to the interests of Europe—into which I will enter more fully at a later period. I will now resume my narrative of the events of 1857.

In 1857 the Prince of Prussia celebrated the Jubilee of his fifty years' military service. On this occasion the Queen conferred on His Royal Highness the Grand Cross of the military Order of the Bath. General Sir Colin Campbell (afterwards Lord Clyde), accompanied by Colonel Stirling and other officers, was selected by Her Majesty to deliver the insignia of the Order to the Prince at Berlin.

Not long after the conclusion of the war symptoms were apparent of a movement in Europe of the democratic and republican party, and constant rumours were

spread about of conspiracies against the life of the Emperor Napoleon. The Italian patriots were burning with impatience for the freedom of Italy, and ardently counted on the aid of the Emperor Napoleon, who had been, in his early youth, a member of a secret society termed the "Carbonari."

The Italian Question had been brought before the Congress of Paris by Count Cavour, and had been partially discussed ; but the representatives at that Congress, after the conclusion of a sanguinary and costly war, were little disposed to incur further responsibilities which might endanger the general peace, and plunge Europe into a war the grave consequences of which were incalculable. The Italian emigrants, under Mazzini, were actively engaged in revolutionary conspiracies, with a view to the liberation of Italy, and indulged in the wildest threats against the Emperor Napoleon.

In July, 1857, I wrote to Lord Clarendon as follows :—

There is beginning to sound again in the foreign Press a crusade against the residence of political refugees in England. I venture to remark to your lordship (and in doing so trust you will excuse my freedom) that it would be advisable to forestall this thorny question—which may lead to serious complications in our foreign relations—by England taking the initiative herself. *If it can be proved* that Mazzini and his associates have been the promoters of the late insurrectionary attempts in Italy, and that he and they are planning revolution in France and elsewhere and that their late plot was organised and matured in England, it appears to me that those proceedings on their part afford

sufficient grounds to enable the Government to take the initiative in this matter, and that they might in all justice and reason refuse to them permission of residence in the United Kingdom. Such a measure would go far to remove that distrust and suspicion of England which unfortunately exists. It would also be an act of good-faith to our ally the Emperor Napoleon, and to the French nation so lately fighting with us for the liberty of Europe, and it would save us much future embarrassment. I am well aware how sensitive public opinion in England is—and justly so—on this question, and that we can never refuse the right of asylum to political refugees; but I also know that the English nation judges truthfully and impartially, and that they have, further, the utmost confidence in your lordship and Lord Palmerston; and I feel confident that measures which might fail in other hands would meet with the approval of the country if proposed by the present Cabinet, and if the initiative were taken by England without any action on the part of foreign Governments.

Again, on July 24th, 1857, I wrote further to Lord Clarendon as follows:—

I am secretly informed that a stir is making here and elsewhere on the subject of the refugees in England—or, I should rather say, in regard to Mazzini and his associates—of the exact nature of which I am not told, but with the intent of bringing about a concerted action on the part of France, Austria, and Prussia, to demand their expulsion from England. I know that the King of Prussia proposed to Baron Manteuffel to appeal to the English Government in this sense, and to suggest to France and Austria a joint action with Prussia. Baron Manteuffel discouraged any action of the kind, urging that it would place them in a bad light with England, and breed ill-will. He urged that it would be far better that the initiative should be taken by the English Government, and that any apparent pressure from foreign Governments would only impede, and not further, the object in view.

Thus the matter now stands, and for the moment nothing will be done, in the hope that some action will be taken by England. But I am given to understand that if no notice is taken in England of the late machinations of Mazzini and Co., some steps will be taken and efforts made to induce France and Austria to join in addressing representations to Her Majesty's Government on this subject.

I believe that if there could be any means of an official notification, either by the Press or in Parliament, that "Her Majesty's Government will never allow foreign subjects enjoying the hospitality of England to concert plans of revolutions and assassinations against foreign Sovereigns, and that, *if proofs can be given* of parties so offending, they shall no longer be permitted to reside in Great Britain," such a declaration, acting as a warning, would be considered satisfactory and sufficient.

I take the liberty of making this suggestion to your lordship, as I should not be deserving of your confidence or fulfilling my duty were I not frankly to state that we endanger our relations abroad, and create towards ourselves ill-will and distrust on the part of all foreign Governments, by giving shelter to those political refugees who abuse our hospitality by plotting assassinations and revolutions against foreign Sovereigns and States.

I know that England glories in her freedom, and I wish most heartily that her free soil should always offer a refuge and safety to the unfortunate exile; but I make a wide distinction between those exiles who respect the laws of the country which so freely offers them an asylum, and those wretches who only make use of our free and noble institutions to plot murder and insurrection. In screening them from the deserts they merit, we are doing an injustice to those foreign exiles who respect our laws and our sanctuary, whilst we are promoting hatred and distrust to ourselves abroad. Any warning of the nature to which I have referred—in the Press or Parliament—will produce a salutary effect, and will best provide for the future without a retrospective action.

Lord Clarendon replied to me as follows :—

It is easy to say, as the *Moniteur* did, that plots are hatched in England ; but we must have some proofs of this before we can take steps even against such a conspirator as Mazzini. And when we see that at Paris Béranger's funeral brings a hundred thousand fighting workmen into the streets, and throws the Government into a panic ; when we know that all France is mined by secret societies, that Geneva is filled with arms and ammunition without any interference on the part of the authorities, and that Mazzini goes about disguised on the Continent without ever being meddled with even by the Austrian police, it is rather too much for foreign Powers to say that *we alone* are responsible for the agitation which has existed lately in Europe, and that all would be peace and brotherly love if we did not afford an asylum to some one thousand five hundred refugees, most of whom are *exported to this country* by France, and among whom there are some desperate characters.

In again reverting to this question, Lord Clarendon says :—

I fear it is impossible to send away refugees against whom no proofs of conspiracy or guilty intentions exist, and such proofs are exceedingly hard to obtain. We have good reason to believe that the recent Italian movements were all planned out of England, and we know that Mazzini quitted this country some time before they took place. There can be no doubt that we suffer from England being an asylum for some rascals who abuse the hospitality they enjoy ; but we cannot help this consequence of our free institutions, and we must take the good and the bad of them together. The smallest infraction of the law by any of these people would be instantly punished, and a sharp look-out is kept on them.

It was, perhaps, difficult for the Government to take the initiative, in a premonitory sense, on this question, and especially in view of the strong feeling of public

opinion in England on the subject of the right of asylum to political refugees. The arguments of Lord Clarendon are incontestable, and inaction may then have appeared to be the most prudent policy; but, on the other hand, I firmly believe that the suggestion I had made as a "premonitory" step, and as evidence of a friendly disposition on the part of Her Majesty's Government to frustrate, as far as lay in their power, the evil designs of foreign conspirators residing in England, which was regarded by foreign Governments as an act of international duty, would have prevented the outburst of indignation against England which was manifested at the time of the murderous attempt on the life of the Emperor Napoleon by Orsini some months later.

This tragic event, which cost several lives, occurred on the 14th of December, 1857. The Emperor and Empress happily escaped, but their escape was miraculous. Three bombshells were launched against the Emperor's carriage on arriving at the private door of the opera house in the Rue Pelletier. The second bomb exploded under the carriage, and with such violence that the servants and horses were knocked down and wounded, as were also several of the escort. A third bomb was thrown at the entrance door, and a violent explosion took place, the fragments flying in all directions.*

This attempt on the life of the Emperor caused the greatest indignation on the part of the French

* A graphic account of this tragic incident is given by the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, who was present on the occasion, and who happily escaped being a victim to this atrocious attempt.

nation against England, and, without even awaiting the results of the police investigation, the public became infuriated, and the danger of a rupture between the two countries was imminent.

Addresses from the army were presented to the Emperor demanding war against England, and were indiscreetly published in the *Moniteur*. So completely had political frenzy against England taken possession even of those in high positions that, as related by the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, "Maréchal Baraguéy d'Hilliers, who had only one arm, had exclaimed at the club that he would willingly lose the other in fighting against a country whose flag harboured such monsters."

This excitement gradually subsided when it became known that the English police had notified to the French police the departure of Orsini with sinister intentions for Paris, and that he had taken the route *viâ* Brussels in order to elude the possibility of arrest by the French police at Calais or Boulogne. It was also proved that he had been ten days at Paris previous to the attempt, when the French police might have secured him. If, therefore, any party were to blame in this tragic affair, it was the French police.

The publication of Orsini's letter to the Emperor Napoleon, urging him to favour the Italian cause, gave to him the character of a political martyr, and produced a deep impression on the mind of the Emperor, who finally determined on joining Sardinia in liberating Italy from the Austrian rule.

As the first result of this untoward event,

General Espinasse was appointed Minister of the Interior, with exceptional powers, which were confirmed by the Legislative Body and the Senate, and a *régime* of arbitrary severity marked his administration. Externally, the effect of Orsini's attempt was to impel the Emperor Napoleon more instinctively towards a Russian alliance, and to regard a warlike policy as the best expedient to satisfy the army and to draw off the public mind from dwelling on internal difficulties.

An official communication, in a rather recriminatory tone, was addressed by Count Walewski to our Foreign Office on the subject of political refugees. Lord Clarendon, with that admirable tact and spirit of conciliation which distinguished him, not wishing to increase the tension in the relations between the two Governments by replying in a tone which might give offence, did not immediately send an official answer, but replied privately in friendly and conciliatory language. In the meantime Lord Palmerston brought in a Bill to amend the existing law by making conspiracies to murder hatched in England felony instead of misdemeanour. The first reading was passed by a large majority. Previous to the second reading Count Walewski's note had got into the newspapers. Thereupon the Radicals, aided by the Conservatives, attacked the Government for thus surrendering British liberties at the dictation of a foreign Power; and on an amendment to Lord Palmerston's Bill, moved by Milner Gibson, in censure of the Government, Lord Palmerston was defeated by a majority of nineteen, and thereupon he

resigned. Thus this unfortunate and tragic attempt on the Emperor's life was the cause of the fall of the British Ministry.

As a means of allaying all irritation and of restoring the friendly relations of the two countries, the Emperor invited the Queen and Prince Albert to meet him at Cherbourg on the occasion of the *fêtes* which were to take place in honour of the inauguration of the docks. The invitation was accepted, and Her Majesty and the Prince arrived on the 5th of August. The meeting was of a courteous and friendly nature, but nothing of a political character took place, and it merely represented to the political world of Europe that the Anglo-French alliance still existed. It had one good effect—namely, in calming and soothing the French effervescence against England.

On the fall of the Palmerston Ministry Lord Derby was charged with the formation of a new Government, in which Lord Malmesbury for the second time was appointed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He had been in former years an intimate friend of the Emperor Napoleon, to whom he had rendered services.

Within a short time communications of a satisfactory nature were exchanged by Lord Malmesbury and the French Government. The Conspiracy Bill of Lord Palmerston was allowed to drop, and the relations between the two Governments resumed their former placid course.

At the conclusion of the Crimean War in 1856 I was sent by Lord Clarendon to inspect and report on

the British Consulates in the Baltic, complaints having been made that some of them had proved lax in reporting intelligence, especially in regard to the entry into Russia across the Prussian frontier of contraband of war. I visited Dantzic, Königsberg, Pillau, Memel, Stettin, and Swinemunde. In addition to a report on the Consulates, I took the opportunity of inquiring into the commercial "status" of those ports; and, in addition to the Consular report, furnished Lord Bloomfield with a detailed statistical report on the questions of their trade and finance, which he transmitted to the Foreign Office.

I was much gratified by receiving through Lord Bloomfield a despatch in recognition of my services and highly approving of my reports. This precedent was the origin of all secretaries of embassies and legations being henceforth instructed to send in an annual report on the trade, commerce, and finance of the countries where they resided.

In February, 1858, the marriage of the Princess Royal with Prince Frederick William of Prussia was solemnised with great state at Windsor Castle. The marriage was one of pure affection—the union of two hearts linked sympathetically and devoted to each other. Never was there a royal bride more highly favoured by Nature; never was a royal bridegroom more worthy of the inestimable prize he had won. They possessed every high quality which presaged a happy destiny, and every virtue which could adorn exalted rank. Never shall I forget the bright happy face, the winning smile of the Princess, when she first placed her foot on

Prussian soil at Herbesthal, where I accompanied Lord Bloomfield and the members of the Legation to greet the happy pair. There was a charm in her manner—so soft, so engaging, so natural and utterly devoid of affectation, that it won all hearts and endeared her to all classes.

The Prince's countenance beamed with delight and happiness, and he responded in gracious terms, and with that heartiness which distinguished his manly and chivalrous character, to the felicitations which were offered to him. Well indeed may he have been proud of the priceless pearl he had obtained.

Their entry into Berlin in state was a most impressive sight. Thousands were assembled along the whole line of route. Every window under the Linden was filled with joyous spectators, who evinced their enthusiasm and loyalty with rapturous applause. Never was a royal bride received with more love and devotion; never was a royal bride more deserving of it.

In the autumn of 1858 the Queen and Prince Albert visited the Prince and Princess of Prussia at the Château of Babelsberg. The Prince and Princess Frederick William were then residing at the new palace at Potsdam, in the vicinity of Babelsberg; and the Queen's Court, including Lord Malmesbury, who was in attendance on Her Majesty, were lodged in the town palace at Potsdam. The multiplicity of royal palaces and châteaux in every province of Prussia is marvellous—all kept up at the expense of the Crown, and all in readiness for immediate occupation. They are now increased in number

since the annexation of Hanover, Electoral Hesse and Nassau, and the provisional occupation by Prussia of the Duchy of Brunswick.

I was summoned with Sir Henry Elliot to Potsdam, to "kiss hands" on our respective appointments to Vienna and Copenhagen. We were graciously invited by the Prince and Princess of Prussia to dine at the royal table, and the ceremony was to take place before dinner. The Prince of Prussia was curious to witness the proceeding. I was ushered first into the presence of Her Majesty, performed my obeisance, and, kneeling, kissed Her Majesty's hand. The Queen addressed to me a few words in that gracious tone so characteristic of Her Majesty. On retiring from the Royal presence, Lord Malmesbury observed to me that I had not made my bow to the Prince. "I never saw His Royal Highness," I replied. "Ah!" said Lord Malmesbury, "thus it is; the Prince is always there, but is never seen."

During my short stay at Potsdam I had the pleasure of seeing Baron Stockmar, and had a long conversation with him on the present state of affairs in Prussia and in Germany. He then repeated what he had often said—that the regeneration of Germany, and the hopes of attaining the aspirations of the German nation for unity, lay in the hands of Prussia. He expressed his strong conviction that a moment would come when these hopes would be realised; but he lamented the apathy, vacillation, and weakness which Prussia had of late years evinced. No one knew better than he did the pulse of the German nation; and, as subsequent events proved,

no one foresaw more clearly what would be the ultimate result. His ideas were fully realised by the events of 1866 and 1870, and justified his remarkable foresight and sound judgment. I had the greatest respect and admiration for Baron Stockmar—for his simplicity of life, for his stern truthfulness and probity, for his noble disinterestedness, for his sound judgment, and for that remarkable foresight which merited the appellation of “heaven-born genius.” He was devoted to the Queen and Prince Albert and to every member of their family, and was a true and faithful friend to them.

I may here mention that in 1858 M. de Bismarck expressed his opinion of England in the following terms : *—“Since the Reform Bill, since the old hereditary wisdom is no longer able to discipline the uncurbed passions of party, it is impossible for me to place confidence in a country in which newspaper articles are of more value than principles ; in short, in a country which is ruled by the opinions of the day. Good Heavens ! if that should be the lot of the Prussian Monarchy !—if she also should have her Reform Bill !—if the power was taken from the sacred hands of the King, to fall into those of the lawyers, the professors, the babblers (*Schwätzer*) who style themselves Liberals ! ”

I contrast this with what M. de Bismarck often stated to me, viz., “That he gloried in having no principles, for he observed that when you wish to gain a certain object, your principles cross your path and defeat your aim.”

* See Bismarck's “*Denkwürdigkeiten*,” vol. i., p. 218.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Appointment to Vienna—First Interview with Count Buol—Audience of the Emperor—Dinner at the Imperial Court—Vienna Court and Aristocracy—Buol's Conversation on the Conference; only Three Questions to be Treated—Distrust of the Emperor Napoleon and his Policy in regard to Italy—Montenegro—Sanguinary Conflict with Turkey—Origin of Montenegro—Exceptional Position of Russia in regard to Montenegro—Difference with Turkey subsequently arranged by European Commission—French Fleet in the Adriatic viewed suspiciously by Austria—Offer made by Sultan Mahmoud in 1829 to give up Wallachia and Moldavia in lieu of War Indemnity; Declined by Count Orloff—Intrigues to remove Buol—Prince Alexander of Hesse fails to bring about Reconciliation between the Emperors of Austria and Russia.

On the 21st of March, 1858, I received my appointment as Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary to the Emperor of Austria. It was the first time in our diplomatic service that the appointment to a post ranking with an embassy had been conferred on a Secretary of Legation; and so unexpected was it by myself that on deciphering Lord Malmesbury's telegram, I could only ascertain that I was appointed "Her Majesty's Minister at ——" without being able to decipher the destination; but I was informed that I was to enter on my new duties on the 1st of April. The messenger had arrived the same evening from Vienna, and Lord Bloomfield had received a letter from Sir Hamilton Seymour, stating that he was to leave Vienna at that date. This served as a key to the enigma, and we subsequently discovered that

Vienna was really the word signified in the ciphered despatch.

I was subsequently told by Lord Clarendon that previous to making this appointment Lord Malmesbury had consulted him on the subject, and that he (Lord Clarendon) had said that had he remained in office it was his intention to have conferred the appointment on me. Thus I had been selected for this important post by one Secretary of State, and appointed to it by his successor.

I cannot say that I was elated by this extraordinary rise. I felt the grave responsibility of the important charge confided to me at a most critical moment, when the affairs of Europe—and more especially of Italy—were so embroiled. During my six years' service at Berlin I had been initiated in the general policy of Europe, and brought in contact with many of its leading statesmen; but I felt great diffidence in my capability of fulfilling with efficiency the duties of so important a post, and also of succeeding a diplomatist of such distinction and of such vast experience as Sir Hamilton Seymour. I was, however, flattered and encouraged by the confidence reposed in me, and by the approval and commendation of my past services by Lord Clarendon. I determined, therefore, to do my best, and by a zealous and faithful discharge of my duties to my gracious Sovereign and my country to prove myself worthy of the confidence placed in me.

I arrived at Vienna on the 8th of April, as I was anxious to confer with Sir Hamilton Seymour before his

departure, and to profit by his knowledge of the *terrain* and by his great experience. On the following day he presented me to Count Buol, the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs, who received me in the most cordial and friendly manner.

Count Buol was Austrian Minister at Turin when, on the death of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, he was called by the Emperor to fill the vacant post of President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had been for a short time employed in London, and likewise at St. Petersburg, but, from a certain stiffness of manner, had not made himself popular in either capital, although his abilities were duly recognised. His position at the moment of his assuming the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, and during the trying period of the negotiations preceding the Crimean War, was extremely difficult.

His sister, to whom he was devoted, was married to Baron Meyendorff, then Russian Minister at Vienna, and there existed among the aristocracy and the leading Austrian generals a strong feeling for Russia and for the absolutism and Conservatism which Russia then represented. He was fairly Liberal in his opinions, but was not large-minded in their application; and when his opinions were once formed, he was inflexible and tenacious in holding to them. He was very sensitive, and was easily irritated; but he had fine and noble qualities beneath the surface, which were often not sufficiently appreciated. He had a kind and noble heart, and was ever ready to do a kind act. He had the keenest sense

of honour, truth, and justice ; and in all his actions he evinced the strictest honesty of purpose and integrity. In our conversations we had many stormy discussions, in which he often indulged in the sarcasm of which he was master ; but they never disturbed our friendly relations, and I shall always retain my recollections of Count Buol as those of a true and valued friend.

The conversation, which was opened by Sir Hamilton Seymour, turned on the relations between Austria and France, and His Excellency stated with great frankness that in a late interview with Baron de Bourqueney, the French Ambassador, on the day previous to his departure for Paris, he had expressed to him that on this subject he was not without “fears” and “doubts.” He had observed to Baron de Bourqueney that since the Orsini *attentat* much had transpired to give cause for them, although he could assure him that this deplorable event had equally affected both States—or, to use his own expression, “that it had been a slate which had fallen on both their heads.”

In referring to Orsini's first letter, Count Buol observed to Baron de Bourqueney that he could not suppose that there was any intention on the part of France of identifying them (Austria) with the projects of an assassin, but that the second letter of Orsini differed very materially from the first ; it repudiated the doctrine of regicide and assassination ; it stated that he himself (Orsini) had repented of his deed, and he forcibly denounced therein to his compatriots the doctrine of assassination. It was patent, however, to all

that the language therein used was calculated to create great excitement among the Italian people, and thereby to give well-founded cause for the fears now entertained. The Austrian Government, continued Count Buol, had been necessarily obliged to take precautionary measures, and to reassure and give confidence to the Italian Governments. He then remarked to Baron de Bourqueney that what he did expect was that a few lines should be inserted in the *Moniteur* of a nature to give assurance to the Austrian Government, and to dispel any illusions under which the Italian people might labour of encouragement and support from France.

Count Buol here remarked to Sir H. Seymour and myself that whatever good intentions existed in the mind of the Emperor Napoleon as regarded Austria, they were constantly counteracted by the three persons supposed to have the greatest influence over him—namely, Count Walewski, Morny, and Persigny, all of whom were openly-avowed enemies of Austria; and His Excellency seemed to fear that their counsels might eventually drive the Emperor into war as a means of escaping from internal embarrassments.

I profited of this remark to mention a subject of great importance—namely, the relations between Austria and Prussia. I observed that in face of such an eventuality as that to which he had referred, and of the dangers which might possibly threaten the peace of Europe, it was of essential importance that the two great German Powers should be united; that, whatever their differences might be on matters of a purely German nature, they

should pursue in matters of European policy one and the same course; and that if Germany were united and strong, it would offer the best security for the peace of Europe. I referred to past history as an example and a lesson, alluding to the successful policy pursued by Napoleon I. in dividing the two German Powers, and the fatal consequences of their disunion to Germany and to Europe.

I was able to inform His Excellency of an interesting conversation I had held previous to leaving Berlin with the Prince of Prussia and Baron Manteuffel on the relations between the two great German Powers. His Royal Highness had expressed to me his anxious wish for a cordial understanding with Austria, and for a harmonious co-operation with her on matters of European and German policy; but that he had found it impossible to attain this object, in consequence of the difficulties raised at Frankfort. His Royal Highness cited as an example a proposal he had made in regard to an extension of the fortress of Mayence, which had been favourably received by His Imperial Majesty, but was subsequently opposed by the Austrian Military Commissioner at Frankfort.

Count Buol heartily recognised the importance of a cordial understanding with Prussia. He said that there had been moments when Prussia seemed to consider that Germany should exist without Austria, and that Prussia was continually endeavouring to increase her influence in Germany at the expense of Austria.

He said that Prussia had her rightful position in

Germany ; that he was in no way disposed to contest it, but rather to support it ; but Prussia must not expect Austria to make sacrifices detrimental to her own interests. I then observed that it often happened that when the two Cabinets were really intent on agreement, circumstances of a personal nature intervened at Frankfort to disturb their harmony ; and that in some cases personal considerations had arrested the unity of political action. In regard to this subject I had been charged by Baron Manteuffel on leaving Berlin to express to His Excellency his anxious desire to bring about a direct understanding between the two Cabinets on all questions of mutual interest previous to their submission to the Diet at Frankfort, in order to prevent what had so often occurred—an open divergence of opinion and unseemly disputes between the two great German Powers in the bosom of the Diet. I said that Baron Manteuffel had expressed this desire with so much earnestness that I could not doubt his sincerity.

I must do Count Buol the justice to say that he appeared deeply impressed with the importance—at the present moment especially—of a cordial understanding with Prussia, and entirely concurred in the wish of Baron Manteuffel.

Our interview then terminated, and we took leave of Count Buol (who had listened to our observations with great interest, and apparently fully concurred in them) in the hope that the two great German Powers would see the necessity of uniting in one common cause for their own security and for the welfare of Europe.

On the 11th of April I had my audience of the Emperor Francis Joseph, to deliver to His Majesty the Queen's letter accrediting me to His Majesty as Her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary. The Emperor received me most graciously alone, without any formality or parade. His Majesty was pleased to express in the warmest terms his sincere regard and esteem for the Queen, and the high value which he attached to an alliance with England. This alliance, His Majesty said, "was not of yesterday." In times past it had rendered signal service to Europe, and had been productive of mutual benefit to both countries.

His Majesty then referred to the present state of Europe, and his language seemed to imply that dangers to the peace were gathering. I took the opportunity to express the anxious desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain cordial relations with His Majesty's Government, adding that a good understanding between England and Germany, in unison with the Anglo-French alliance, offered the surest guarantee for the peace of Europe.

His Majesty then referred to the approaching meeting of the Conference at Paris, and expressed a hope that its labours would be brought to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion.

His Majesty observed that there appeared to him a desire to submit new questions for discussion, and he stated very decidedly that the Conference could not enter on any questions but those devolving from the Treaty of Paris.

His Majesty having touched on this subject, I stated that before leaving Berlin Baron Manteuffel had informed me that he had received a communication from Baron Brunnov, inviting the co-operation of Prussia in favour of the Christian population of Turkey, and that the proposal indicated a wish to bring the subject before the Conference at Paris. Baron Manteuffel had in the most decided manner declined to enter into any such co-operation, stating that Turkey was an independent country, and that no interference in questions of an internal nature could take place.

The Emperor appeared much satisfied at the reply of Baron Manteuffel, and the object I had in stating it to His Majesty—namely, of inspiring a more cordial feeling towards Prussia—was thus, I trust, partially attained.

His Majesty alluded to the question of the Danish Duchies as still occupying the attention of Europe and awaiting solution.

I ventured to express a hope that His Majesty, in concert with Prussia, would be enabled to bring this complicated question to a satisfactory issue. I stated that I believed the Danish Government were really anxious to make such concessions as would be consistent with the honour and interests of their country; but that their position was extremely difficult, and that a satisfactory arrangement could alone be brought about by all parties mutually evincing a spirit of moderation and forbearance.

His Majesty expressed himself in warm terms of

affection towards the Prince of Prussia, extolling the conduct of His Royal Highness in the difficult position in which he was placed.

My audience then terminated, and I was most agreeably impressed by His Majesty's gracious reception, and by the graceful ease and dignity of his deportment.

On the 15th I was honoured by an invitation to dine at the Imperial Court. On this occasion I was given the seat of honour on the right of the Empress, who conversed with me in English and in the most gracious and affable manner.

There is an air about the Imperial Court which represents the historical traditions of an ancient Empire, and they are still carefully observed. The same may be said of the high aristocracy of ancient birth, whose stately palaces date from the mediæval age. The Archduke Franz Karl, father of the present Emperor, retained till lately the old style of *attelage* with Spanish mules for his equipage as was used in the time of Charles V. Since his death, however, this has ceased; and since the ramparts of the old town have been removed, and the old *glacis* transformed into a Parisian city, the character of Vienna has been completely changed. The old city, with its narrow streets and majestic palaces, still remains unchanged, and forms a singular contrast with the boulevards of the modern portion of the city.

There is no country except England that possesses an hereditary aristocracy of such wealth and ancient

lineage as Austria. The society of Vienna is very exclusive, but for a foreigner, when once admitted into it, is very fascinating and agreeable. The men are affable, good-natured, and obliging, with distinguished manners and a chivalrous bearing like the knights of olden time; they are high-bred gentlemen in the full force of the term. The Austrian ladies are unsurpassed for their beauty, their elegance, and their charming manners. They have an ease of manner and a natural amiability which is very attractive; and their unaffected gaiety, free from all vulgarity and pretension, gives an indescribable charm to society, and entitles them to that admiration and homage which is accorded to them.

The two leading stars of Vienna society were Princess Schönburg and Princess Schwarzenberg. They were not only distinguished by their high birth and rank, but they were remarkable for their intellectual qualities and the charm which they imparted to society, thus rendering their *salons* the most sought after in Vienna.

We had letters to Princess Schönburg, and nothing could exceed her kindness to us during our stay at Vienna. Princess Schwarzenberg, in addition to her well-merited reputation for *esprit*, combined great beauty and elegance, and was a *grande dame* in every respect.

These, with many others of the same high birth and qualities, formed the *crème* of the Viennese society, and made it the most attractive capital of Europe. Since the period to which I refer thirty years have passed,

and the tone of society in all European capitals has much changed, but less so in Vienna than in others.

Political considerations, added to the extended wealth during the last thirty years, have produced a great change in the social relations of all the European capitals, but especially of those of London and Paris. The floodgates have been opened, and *oi polloi* have rushed in—the consequence being that society in London is now so large that it has become an unlimited crowd.

The Viennese population is also gay, light-hearted, and fond of amusement; and they have the general appearance of a lively and joyous people. They appear to form a happy combination of the various races of which the Empire is composed—the vivacious Hungarian, the impetuous Slav, the sturdy German.

Among the various political questions then occupying the attention of Europe were the Servian, the Bosnian and Herzegovinian, the Montenegrin, and that of the Danish Duchies. Although these questions were mostly of local interest and of minor importance, still any one of them might have produced discord among the leading Powers, and possibly even war. But, for the moment, the meeting of the Conference at Paris was the predominating interest.

I was instructed by Lord Malmesbury to inform Count Buol that the English and French Governments had stated to the Porte their opinion that the Conference should meet at Paris on the 10th of May, and to request that a similar communication should be made to the Porte by the Internuncio.

Count Buol inquired for what object the Conference was to meet. "If," said he, "it is in accordance with a request made by the Russian Government, and assented to some short time ago, in order to record and sanction the final fixation of the Asiatic Frontier Question, then I can say that the Austrian representative at Paris has received orders to attend; but if," continued His Excellency, "it is to enter on the discussion of other subjects—for instance, that of the Principalities—then I must reply that we must have time to peruse the report of the Commissioners, which has not yet been placed in our hands, and which, I hear, is a voluminous document of some fifty pages."

He said that he did not wish to cause unnecessary delay. On the contrary, he wished the Conference to commence and finish its labours as speedily as possible; but there were certain indications that France was desirous of submitting other questions which did not devolve from the Treaty of Paris, and to this he must give his decided opposition.

He did not object to questions of political interest being treated by the five great Powers, but he had an insuperable objection to the establishment of a permanent Conference at Paris, and to acknowledge a position to which France appeared to lay claim—of constituting herself the "arbiter or great tribunal of Europe."

Count Buol further expressed the wish that some understanding should be come to in regard to the questions to be treated of by the Conference before they were submitted for discussion, and he thought that such a

course would be attended with advantage to all parties. I replied to His Excellency that I had no further instructions than those I had communicated to him, and that I would report by telegraph His Excellency's reply.

It appeared to me that there was a disinclination on the part of the Austrian Government to find themselves, at a moment when their relations with France were on a delicate footing, face to face with a French Plenipotentiary and engaged in the discussion of questions on which there existed a wide divergence of views between the two Governments. Baron Hübner, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, had been instructed to suggest to the French Government the insertion in the *Moniteur* of a few lines to dispel the illusion which certain publications in that journal were calculated to produce on the disaffected population in Italy of receiving encouragement and support from France. Count Buol was therefore desirous of postponing the meeting of the Conference until he received Baron Hübner's reply.

On the 20th of April I was enabled to inform Lord Malmesbury that Count Buol had received from Paris very satisfactory assurances, and agreed to the meeting of the Conference at Paris on May 10th.

I subsequently informed Count Buol that Count Walewski had stated to Her Majesty's Government that only the three following subjects would be submitted to the approaching Conference:—

1. The question of the organisation of the Principalities.

2. The navigation of the Danube.

3. The result of the Asiatic Boundary Commission.

Count Buol expressed his great satisfaction at this communication, and the assent of the Austrian Government to the meeting of the Conference at the date named (May 10th) was notified to Her Majesty's Government.

At this moment there was great distrust at Vienna of the Emperor Napoleon and his policy. It was feared that the severe repressive measures introduced in the internal administration since the Orsini *attentat* might lead to internal troubles, which would re-echo in other parts of Europe; or, should this not be so, that the Emperor would be obliged to strengthen his dynasty and popularise his name by an external war, and thus divert the public mind from internal affairs.

Italy was considered the vulnerable point for Austria, and the Emperor of Austria and his Government were determined to fight to the last for every inch of ground, and not to surrender a village except at the point of the sword.

Among the disturbing elements in Europe were the relations between the Porte and Montenegro. This small Principality was almost unknown, as well as its origin and the circumstances under which it existed. At the time of the conquest by Turkey of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Christian populations of those provinces, Serbs by race and of the Greek faith, sought safety from the fanatic oppression of the Turks. A large portion crossed the Danube and took refuge on

Austrian soil; the other portion fled to Montenegro (the Black Mountain), which formed a natural fortress, inaccessible to Turkey. As time passed, they elected a Bishop (Vladica), who became the head and ruler of the small community. The Bishop—or Vladica—was subsequently transformed, under Russian auspices, into a prince in the family of the present ruler, Prince Danilo, who considered himself independent of the Porte and not under its suzerainty.

Russia, in support of the Christian population of the Greek faith, and possibly from political motives of a Slavonic character, tacitly admitted the independence of Montenegro, and always treated the Prince as an independent sovereign. A collision had lately taken place between the Turks and Montenegrins, and the war was signalised by the greatest atrocities on both sides.

Count Buol informed me that a proposal had been made for a Commission to settle the existing disputes between Turkey and Montenegro, to be nominated by England, France, and Austria. France suggested that Russia should be invited to take part in it. Count Buol observed that Russia was in a different position, not recognising that the Porte had any authority over Montenegro, and he stated that France was inclined to take the same view, but that Austria was bound by a treaty (that of Sistowa) which positively stated that Montenegro was a Province of Turkey, to which treaty Great Britain had been a party. France, he said, was apparently quite disengaged, and Count Walewski

stated that she was disposed to partake of the Russian view.

Count Buol said that Russia had some time ago declared that the spiritual chiefdom should cease, and had nominated the present Prince as Sovereign. Austria was interested in the question, as she had a large Serb population of the same origin as the Montenegrins.

I was informed that the French Consul at Cetinje was exerting himself to obtain from his Government a dotation similar to that of the Russian Government for the Prince of Montenegro. But the circumstances of the case were widely different. The annual dotation of 30,000 florins by Russia to the Vladica of Montenegro originated in a debt arising out of losses sustained by Montenegro in the combined Russian and Montenegrin operations against Napoleon I. in Dalmatia. It would therefore be somewhat singular if the French Government were now, in imitation of Russia, to grant an annual dotation to Prince Danilo.

Great depredations had been committed by the Montenegrins on Turkish territory, which were in reality acts of brigandage.

The territory of Montenegro is little more than rock, and did not offer the means of supporting its increasing population. The Montenegrins were led into these acts of brigandage—causing continual loss of life, and accompanied by the vilest atrocities—by the want of means of subsistence.

The differences between Turkey and Montenegro were assuming a menacing aspect, and the French

Government viewed with dissatisfaction the advance of the Turkish troops, after the assurances given by the Porte that Turkey would maintain the *status quo*, and would not attack Montenegro. I had an interview with Count Buol, and by Lord Malmesbury's instructions invited the Austrian Government to co-operate with the English and French Governments in urging the Porte to suspend further hostilities till the three Powers could mediate between the combatants, and to recommend to the Porte a Commission of the five Powers, to which a Turkish and Montenegrin Commissary should be added, to settle the question.

Count Buol expressed his surprise at this proposal. In regard to advising the Porte to suspend hostilities, he said that as a matter of principle he could not advise to others what, in a similar case, he could not accept himself. "Turkey," said he, "had an indisputable right to subdue her revolted subjects, and to restore order in her own State. The same case may occur to ourselves; and do you think that if a suburb of this capital was in the hands of rebellious subjects, we should listen to an appeal to suspend hostilities or to a proposal for a Commission to mediate, or that we could assent to treat with a commissary of our revolted subjects?"

"If," continued His Excellency, "it had been possible for anyone to have been insane enough to have proposed to Great Britain a similar mode of pacifying the late revolt in India, could she have listened to it?"

I replied to His Excellency that there was no

analogy between the two cases. In India a great military revolt had taken place; it had been put down by British arms; but neither the revolt, nor the suppression of it, had caused danger to European States. In Montenegro the question was wholly different. The independence of Montenegro, or the sovereignty of the Sultan in that Principality, was—rightly or wrongly—a disputed question. But there was, besides, imminent danger—and the danger is not yet allayed—that a conflict between the Turkish troops and the Montenegrins might so exasperate the two races that a rising of the whole Christian population of Northern Turkey might ensue, and that a civil as well as a religious war might be the consequence of blood now shed in Montenegro. He must not forget that a spark might quickly ignite the inflammable matter which was producing incessant irritation between the Christian and Mussulman populations of the Turkish northern provinces; and, if this were unfortunately to be the case, Europe might again be exposed to the turmoil of war. It was therefore incumbent on Europe to quench these sparks, and not allow them to be fanned into a flame.

But I further observed that His Excellency “could scarcely base his refusal to co-operate in advising a suspension of hostilities on the argument of principle, as Austria had taken a similar step in 1852, and had arrested the progress of Omar Pasha in full march on Cetinje, and that it was in consequence of Austrian intervention in favour of Prince Danilo that the *status quo* had been reciprocally agreed upon.”

Count Buol replied "that the circumstances of that day were different, and that the intention of Omar Pasha had been to march into the heart of Montenegro and to subjugate the population. In the present case," he said, "there could be no doubt that Bagnani and Grahovo were on Turkish territory, and within the *status quo* agreed to at that period. But," said Count Buol, "it is now contended that Grahovo was in the possession of the Montenegrins at the time when Ali Pasha declared to the Conference at Paris that the Porte would maintain the *status quo*;" and this appeared to be the opinion of the French Government. But His Excellency remarked that the *status quo* to which Ali Pasha referred was the one agreed to between Turkey and Austria at the time of Count Leiningen's mission. He was satisfied that Turkey would adhere to the solemn assurances she had given not to attack Montenegro, but that he (Count Buol) could only recognise the *status quo* which bore a real and not an imaginary character—viz., the one agreed to between Austria and Turkey. He considered therefore that Turkey had a perfect right to restore order within her own State and to re-occupy her own territory.

With regard to the proposal for a Commission of the five Powers, His Excellency expressed his astonishment that the idea could ever have been entertained that the Porte would consent to treat with a commissary from Montenegro.

"How can you suppose," said His Excellency, "that

Turkey would ever submit to a Commission of the five Powers to sit in judgment in a cause between her and her vassal? or that her dignity would allow her to find herself in the ante-chamber, on a level and face to face with that vassal? ”

If the Porte would assent to a Commission to be formed of the five Powers, in which Turkey should hold an equal place with them, for the arrangement of the differences with Montenegro, he (Count Buol) would not object to take part in it, but he considered that the five Powers differed so widely in their opinions on Montenegro that a Commission of this nature appeared to him impracticable.

His Excellency observed that the Turkish troops might probably be at that moment in possession of Grahovo, that they would surround the Montenegrin territory and repel any attacks, but that they would not cross the frontier of the *status quo*. If therefore a conflict was to be avoided, Prince Danilo should be advised to retire within the territory which formed the *status quo* referred to.

I had an interview with Fuad Pasha on his passage from Constantinople to attend the Conference at Paris, and I mentioned to him the proposal of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the suspension of hostilities and the appointment of a Commission by the five Powers to settle the differences with Montenegro. He stated that the Porte would strictly adhere to the engagement she had taken not to attack Montenegro, and to maintain the *status quo*; that the Porte had acted in accord-

ance with the advice of the three Powers ; that the Sultan was ready to grant to Prince Danilo all that he could wish, provided he would acknowledge the suzerainty of the Porte ; that on this condition the Sultan was ready to confer on him the rank and title of Muchir, with an allowance of 50,000 piastres per month ; and that the Sultan would grant him whatever territory might be required for the support of the population of Montenegro. If hostilities were to cease, it was in the power of Prince Danilo to effect this object at once. The Porte could not abstain—nor could she be expected to abstain—from re-occupying and reducing to submission those portions of territory which incontestably belonged to her ; but the most positive orders had been given to the Turkish commanders not to attack Montenegro or to pass the limits of the *status quo* agreed to between Austria and Turkey in 1852.

Fuad Pasha said he was surprised and pained to learn that a proposal had been made by Her Majesty's Government that a Montenegrin should be associated with a Turkish Commission to appear before a tribunal of the five Powers for the settlement of the *status quo*, observing that it would be beneath the dignity of Turkey to treat with a vassal. In his absence he could not state what reply would be made to this proposal, but he could confidently state that the Porte would always be ready to listen to the advice of the three Powers through their representatives at Constantinople.

I urged on His Excellency the desirableness of suspending hostilities at the moment when the Conference was about to meet at Paris. I said it would be impolitic to arouse the susceptibilities of the French Government on a question which had created some emotion at Paris, and that any serious conflict between the combatants in Montenegro would produce a painful impression on the mind of the Emperor Napoleon. I remarked that Turkey was strong, Montenegro weak, and that a suspension of hostilities by the former could not be misconstrued, and that it would only produce a feeling favourable to Turkey.

His Excellency dwelt on the legality of the measures taken by Turkey, the object of the expedition being to restore order and repel the incursions of the Montenegrins.

At a concert given by the Duke and Duchess of Coburg-Cobari to their Imperial Majesties and the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, the Emperor was graciously pleased to address me, alluding to the visit of Fuad Pasha and the favourable impression he had made on His Majesty. I availed myself of the opportunity to mention the wish of the English and French Governments for a suspension of hostilities between Turkey and Montenegro, in order to prevent any occurrence which could disturb the harmony so desirable during the deliberations of the Conference at Paris: His Majesty fully assented to the expediency of the object in view, but did not consider that the Porte could be held back from re-occupying her own territory, adding that there

was no doubt that Grahovo was Turkish territory. His Majesty said that the Turkish troops would not advance beyond the limits of the *status quo*, and remarked that they had conducted themselves with great order and discipline, and had committed no excesses of any sort. I stated to His Majesty that the meditated attack on Grahovo had caused some emotion at Paris, and that it was the anxious wish of Her Majesty's Government—as also of that of France—to prevent a further conflict and loss of life, in the hope that through the mediation of the five Powers the question would be satisfactorily arranged.

I could not better illustrate the little effect produced on Count Buol by the menace on the part of Russia of declaring the independence of Montenegro than by relating the following :—

When Monsieur de Knorring, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, by order of his Government, informed Count Buol that if Turkey did not assent to the demands addressed to her for the suspension of hostilities and a Commission of the five Powers for the delimitation of the Turco-Montenegrin frontier, Russia would openly declare her recognition of the independence of Montenegro, Count Buol replied, "Your communication is really a very pleasing one. I had always thought that Russia had long ago regarded Montenegro as an independent State, but I am happy to learn now that she is only disposed to do so under certain eventualities."

After much discussion the opposition of the Porte

to the proposals of the English and French Governments for the settlement of the differences between Turkey and Montenegro was removed. Hostilities were suspended, and the settlement of the frontier on the basis of the *status quo* of 1852 was confided to the representatives of the five Powers, and tranquillity was momentarily restored, although Count Buol feared that other clouds would ere long arise from the same quarter to darken the political horizon.

At the period of the Montenegrin differences with Turkey, two French ships of war visited the Adriatic. Count Buol, although somewhat surprised at their apparition, studiously avoided touching on the subject with Baron de Bourqueney.

“The subject,” said Count Buol to me, “was either one of gravity, or it was of no importance at all. If the former was the view taken, there could be but three motives which had dictated it—namely, either to serve as a menace towards Austria, or as pressure upon Turkey, or as a means of rendering open assistance to Montenegro.” For his part he accepted none of these motives, and he treated the matter as of no importance. In the first case, if a menace towards Austria had been intended, the presence of two ships was not likely to produce the desired effect; in the second case, if any act of hostility or pressure was intended against Turkey, it did not solely regard Austria, but all Europe; and in the third case, if France had meditated any overt assistance to Montenegro, it would have been an ill-judged act, and one of doubtful utility to Prince Danilo,

for an army of 20,000 Austrians would have speedily frustrated any such attempt.

His-Excellency informed me that on the arrival of the French ships before Ragusa, and after an exchange of salutes, the French admiral requested permission of entry into the harbour for the two ships. He was civilly informed that the Governor would be happy to receive one ship in port, but that the regulations prohibited the entrance of two ships of war into the harbour. The admiral expressed his wish to enter with his own vessel, and requested permission for the second ship to be allowed to do so for repairs in the machinery. The permission of the Emperor was asked for by telegraph, to which His Majesty replied in the following terms: "*Faites entrer le malade avec le bien portant.*"

The admiral had further requested to be permitted to visit Cattaro and Kleck, but was informed that no foreign ships of war were allowed to enter those harbours, as it was considered a *mare clausum*.

The admiral and French officers were very well received, and courtesies were exchanged with the official authorities of the ports visited. A banquet was given by the admiral on board his flag-ship, and nothing occurred during the stay of the French ships to disturb the friendly feeling which was demonstrated on either side. Count Buol's mind was, however, much relieved on learning their departure.

A very remarkable anecdote has been told me by the person who was the actor in the affair.

In 1829, when Count Orloff was at Constantinople,

the Porte was very pressed by Russia to pay the indemnity stipulated by the Treaty of Adrianople. Sultan Mahmoud sent for Prince C——, and said to him, “The matter of this indemnity worries me. I have an idea by which it may be arranged. You know the Danubian Provinces” (referring evidently to Wallachia and Moldavia). “They have never been of any value to me; on the contrary, a constant source of disquietude and even of danger, to my Empire. In lieu of displaying power there, I only display weakness, for I cannot send a Turkish soldier into them. Now,” said the Sultan, “I empower you to go to Orloff and offer to make over these two provinces to Russia in lieu of the war indemnity.”

Prince C—— bowed to the ground, and observed to His Majesty that he could not undertake a mission of that nature without having his instructions in writing and signed by His Majesty.

“Oh,” said the Sultan, “I see what it is—you are afraid of your head;” and His Majesty thereupon told Achmet (who was afterwards the Pasha who delivered his fleet to the Egyptians) to draw up his proposals in writing, and he signed them.

Prince C—— then obeyed the Sultan’s order, and, much to his surprise, received from Orloff for answer, “That Russia did not covet these Provinces, nor would she accept them. Neither,” said Orloff, “will I forward the proposal to St. Petersburg. All Russia requires is to exercise her influence over her co-religionists in those provinces, and that nothing shall take place there with-

out her sanction ; but we do not want to have annexed to Russia two Provinces whose Liberal and democratic tendencies will only infuse their poison into our State. No ! Go back to your master and say that I refuse his offer.”

Bourqueney showed me a letter from Benedetti and Walewski, both of which spoke in terms of great satisfaction at the opening *séance* of the Conference at Paris, and of great hopes that the various questions for discussion would be satisfactorily disposed of.

Buol observed to me with a smile, when relating the opinions given by each plenipotentiary on the question of the union, “ *Et la Prusse était obscure.*”

April, 1858.—Things look brighter than they did a week ago, but in these days we must not expect a blue sky without clouds.

In regard to the question of the navigation of the Danube, to be decided by the approaching Conference, Count Buol repeats again and again, “ *Ne perdez pas de vue le côté politique de cette question. Vous avez jeté la Russie par la fenêtre ; elle essayera d’entrer par la Porte.*” “You refused,” says he, “to let Russia have Bolgrad because it is on the Danube. Take care how you now make the Danube a continuation of the Black Sea. Russia sees, and tries to obtain, a political object in every question touching the East. She objects to the St. George’s Channel because it is the one which will render the greatest service to the navigation of the Danube, which it has always been her object to obstruct.

So, again, with the question of the *cabotage* on the Danube; if thrown open, it can only turn to her advantage and interests, which are not yours or those of Europe at large. You and France are too far removed to take part in the *cabotage*; your trade is of a different nature; but to Russia and Greece the question presents itself in another light. Russia will seek through these means to obtain a preponderating influence on the Danube, and Russia and Greece will alone be the gainers."

May, 1858.—In regard to the Servian Question, a change of rule had taken place, and Prince Karageorgevitch was replaced by Prince Milosch, who had previously governed Servia.

Some little stir was created by the Austrian Government announcing their intention to occupy Bolgrad in case of any insurrectionary movement menacing the Austrian frontier. A protest was entered by England and the other Powers, but happily there was no necessity for it, and the peace was not disturbed. But this question brought before Europe the anomaly that no Turkish troops were permitted in Servia, while the fortress of Bolgrad was still in the hands of the Turks. This was, later, satisfactorily arranged by the Porte withdrawing from Bolgrad.

At this time there was much excitement at Bolgrad, and on the 7th of June two Turkish soldiers attacked our Consul-General, Mr. de Fonblanque, and severely wounded him. It was an act of religious fanaticism.

Mr. de Fonblanque never recovered from this shock,

and shortly afterwards died. I was instructed by Lord Malmesbury to send a member of the Legation at Vienna to Bolgrad to take charge of the archives of the Consulate; and I selected Mr. Robert Lytton,* then Senior Second Secretary, for this duty, duly notifying to Sir Henry Bulwer, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, that I had done so in conformity with instructions from the Secretary of State, Servia being under the Porte and consequently in his jurisdiction.

June 2nd.—The blue sky was soon overcast. The project of Count Walewski in regard to the union of the Principalities has broken like a thunderstorm on Count Buol. I cannot describe the disturbed state of mind in which I found him. It was a mixture of agitation, exasperation, determination. Since, however, he has seen the Emperor he has become more calm. The decision being now taken, he is resigned, and determined, happen what may, to abide by it. He appeared annoyed that England, as he thinks, should have deserted him. He reproaches us with clinging to France for the maintenance of peace. He says, "You do not know your strength—your influence. Look at the question of Bolgrad. There you spoke out; you said at once you would not yield, and the consequence was that France and Russia did. The same would occur again; but you hold back, or you wish for peace' sake to conciliate France." He regards the Walewski project as more objectionable than the union under a foreign

* Afterwards Earl Lytton.

prince, and says, “ *Que la France fait les affaires de la Russie,*” and that we, having made war against the aggression and preponderance of Russia in the East, are now, out of deference to France, sacrificing the interests of the Porte and the advantage which the war had procured.

He considers Count Walewski's proposal for the organisation of the Principalities as the establishment of a Republic, which will give rise to endless anarchy, the future consequences of which to the Turkish Empire are incalculable.

There is something curious in the visit of the French admiral to Cetinje, where he was received with great *éclat* by Prince Danilo. Bourqueney assures me that there is no *arrière-pensée* connected with this visit, but I rather imagine he is not informed of all the plans formed at Paris.

There are two diplomatic currents flowing from Paris—viz., the ostensible official one from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and an undercurrent secretly carried on by the Emperor through private and secret agents.

In regard to Montenegro, I believe that Russia is desirous of obtaining a seaport in the Mediterranean for Montenegro which may serve Russian purposes, and Cattaro may be the object she has in view.

Bourqueney read me in confidence his private letter to Walewski. It was a *chef-d'œuvre* of reasoning, sense, and feeling. It contained the following remarkable passage:—

You have frequently expressed to me your suspicion that it was England that was constantly exciting the opposition of Austria towards France. I always differed with you, and now you have a signal proof that such is not the case. Do not mistake the man you have to deal with. I know Count Buol. He is firm ; he is determined ; he will not bend ; he asserts that he will respect the rights and the judgment of others ; he expects also that others will respect his.

Nothing can be more cordial, more confidential than the relations which exist between Bourqueney and myself.

July 29th.—I am told confidentially that intrigues are carrying on here under Russian auspices to get rid of Buol and Bach. It is said that the Emperor hesitates ; but my belief is, that the Emperor completely partakes of Count Buol's opinions, and that he will not sacrifice him for anyone. This attempt is not the first.

It is reported that Prince Alexander of Hesse, a general in the Austrian service and brother of the Empress of Russia, has made attempts to bring about a reconciliation between the Emperors of Austria and Russia, but without success.

On July 28, 1858, the Grand Duke and Duchess of Hesse-Darmstadt arrived at Vienna on a visit to the Imperial Court. Although the visit may be ostensibly one of courtesy, it is supposed that there are other motives of a political nature which have originated it. It is hinted to me that the Grand Duke has arranged to meet at Trieste his brother, Prince Alexander of Hesse, now quartered at Milan, and that it is the

object of the Grand Duke, through the medium of Prince Alexander (who is said to have influence with his sister, the Empress of Russia), to effect a reconciliation between the two Emperors and a renewal of the former friendly and intimate relations between the two Courts.

The meeting of the two Emperors which took place last summer at Weimar was effected through the medium of Prince Alexander. At that interview the sacrifice of Count Buol was required as the *sine quâ non* condition of a perfect reconciliation between the two Sovereigns. I am told that so anxious was Prince Gortschakoff to obtain the dismissal of the Imperial Minister who had so successfully thwarted the Russian policy in the East that the aid of France was appealed to. The French Government, however, most honourably refused to lend themselves to such a transaction, and, in lieu of complying with the request, a despatch was addressed, as I am confidentially informed, to Baron de Bourqueney instructing him to support Count Buol to his utmost against the intrigues directed against him. The Emperor of Austria was immovable, and steadfastly refused to listen to the overtures addressed to him.

The object of the meeting of the two Sovereigns was thus an utter failure, and they separated without any material improvement having been effected either in their personal or political relations.

CHAPTER XXV.

Effect of Orsini's Attempt on the Emperor Napoleon ; his Decision to join Sardinia against Austria—Secret Meeting of Napoleon and Cavour at Plombières in 1858—The Italian Question—The Mazzinists—The Moderate Party—Garibaldi—The Paris Conferences—Differences between Austria and France, menacing the Failure of the Conferences ; after many Difficulties they were happily adjusted—The Conferences closed on the 19th of August—The Hungarian Question—The Birth of the Crown Prince Rudolf.

THE Emperor Napoleon, after the Orsini attempt, was deeply impressed with the fear of assassination. He was in frequent communication with Count Cavour, who worked on his feelings by representing that his only choice was between war and revolution. He employed a secret agent to confer with the Sardinian Minister on Italian affairs, and he also sent Monsieur Benedetti, a Corsican by birth (and subsequently Ambassador at Berlin), to arrange with Count Cavour the terms for his future combined action with the King of Sardinia.

The Emperor had a secret meeting with Cavour in the autumn of 1858 at Plombières. The exact terms of the agreement then come to have never been divulged, but it is generally surmised that he then bound himself to free Lombardy from Austrian rule—the term used was “from the Alps to the Adriatic”—and to deliver it to the King of Sardinia, the Emperor receiv-

ing as compensation for this service the cession to France of Savoy and Nice. The marriage of the Prince Napoleon with the King of Sardinia's daughter was a further stipulation of the agreement, but the Emperor reserved for himself the moment for commencing the war against Austria.

The greatest secrecy was preserved in regard to this agreement, and it is doubtful even that it was made known to his Ministers. It is also said that Count Cavour craftily obtained the Emperor's signature to the agreement, to avoid all future risk of disavowal.

It is thus evident that the Emperor Napoleon had fully determined in the autumn of 1858 on war with Austria in combination with Sardinia, although there is no evidence that the Emperor's views and intentions at that period went beyond the liberation of Lombardy and Venetia from Austrian rule.

It must be admitted that the proceedings of the Emperor Napoleon—who had fully determined on war, who had engaged himself by a signed document to that effect, who had given repeated assurances of his desire for peace, and who had also charged Lord Cowley to repeat them on his confidential mission to Vienna in 1859—can only be viewed as artifices to delude Europe, to conceal his ambitious designs, and to gain time for preparing his armaments.

The Italian Question (although Prince Metternich declared “*Que l'Italie n'était qu'une expression géographique*”) signified the regeneration of Italy. The popular agitation for enfranchisement from foreign rule,

and for Liberal and free institutions, had already commenced in 1821; and although it had passed through many phases, and suffered many defeats, the hopes of the patriotic party were neither damped nor extinguished, and the slumbering embers only awaited the opportunity to be re-kindled and to burst forth again with redoubled vigour.

Secret societies had been formed for keeping alive Italian nationality, and were in action throughout Italy, notwithstanding the efforts of the various Governments to suppress them. They were like those plants which, the oftener they are cut down, spring up again regenerated and restored to fresh vigour and luxuriance.

The revolutionary year of 1848 had produced great changes in the public mind, and had stimulated the hopes of the Italian patriotic party that the dawn of the liberation of their country was approaching. The secret societies were active in distributing inflammatory papers and pamphlets of all kinds to propagate their revolutionary doctrines and to invigorate the spirit of the nation. One of these secret societies was termed "Carbonari" (the name originated from its having been formed by a body of charcoal-burners at Naples). The oath taken by them was to put to death any member who refused to carry out the orders of the society. Prince Napoleon and his brother Prince Louis Napoleon (afterwards Napoleon III.), sons of the Count de St. Leu, ex-King of Holland, and Queen Hortense, had been enlisted as members of this society, and had taken the prescribed oath. The advent of Prince Louis

Napoleon to the throne of France naturally inspired the extreme national party with fresh hopes of obtaining his assistance in the accomplishment of their designs. The attempt on the life of the Emperor Napoleon by Orsini was mysteriously connected with this society, and it was said at the time that Orsini had become a member of the society on the same day as the Emperor Napoleon.

There can be no doubt that this murderous attempt on his life produced a deep effect on the mind of the Emperor, and that he was greatly influenced by it in his Italian policy. He felt that he was bound to do something for Italy, and his thoughts were distracted by doubts and fears—doubts as regarded the interests of the Catholic Church in France, and the influence of the priesthood, whom he dared not offend; doubts in a political sense as regarded the prudence and desirableness of forming a great Power on his frontier which might hereafter become a troublesome and dangerous neighbour; and fears of a murderous attempt on his person, like that of Orsini and others, if he failed to carry out the policy of the secret society of which he had been a member. I think that these conflicting agencies which must have overshadowed his mind were sufficiently evidenced by the preliminaries he offered at Villa Franca—viz., the maintenance of the Italian Duchies, with the restoration of their Sovereigns, who were to form a confederation under the presidency of the Pope, thus abandoning the cry for the “unity” of Italy, and increasing the temporal power of the papacy in lieu of restricting it.

The proposed restoration of the Austrian Archdukes to their States was viewed with disfavour by the moderate as well as by the advanced Liberal party in Italy. It was not a wise measure, for however mild and beneficent the government of Tuscany and Modena had been, it was evident that after the occurrences which had taken place, too many of their subjects had been compromised by late events to render the restoration of the Archdukes either desirable to the Sovereigns themselves or to their subjects. Nor did it fulfil the aspirations of the Italian patriotic party, whose chief aim had been to bring about Italian unity, and to deliver Italy from all interference of Austria in Italian affairs. What confidence could be reposed, what hopes could be entertained that Sovereigns—however well-meaning—who had been brought up in the absolute school, who had been invested with absolute power, and who had been supported and protected by Austrian bayonets in its exercise, could be suddenly converted into constitutional rulers? The idea of a confederation under such circumstances implied a return to the Middle Ages, when the Italian Republics of that epoch were in a state of continual civil war with each other.

The cry of the Italian patriots was originally for "The Independence of Italy." It was subsequently transformed into that of "The Unity of Italy."

There were two parties in Italy—the moderate party for the "independence of Italy," the ultra party for the "unity of Italy." The former aimed at the grant of free institutions and the formation of Italy into a con-

federation, including the Papal States, under the presidency of the Pope, and they intended by this organisation to exclude Austria from all interference in the affairs of Italy. The changes to be effected by this party were to be peacefully carried out on the monarchical principle, in order not to alarm Europe with fears of a revolutionary and republican movement.

The “ultra party,” under the leadership of Mazzini and the inspiration of Cavour, looked to the expulsion of the Austrians, a complete sweep of the Italian Sovereigns, the suppression of the temporal power of the Pope, the construction of a “United Italy” under one head (Victor Emmanuel), with Rome as the capital and seat of Government, and with a representative Parliament.

The two programmes did not essentially differ as to the aim to be attained, but they differed widely as to the means of attaining it. The Mazzinists and ultra party were Revolutionists and Republicans; the moderate party were Constitutionalist and Monarchists; and there was a certain hesitation—not to say repugnance—on their part to unite with the Mazzinists or to place in their hands the control and direction of the movement.

The tortuous policy of the Emperor Napoleon, who felt no desire for a “United Italy,” the subtle manœuvres and intrigues of Cavour, and the apathy of Europe, all tended to invigorate and encourage the ultra party, when the appearance of Garibaldi on the scene of action completely changed the aspect of affairs.

He was a man of action. He knew what he wanted to effect, and there was no hesitation about him. He organised a band of volunteers, landed in Sicily, was received with open arms by the whole population, marched triumphantly to Naples without encountering opposition, and entered the capital in triumph. He might have exclaimed, like Cæsar, "Veni, vidi, vici!"

The Sardinian Government outwardly disavowed his proceedings, ostentatiously attempted to oppose his embarkation at Genoa, but secretly encouraged and supported him; and the King finally accepted the throne of Naples, which Garibaldi had placed at his feet.

Thus the question of "Italian unity"—with the exception of Venetia and Rome—was solved by an Italian patriot without foreign aid, fulfilling the patriotic watchword, "*Italia fara da se.*"

The secret of Garibaldi's success was in the firmness and honesty of his character, combined with an "iron will." He was regarded by the nation as a true and disinterested patriot. He possessed its entire confidence and support. At Naples the mantle of royalty was at his feet, but, unlike Massaniello, he disdained to assume it. He was welcomed by the whole population as a liberator from the thralldom which the nation had so long borne. To his credit and glory he refused all honours and remuneration. He handed over the crown to his Sovereign, the elect of the Italian people, as he had received it, and was satisfied by the patriotic feeling of having delivered his compatriots from the yoke under

which they had so long suffered, and from the painful exactions which that yoke had imposed.

In the page of Italian history no name will shine with greater lustre than that of Garibaldi. Among his great deeds none will figure more conspicuously than the spirit of humanity which ruled his actions. After the conquest of Sicily and Naples, although he was endowed with supreme power, he evinced no spirit of a revengeful nature ; he neither committed nor suffered to be committed any act of severity towards his opponents. He was as disinterested in his intervention as he was humane in his actions. His singleness of mind, his strength of character, and honesty of purpose enabled him to exercise unlimited control over his followers and the masses, who regarded him with an unexampled devotion, and obeyed his commands with boundless faith and confidence.

During the summer of 1858 the attention of the political world was chiefly engaged with the proceedings of the Conference of the European Powers summoned in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris to receive the reports of the Commissioners appointed by the several Governments, in regard to the future organisation and constitution of the Danubian principalities, the navigation of the Danube, and the delineation of the Russo-Turkish frontier in Asia.

On the project submitted by Count Walewski for the constitution of the principalities great opposition was raised by Austria, and I found Count Buol extremely agitated and depressed by the intelligence he

had received from Baron Hübner. Count Buol designated the project as "*une Union Rpublicaine.*" He said it proposed a representative assembly with a "*Comité Central,*" into whose hands was to be committed not only the legislative, but the executive power; that there was to be one army, one flag (which he presumed would be the tricolour), one Supreme Court—"in short," said His Excellency, "a complete union of the worst and most dangerous kind, for it had not even the recommendation of being a monarchical union, which, at all events, would have been the case under a foreign prince, and which would have offered better guarantees of stability and order." He considered it a complete union of the Principalities in a republican in lieu of a monarchical form, and in his opinion was wholly unacceptable.

The question assumed a serious aspect, as, if Austria held aloof, or refused to discuss even the project, the Conference would be broken up, and thus a rupture between Austria and France would become imminent.

On the 1st of June I wrote to Lord Malmesbury as follows :—

The moment is one of great anxiety. On the decision of the Austrian Cabinet will depend the successful issue or the failure of the Conference, the complete execution of the Treaty of Paris, and finally, and at no distant period, the grave and all-important question whether Europe is tranquilly and happily to repose on the engagements contracted in that treaty, or to be again involved in the calamities of war.

The Austrian Cabinet decided that if the Porte should accept the basis of the project and agree to enter

on its discussion, the Austrian Plenipotentiary would be instructed to take part in it, stating at the same time that Austria would refuse to vote for, or would record her vote against, those portions of the project which appeared to her inadmissible.

“All we ask,” said Count Buol, “is that, if our withdrawal or non-participation in the Conference may be considered a fault, it should not be taken as a crime, and that it will not interrupt our good relations with the other Powers. We do not play the part of a Don Quixote. We acknowledge that we are powerless (*notre impuissance*) to prevent the organisation if assented to by Europe. We are not going to fight against its application, or to place ourselves in open resistance to Europe, but we will preserve to ourselves a clear conscience by not affixing our signature to a project which we consider dangerous to the Principalities, dangerous to ourselves, and dangerous to Turkey.”

Count Buol expressed a hope that this course of passive abstention would not be ill-taken or ill-judged, and that it would not give rise to angry recriminations or unfounded suspicions.

From the foregoing will be seen the spirit of opposition which dictated the policy of the Austrian Cabinet, and the difficulty of overcoming that opposition. But the opposition to Count Walewski's project for the organisation of the Principalities was but the “first of the Austrian woes” which the Conference at Paris had to undergo. It would be too tedious to my readers to enter into the details of these “woes,” but they were of

a serious nature, and threatened a rupture of the Conference which would not only have prevented the execution of the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, but would have inevitably led to a rupture between Austria and France. It was, therefore, of the first importance that the Conference should bring to a successful issue the objects for which it was convened.

The other Austrian "woes" or objections referred to the titles of "Provinces Unies," "United Army," and "common flag," and these gave rise to endless discussion. The Austrian Cabinet was strongly opposed to a union of the Principalities, considering that it would be the commencement of their complete independence and severance from Turkey, which would be followed by Servia, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina.

The discussion of the "Union of the Principalities" gave rise to much wrangling in the Conference between France and Austria, and Count Buol opposed resolutely inch by inch every proposal tending towards that object.

The popular wishes of the two Principalities in favour of the "Union" were clearly expressed by both divans, and were subsequently confirmed by the election of Monsieur Couza as Caimakan for both Wallachia and Moldavia.

A compromise was, after much labour, effected by the efforts of Earl Cowley, and the project of Count Walewski's was so modified that the powers of the proposed Central Committee, to which unlimited power

had been given, were greatly modified in a conservative sense.

The question of the title "Provinces Unies" was also; by the addition of "La Valachie et la Moldavie," at the suggestion of Lord Cowley, assented to by the Conference.

The question of the common flag was the most difficult of solution, and was sternly resisted by Austria. The danger to Austria of a national flag for Wallachia arose from the circumstance that Austria had some four millions of Wallachian subjects, and it was feared that they might be induced to join a national flag, and regard it as their own.

In a conversation I had with Count Buol on these various negotiations, he said that he recognised an "identity of views between the two Cabinets, both wishing to arrive at the same ends, but by different roads. You," said His Excellency, "seek by conciliation to harmonise any divergent lines of policy with France, and to act as a sort of mediator between conflicting opinions. We, on the other hand, take our stand on the ground of principle; but," continued His Excellency, "be assured that we have no desire *de casser les vitres—de briser la Conférence ou de voir la Conférence se séparer de nous.*"

With reference to the argument I had used, "that it was not advisable to be more Turkish than the Turks," His Excellency remarked that he did not by any means wish to assume that position, but that where Austrian interests are concerned he must con-

tinue to be Austrian, even though the Turks ceased to be Turkish.

His Excellency said with some playfulness that he was well aware that Austria was always considered a stiff and obstinate opponent, continually standing on principles and resisting innovations. "Still," said His Excellency, "we are obliged to be so, and be assured that no harm arises therefrom. The part we have to play is to contest inch by inch and to yield concession for concession. *Enfin*," said His Excellency, "*il faut marchander*."

The question of a common flag for the Principalities was firmly maintained by the Emperor Napoleon, and as firmly resisted by the Emperor of Austria. Every sort of proposal was made to solve the difficulty, and a menace of breaking up the Conference was resorted to, but without result. I finally received a telegram from Earl Cowley on the 7th of July, stating that the Emperor Napoleon refused all further concessions on the subject of the flag, and that he (Lord Cowley) was at his "wits' end." He then suggested as a last effort, "When the two armies are united they shall have attached to their separate flags a pennant of one uniform colour, that colour to be blue, which now exists in each of the separate flags. He could not positively say that it would be accepted by the French Government, but he had hopes that it might be."

After a lengthened interview with Count Buol I was authorised by him to reply to Earl Cowley that if the Emperor Napoleon, in consideration of the appeals made

to him in the despatch he (Count Buol) had addressed to Baron Hübner, would abandon the proposal of a common flag, Austria would be found very *coulant* (easy to deal with).

At the desire of Earl Cowley, I also suggested to Count Buol that, in announcing to Baron Hübner and the French Ambassador the acceptance of his (Lord Cowley's) proposal, he should say that the abandonment by France of the proposal for a common flag will be personally agreeable to the Emperor of Austria.

As Count Buol was in the country, and to avoid the delay which would have been occasioned by a personal interview, I wrote the following letter to him:—

Vienna, July 8th, 1858.

MY DEAR COUNT BUOL,—Lord Cowley has requested me by telegraph to suggest from him that Your Excellency should say to Baron Hübner and Baron Bourqueney, in announcing to them that you will assent to his proposal on the question of the flag—namely, that there should be a common emblem, blue, affixed to the separate flags when the armies are united for common action—that the abandonment by France of the proposal of a common flag will be personally agreeable to the Emperor of Austria. Lord Cowley thinks that some conciliatory expression of this kind will make matters easier with the Emperor of the French.

You had already left for the country when this telegram reached me, but I lose no time in bringing this suggestion under Your Excellency's notice, and I shall be much obliged if you will kindly inform me whether Your Excellency will be enabled to give effect to it.

Believe me, &c.,

(Signed)

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

To this I received the following reply :—

MON CHER LORD AUGUSTUS,—Je vous remercie de l'empressement avec lequel vous m'avez fait parvenir le *hint* de Lord Cowley. L'avis me semble parfait, et je m'occupe en ce moment d'une dépêche qui doit faire appel aux sentimens de l'Empereur Napoléon. J'en prévienrai demain le Baron de Bourqueney.

C'est bien dans les moments critiques que l'on reconnaît ses amis, mais croyez bien aussi que j'apprécie tout le mal que vous vous donnez pour nous faire pardonner notre ténacité.

Un télégramme de Constantinople me mande que la Porte comme de raison accepterait à deux mains la combinaison unicolore de Lord Cowley.

(Signé)

BUOL.

On the 10th of July Lord Cowley telegraphed to me that the Emperor Napoleon's answer was decidedly against accepting the proposal of a common pennant when the troops were united, but that there was a chance of his accepting the permanent pennant if Austria would assent to that.

I sounded Count Buol accordingly on the proposal of the permanency of the pennant. He gave no decided answer, but authorised me to state to Lord Cowley that if France abandoned the common flag, Austria would be easy to deal with. I suggested to Lord Cowley that the Emperor Napoleon might reciprocate the step taken here, and that His Majesty should say that the acceptance of the "permanent" pennant by the Emperor of Austria would be agreeable to him.

Count Buol informed me on the 28th of July that he had received a despatch from the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, stating that the Emperor Napoleon, in pur-

suance of the wish expressed by the Emperor of Austria, and in consequence of the appeal which had been addressed to his Imperial Majesty, had consented to abandon the project of a common flag, and he trusted that the Emperor of Austria would assent to the proposal of a permanent pennant.

Count Buol stated that the Emperor his Sovereign had been extremely gratified by this despatch and the courteous terms in which the Emperor Napoleon had assented to his request, and that the Emperor had instructed him to announce by telegraph his entire concurrence with the proposal for a permanent pennant, and to convey his thanks for the Emperor Napoleon's considerate act in the most gracious terms.

Count Buol was radiant with satisfaction at the successful termination of this thorny question.

The Conference was finally closed on the 19th of August, having completed the task which had devolved on it in conformity with the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, thus fulfilling the great objects of that important treaty. It closed more auspiciously and harmoniously than it had commenced, which was greatly due to the ability and conciliatory spirit evinced by Earl Cowley.

It will be seen from the foregoing statement that in consequence of the strong divergence of opinions between Austria and France, a break up of the Conference was on several occasions threatened, which would have nullified the Treaty of Paris and rendered imminent a rupture between Austria and France. The march and progress of events often render abortive the foresight

and calculation of man, and nullify his most sagacious anticipations. Within a few years from the date of the Conference of Paris, the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were formed into the kingdom of Roumania, with complete autonomy, and their example was subsequently followed by the creation of the kingdom of Servia. Bulgaria will probably ere long follow in the same course. How futile, how impolitic, then, would have been a war undertaken by Austria to prevent the union of the Principalities !

In a similar instance of the Spanish marriages, England was on the brink of a war with France—a war in which thousands of innocent lives would have been sacrificed and millions of treasure expended. Within a few years afterwards the instigator of those marriages for interested and dynastic ends was deprived of his throne and had to seek refuge in England, and all the fears entertained in regard to the result of those marriages proved thoroughly groundless, and vanished like smoke. No stronger proof could be given of the necessity to provide against useless wars, and to institute by common assent among the Powers of the world a new system of arbitration to compose all differences and disputes between Governments and nations.

If this humane and philanthropic idea could be realised, the monstrous armies which are now ruining the nations of Europe would no longer be necessary, and it may be hoped that peace and goodwill would bind all nations in one bond of Christian friendship, and obliterate all feelings of animosity and ill-will.

I fear, however, that we are not yet arrived at that happy stage of practical concord, and that, on the contrary, the vast armaments so destructive to peace will be brought into action at no distant date. The maintenance of these costly armies is worse than a state of war, and acts most prejudicially on the development of trade and industry.

The question of a general disarmament has often been mooted, but invariably failed. I feel confident that nothing will or can be done to remedy this evil till all the Powers agree to institute for war a system of arbitration for the settlement of all international disputes.

In speaking to Count Buol on the difference with Denmark on the subject of the Duchies, I suggested that the Austrian and Prussian *Chargés d’Affaires* might adopt a more conciliatory attitude in their relations with the Danish Government, and thus encourage them to meet the just demands of Germany. He replied that he could not alter the instructions which the Austrian *Chargé d’Affaires* had received to maintain complete silence with the Danish Ministry on the question of Holstein. He observed that this question was purely a federal question, and that none of the German Powers could separately confer on it with the Danish Government, as it was solely in the hands of the Diet. “If we did,” said His Excellency, “we should be at once accused of acting a double part.” He told me that Count Bulle Brahe, the Danish Minister, had called on him lately to take leave previous to his departure for

Copenhagen for a few weeks. He had asked Count Buol, "*S'il avait quelques bons conseils à lui donner?*" to which Count Buol replied, "*Que les bons conseils étaient maintenant si rares que quand il les avait il les gardait pour lui-même.*"

On the conclusion of the Conference at Paris, Europe entered, comparatively speaking, into a state of political repose. The excitement in the northern provinces of Turkey had gradually subsided, and the labours of the Commission to fix the boundary between Turkey and Montenegro had been successfully terminated, and nothing indicated the renewal of political activity for some months. The affairs of Servia alone caused some agitation in Eastern Europe. The Prince (Alexander Karageorgevitch) had become very unpopular, and political intrigues were at work to upset him. He was finally deposed by a vote of the Senate, and a provisional Government was formed until the arrival of Prince Milosch, the former ruler, who had been elected his successor.

In May, 1858, the Archduke Albert, Governor of Hungary, paid a short visit to Vienna for the purpose of conferring with the Emperor and the Government on the present state of that country. There is no doubt that the state of Hungary caused some anxiety to the Government, although this anxiety did not appear to create alarm. The discontent was chiefly among the nobility and the higher classes, who felt deeply humiliated by the loss of their former independence and of the rights and privileges which they enjoyed under their former constitution.

One of the difficulties experienced by the Government was that of finding employés among the Hungarians, as they refused all employment under the Crown. The result was that the Government were obliged to resort either to the appointment of Germans conversant with the language, or to select persons of a secondary class. Consequently their appointments were conferred on incompetent persons, which was naturally productive of an inefficient and unpopular system of Government.

A trivial anecdote often affords the best illustration of popular feeling. During the winter of 1857 permission was asked of the Archduke Albert to allow certain public balls to take place which had been usual in former times, but of late had been discontinued. His Imperial Highness granted the permission, on condition, however, that the Hungarian flag should not be prominently displayed, and *apart* from the Austrian flag as of old, and that the latter should be placed in its stead. To this the Hungarians refused to accede, and the balls were given up. The Hungarian nobility also abstained from appearing at the Court of the Archduke Albert, and remained at their châteaux in the country without repairing to Pesth as usual.

This feeling of discontent appeared to be very much confined to the nobility; the middle and lower classes were not dissatisfied, neither were they indisposed to the Government, although they retained strong feelings of nationality.

This may be explained by the fact that whilst they

have been the gainers by the recent changes which their country has undergone, the high nobility and landed proprietors have been the losers. Hungary having lost her old constitution, and having now in reality become a mere province and dependence of the Austrian Empire, her ancient nobility have lost the proud position of independence as well as the material advantages derived from it.

A Hungarian of note lately observed to me that Hungary was then in the same position in which Bohemia was in former times after the failure of her attempts to erect herself into an independent kingdom.

At this time there were three parties in Hungary—the Government party; the constitutional party, of which Déak and Eötvôs were the leaders, who strove for the restoration of the rights and privileges enjoyed under the old constitution (which dated from about the same period as our Magna Charta); and the ultra party or separatists, who were the disciples of Kossuth.

The Hungarian Question went through many phases without a satisfactory result, which I will not weary my readers with relating. It was not until 1867 that a final arrangement was come to, and a dual Government of Austro-Hungary established, restoring to Hungary her Parliamentary rights and privileges in union with Austria. It satisfied the Hungarian nation, and has worked beneficially both for Austria and Hungary.

Both the Emperor and the Empress contributed largely to the happy solution of the differences with

Hungary when the satisfactory arrangement was made. They resided a portion of the year at Pesth, and held their court there. The Empress learnt the Hungarian language, and by her engaging and graceful manners ingratiated herself in the hearts of all Hungarians, and at the present time (1891) I believe there is no portion of the Empire more loyal or devoted to their Majesties than the Hungarian nation.

On the 21st of August, 1858, the joyful event of the birth of an heir to the Imperial throne took place, and caused great enthusiasm throughout the Austrian dominions.*

* Crown Prince Rudolf married Princess Stephanie, daughter of the King and Queen of the Belgians, by whom the Crown Prince had only one child, a daughter. His tragic death in 1889 was a severe shock to the Emperor and Empress, and a sad blow to the hopes of the nation. The heir to the Imperial Throne is now the Emperor's brother, the Archduke Charles Louis.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Peaceful Close of 1858—Effect of Words Addressed by the Emperor Napoleon to Baron Hübnér on the 1st of January, 1859; Considered to be Premonitory of War—Conversation with Count Buol on Italian Affairs—Lord Malmesbury's Despatch on the Estrangement between Austria and France; My Report of its Communication to Count Buol, and his Observations—Earl Cowley's Confidential Mission to Vienna—Lord A. Loftus's Private Letter to Count Buol.

THE old year, notwithstanding the menaces which had threatened the peace of Europe during the Paris Conferences, passed quietly away, leaving Europe in the enjoyment of apparent tranquillity and repose. But the opening of the new year was the harbinger of war. The ominous words addressed to the Austrian Ambassador by the Emperor Napoleon at the New Year's Court on the 1st of January resounded throughout Europe like an electric shock, and caused a general panic on the foreign exchanges.

The words addressed to Baron Hübnér were the following: "That although the relations between the two Empires were not such as he could desire, he begged to assure the Emperor of Austria that his personal feelings towards His Majesty remained unaltered."

I wrote to Lord Malmesbury on the 17th of January "that, as might have been expected, the above words had produced considerable sensation, but that they had

been apparently viewed at Vienna with far more calm and far less passion by the Government than by the public. Whatever effect they may have been intended to produce, they had neither produced that of fear nor of anger. Count Buol, in referring to the article of the *Moniteur*, remarked to me with some irony, "*C'est vraiment bien unique. Voilà l'Empereur Napoléon qui prononce des paroles à une occasion solennelle, voilà le journal officiel qui vient les corriger, et, plus drôle encore, voilà le public qui ne veut pas croire le journal officiel.*"

I profited of the first opportunity in conversation with Count Buol to open on the state of Italian affairs. I said that I had no wish to intrude or offer an opinion on Italian affairs, and my only motive for doing so was in the interest of Austria and in connection with the peace of Europe.

I said that Her Majesty's Government viewed with some anxiety the present state of political agitation in that peninsula, and that anxiety was increased by the absence of an understanding between Austria and France on questions which were of equal interest and gravity to both. In the present state of Italy it was impossible to foresee events, and in the obscurity which veiled the political horizon events of trifling import in themselves might produce the most serious results. I referred to the possibility—and even to the probability—of disturbances taking place in some of the minor Italian States, and to the language which Baron Hübner unreservedly held at Paris, that military assistance to them would be given by Austria should it be applied

for. This might very possibly be intended to overawe the populations and to prevent disturbances, but it was also more likely to promote them, for it would virtually place the decision of peace or war in the hands of Mazzini and Co., who were striving to produce a breach between Austria and France.

The position of Sardinia was also one which must be taken into account. She was making great sacrifices to maintain her position in Italy. Her expenditure was beyond her strength ; her army beyond her means, and to keep up this position Count Cavour was obliged to lean upon the popular sympathies of the Italian national party. It is clear, therefore, that he was abiding his opportunity, and were troubles to break out in any of the minor Italian States, and Austria to intervene, the opportunity would not be lost by Count Cavour, who would indubitably look to France for aid.

I said to Count Buol that I did not think that there existed any strong predilection on the part of the French Government towards Count Cavour, nor, if politically considered, could it be the policy of France to raise up a strong Italian kingdom at her frontier ; but what I wished to impress on him was that Austria, by prematurely declaring what her policy would be, and by the irritation which she constantly kept up with France, offered a chance of creating opportunities for Sardinian action which might not otherwise occur. I continued : " Thus will be seen what will be the fatal and inevitable results of the discordance with France and the extreme danger to the peace of Europe were Austria to march troops

into the Legations or any other independent State in Italy on whatever cause without previous agreement with France. By acting together and in concert will be the surest means of preventing disturbances. By keeping apart an additional incentive will be offered to promote them. If that agreement should exist, it is *now* that you have an opportunity which may not occur again. The Emperor Napoleon has expressed ‘his regret that the relations between the two Empires were not such as he could desire.’ Here is an occasion for you. Do not forget that some months ago the first move of a similar nature came from Paris. France proposed to you to act in concert with her to suggest reforms in the Government of the Papal States. It was not a mere form; she submitted to you a project of her views. Why should you not, therefore, reciprocate this friendly and well-intentioned act? You would be rendering an incalculable service to yourself, to Italy, and to the peaceful wishes of Europe. Even though it should fail—which is not probable—you would have the satisfaction of proving that you had omitted nothing which could promote harmony and a good understanding with France, and that, happen what might, you could conscientiously appeal to Europe in support of your cause.”

I then added that the public opinion of England and the policy of the Government, of whatever elements composed, would depend entirely on Austria being in the *right at first*, and that were she to enter other States but her own in Italy without previous concert, the voice of England would most decidedly be against her.

Count Buol received my observations in a friendly spirit, and replied to me with great frankness. He fully admitted the statement regarding Count Cavour and Sardinia. He said that a crisis in Sardinia was inevitable, and that this was producing the present agitation. Austria did not desire war, but she was prepared to accept it were it offered, and if disturbances broke out she would suppress them. With respect to intervention in other of the Italian States, Buol remarked that Austria had treaty obligations which she would fulfil, and if her aid were applied for—and only in such case—would she interfere.

“I hear,” said Count Buol, “an ‘Italian Question’ much talked of. I know of no ‘Italian Question.’ I can understand a Danish, or a Swedish, but I recognise no Italian Question.”

I replied to this remark that, whether there existed an Italian Question or not, there might arise an Italian war, and it little mattered out of what circumstances that war sprung.

“But,” asked Count Buol, “what would England do in such event? Her interests in the Mediterranean might be greatly compromised, and her position as a great naval Power would never permit her to see a Russian fleet, or a French fleet, or a Sardinian fleet united against us, assuming naval supremacy in that sea. Could she also tolerate that territorial aggrandisement should take place independently of her, and perhaps in opposition to her?”

I replied that certainly no great war had taken place

without Great Britain having been mixed up in it, but that in the eventuality to which he referred much must depend on the origin of the war, and the public opinion of England would undoubtedly be against those who may place themselves in the wrong. "Thus," I repeated, "if you should enter into States not your own without previous concert, you must not be surprised if public opinion in England considers you the aggressor."

Count Buol said that they would never do so uninvited, but that if the Duke of Modena or the Duchess Regent of Parma were to appeal for succour, it would be immediately granted.

"Well," I said, "here is the very eventuality, the very danger, to which I have alluded. Any day Mazzini and Co. may get up a riot in Parma; your aid is asked and granted. Your intervention will be resisted by Piedmont, and probably also by France; there is war. Do you think that there is any Government in England of any composition which could appeal to Parliament in your cause? Most certainly not, and you have only to read the late articles in the *Times* to assure yourself what would be the current of public opinion in such an eventuality."

Count Buol observed that England regarded Austria in two distinct categories—" *Sociale et Politique*." In the former the sympathies and national feeling of England could never be with Austria. "You have," he said, "your ideas of liberty, of constitutional government, of religion, all in opposition to ours. But in the '*catégorie politique*' you are with us. We were your

great allies against Napoleon I.; we have the same political interests; we have mutual friends and mutual enemies. On that *terrain* we meet. If," said Count Buol, "Napoleon III. was to attempt to conquer and overrun Europe as his uncle did, you would—you must—necessarily go with us, or you would descend from that great position you have always held. We have no wish to go to war with anybody; we desire peace. Do not you think," he added, "that a young chivalrous Emperor devoted to military matters, possessing a magnificent army, deserves merit for his love of peace?"

He then related to me that the Emperor, on his return in 1854 from reviewing his army of 250,000 men on the Russian frontier, had remarked, "*Que c'est dommage de ne pas en faire usage.*" But at that time, when it was a question of war with Russia, Count Buol had stated to His Majesty, "*Qu'une guerre devait être juste et politique.*" The Emperor said that it would have been *politique*, but not *juste*. Buol, however, observed that it might be termed *juste*, but it would not be *politique*.

Count Buol was very calm, evincing no fear in regard to the coming storm, nor any indecision as to how it should be met. He is convinced that a serious crisis in Piedmont is at hand, and humorously observed, "*Mais j'espère bien que l'autre ne va pas faire banqueroute également, car cela serait bien grave.*" Then, turning to me, he said, "*Ah, mon cher, la Bourse est notre meilleur allié*"—observing that Morny had won two millions by his last manipulation!

In regard to the proposal made by France for reforms in the Papal States, Count Buol stated that they had been favourably received by Austria, and so ratified at Paris, but that after the publication of Monsieur de Rayneval's despatch no further steps had been taken by France. Austria, said he, would have co-operated with France towards that aim, under the condition that no pressure should be used. But we never could agree with France on Italian affairs. In the first place, we do not recognise in her any claim to be an Italian State or rightfully entitled to be considered such. Secondly, our interests there would, in her present mood, be always antagonistic.

Count Buol, during the whole of this long interview, was most friendly both in tone and manner, and fully appreciated the motives which had dictated my observations. But I could clearly perceive that the path which the Austrian Cabinet had decided to follow in regard to Italian affairs would infallibly lead to war, and that in the present combination between France and Sardinia there was no possibility of avoiding it.

Shortly after my interview above referred to with Count Buol, I received an important despatch from Lord Malmesbury, expressed in the most forcible language, but still in the most friendly tone, urging on the Austrian Government a good understanding with France as the surest means of contributing to the welfare of Italy and of averting a war the results of which no human foresight could foresee. As this despatch gives a clear exposition of the state of affairs

in Italy, and shows the dangers to the peace of Europe arising therefrom, I think it desirable, notwithstanding its length, to reproduce it *in extenso*.

. Foreign Office, January 12th, 1859.

MY LORD,—I have to instruct your lordship to take an early opportunity of stating to Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government have witnessed with much concern the increasing estrangement between Austria and France, which has at last become so notorious as to produce a general impression that Europe is on the eve of witnessing a contest between these two States, and the battle-field selected by them will be Italy.

On two occasions—one more than a month ago—I stated to Count Apponyi, verbally, the apprehensions of Her Majesty's Government, and ventured to give him their views and opinions in the form of advice. They were analogous to those which I now submit to your lordship.

Her Majesty's Government therefore have hoped, and still continue to hope, that maturer reflection on both sides will avert a calamity the results of which no human foresight can divine; and deprecating all officious interference with Austrian affairs, your lordship can scarcely find it necessary to assure Count Buol that we are ready and anxious to exert our utmost influence to assuage animosities and explain away causes of offence, if only a disposition is shown by either party to avail itself of our good offices for that purpose.

It appears, indeed, to Her Majesty's Government that the existing ill-feeling between the two Imperial Courts has its origin not so much in any real and patent cause of disagreement as in mutual distrust of each other's views and intentions, and the consequent disposition to give an unfavourable construction to every measure to which either party have recourse.

There are no questions of territorial claim or occupation, none of commercial injury or of disregarded rights, which can be alleged on either side as justifying the coldness and reserve, not

to say suspicious irritability, which characterise their present intercourse. Yet it appears to Her Majesty's Government that neither party evinces a sincere disposition to come to a frank understanding with the other, or to make any sacrifices, however unimportant, to bring about so desirable a result.

With these impressions, it must be evident to the Austrian Government that no unseemly wish to interfere with its independent line of action induces Her Majesty's Government to tender their advice to Austria. That advice is offered from a sincere desire to see her prosper as one of the most important members of the European Family of States, and as one of Her Majesty's most ancient allies.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, desire your lordship while there is yet time to place before the Imperial Court some considerations which they hope may not be without influence at the present crisis.

It is impossible to deny that a war once begun in Italy would soon assume the character of a revolutionary contest; and no human foresight can perceive what results would remain to Europe when, after a long and desperate contest, the combatants had sunk from exhaustion into peace. Such a war, however begun at first, would soon be adopted as one of dynasties and opinions, in which exiled pretenders and every class of political theorist would see the possible realisation of their wishes.

It cannot be predicated that France would be a gainer from such a state of things. On the contrary, it is probable that she would be far from finding her account in it. But it is certain that Austria, even if she were to come out of the contest triumphant, would suffer to an irreparable extent in all her material interests.

It is with sincere pleasure that Her Majesty's Government pay a just tribute to Austria by admitting that the government of her Italian provinces has been conducted by the Archduke Viceroy with great ability, and in a spirit of conciliation and liberality which does His Imperial Highness the greatest honour. Her Majesty's Government ardently trust that in the interests

of the Italians themselves, and of the peace of Europe, the Austrian Government will continue to pursue a course which cannot fail to bring to its side the public opinion of impartial and independent States. It appears to Her Majesty's Government to be of paramount importance at this critical moment for Austria to enlist public opinion in her cause, and to take more than common care to avoid any act that could possibly be construed into a wilful offence to those States who may perhaps desire a quarrel with her. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, urge your lordship to take every opportune occasion to impress this truth on the Austrian Government.

Your lordship will frankly tell Count Buol that should such a struggle as we deprecate be the result of the present estrangement between Austria and France, England would remain a neutral spectator of the contest, and that in no case would public opinion in this country render it possible for her to assist Austria as against her own subjects if the contest assumed the aspect of a revolution of her Italian Provinces against her Government.

The public opinion of England has a natural tendency to sympathise with Italian nationalities, but Her Majesty's Government believe that those sympathies would not be aroused to any active form against Austria unless Austria put herself potently in the wrong, and either became an aggressor or gave France or Sardinia a fair excuse for beginning a war.

Her Majesty's Government do not deny that Austria has cause of uneasiness in Italy, but they maintain that it cannot be mitigated or removed by plunging into war with France or Sardinia. If Austria and France could be induced to take a just estimate not only of their own political interests but of the course which would most effectually contribute to the happiness of the Italian populations throughout the whole extent of the peninsula, Her Majesty's Government feel that the work would be already half accomplished, and the rest of Europe, instead of looking with anxiety to the future, would only have to congratulate itself on the prospect at length opening to them of Italian regeneration unstained by deeds of violence and bloodshed.

No one looking on the state of Italy can doubt that many causes of just discontent are to be found in the general administration of the country, and Her Majesty's Government, sympathising as they unquestionably do with the sufferings of the Italian population, would gladly lend their best effort to produce an amelioration in the existing state of things. But they know that such amelioration can never be effected with any certainty of permanency by war. It may produce a change of masters, but it will not confer independence; it may, perhaps, contribute to the elevation of some fortunate individuals, but it will ensure the disorganisation of the whole social system, and indefinitely retard the material improvement of the Italian population.

On the other hand, Her Majesty's Government entertain but little doubt that if Austria and France—the former an Italian, and both Roman Catholic States—laying aside mutual suspicion, were to join heartily with a view to promote, by peaceful means, the regeneration of Italy, their combined influence would speedily effect a change in the present unhappy state of affairs, and contribute to establish confidence between rulers and their subjects.

Her Majesty's Government have not failed to press upon the Government of France considerations such as these, and they have not hesitated to express their conviction that France, though she may have no material stake at issue, could have little or nothing to gain in an Italian war.

As the common friends, then, of both parties, and as sincerely desirous of the welfare of the Italian people, Her Majesty's Government entreat the two Imperial Courts to lay aside their animosities and to act in peaceful concert for that important object. Her Majesty's Government think that it would not only be becoming in Austria from her peculiar position in Italy, but also advantageous to her in the public opinion of Europe, if she were to make the first advances and propose to the French Government to join with her in considering the best means of reforming the glaring abuses in the Papal Dominions which

occupy Central Italy. Austria is an Italian State, and both Austria and France are now occupying the Papal territory with their troops. Such a position cannot be lasting, and Her Majesty's Government submit to both Austria and France that it is their public duty to terminate, if possible, a state of things which has become intolerable.

Your lordship may assure Count Buol that the earnest support of Her Majesty's Government will not be withheld at Paris from any overtures which the Cabinet of Vienna may there make for the establishment of a good understanding with France with regard to Italy, or for giving effect to her praiseworthy efforts.

Her Majesty's Government would further be prepared to contribute as much as in them lies to make any propositions emanating from such a common understanding on the part of Austria and France acceptable to the parties in Italy to whom they might be addressed.

If it should appear to Austria and France, the two great Roman Catholic Empires, after mutual counsel on the subject, that any modification of the existing territorial arrangements in Italy would be likely to contribute to the peace of the country and the good government of the people, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared, in conjunction with the other Powers by whom the present order of things was established in 1815, to give their best consideration to any measures calculated, without enfeebling the spiritual power of the Pope, to effect objects so desirable in the interests of humanity and so important as regards the general peace of Europe.

But Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that, at the outset of the endeavours which might be made by Austria and France to induce any of the sovereigns of Central Italy to agree to and carry out such reforms in the internal administration of their dominions as may be required by justice and sound policy, it would not be expedient that England should appear to take the initiative or prominent part. So much of ecclesiastical polity is involved in these questions, more especially as regards the Papal States, that the interference of a Protestant country

in the proposed reforms might be looked upon with suspicion, and rather injure than benefit the cause.

It appears, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government to be essential that Austria and France, by reason of their more direct interests in, and the means they can bring to bear on, matters at issue, should take a leading part in their adjustment, leaving it to Her Majesty's Government and to those of Prussia and Russia, equally dissenting with themselves from the Church of Rome, to support, by such means as they might deem most advisable, the efforts of the Catholic Powers to induce the Pope and other Italian sovereigns to sanction a change of system for the benefit of their respective subjects.

Your lordship will enter fully with Count Buol on this important subject, and you will earnestly press upon him the expediency of an early decision while there is yet time for an honourable and amicable understanding being effected with France. The present opportunity once lost, no other may present itself until the resources of both countries are wasted in a war undertaken by the aggressor, whoever he may be, for no national purpose, and defensible by no principles of morality.

I am, &c.,

(Signed)

MALMESBURY.

The Lord Augustus Loftus,
Vienna.

I think it desirable to give to my readers *in extenso* the despatch I addressed to Lord Malmesbury reporting my communication to Count Buol of the foregoing instruction, and the observations he made to me thereon :—

Vienna, January 20th, 1859.

MY LORD,—I have had the honour to receive your lordship's despatch of the 12th inst. relating to the serious state of affairs in Italy, and portraying the dangers which menace Europe if

that peninsula should again become the battlefield between Austria and France.

I have accordingly lost no time in bringing under the notice of Count Buol the important topics therein referred to, and I have deemed it advisable to read that despatch to Count Buol *in extenso*, in order to impress on His Excellency with greater force the wise and judicious counsels which are therein contained, and in order that the advice and the opinions of Her Majesty's Government should be placed before His Excellency in the same clear, conciliatory, and forcible language in which they are embodied in your lordship's despatch.

Before reading that despatch I stated to Count Buol, as a prelude to it, that it was the ardent desire of Her Majesty's Government to use their best endeavours to preserve to Europe the blessings of peace, and that they considered it a duty to humanity, on an occasion like the present, to tender their good offices in any way that might further this desirable end. I further added that these laudable efforts on the part of Her Majesty's Government were not solely confined to Austria, but that your lordship had in like manner most strongly urged, both at Paris and at Turin, a moderate and peaceful policy, and had most strenuously recommended those States not to forsake the path of peace and conciliation.

Count Buol listened with the deepest interest and attention to the reading of this despatch. At its termination I requested His Excellency to reflect over the very important subject to which it referred, and to reserve to another opportunity the expression of his opinion respecting it. I have now the honour to report to your lordship a *résumé* of the conversation which I had with His Excellency on reverting to this subject.

Count Buol commenced by stating that, as I had not made a formal communication to him of your lordship's despatch (for such, I stated; had not been my instruction), he should not reply to it in any formal manner, but merely consider it and refer to it in the light of remarks which I had addressed to him in the course of conversation. He expressed himself as fully sensible

of the kind and friendly motives which had moved Her Majesty's Government to offer their advice and counsel at the present critical moment, and he appreciated the cordial and sincere interest which they evinced for Austria. But he could not conceal from me his fears that the opinions set forth in your lordship's despatch might produce more harm than good if these same views and opinions had been likewise expressed at Paris and Turin. "In fact," said His Excellency, "I regret that you have read that despatch to me; I regret also that it has been written. If," continued Count Buol, "you wish to preach peace and to prevent war, address yourselves with firmness to France and Piedmont. We are not meditating war; we shall not be the aggressors. Tell the Emperor Napoleon that Great Britain will not passively look on if His Majesty should commence hostilities; say to him that should he take such a course it will be at his own risk and peril. On the other hand, warn King Victor Emanuel that England will not sanction any act of wilful aggression undertaken in full peace by Piedmont against Austria. If Great Britain is prepared to hold this language, no war will arise."

In referring to that portion of your lordship's despatch respecting any possible territorial change which might be deemed desirable by all parties in Central Italy, His Excellency stated with some emphasis that he considered this proposal as a most dangerous doctrine, and as subversive of the Treaties of 1815.

I stated to Count Buol that your lordship's intention and wish was not to inflame the Italian minds or raise hopes which could not be pacifically realised. Your lordship had given the soundest advice to the Cabinet of Turin not to commit any wilful infraction of the peace, and you had deprecated in the strongest terms any attempt to carry out the reforms required in Italy by physical force, and had advocated at Paris, as well as here, the desirableness of harmonious understanding between Austria and France on the affairs of Italy.

"There are," I observed to His Excellency, "two courses to

pursue with respect to Italy, where the present state of things is intolerable, and cannot last. The reform which must inevitably be made can be effected by peaceful negotiation, and the establishment of a complete agreement between Austria and France, with far more chance of eventual success than by the ruinous action of war. Such is the course urged on your attention and recommended by Her Majesty's Government. The other course, and only alternative, must be eventually revolution and war; and I have no doubt that Your Excellency will agree that the remedy in the latter alternative is as dangerous as the evil which it seeks to cure." I recalled to him the opinions enunciated at the Congress of Paris, when the continued occupation of the Roman States was acknowledged to be an irregular state of things which could not last, and served only to perpetuate the bad government of those States. It amounted almost to an annexation which was opposed to the spirit of the European treaties. "If, therefore," I said, "you will do nothing by peaceful means and in concert with France for the amelioration of the Italian Government, be assured that a war will be inevitable, and no human foresight can foretell to what ultimate changes it may lead. You reply, 'We shall not begin war; we do not meditate any aggression.' But let me tell you that at this moment the decision of peace or war is no longer within the power of the Government, but is transferred to Mazzini and the revolutionary party, whose aim is to bring about a war between Austria and France for the attainment of their own ends. You are therefore playing the game of the revolutionary party, and you will inevitably fall into the trap which they have laid."

"How so?" said His Excellency.

I replied, "By loudly declaring your intention of giving succour to the minor independent States of Italy, you will give a pretext for others to oppose such intervention, and you thus place it in the hands of Mazzini by getting up some disturbance in Parma or Modena to bring about that very collision with Piedmont—and probably also with France—which that party are desirous of. If Your Excellency," I continued, "gives me

the assurance that in no case will Austria move a soldier across her frontier in Italy without previous concert with France, then I shall consider that war may be averted."

"No," said Count Buol, "I cannot give you that assurance, for it would be a surrender of our sovereign power. We shall not intervene in any State unless our aid is asked for, and in that case it will be granted, and the knowledge that it will be granted is the best preservative of order. But," said His Excellency, "let me ask you what will you say to Piedmont if she were to attack us?" I said, "I could not imagine such an eventuality—it would be a mouse attacking a lion; but I should then say what I should equally say of you if you move a soldier across your frontier, that she is the aggressor."

Count Buol then said that the agitation had greatly subsided in Lombardy since the Austrian reinforcements had arrived, and he did not entertain the same fear as that with which Her Majesty's Government were impressed of a disturbance arising in Italy. The accounts from Paris were also more satisfactory; the public mind and the Press were far more calm and reassured. His Excellency added that there was really no question of difference between Austria and France except the Bolgrad affair,* which might be considered closed, and he did not partake of the alarm felt for the peace of Italy.

* The Bolgrad affair here referred to arose from the circumstance of an order having been sent to the Austrian General Coronini, commanding at Semlin, in the expectation of an attack being made on the fortress of Bolgrad by the Servians, to notify to the Turkish commandant of that fortress that in case of an attack, and should he apply for aid, he was authorised by the Emperor his Sovereign to place a brigade of Austrian troops at his disposal. This was viewed by the Powers, signatories of the Treaty of 1856, as an infraction of the twenty-ninth article of that treaty. Remonstrances were accordingly addressed to the Austrian Government, who were requested to recall the order. Count Buol excused the act by stating that the notification to the Turkish commandant was known, and its moral effect would discourage any intention on the part of the Servians to attack the fortress. At the same time the act was the one best calculated to meet the wishes of the Powers—namely, that the fortress should not fall into the hands of the insurgents, and, secondly, that Austrian troops should not enter that fortress or take any part in Servian

His Excellency expressed a fear that a political crisis was imminent in Piedmont, and he seemed to think that Count Cavour, if driven to a last extremity, might, to retain power, resort to some violent course which might produce an open collision with Austria. For this danger Austria had provided, and if anything aggressive was attempted against Austria by Piedmont they were perfectly prepared to repel it.

With respect to the proposal in your lordship's despatch that Austria and France should come to an agreement on Italian affairs, Count Buol stated that some months ago the French Government had addressed certain proposals for the reform of the Papal States; that the Austrian Government had cordially entered into those views, and had expressed their readiness to co-operate with France within a certain limit and with certain reserves to obtain their acceptance at Rome. The French Government had then promised to take the matter into further consideration, and to resume it (*d'y revenir*). Since that period, which coincided with the publication of M. de Rayneval's despatch, no further notice had been taken of the matter by the French Government, and the Austrian Government had re-

affairs. He considered the question in the light of an offer made to Turkey, and not as an order given to an Austrian general. The Porte having declined the offer, the order to the general lapsed, but he positively refused to recall it. This incident produced fresh irritation against Austria at Paris, and although it died out, it left a regrettable impression of the obduracy of the Austrian Government. A protest against the intended infraction of the Treaty of Paris was addressed by the Powers in the form of a despatch. Lord Malmesbury stated that Her Majesty's Government "would consider the employment of Austrian troops for the defence of the fortress of Bolgrad without previous agreement with the Treaty Powers as a breach of the 29th Article of the Treaty of Paris, which provides in express terms that '*Aucune intervention armée ne pourra avoir lieu en Serbie sans une entente préalable entre les Hautes Parties contractantes.*'"

Count Buol, on receiving from me a copy of this despatch, observed that the French despatch was long and bitter; that the Prussian despatch was the most amiable, for there was no mention of the word "protest"; that the English despatch had at all events the merit of being the shortest; and that the Russian communication was merely a verbal one.

ceived no reply to their last communication; therefore Austria could not now take the initiative in resuming that question. "But," said Count Buol, "I am not aware whether it be known at Paris that you have given this counsel and made the proposal to us; for if it should appear that these proposals of your Government have been rejected by us, you will be doing us a bad service with the French Government, although with the best of intentions, for we shall be viewed as more obdurate and less conciliatory than we now are; and I therefore pray you to take care how you act in this sense. But the truth is, we can never come to an understanding with France on Italian affairs, for we start from two different points. First, we do not consider France to be an Italian Power; secondly, France sympathises with and protects the cause of nationalities, whereas we support that of the sovereigns, the Governments, and '*l'ordre établi*;' therefore there can be no basis on which to found a concert or perfect co-operation. Nor is it necessary. It is a great mistake to think that Italy requires change. If Italy is left quiet, if agitation is put down, and if the hopes of certain parties who only seek their own aggrandisement are annulled, there will be no commotion, no war in Italy, and no cause for the measures which are counselled in the despatch you have read to me."

Count Buol finally said that Her Majesty's Government may be assured that the Austrian Cabinet will evince the greatest caution and prudence not to provoke hostilities in Italy, but that if other parties, intent on bringing about a war with Italy, were to do so, Austria was perfectly prepared to accept it. He trusted that Her Majesty's Government would use their powerful influence at Paris and at Turin, where the decision as to peace or war mainly rested, to urge the sacred observance of treaties and the grave responsibility which will be incurred if, through the instrumentality of France and Piedmont, the peace of Europe should be unhappily broken.

(Signed)

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

The Earl of Malmesbury, G.C.B.

On the 27th of January I wrote to Lord Malmesbury as follows, describing the menacing aspect of affairs as then existing :—

[*Extract.*]

Vienna, January 27th, 1859.

Since I had last the honour of addressing your lordship, no very material change has taken place here in regard to Italian affairs and the relations of this Government with France. The news from Italy is somewhat more satisfactory ; the agitation in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom somewhat abated, and the public mind is relieved—at least momentarily—from the fear of any immediate hostilities. From Paris, likewise, the reports, both private and official, are more encouraging. The Emperor Napoleon is reported to have returned to the pacific course from which he had apparently digressed, and greater confidence was felt as to the maintenance of peace. This satisfactory change in the political atmosphere is attributed to various causes—to the influence of Her Majesty's Government ; the manifest aversion to war, not only in France, but in Europe ; to the successful attempts in the cause of peace of those who exercise an influence over the Emperor ; to the salutary warning which the Emperor Napoleon has received by the clear manifestations of public opinion in favour of peace ; and lastly, though not perhaps in a lesser degree, to the temporary absence of Prince Napoleon from Paris. It is hoped and thought that the dark political clouds which had threatened the peace of Europe are for the moment dispersed, but confidence in the future is not restored, and the feverish state of the public mind is evinced by the fluctuating state of the exchanges, by their continued depression, and by the difficulty which they experience in regaining their buoyancy.

Nor is this want of confidence in the maintenance of peace surprising, when notable facts are of daily occurrence to produce it. Great military precautions in Lombardy have been taken

by the Austrian Government, and are of that magnitude as not to leave a doubt that they have been dictated by other causes than those of providing an ordinary and sufficient guarantee for the maintenance of order and tranquillity in the Austro-Italian States.

Then, again, Sardinia is engaged in concentrating all her disposable military forces from distant parts on the Lombard frontier, the National Guard has been called under arms, and the whole country is busily employed with military preparations; whilst in addition to this inflammable matter, the Press of Europe is daily occupied with discussing the chances of war, and in some instances with an evident desire to produce one.

Such is the position—and the alarming position of affairs in Europe. The question to be asked, then, is—First, where are the causes, and what are the elements, which are to produce this war? Secondly, can this terrible scourge be averted, and by what means?

The state of Italy is the question which is at present uppermost in men's minds, and is the one out of which war may at any moment arise. The public mind of that peninsula is extremely agitated, and this agitation is produced by several causes partly natural, partly fictitious. There is in general a great discontent on the part of the Italian people, and want of confidence in the Italian rulers—the effect of long periods of bad government and of oppression. Wrongs have been committed on the one hand, and wrongs have been long left unredressed on the other. A system of intolerance, of religious bigotry, and of persecution has imparted to the sufferers feelings of hatred, of despair, and of revenge. The result is that the whole population is unsound and undermined; and it is a well-known fact that the Sovereign Pontiff could not remain at Rome unless protected by foreign bayonets.

But the present agitation is mixed up with other causes. There is, and has been, fostered by the Mazzini party a feeling and a cry for “Nationality,” which is a common watchword,

under which garb is concealed, and with which is intimately blended, the ambition for aggrandisement and the lust for conquest on the part of some, the Republican dogmas and hopes on the part of others, and the long-cherished desire for liberty and freedom on the part of all. These separate and several elements are now conglomerating with a view to produce a general conflagration, in which each party looks to obtaining his own end. This eventuality may be near or far, but it is certain; and it therefore behoves the European Powers, in the cause of humanity, in the cause of Peace and the general security of Europe, to concert together and to devise means for the purpose of arresting so terrible a calamity as war. It may be possible to do so even at this the eleventh hour if the combined counsels of Europe can be brought into practical union, so as to force the Italian Governments and rulers to adopt those reforms in their administration which are their only means of future safety, with a view to content their populations, and to render them happy and loyal subjects.

It must be clear to every reasoning mind that there are but two means for the solution of what is generally termed the Italian Question—namely, either by a conference of the Powers of Europe for the purpose of averting war, or by revolution and war itself.

Although I much fear that the moment when the grievances of the Italian people might have been peacefully redressed has been too long delayed, and that the sword alone can cut the Gordian knot, the Governments of Europe may still have time to interpose their powerful voice, and thus stay the ruthless hand of war before it is stretched out to stain with bloodshed the fairest portion of the European Continent.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

The foregoing despatches will give the reader a clear insight into the whole Italian Question. I have added in the appendix other interesting despatches and

official documents which were laid before Parliament. From these it will be seen that the expulsion of Austria from Lombardy and Venetia was the aim of the Italian policy. Nothing less would have satisfied, nothing more was intended by, the Emperor Napoleon. The freedom of Italy from the Alps to the Adriatic was the engagement of Plombières.

It was equally manifest that there could be no question of a voluntary cession of Lombardy for other compensation. Count Buol, in reverting to the proposals made by Austria through Baron Hummerlauer to Lord Palmerston in 1849, said Austria would never consent to the cession of any of her territory, for in that case she could never hope to recover it; but if taken from her by force of arms, she might later seek to regain it. War, therefore, if the Emperor Napoleon held to his engagement with Cavour, was inevitable, and all the professions of a desire for peace on the part of the Emperor Napoleon were solely delusive, and merely intended to gain time and to force on Austria the grave responsibility of being the aggressor.

As a last and laudable effort on the part of Her Majesty's Government, it was decided to send Lord Cowley to Vienna to ascertain whether it were possible to place the relations between Austria and France on a better footing.

The mission was gratifying to the Emperor of Austria and the Austrian Cabinet, and was looked upon generally as proof of the sympathy felt for Austria, and

as giving hopeful expectation of the support of England. Count Buol, who when Austrian Minister at Stuttgart had been on intimate terms with Lord Cowley, was greatly pleased when I announced his mission to Vienna, but he added that no further concessions would be made to him in regard to the Austrian policy than had been already made and communicated to Her Majesty's Government through me.

Lord Cowley was strongly impressed with the belief that the Emperor Napoleon was sincere in the expression of his desire for peace. But it was difficult to persuade the Austrian Government of his peaceful intentions when they had positive proofs that French cannon (the newly-invented *canon rayé*) had been for some weeks in cases at Genoa, with a considerable quantity of ammunition and military stores. It was evident to Count Buol that the Emperor Napoleon was seeking to gain time to complete his armaments and to exhaust the patience of Austria in order to force her into action, and thus to cast on her the grave responsibility to Europe of being the aggressor.

On the 5th of April—a fortnight before the untoward Austrian summons addressed to Sardinia—I wrote a private letter to Count Buol in acknowledgment of one from him announcing the dissolution of Parliament in England, and expressing his hope that the meeting of the Congress would take place with the least delay, in order that a *bon fait accompli* might be presented to the new Parliament. The following is a copy of my letter :—

Vienne, le 5 Avril, 1859.

MON CHER COMTE,—Mille remerciements pour les bonnes lignes que vous avez eu la bonté de m'adresser, ce matin. Ces nouvelles sont d'un haut intérêt, et je vois avec grande satisfaction que Votre Excellence y trouve un nouveau et puissant argument pour hâter la réunion du Congrès. Je partage entièrement l'opinion énoncée par Votre Excellence, et je reçois par là une nouvelle assurance que le Cabinet Autrichien s'y prêtera de tout son possible, et sera disposé d'écarter tout obstacle qui pourrait entraver la réunion du Congrès. Pour l'heureux accomplissement de cette œuvre de paix et de conciliation je me plais à croire que toutes les difficultés sont à peu près aplanies ; il n'y reste que la question du désarmement de la Sardaigne, et je ne doute point que le Cabinet Autrichien, guidé comme par le passé, par les sentiments de modération et de sagesse, accueillera avec reconnaissance les conseils de ceux qui lui portent une véritable et sincère amitié.

La réunion du Congrès des cinq Puissances avec l'exclusion de la Sardaigne pourrait être regardée par l'Autriche comme le désarmement politique de la Sardaigne, et il le sera en réalité, d'autant plus que le Comte Cavour ne cache pas son désir de faire échouer le Congrès. La Sardaigne étant exclue du Congrès comme parti intégrant ce ne sera plus sur elle que tomberait le blâme, si malheureusement le Congrès ne venait pas à se réunir : au contraire on pourrait alléguer que c'est l'Autriche qui en fut la cause, et c'est sur elle que la responsabilité—et quelle responsabilité!—pèsera. D'ailleurs, le regardant sous le point de vue de l'Autriche et par rapport à sa position est-ce qu'elle y gagnera ? Certainement il me semble que non ! Car si l'Autriche entre au Congrès aux conditions posées, sa position politique serait renforcée, tandis que sa position militaire n'aurait rien perdu.

L'Autriche possède aujourd'hui les sympathies de l'opinion publique en Angleterre, dont le *Times* en donne tous les jours les plus éclatantes épreuves. Qu'elle ne risque donc pas de perdre cet appui moral qui, de nos jours, est d'une si haute valeur !

J'espère que le Cabinet Impérial n'insistera donc pas que le désarmement de la Sardaigne soit une condition *sine quâ non* de son entrée au Congrès, et qu'il se *déclarerait* satisfait si l'Angleterre et la France conjointement s'adressent à la Sardaigne pour l'inviter à licencier les corps Francs, et à prendre l'engagement de ne pas attaquer l'Autriche. Cette démarche de la part de ces deux Puissances devrait, j'ose espérer, équivaloir aux yeux de l'Autriche le fait même du désarmement matériel de la Sardaigne.

Pardonnez, chère Excellence, que je vous trouble avec ces lignes. Mon excuse est bien légitime, et sera j'espère appréciée : c'est l'intérêt que je porte à l'Autriche, et le désir que nos Cabinets respectifs marchent de commun accord pour saufergarder la paix de l'Europe.

Agrééz, &c.,

(Signed)

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

A son Excellence

Le Comte Buol-Schauenstein.

The Emperor of Austria was very gracious to Lord Cowley, and fully appreciated his endeavours in the cause of peace; but he told him that in his return to Paris he might do good by informing the Emperor Napoleon that Austria desired peace, but that she was quite prepared and willing to accept war if imposed on her.

The mission of Lord Cowley had no practical result, nor, indeed, under the circumstances, was any result to be expected. The Austrian Cabinet was fully convinced that the Emperor Napoleon had made up his mind for war, and that his pacific declarations, and his participation in the negotiations to avert it were merely intended to gain time for his armaments, to calm the apprehen-

sions, and to force Austria into action, and thus incur the grave responsibility of being the aggressor.

There is no doubt that Count Buol entertained delusive hopes of material support from England and Prussia. He observed to me shortly before addressing the Austrian summons to Sardinia, "*Nous n'avons pas des Alliés dans les Cabinets, mais nous les aurons sur le champ de bataille.*"

APPENDIX.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Foreign Office, September 30th, 1853.

SIR,—The despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff, communicated to me by Baron Brünnow, announcing that the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note had been rejected by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and the analysis of the grounds upon which that decision was founded, would appear to preclude the hope of an amicable arrangement between Russia and Turkey; and as their effects may consequently be disastrous to Europe, they have received the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government, and I shall now proceed to state the opinion that has been formed of them with reference to the intentions of the Conference of Vienna in framing the note, to the motives of the Ottoman Government in proposing amendments, and to the repeated declarations of the Emperor that he desired no new right nor any extension of influence in Turkey.

In his despatch Count Nesselrode alludes to the terms on which the note had been accepted at St. Petersburg, and the understanding that if any changes were introduced at Constantinople, the Russian Government would be at liberty to withhold its assent.

The Russian Government had of course a right to make this condition, or to suggest amendments to the note. The Turkish Government, possessing a similar right, exercised it by proposing

certain modifications. The Conference had no power to impose the note on either party; its position was that of a mediator endeavouring to do equal justice to both parties, and its intention was to guard the honour and independence of the Sultan, and secure to Russia what she was entitled to claim, but no more—viz., the maintenance of existing treaties, and the *status quo* in matters of religion. The Conference, therefore, could not refuse to entertain the modifications of the Porte, although regretting the loss of time which they occasioned. They were not looked upon as altering the sense of the note, nor at variance with the intentions of the Conference, and they were unanimously recommended to the acceptance of the Russian Government; the Russian Minister at Vienna, it is understood, concurring in the recommendation.

They have been rejected, but the Russian Government did not take its stand upon the condition on which the note had been accepted—viz., that of no change being made—but has fully entered into the objections to which it considered the modifications were liable, and which showed that inferences were drawn from the note, and claims were to be established by means of it hereafter, altogether inconsistent with the views and intentions of the four Powers.

The frankness of this proceeding on the part of the Russian Government, and the determination that its intentions should not be misapprehended, are doubtless very proper; but, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government feel that, even while retaining their own original interpretation of the note, it would now be highly dishonourable to press its acceptance on the Porte, when they have been duly warned by the Power to whom the note is to be addressed that another and a totally different meaning is attached to it by that Power. And even if this were not dishonourable, it would be in the highest degree impolitic for the reason stated in Count Nesselrode's despatch with reference to admitting of any amendments—viz., that the Emperor would expose himself "to renew political relations with Turkey under unfavourable auspices, which would deprive them

of all solidity for the future, and inevitably bring about a fresh and more decided rupture."

Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire to see the relations between Russia and the Porte re-established on a friendly and permanent footing, and they consequently can be no party to an arrangement which the Cabinet of St. Petersburg has shown would frustrate the object which they have at heart.

Count Nesselrode appears to think that the modifications are by no means insignificant, but he seems not to be aware that this goes far to justify the Turkish Government in proposing them; and His Excellency altogether fails to show by what right, or in reparation of what injury, Russia claims admissions and concessions from the Sultan, who is unwilling to make them, and whose independence Russia, together with the other Powers of Europe, have determined to respect.

With regard to the first objection in Count Nesselrode's note, I have to observe that the Conference at Vienna, in adverting to the active solicitude at all times displayed by the Emperor of Russia for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities of the Greco-Orthodox Church, simply intended to record the anxiety which every Sovereign must feel for the welfare in a foreign country of the religion he himself professes; but the Conference by no means intended to affirm that the immunities and privileges in question were solely due to the solicitude of the Emperors of Russia; and the Porte is justified in asserting that many of these privileges are of a date anterior to the existence of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Count Nesselrode alludes to other grievances, but specifies none except that regarding the Holy Places, which has been satisfactorily settled; nor have any other grievances connected with religious matters at any time been put forward by Russia, and it was not for the Conference to assume the existence of wrongs of which they had no knowledge.

But Count Nesselrode asks, Where, then, was the object of Prince Menschikoff's Mission?—and the answer to that is the

assurance repeatedly given that it was to settle the question of the Holy Places, and to obtain a guarantee for its not being again disturbed. That question has been settled to the satisfaction of all parties, and the Vienna note contains a guarantee against which Russia raises no objection.

The modification proposed by the Porte with reference to the Treaty of Kainardji appeared to Her Majesty's Government wholly uncalled for, until they read the objection made to it by Count Nesselrode's note. Her Majesty's Government considered that the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, and the maintenance of religious privileges, had been disconnected in the note in a manner not to be mistaken; and, indeed, this is admitted by Count Nesselrode; but the Russian Government, while disclaiming all pretension to exercise a Protectorate, yet affirms that all these religious privileges and immunities are direct consequences of the treaty, which was doubtless a solemn engagement taken by Turkey towards Russia; and the fulfilment of that engagement, but no more, it was the object of the Conference to secure. By Count Nesselrode's interpretation of the note, however, Russia would, under the seventh article of the treaty, be entitled to superintend all these privileges and immunities, which are of that peculiar character that she would be constantly able, if so minded, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects; and thus the religious Protectorate, which is abjured, and the new rights and extended influence, which are equally disclaimed, would be established.

It is superfluous to say that no such intention was entertained by the Conference, nor can the Treaty of Kainardji by any subtlety of reasoning be so construed. By the seventh article of that treaty the Porte promises to protect the Christian religion in all its churches throughout the Ottoman dominions; but by the same article the Ministers of Russia are permitted to make representations in favour of a new church and its ministers, and this clause would have been wholly unnecessary if Russian diplomacy had also been allowed to make representations on every matter connected with religion. If the article bore the

sense that Count Nesselrode now seeks to attach to it, and if the two contracting parties had been agreed upon it, it is reasonable to suppose that at the signing of the treaty a stipulation so important as that of maintaining the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church would not have been omitted.

The third objection raised by Count Nesselrode is even more than the two which precede it at variance with the intention of the Conference, which assuredly was not that the Sultan should enter into an engagement with Russia to concede to the Greek Church all such advantages as might be granted to other Christian denominations, but only those advantages which were conceded to communities who, like the Greeks, were Ottoman subjects.

The spiritual head of the Roman Catholics in Turkey, as elsewhere, is a foreign Sovereign ; and if it pleased the Sultan to enter into a concordat with the Pope, conferring privileges upon Roman Catholics not subjects of the Porte, surely that ought to confer no right upon the Emperor of Russia to claim all the benefits of that concordat for the Greek community subjects of the Porte, whose spiritual head, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is also a subject of the Sultan.

No Christian community being subjects of the Sultan would have any right to participate in the privileges and advantages that the Sultan might confer upon Russian convents, ecclesiastics, or laymen, such, for example, as the Russian church and hospital about to be built at Jerusalem ; and in the same manner the Greek community, consisting of many millions, would have no right to participate in advantages granted to foreign convents or ecclesiastics, and which might not, for many and obvious reasons, be fitting for a Christian community subject to the Porte.

In fact, if the Sultan has at any time, in the exercise of his sovereign authority, conferred religious privileges upon a community not subject to him, or if he at any future time should think proper to do so, Count Nesselrode claims that Russia should have a right to demand that several millions of Greeks

who are subjects of the Porte should at once be placed upon the footing of foreigners, and should enjoy, through the intervention of Russia, all the advantages which the Sultan, for reasons of which he is the only competent judge, may have granted to such foreigners.

How such a claim can be reconciled with the professed desire for the maintenance of existing treaties and the strict *status quo* in religious matters it is not for Her Majesty's Government to explain, but they consider that it exhibits a total disregard for the feelings and interests of the European Powers, who, in common with Russia, have declared that they will uphold the independence of Turkey, and who cannot, therefore, see with indifference that Russia should thus surreptitiously seek to obtain a virtual protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. And with respect to Count Nesselrode's supposition that some new privilege, not mentioned in the recent firmans, might be granted to the Roman Catholic establishment in Palestine, to the prejudice of the native communities, His Excellency appears to have overlooked that by the Vienna note the Porte engages that no change shall be made in the order of things lately established at Jerusalem without previous communication with the Governments of Russia and France.

I have now fully stated in what spirit and with what intentions the Vienna note was framed ; but in interpreting it as Count Nesselrode has done by his objections to the modifications, His Excellency not only does not prove, but he does not even advert to, any obligation by which the Porte is bound to make concessions utterly irreconcilable with its independence. But Her Majesty's Government are compelled to consider that the claims put forward by Russia are equally irreconcilable with the assurance that no extended power or influence is sought in Turkey. They deeply regret that such claims should have been made, for even were they successful, they would be useless to Russia if she sincerely desires the independence of the Ottoman Empire ; but under any circumstances they must produce feelings of suspicion and distrust on the part of the Porte ; and differences

between the two Powers will thus in future, as of late, be a source of anxiety to Europe, and expose the general peace to constant danger of disturbance.

You will communicate this despatch to Count Nesselrode, or to M. de Séniavine should Count Nesselrode be still absent, and also give him a copy.

I am, &c.,

(Signed)

CLARENDON.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

Foreign Office, September 20th, 1853.

MY LORD,—I enclose copies of despatches which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and to Sir G. H. Seymour respecting the modifications of the note sent from Vienna that have been proposed by the Porte.

It is important that Your Lordship should be in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this subject, as you are going to Olmütz, and may possibly have an opportunity of communicating with the Emperor of Russia, or with Count Nesselrode, who it is understood will accompany His Imperial Majesty.

Your Lordship will perceive that Her Majesty's Government considered the modifications to be unimportant, and regretted that they had been proposed. Her Majesty's Government were accordingly prepared still to recommend that the note should be accepted by the Porte upon their interpretation of it, which was that of the Conference at Vienna; for the four Powers, who have anxiously laboured to effect a peaceful and honourable solution of the question, thought they did justice and gave ample security to the Porte by acting upon the declaration so repeatedly made by the Emperor, that he sought for no new right and no

increase of power in Turkey, but desired only the maintenance of existing treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters. Upon this principle, and with no other intention, the note was framed, and Her Majesty's Government considered that no other meaning could be attached to it; but the reasons given by Count Nesselrode in his analysis of the modifications proposed by the Porte induce Her Majesty's Government to think that the apprehensions entertained by the Porte, so far from being groundless, are to a great extent justified by the construction put upon the original note by Count Nesselrode.

I do not now propose to enter into a discussion upon the objections raised by Count Nesselrode. It is sufficient to say that they are at variance with the intentions of the four Powers, and Her Majesty's Government feel that it would not be just or honourable, either towards the Emperor or the Sultan, to press the acceptance of the note upon the Porte so long as any misunderstanding existed upon its true meaning; and they feel, moreover, that the re-establishment of real and permanent friendly relations between Russia and Turkey, the object which the four Powers have sincerely at heart, would be defeated if the note which they looked upon as the basis of reconciliation were hereafter to be made a cause of irritating discussion with respect to claims which it might be held to justify, and the resistance to them which, on the other side, would appear equally warrantable. The importance of avoiding all misunderstanding upon the question itself, and at the critical period at which it has arrived, cannot be exaggerated, and Her Majesty's Government, therefore, in the interest of peace, and possibly as the last hope of preserving Europe from the danger which now appears imminent, are anxious to learn whether the Emperor is still determined to seek no new right and no further extension of power in Turkey; and as they feel convinced that His Imperial Majesty will not hesitate to renew his former declarations to that effect, they cannot believe that he will object to such alterations of the Vienna note as would have the effect of quieting the alarm of the Porte, or that he will, upon a misunderstanding

that it is in his power to rectify, permit the recent negotiations to prove fruitless, and thus expose Europe to the risks of war, which would entail the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire—an event which the Emperor, in common with all his allies, has never ceased to deprecate as a calamity of the greatest magnitude.

In the event of Your Lordship being honoured by an interview with the Emperor at Olmütz, you will govern yourself by the language of this despatch and its enclosures, and you will make the views of Her Majesty's Government known to Count Nesselrode, who, with reference to the importance and pressing nature of the subject, will doubtless overlook the irregularity of the communication being made through Your Lordship, who has no official relations with the Court of Russia.

I am, &c.,

(Signed)

CLARENDON.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff, communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brünnow, September 16th, 1853.

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, $\frac{\text{August } 26\text{th.}}{\text{September } 7\text{th.}}$ 1853.

We have received with Your Excellency's reports dated August $\frac{1}{2}$ ⁶₈th the modifications introduced by the Ottoman Government into the draft of note drawn up at Vienna.

It will be sufficient for Count Buol to call to mind the terms of our communication of the 25th of July last, in order to appreciate the impression which those modifications must needs have made on the Emperor's mind.

In accepting in His Majesty's name the draft of note which Austria, after having first obtained the assent and approval of the Courts of France and of England, had announced to us as an

ultimatum which she proposed to offer to the Porte, and on the acceptance of which depended the continuance of her good offices, I added, M. le Baron, in the despatch, that it was incumbent on us to communicate to the Austrian Cabinet the following observations and reservations :—

“ I consider it superfluous in this place to remark to Your Excellency that in accepting, as we do from a spirit of conciliation, the expedient devised at Vienna and the mission of a Turkish Ambassador, we fully understand that we are not to have to examine or discuss fresh modifications and new drafts, drawn up at Constantinople under the bellicose inspirations which at this moment seem to influence the Sultan and the majority of his Ministers; and that in case the Ottoman Government should still reject this last plan of settlement, we should not consider ourselves as any longer bound by the consent which we now give to it.”

Words so positive could not have left the Austrian Government in any doubt as to our present intentions.

I will not in this place examine the alterations which have been made at Constantinople. I have done so in a separate despatch. I will for the present confine myself to demanding whether the Emperor, after having denied himself the power of changing even a single word in a draft of note drawn up without his participation, can allow the Ottoman Porte to retain that power for itself, and permit Russia to be thus placed in a position of inferiority as regards Turkey. We conceive that the dignity of the Emperor precludes this. Let the course of events be called to mind. In the place of the “Menschikoff note,” the adoption of which without alteration we had put forward as the condition of the re-establishment of our relations with the Porte, a different note was proposed to us. For this reason alone we might have declined to discuss it. We might, whilst acceding to it, have had more than one objection to offer to it, more than one alteration of its terms to insert in it. You are well aware, M. le Baron, that from the time that we consented to modify the ultimatum which we had presented at Constantinople, the

form of a note is not that which could have suited us. You are acquainted with the plan and form of arrangement which we should have preferred. Nevertheless, we did not insist on that plan. We set it completely aside as soon as other proposals were made to us. Wherefore? Because, by opposing to these a counter-project or any counter-propositions whatsoever, which, nevertheless, we had a full and perfect right to do, we might have incurred the reproach of seeking to protract the matter, and gratuitously to prolong a crisis which occasions anxiety to Europe. Wishing, on the contrary, to bring that crisis as soon as possible to an end, and acquiescing with this view in the wishes which were expressed to us, we sacrificed our objections of substance and of form. On the mere receipt of the first draft of note agreed upon at Vienna, and even before we knew if it would be approved at London and at Paris, we announced by telegraph our adhesion to it.

The draft, as finally agreed upon, was sent to us at a later period, and although it had been modified in a sense which we could not mistake, nevertheless we did not on that account retract our adhesion or raise the slightest difficulty. Was it possible, we ask, to manifest greater readiness and more conciliatory dispositions? But when we acted in this manner, it was well understood that it was on condition that the draft of note which the Emperor had accepted without discussion should be accepted in the same manner by the Porte. It was under the conviction that Austria would regard it as an ultimatum in which no change was to be made, as a last effort of its friendly intervention which, if the effort were to fail by reason of the obstinacy of the Divan, would cease *ipso facto*. We regret to perceive that such is not the case. But the Cabinet of Vienna will on its side admit that if it is a question not of an ultimatum but of a new draft of note which each of the two parties is at liberty to modify, we then resume the right which we had voluntarily renounced, of proposing in our turn our own alterations, of again considering the draft of arrangement, and of altering not only its terms but its form.

Would this result enter into the views of Austria? Would it suit the Powers who, by modifying and adopting her draft of note, made it their own work? It is for them to consider the delays which will necessarily result from such a course, or to examine whether it is for the interest of Europe to cut those delays short. We see only one way of putting an end to them. It is that Austria and the Powers should frankly and firmly declare to the Porte that having opened to it in vain the only way which can lead to the immediate re-establishment of its relations with us, they henceforth abandon to it the task. We conceive that if they hold this language unanimously to them, the Turks, yielding to the advice of Europe instead of reckoning upon its assistance in a contest against Russia, will accept the note such as it is, and will cease to prejudice their position in so serious a manner in order to afford themselves the childish satisfaction of having modified certain expressions of the document which we had accepted without discussion. For one of two things: either the modifications required by the Porte are important, and then it is very obvious that we should refuse to assent to them; or they are insignificant, and in that case why should the Porte continue, without necessity, to make its acceptance dependent on them?

In conclusion, M. le Baron, the ultimatum agreed upon at Vienna is not ours. It is that of Austria and of the Powers who, having in the first instance devised, discussed, and modified it in its original terms, have considered that it might be accepted by the Porte without prejudice to its interests and to its honour. It is for them, therefore, and not for us, forthwith to bring to an end the uncertainties of the present crisis. We on our side have done all that depended on us to abridge useless delays, by renouncing, when the arrangement was proposed to us, all kinds of counter-propositions whatsoever; no one can refuse this testimony to the sincerity of the Emperor. Having for long time exhausted the measure of concessions without the Porte having hitherto made a single one, His Majesty cannot go further without prejudice to his position, and without exposing

himself to the risk of renewing his political relations with Turkey under unfavourable circumstances, which would deprive them of all stability for the future, and would inevitably bring on a fresh and more decided rupture. At the present moment, indeed, fresh concessions in regard to the terms of the note would serve no purpose, for we perceive by your despatches that the Ottoman Government is only waiting for our acquiescence in the alterations made in the Vienna note, in order to make its signature of it, as well as the mission of the Ambassador who is to convey it here, dependent on fresh conditions and inadmissible propositions, which it has already put forward on the subject of the evacuation of the Principalities. On this last point, M. le Baron, we can only refer to the assurances and explanations contained in our despatch of the 10th of August, and repeat that the arrival at St. Petersburg of a Turkish Ambassador, bearer of the Austrian note without alterations, will be sufficient to ensure our troops being immediately ordered to repass our frontier.

Receive, &c.,

(Signed)

NESSELRODE.

Russian Analysis of the Three Modifications introduced by the Ottoman Porte into the Vienna Draft, enclosed in Count Nesselrode's Despatch to Baron Meyendorff, of ^{August 26th,} September 7th, 1853.

(Translation.)

1. In the Vienna draft it is said, "If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire," &c.

This passage has been thus modified: "If the Emperors of Russia have at all times evinced their active solicitude for the religion and orthodox Greek Church."

The words "in the Ottoman Empire," as well as those "the maintenance of the immunities and privileges," have been struck out, in order to be transposed to a subsequent passage, and applied to the Sultans alone. This omission deprives the mutilated passage of all its meaning and sense. For no one assuredly disputes the active solicitude of the Sovereigns of Russia for the religion which they profess themselves and which is that of their subjects. What it was designed to recognise is, that there has ever existed on the part of Russia active solicitude for her co-religionists in Turkey, as also for the maintenance of their religious immunities; and that the Ottoman Government is disposed to take account of that solicitude, and also to leave those immunities untouched.

The present expression is the more unacceptable since, by the terms which follow it, more than solicitude for the orthodox religion is attributed to the Sultans. It is affirmed that they have never ceased to watch over the maintenance of its immunities and privileges, and to confirm them by solemn Acts. However, it is precisely the reverse of what is thus stated, which, having more than once occurred in times past, and specifically in the affair of the Holy Places, has compelled us to apply a remedy to it by demanding a more express guarantee for the future. If we lend ourselves to the admission that the Ottoman Government has never ceased to watch over the maintenance of the privileges of the Greek Church, what becomes of the complaints which we have brought forward against it? By doing so we admit that we had no legitimate grounds of complaint; that Prince Menschikoff's mission was without motive; that, in a word, even the note which it has addressed to us was wholly superfluous.

2. The suppression and additions of words introduced into this passage with marked affectation are evidently intended to invalidate the Treaty of Kainardji, while having the appearance of confirming it.

It was said in the note originally drawn up at Vienna that, "faithful to the letter and to the spirit of the stipulations of the

Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople relative to the protection of the Christian religion, the Sultan considers himself bound in honour . . . to preserve from all prejudice . . . the immunities and privileges granted to the orthodox Church.” These terms, which made the maintenance of the immunities to be derived from the very spirit of the treaty, that is to say, from the general principle laid down in the VIIth Article, were in conformity with the doctrine which we have maintained and still maintain. For, according to us, the promise to protect a religion and its churches implies of necessity the maintenance of the immunities enjoyed by them. They are two inseparable things. These terms, originally agreed upon at Vienna, were subsequently first modified at Paris and at London, and if we did not object to this at the time, as we should have been entitled to do, it is not that we misunderstood the purport of that alteration. We clearly perceived the distinction made between two points which, in our estimation, are indissolubly connected with each other; but this distinction was, however, marked with sufficient delicacy to admit of our accepting, from a spirit of conciliation, and from a desire of speedily arriving at a definitive solution, the terms of the note as they were presented to us, which we henceforth looked upon as unalterable. These motives of deference no longer apply to the fresh modification of the same passage which has been made at Constantinople. The line of demarcation between the two objects is there too plainly drawn to admit of our accepting it without falsifying all that we have said and written. The mention of the Treaty of Kainardji is superfluous, and its confirmation without object, from the time that its general principle is no longer applied to the maintenance of the religious immunities of the religion. It is for this object that the words “the letter and the spirit” have been suppressed. The fact that the protection of the Christian religion is exercised “by the Sublime Porte,” is needlessly insisted on, as if we pretended ourselves to exercise that protection in the Sultan’s dominions; and as it is at the same time omitted to notice that, according to the terms of the treaty, the protection

is a promise made and an engagement undertaken by the Sultan, there is an appearance of throwing a doubt upon the right which we possess of watching over the strict fulfilment of that promise.

3. The alteration proposed in this passage of the Austrian note is altogether inadmissible.

The Ottoman Government would merely engage to allow the orthodox Church to share in the advantages which it might grant to other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte. But if those communities, whether Catholics or others, were not composed of native Rayahs, but of foreign monks or laymen (and such is the case with nearly the whole of the convents, hospitals, seminaries, and bishoprics of the Latin rite in Turkey), and if, let us say, it should be the good pleasure of the Porte to grant to those establishments fresh religious advantages and privileges, the orthodox communities, in their character of Ottoman subjects, would not, under the terms which it is desired to introduce into this note, have the right of claiming the same favours, nor would Russia have the right of interceding for them.

The malevolent intention of the Ministers of the Porte will become still more evident if we cite an instance, a possible contingency. Let us suppose the very probable case of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, recently extolled, obtaining from the Porte prerogatives not enjoyed by the Greek Patriarch. Any claim on the part of the latter would be rejected, in consideration of his character of "subject of the Porte."

The same objection would be made by the Ottoman Ministry with reference to the Catholic establishments of Palestine, in case any fresh advantage or right not specified in the last firmans should hereafter be granted to them to the prejudice of the native communities.

(Translation.)

London, September $\frac{13}{25}$ th, 1853.

MY LORD,—On the $\frac{21\text{st of May}}{2\text{nd of June}}$ you announced to me that Lord Stratford had been contingently authorised to call the British

squadron within the Straits of the Dardanelles if Constantinople should be attacked.

I remarked that if a foreign squadron entered the Dardanelles before the occurrence of the case of war contemplated by the Treaty of the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ of July, that proceeding would amount to a breach of that treaty.

In order to assure myself of the correctness with which I had reported what you said, I had the honour to place before you, on the same day, the despatch which I addressed to the Imperial Cabinet, giving an account of our conversation.

Hitherto the contingency which you had pointed out to me has not arisen. Constantinople, as far as we are concerned, has remained in full security both by sea and by land.

Our squadron has refrained from any demonstration which could place in danger the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

Its tranquillity has equally been undisturbed by any attack on the land side. For I need not remind you, M. le Comte, that at the time when the Russian troops entered the Principalities, you were informed of the limits which the Emperor had set to their movements. They have not crossed the Danube. Having no hostile view, the Emperor has confined his action to a measure of security, adopted for a time as a pledge for a reparation which might be offered to him, and within the limits of conciliation and of peace.

It rested with the Ottoman Government, you told me, at that time to consider this measure as a case of war. It has not done so.

I am not ignorant that the recommendations of Her Britannic Majesty's Government meritoriously contributed to this result, effected in the well-understood interest of peace, especially in that of the Porte itself.

The Divan, appreciating this truth, the more so that at that time it was conscious of its weakness, followed the advice on which its safety depended.

Notwithstanding the interruption of our diplomatic relations, notwithstanding the temporary occupation of the Danubian

provinces, peace has continued to subsist between Russia and the Ottoman Empire.

The commercial relations between the two countries have not been interrupted. Furthermore, all chance of conflict between the Russian and Ottoman troops has been prevented by an understanding arrived at between the respective commanders. With this view, Prince Gortschakoff announced to Reshid Pasha that he was instructed not to have recourse to offensive measures on the right bank of the Danube, and that it rested with the Ottoman Government to furnish its officers with instructions of the same kind in order to prevent any collision.

In reply to this communication, Reshid Pasha stated that the Turkish commanders were ordered to refrain from any act of hostility so long as the Russian troops remained on the left bank. This understanding, formally established on both sides, has maintained the relations of both parties on a footing of peace. This state of things, acquiesced in by the Porte, continued up to the ^{28th of August}_{9th of September}, the date of the last official communication from Prince Gortschakoff, which reached me yesterday.

Finally, a negotiation, carried on by the Emperor's desire under the good offices of Austria, has continued up to the present day to inspire us with a hope of the pacific solution of the existing crisis.

An amicable settlement proposed by the Cabinet of Vienna, with the concurrence of the other great Powers, had already obtained the frank and cordial assent of the Emperor.

Whilst this plan was forming the object of amicable communications between the Cabinets and the Porte; whilst the latter was being invited to send to St. Petersburg an Ambassador, as the organ of a reconciliation which was fondly supposed to be at hand, there was assuredly no ground for admitting that the Porte could look upon peace as already broken. It remained unimpaired. It continued, I maintain, altogether for the advantage of the Porte; for so long as it was protracted the Turks were daily augmenting their armaments, while Russia,

relying on her own pacific intentions, did not ask any explanations in regard to them, or offer to them any obstacle.

But, in good faith, war, according to public law, is not a matter of assumption. Before it breaks out it is declared.

As far as I know, no declaration of war has been made on the part of the Porte. And as regards the determinations of my Court, you are aware, M. le Comte, that even very recently I have been instructed to express to you how much His Majesty the Emperor had at heart to hasten the conclusion of an amicable arrangement which might allow him to put an end to every cause of misunderstanding with the Porte, and forthwith to withdraw his troops within our frontiers.

It is this very time which appears to have been chosen by the Divan for raising up fresh obstacles to this work of reconciliation, by summoning a foreign flag of war within the Strait, the closing of which had been placed by the Treaty of 1841 under the protection of an European Act.

That compact, with the precise terms of which I am the better acquainted from having been called to take part in it, comprises a twofold engagement.

On the one hand, the Sultan declared "his firm resolution to maintain for the future the principle invariably established as the ancient rule of his Empire, in virtue of which the ships of war of foreign Powers have at all times been prohibited from entering into the Straits of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, and that so long as the Porte is at peace His Highness will not admit any foreign ship of war within the said Straits."

On the other hand, the five great Powers engaged "to respect this determination of the Sultan and to conform to the principle above set forth."

If it is true, as I learn, that the Sultan has summoned foreign ships of war within the Straits while peace continued to subsist, without its being declared by a formal, patent, and public Act to be broken, I will assert that the Sultan has failed in an engagement imposed upon him by a treaty to which I am a signing party.

It is with lively regret that I must state at the same time that Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by complying with an invitation from the Sultan opposed to that engagement, without previous deliberation with the other contracting Powers, has not acted in conformity with the principle which the treaty of the $\frac{1st}{13th}$ of July imposed upon us the obligation to respect.

I expect, M. le Comte, that you will acquaint me, for the information of my Court, with the circumstances which have accompanied so serious a proceeding. It requires explanation.

I require it of the good faith of Her Britannic Majesty's Government. When it shall have been afforded, the Emperor, in concert with the other high contracting parties, will be in a position to declare himself as to the consequences of a state of things against which, in the strict discharge of my duties, I raise my remonstrances and make my reservations the instant that that proceeding has come to my knowledge.

I fulfil that duty by formally requesting Your Excellency to take note of these reservations, which, by the present communication, I make in the name of my Court.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

BRÜNNOW.

The Earl of Clarendon to Baron Brünnow.

Foreign Office, October 1st, 1853.

SIR,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 25th ultimo, in which you express your opinion that if the Sultan has admitted foreign ships into the Straits of the Dardanelles while peace continued to exist, and without its having been declared broken by a formal, public, patent Act, he has violated an engagement imposed upon him by the Treaty of 13th July, 1841.

You add that Her Majesty's Government, in complying with the request of the Sultan, contrary to that engagement, and without previous deliberation with the other contracting Powers, has not conformed to the principle which the treaty imposed upon them the obligation to respect.

And you further say that you expect to learn from me, for the information of your Court, the circumstances which have preceded and accompanied a fact so grave, which demands explanation.

The foundation upon which you rest your right to make this inquiry is the Treaty of July 13, 1841, which, as you correctly state, binds the Sultan not to admit, and the other contracting Powers not to send, ships of war, not Turkish, into those Straits as long as the Porte is at peace; and you allege that this engagement has been broken by the Porte and by the British Government.

But the Porte has ceased to be at peace from the moment when the first Russian soldier entered the Danubian Principalities, and from that moment the Sultan had a right to invite the British squadron into the Straits, and Her Majesty's Government had a right to send the British squadron into, and if necessary through, those Straits.

It is true that on entering the Principalities war was not declared by Russia, but a country whose territory is forcibly invaded and retained in contravention of a special treaty engagement, for the purpose of compelling it to submit to conditions which it considers incompatible with its political independence, whose functionaries are forbidden to hold intercourse with its Government, and whose tribute is suspended—that country cannot consistently, with international law and usage, or with common-sense, be considered at peace with the Power that so acts towards it, and I repeat, therefore, that from the day on which the Principalities were occupied, the treaty, in accordance with its own provisions, has been suspended, and it rested with the Sultan and with Her Majesty's Government to determine at what time, and for what purposes, the British squadron should enter the Dardanelles.

It is not necessary to pursue this subject further, as Her Majesty's Ambassador has called up a portion of that squadron to Constantinople, not, as you appear to suppose, to favour an object on the part of the Divan of opposing fresh obstacles to the work of conciliation, but exclusively from apprehension of local dangers to British life and property; his proceedings have been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government, who, with the same object in view, have instructed him to send for the whole of the squadron.

That the apprehension was well founded there can exist no doubt, because the protracted occupation of the Principalities, the military preparations which the Porte has lately been compelled to make on that account, and in consequence of the vast number of Russian troops that for a long time past have been assembled on the frontier of Turkey, have led to a state of things in Turkey which is natural, and must have been calculated upon, but which, on the other hand, is viewed with deep concern by those who desire the preservation of peace, and who regard the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as an essential feature of European policy.

I am, &c.,

(Signed)

CLARENDON.

AUSTRIA AND THE WESTERN POWERS.

THE following is the text of the Treaty of Alliance between Her Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, and the Emperor of the French, signed at Vienna, December 2, 1854, and of which the ratifications were exchanged at Vienna on the 14th of December, 1854:—

“ Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being animated with the desire of terminating the present war at the earliest possible moment, by the re-establishment of general peace on solid bases, affording to the whole of Europe every guarantee against the return of the complications which have so unhappily disturbed its repose, being convinced that nothing would be more conducive to that result than the complete union of their efforts until the common object which they have in view shall be entirely attained; and acknowledging, in consequence, the necessity of coming to an immediate understanding with regard to their respective positions, and to arrangements for the future, have resolved to conclude a treaty of alliance, and have for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries:—Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland—the Right Hon. John Fane, Earl of Westmorland, a Peer of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, a General in Her Britannic Majesty's Army, Colonel of the 56th Regiment of Infantry of the Line, Knight Grand Cross of the most Hon. Order of the Bath, and Commander of the Military Division of the same Order, Knight of the Imperial and Military Order of Maria Theresa, a Member of Her Britannic Majesty's Privy Council, and her Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, &c.; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria—the Sieur Charles, Count de Buol-Schauenstein, his Chamberlain and Privy Councillor, Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the Imperial House, Grand Cross of the Imperial Order of Leopold, Knight of the Order of the Iron Crown of the First Class, &c.; His Majesty the Emperor of the French—the Sieur Francis Adolphus, Baron de Bourqueney, his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty, Grand Officer of the Imperial Order of the Legion of Honour, &c.; who, after having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon and signed the following articles:—Article 1.—The high contracting parties refer to the declarations contained in the Protocols of the 9th of

April* and the 23rd of May† of the present year, and in the notes exchanged on the 8th of August last;‡ and, as they reserved to themselves the right of proposing, according to circumstances, such conditions as they might judge necessary for the general interests of Europe, they engage mutually and reciprocally not to enter into any arrangement with the Imperial Court of Russia without having first deliberated thereupon in common. Article 2.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, having, in virtue of the treaty concluded on the 14th of June last with the Sublime Porte, caused the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia to be occupied by his troops, he engages to defend the frontier of the said Principalities against any return of the Russian forces; the Austrian troops shall for this purpose occupy positions necessary for guaranteeing those Principalities against any attack. Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, having likewise concluded with the Sublime Porte on the 12th of March a treaty § which authorises them to direct their forces upon every part of the Ottoman Empire, the above-mentioned occupation shall not interfere with the free movement of the Anglo-French or Ottoman troops upon these same territories against the military forces or the territory of Russia. There shall be formed at Vienna between the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, and Great Britain, a Commission to which Turkey shall be invited to send a Plenipotentiary, and which shall be charged with examining and regulating every question relating either to the exceptional and provisional state in which the said Principalities are now placed, or to the free passage of the different armies across their territory. Article 3.—In case hostilities should break out between Austria and Russia, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His

* Laid before Parliament in Part 8 of Eastern Papers.

† Laid before Parliament in Part 9 of Eastern Papers.

‡ Laid before Parliament in Part 11 of Eastern Papers.

§ Already laid before Parliament.

Majesty the Emperor of the French mutually promise to each other their offensive and defensive alliance in the present war, and will for that purpose employ, according to the requirements of the war, military and naval forces, the number, description, and destination whereof shall, if occasion should arise, be determined by subsequent arrangements. Article 4.—In the case contemplated by the preceding article, the high contracting parties reciprocally engage not to entertain any overture or proposition on the part of the Imperial Court of Russia having for its object the cessation of hostilities, without having come to an understanding thereupon between themselves. Article 5.—In case the re-establishment of general peace, upon the basis indicated in Article 1, should not be assured in the course of the present year, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, will deliberate without delay upon effectual means for obtaining the object of their alliance. Article 6.—Great Britain, Austria, and France, will jointly communicate the present treaty to the Court of Prussia, and will with satisfaction receive its accession thereto, in case it should promise its co-operation for the accomplishment of the common object. Article 7.—The present treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Vienna in the space of a fortnight. In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.—Done at Vienna, the 2nd of December, in the year of our Lord, 1854. WESTMORLAND (L.S.), BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN (L.S.), BOURQUENEY (L.S.).”

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Rec. Feb. 28.)
(Extract.) *Vienna, February 24, 1859.*

I had the honour to receive, late on the night of the 20th instant, Your Lordship's telegram of that date, acquainting

me with the proposal of Her Majesty's Government to send Earl Cowley on a confidential mission to Vienna; and stating that, should this course meet with the approval of the Austrian Cabinet, His Excellency was prepared to leave London on the receipt of a favourable reply.

I lost no time in communicating to Count Buol, on the following morning, the proposal of Her Majesty's Government. I stated to His Excellency that it was the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to exert all their efforts for the maintenance of peace; that, in view of the general anxiety and alarm which pervaded Europe, they felt that they should leave no means untried to save Europe from the calamities of war; and that, animated by these sentiments, they were desirous of making a fresh attempt to ascertain whether, by the assistance of England, a better understanding could be brought about between Austria and France. It was with this aim that Her Majesty's Government now proposed to send Earl Cowley on this confidential mission; and I was confident that His Excellency would heartily and cordially recognise with me that this delicate and important charge could not have been committed to abler hands. The high esteem in which Lord Cowley was held by the Emperor of the French, and the great confidence His Imperial Majesty reposed in him, added to his great abilities and intimate knowledge of European affairs, pre-eminently designated him as the fittest person for this important mission, and would enable him, I most sincerely hoped, successfully to attain the ends which Her Majesty's Government had so much at heart.

His Excellency expressed to me, in the warmest and sincerest manner, the high respect and regard he entertained for Lord Cowley. He likewise expressed his due appreciation of this mark of friendly interest on the part of Her Majesty's Government towards Austria, and the sincere pleasure with which he should welcome Lord Cowley at Vienna.

With respect to the object of Earl Cowley's mission, His Excellency at first observed to me that, desirous as were the Imperial Government for the renewal of a cordial understanding

with France, and grateful as they were to Her Majesty's Government for the friendly interest thus evinced towards Austria, they could not, however, purchase this understanding with France at a cost of personal sacrifices ; and that the Austrian Government would never abandon these principles which they had publicly proclaimed. If, therefore, Earl Cowley should be charged to make proposals to the Imperial Cabinet of a nature inconsistent or at variance with those principles, the Austrian Cabinet would most deeply regret not to be able to accept them.

His Excellency promised to inform the Emperor of the proposed mission of Earl Cowley, and to communicate to me His Majesty's reply without delay.

On the following morning I waited on His Excellency, when he stated that His Imperial Majesty had expressed his great satisfaction at this proof which Her Majesty's Government had given of their friendly interest, and that His Imperial Majesty would be extremely glad to see Earl Cowley. The Emperor considered that, on his return to Paris, Lord Cowley might perhaps be enabled to produce a salutary effect on the mind of the Emperor of the French by reporting to His Majesty the friendly and pacific disposition of Austria towards France, and His Majesty's anxious wish for peace, and for a good understanding between the two countries ; and His Majesty considered likewise that Lord Cowley, on returning from Vienna, will be likewise enabled to bear witness to the firm resolution of Austria to hold steadfastly to those principles which form the basis of her policy, and that, however anxious for the maintenance of peace, she is prepared to accept war should such an eventuality be forced upon her.

Count Buol was evidently anxious that Her Majesty's Government and Lord Cowley should not entertain any delusive hopes that Austria would be induced to grant concessions to France which she had till now resisted. His Excellency said, "There are certain limits beyond which we cannot go. We shall be ready, with the concurrence of the Pope, to withdraw our troops from the Roman States at any moment. We shall be

willing to co-operate in recommending those reforms in the Governments of the minor Italian States which may be deemed advisable, but we will never assent to impose them by force. We shall never permit any foreign interference with our internal affairs, and, on principles of consistency, we cannot, therefore, agree to any forcible interference in the internal affairs of others. We are in alliance with two States in Italy which are 'Asolutist' in their form of government, namely, Naples and Modena; and we are in alliance with two other States where Constitutional government is established, namely, Tuscany and Parma. We are neither opposed to liberal institutions nor to liberal reforms, but we must respect the independence of those Sovereign States.

"If, however," continued Count Buol, "as I must presume to be the case, it is sought to deprive Austria of the influence which she possesses in Italy, in order to give it over into other hands, such attempts we shall persistently resist. If France were once to acquire sway over Italy, she would soon command likewise in Germany. It was against this very danger that the Treaty of Vienna wisely intended that Piedmont should act as a barrier; and see how shortsighted is man! This very Piedmont is now linked with France, and is seeking to frustrate the very object for which she was called into existence in 1815.

"Nor again," said Count Buol, "shall we agree to enter into any Conference on Italian affairs. We have no need to negotiate with France for the withdrawal of our troops from the Roman States. Our compact was with the Pope. We entered those States without any previous arrangement with France, and we can leave them in like manner."

END OF VOL. I.



DA
46
L6A3
v.1

Loftus, (Lord) Augustus
William Frederick Spencer
The diplomatic
reminiscences of Lord
Augustus Loftus

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

